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INTRODUCTION - TACKLING MILITANT RACISM. 
Cbapter One. 
"Ciimes that am motim/ed ý, racial hatird bate a special and 
compelliq call on our conscience. " 
Professor Lawrence, in his book 'Punishbig Hate'' justifies these words by referring to the 
approach that the media takes to racist crime. He suggests that newspaper coverage of 
crime reflects d-ie concerns of society and he demonstrates how numerous assaults occur 
everv dav and vet these receive little, and then onh, local, attention. Sirrularlv, Lawrence 
argues, the general public ordinarily cares little whether any particular assault leads to a 
prosecution of the perpetrators and, if it does, whether any particular prosecution results iri 
a conviction. He argues, this pattern of ii-idifference contrasts sharply with the reaction to 
crimes that implicate race relations, going on to justiý- the introduction of enhanced 
sentencing for crimes motivated by race. 
Professor Lawrence's comi-nents clearly relate to the United States and this thesis is not 
directly concerned with problems diat occur in that country. However, it is important to 
recognise that in the United Kingdom race crime is also of major concern. Indeed, a 
glance through newspapers over the past five years mail suggest that one crime has been 
dorrunant - that is the murder of Stephen Lawrence. 2 The typical response to such 
heightened awareness is to introduce enhanced sentencing for racist crime. Professor 
Lawrence took this approach, and likewise so did the British Government when it 
established the racial aggravation offences in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. ' In this 
thesis I do not disagree wid-i such an approach, but I take the view - once espoused by the 
British Prirne Minister Tony Blair - that 'ive sbould tackle notJust ctime - but Me causes of ciime. 
In this thesis I attempt to tackle not just the crime, but the causes of racist crime. 
To undertake this task I start, in this mtroductorv chapter, bi, defmmg just what ryulitant 
racism is. I ffien seek to give an example of militant racism - displaying any crimes that 
may be involved and then pro-vidmg a general profile that depicts the perpetrators of such 
1 llngoe I -Timishiigli ate -Bins Criineý UnderAmencaii LqV Fredclick- M. Lawrence, fbivard Umversilvl'ress, 1999. 
I Stephen Lav. -rence was mUrdered in a 'racist attick' in April 1993. 
'I'lus vill be discused m (1apter Peter Jepson NJ-j 11998] 1838 for an Sevell, See alýo The tielitution (il'a rai6d iýi, ieienl'bý 
oudine of the racial offcnceý mid how the operate. 
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acts. I produce evidence of 'authoritative' clairris of a link between an increase in racist 
crime and the distribution of racist literature, then giving a brief preview of the wav that I 
intend, in this thesis, to tackle the problem of rrulitant racism. 
What is mihtant racism? 
Militant racisn-ý on the baslS of the Oxford Dictionary. ' can be defined as: 
mffitant 1 combative, aggressively active especially in support of a cause. 
engaged in warfare -ii. a rrulitant person, esp. a political activist. 
racism I a: a belief in the superiority of a particular race; prejudice based on this b: 
antagonism towards other races, esp as a result of this. 2 the theory that human 
abilities etc. are detem-uned by race. 
Mius, the term 'n-ýIltant racisrrý can be deterrruned as 'combatim and aggressive action, or aathýi, 
I. n support of a cause which siýnýFtes and promotes anta , gonisml 
hosfilipý towards people of otber races' 
By its very definition militant racism is concerned with antagonism and hostility associated 
with racist activity, which is clearlv narrower than the wide terminology of racism which is 
all encompassing and includes prejudice and beliefs based upon the superiority of a 
particular race. 1herefore, the concern associated with militant racism is that of concern for 
racist antagonism or hostility rather than any racist beliefs, with it being accepted that a 
person's 'beliefs' in the form of 'thoughts' are almost impossible to police effectively. ' 
-4 '17)e Conc-ise O. -, jord IX, -Ii(ma! y'- Eighth Edition - edited by R. E. Men fuid published 1990 by (larendon Press, 0-xford. A 
variety of dictionmicý were exmnined to establish isuitable inteq)rcuition, however v6di little to chooqc between the 'iNeM, 
Sboder 0. -, yord Enolich Dkl, ý)na? y (in HifIfirial Pi7niples'(edited by Lesley Brown 1993) and Wv Ginise Oiclajnaýy' definition, I 
c,,, ciitLiA\, decided that the more concise ver%on wis more applicable. 
11 is un 1 Antqggoiiýisrn is defined in The Concise O. N: ford Didionag'as active opposition or hostility. The word 'liosdhtx , portant 
since it is udhsed in the C-rime and Disorder Act 1998 in relation to racist crime. See the cL-Tter Raial Moth-ahon and 
Hosl&ly'. 
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rigghtý; stresses that everyone has the right to freedom of thoLight, 
con-; cience and religion. In the case of Kikkinqk-is v Greece, (A 260-A pam 31 119931), the Court said th3t the \-3hies of 
Article 9 were at the fOLIndation of a democr3tic societN., though d-us Article has been interpreted cautiously by the 
Corrimission, with die vast majority of cases iri\ý46rig religion. Vari Dijk and Van Hoof ('Theog (xd Pm-lice ofthe Eumiýean 
Comt, nizan on Human kahts, 2nd edii 1990 at page 397) advocate that there is no line between philosophy mid q political 
prograrmile, saying "in our opinion, , Idc& 9 Y)n, -erns an), ideas and i. kirs.. " The Furopeari Hurnan Rights Commission, 
in the c-L-. c of Arrowsrriith v UK, No 7050/75,19 DR 5 119781 Corn Rq) parass 69-72, accepted that pacifism fell 'Vntliiii 
the arnbitto the right to freedom of thought and conscience because it was 3 philosophy. However, in disagreeing \Aidi 
Van Dijk and Vaii Hoof, the authorý Harris, BovIe -aid Warbrick have rernarked di3t the enquiry die Conums-ion made in 
the Anousmilh, use makes it dubiouý aý to whether their 'gMerOLIS Vievl will prevail (see tax oj-1he EufYj1)ean Comuntýqn on 
I lumnx Rýuhls, published by Buttet-worths 1995 -it page 356-357). See also Chapter Five in thesis - the section ,t t: mp,, bdily 
mith Me Commlion o; 7 Human Ri ghls', \xiiere I argue that tight, -, under the FCfiR are subject to the provisions in Aiticle 14 of 
the ECHR. T11is states that the enjoyment of right, -, set forth in the convention shall be secured without discruninqtion on 
grounds of sex, race, colour, I. -guige, religion, Political or other opinion, national or social origin, association xk-idi a 
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Militant racism is also different from racial discrin-w"ation, which can be determined, as per 
section I of the Race Relations Act 1976, as treating a person less favourabli- on racial 
grounds, with a cIViI breach being possible either directly or indirectly by the actions of an 
employee 7 and organisation. 
Wid-iin society the expression of militant racism can often be seen through material that 
may stir up racial hatred and/or discrimination. It can also be seen on the streets, in terms 
of the criminality of racial harassment and violence. Indeed, it is quite frequently alleged' 
d-iat racist criminality is orchestrated or stirred up by rnilitant gangs and organisations like 
Combat 18,9 these gangs, or organisations often being political u-i nature, in the sense that 
they may work wid-iin and promote views consistent with the nationalist ideas of political 
parties like the National Front (NF) and the British National Party (BNP). III However, this 
does not mean that such ryuhtant gmgs and political groups conduct all acts of racial 
harassment or violence directly, or even indirectly. Rather, it IS argued that the street 
activity" of such groups serves to raise racial tensions within communities and thereby stir 
up racial discrimination and hatred. Some evidence of this can be found from research 
date compiled in Hounslow, where it was found that a doubling of racist incidents in the 
west of the Borough had a sinister connection with the activity of extremist racist groups 
and the distribution of their offensive literature. 12 Despite such an argurnent, it is Important 
to recognise that there is no irrevocable proof that racist literature and materials are directly 
responsible for racist crime. Though there does exist some anecdotal evidence that shows 
that in areas where there is a high incidence of racist material being distributed, racial crime 
national niinority, properýv, birth or other status. To this extent, I concur \Aith I larris et al by arguing that an individual 
shoidd not be able to rely upon Article 9 with regards, to anv racist beliefs. 
As per s. 32 of the Race Relations Act 1976, an cinplover is \jCariojjslNT hable for all acts of his employees or agents. 
11 , or exarnple, ýGmmkg up bi Londyn's Deýp Somd)'- ' Seýarchhglit, September 1998, tells the story of Matthews Collins who 
turned to fascism and then later became an infonnant for Searclihght lielping to proxide inforniation exposing C18 acti"ity 
in 6cious racist attacks in Tower H anilets for a 'World in Action' TV progra: rnrne. 
' Corribit 18 (CI8) was fonned as a splinter group of the British National Party (BNP) in 1992. The nunibers I and 8 
represent the P and 811ý letters of the alphabet mid the iintials of its hero Adolf f fider. C18 newsletters have contained 
instructioný for petrol bonib makirig and advocated die liffling, inaiining and harassing of opponents JSource: Týýr-iý, ohf 
fiolba&lhi(,, ýs eqineerrdnýql wer I Yvler, 'l lie Tinies, 17 Febtuarv 1998 - See also, t" IS termr,, qvea&'- Searclihght, March 1995]. 
Officially die BNP deny working with Conibat 18 - but there is no doubt that sorne BNP members are also active iri 
Combat 18 mid xice versa [see -Scarchlight, Scpternber and Deceinber 1995; ilso see 'BN-P keepsUnks mill) iiolent neo-na, -zý'- 
TI ieG, ii ardi an, 26 October 19 94]. 
11 Actixity here is given a wide interprcta6on. It pfirnaiily includes the distribution of racist ni3tenals, but can also include 
the use of posters, stickers, graffiti and verbal and physical hira-1-nent and/or attacks upon etliiiic people. 
Iýcc Appcii&x reference 21 -letter from CIkj-igdisliSli., mn3 to the Attom IGcri al CA er 
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is often on the increase. Indeed some evidence of this was subn-utted by Searchlight, " to 
the Stephen Lawrence Public Inquiry , 
14 which showed that the neo-nazi British National 
Party (BNP) had been politically active" in the early 1990's in the East of London - 
resulting in a massive increase of racist crime in the capital. " 
An example of militant racism and the variety of laws that can be applicable. 
In subsequent chapters of d-iIS thesis I will produce examples of militant racist activity and 
material. However, in this introductory section I provide an illustration of militant racist 
actiVity by considering, and legally analysing, a news story from ffie Daily Telegraph written 
by the Journalist Hugh Mwr. 17 
I Se. S irchlight is mi Intemationol Anti-Fascist monthly niVvine bascd in Ioiidon 
14 `tcphen l, q S-, vvi-ence was murdered in April 1993 mid the police and (TS filed to bring chaige, in relation to his death, 
while q Comers, jury found Stephen had been killed "in a com#. eleýj imptwivked dfack 17 
, 
ý, flivnhile)(julhs" SubsNuenttodus 
decision, the family instigated a private prosecution for murder, which failed. Due to ongoing political pressure, the Home 
Secietm: y invited Sir Wifliarn MacPherson to Chair a Public Inquity into the police limidling of the case. Sorne of die 
findings of this Inquiry (w The Sle#jen Lau7vn, -e Inquig.,, pu0shed HAISO Febrna! y 1999) will be referred to -it appropriate 
ssI section, - of this thesis, however in summary the hiquiiý confinned that Stephen Lawrence's murder was 'jokly and 
unequime4y molhaled iý, raim'. The Inquin7 found that Metropolitan Police irivestig3tion had been "Nix-red iý, a c(imbination 
pmfe, uional imr)17ý*kmv, institubonaUsed &&-ivtv an4l a fidim, of leadership 4ý senior ýffivrs". The Inquiry Report made 70 
recommendations, including a re-definition ofa racial incident, police training in relation to the reporting and recording of 
incidents, die police practice in relation to the investigation of racist crime mid 1 variety of measures associated with anti- 
racist educ3tion. Despite the Home Secretary's support for the findings of the Inquiry, there liqs been some criticism 
(T., v)7vn, v Inquify db, ýpax6'Geny Gabk, Sean-likaht, Apnl 1999) that the Macpherson Report wa: rushed, xxith a resulting 
failure to fully investig)qte the context aithin which the murder was committed. This criticism of a rushed report is fired 
by the blunder of the Macpherson Inquiry in publishing the namuýs and addresses of people who had given information to 
the police. Additional saipport for this criticism corries irom die narrow approach taken by the Inquiry. At the 
corru-n(fricernent of the Inquiry, Sir William Macpherson promised to took beyond the single murder and consider broader 
issues in the second stage o gf the 
Inquny As the inquir\ proggressed, lie concentrated on racism within die police and 
refused to coqi_, ýider other racist crime- mid the broader issue-, associated. In effect, Macpherson started his report from 
the moment of die stabbing of Stephen Lfnvrence mid continued to treat the killing is an isolated incident of racial 
ýiolence, only considemig other crime_ý directly connected to the 6ve prime suspects. fie notably, failed to focus on 
evidence which pointed to the climate of racial 6olence which was existirig in East London around the time of the attack 
(see footnote 17 for some stitisticý). 'niereby, the Micpherson Report disappointingly inissed a golden opportunity to 
examme the factor,,; mid actions of any groups or organisations that may have cont6buted to this racist climate, with due 
consideration of any lessons that society could learn. 
Proof of die BNP's political actiNity can be seen from the fact that in September 1993 Derek Beqckon was elected as q 
BNP Councillor on Tower Hamlets Council (he lost his seat in the folloxving elections, and lie has so far been the only 
BNP candidate elected in this country). Obviously, political acmity can and doe, take various forms - but racist gr3ffiti 
mid literature is often a key feature of BNP political acti-6ty. See also the comments of leading BNP acti-ost Tony 
I A-comber who -argues that the BNP success in Tower Harnlets was due to a commui-iity approach. This was described as 
a Furo-nationalist approach in which the 'rights for whites' campaign v, 7q,; central (Suxess & Fadurv: The nexpo&vj awd the 
okl'- Spearhead, March 96). 
Seat ,. vlilight submitted e-odence, to the 'Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, of 3 climate of racial \riolence in the 
locality of 
Stephen', murder. 'llicy argued that between 1989 and 1993 the niu-nber of reported incidents of racial xiolence in 
Fngland -aid Wale-, liqd ris-ni by 80 per cent, of \\-hich 44) per cent of die incidents occurred in the capital mid 10 per cc-lit 
in East London alone (Emnzý7g lhejbpies ? I_Hativd' and The B_N-P ii eafl London Stepping stone lo rax nar'- Searchlight, 
';,, ptcmbc-r 1998). 
Daily Telegraph, 23 March 1998. Ilie story of Alison Moore was highlighted on London To4l, 9th February 1999. 
11iisTV programme also displayed some of die racist material sent to her from the "BNP". 
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"These racist thugs vAll never stop me teaching. " 
The thing Alison Moore remembers most vividly before losing consciousness is the 
final insult. As a group of four teenagers kicked and punched her senseless, amid 
fits of cackling, they screamed at her "Black bitch". 
She cannot guess how long the attack lasted, but when she woke up she realised 
her attackers had left her under a hedge. 
The first sensation she felt was excruciating pain. Most of the blows had come 
from behind her as she hunched forward to try and protect her face. She then 
realised that she could not move her legs. Although dazed, she managed to use 
her mobile phone to raise the alarm. 
Miss Moore, 30, suffered cracked ribs, internal bleeding and severe bruising. She 
spent six days in hospital and even now walks with a limp. 
The teacher, who has a six-year old daughter, at first thought the attack at 
Sandhurst Junior School, in Catford, south-east London, was just a matter of bad 
luck. 
But 10 days later she was forced to revise her thinking. "I was on my own at home 
one evening and I heard the letterbox open. I thought it was a circular. When I 
went to look at it I realised it was a death threat, telling me not to go back to school. 
It really frightened me. 
I didn't know if the attackers knew I was the only black teacher in the school and 
had been wafting for me. It was also possible that someone had read about the 
attack in the local newspaper and was making mischief. " 
The police did what they could to make her flat secure. Locks were installed, and a 
panic alarm was fitted and linked directly to the local police station. 
But on March 13"' her tormentors struck again. "I had difficulty getting to sleep and 
went upstairs to take some medication. As I opened my kitchen door, I saw a man 
wearing a balaclava and gloves who had forced open my kitchen window and was 
trying to come in. The thing that frightened me was that he must have heard me 
entering the kitchen but he just stood there to make sure that I saw him. He was 
trying to instil fear in me. " The police arrived quickly and searched the area with 
tracker dogs. They failed to catch the intruder or his accomplice but they did find 
their handiwork -a collection of swastikas and National Front logos which had been 
daubed on the door. 
After each incident, Miss Moore had denounced her abusers and had voiced her 
determination to stay, but a further incident last week proved too much. 
"A local reporter told me he had just received a telephone call from someone who 
said they were going to 'do me in' that night. That evening the police came to the 
flat and stayed with me until I had left. " 
Miss Moore hopes her abusers will be unable to trace her new home but 
nevertheless intends to return to school as soon as she is physically able. Her 
mother, Olga, and her great-aunts were teachers and she says it is a family 
tradition she intends to maintain. 
"I'll be scared to go back to school. The thought of whatever else might happen 
petrifies me, but I love my job. I would be unhappy elsewhere. I feel like I'm 
running away from my home but I couldn't live if I ran away from my job as well. " 
Doctors have told her she may make a full recovery but Miss Moore says it is 
unlikely that she will ever be the same. "I was an outgoing person but these days I 
get very tearful. I'm very nervous, even when the telephone rings. I find it hard to 
deal with it all. " 
"I realise that the people responsible for all this are a minority. My friends are all 
nationalities. I don't look at colour. I look at who people are and I think others 
should do the same. " 
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Ihese harrowing words give an example of n-ulitant racism in the last decades of the 20th 
Century. " 'MIS forrn of Militant racism may not be regarded as fully typical, because the 
threat of murder and the need for police protection suggests the nature of the racism is 
more extreme than the average incident of racial harassment or violence. However, it does 
display, characteristics that are synonymous - with nuhtant racists often using graffiti, 
violence, and terror to intimidate and harass victims. What is also consistent is that those 
comi-nitting racist attacks, harassment and violence, often evade detection essentially 
because they act in a clandestine fashion with the anticipation of avoiding identification. " 
Obviously, there are existing criminal laws that can deal with many forn-is of militant racism 
- especially when it takes its fon-n in harassment or violence. If we exan-une this story 
concerning Alison Moore, a few obvious basic crin-unal offences spring to mind. 
(1) The attack by four teenagers on Alison Moore can be classified as a 
common assault and battery. This can result in up to six months' imprisonment 
and/or a 
fine2o - i. e. assuming that the necessary actus reus' and mens rea22 is 
established. 
(2) It is also possible that, as per section 47 of the Offences Against the Person 
Act 1861, charges could be brought for an assault occasioning actual bodily 
18 It is claimed by Professor Bhlkhu Parekh, in the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Race and Community (Houses of 
Parliament Session 1993/4) report entitled RmU Vidence: A Soarate Offeme?, that almost a third of the ethnic minority 
population will suffer, in some form or another, the experience of racial crime/incidents each year. This projected figure 
is based upon family connections linked to the British Crime Survey (which signi-fied. 130, (XX) [19911,102,000 [1993], and 
143,000 [1995] racial incidents in the respective year - Source: Ethniýio and ViaVmisation: Fhme&gsfmm 1he 1996 Biifish Cnme 
Sim)5v'- Home Office Statistical Bulletin, Issue 6/98), with the claim that it is not just the victim who suffers but also 
his/her immediate family. 
"ý Quite often they vil! use a facemask. There have also been reports of the use of white hoods by the British Ku faux 
Mari - Sunday Mirror, 21 September 1997 and Searchlight, November 1997. [Note: the wearing of Man robes has been 
regarded as an offence under Section I of the Public Order Act 1936 which prohibits the wearing of undorms in 
connection with political objects - see The Times, 8 October 1965] 
"'The penaltv for diese two common law offence- can now be found in section 39 of the Criminal justice Act 1988. 
21 For a discussion on how assault can be established from the use of words that make the -victim apprehend immediate 
force sce pages 542-545 Clarkson and Keating, Cnminal Law. Te, %Y wzdALMe1idF', published by Sweet & Mqxwell 1990. So 
far as batteiv is concerned die case of Wilson v Pringle [1986] 2 All. E. R. 440 CA, Civil Division, held that in a battery 
there must be intentional touching or contact in one form or another of the plaintiff by the defendant That touching 
must be proved to be a hostile touching. 
'2 The case of Rv Venna [19761 Q. B. 421 CA, Criminal Diirision, establisheý that the element of nwmea in the offence of 
issault -aid/or battery is satisfied by proof that the defendant intentionally or recklessly applied force to the person of 
another li-c-ckless here is given a subjective meaning (whether the defendant foresaw the possibility of the consequences 
occurring and whether it was unjustifiable or unreasonable for him to take that risk) as per R -, - Spratt - The Times, 14 Ma. \ 
1990]. 
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- with an outcome of up to 5 years imprisonment should guilt be 
established. 
(3) The daubing of swastikas and National Front logos on the door of Alison 
Moore constitutes an offence under section 1 of the Criminal Damage A 
1971. This carries a sentence ma)dmum of imprisonment of up to 10 years, but 
in practice usually involves a fine for such limited damage to property. " 
(4) There is also some evidence of intentional harassment, which could 
establish grounds for an offence under sAa of the Public Order Act 1986. This 
carries a period of 6 months imprisonment and/or a fine. 25 
(5) The threat to the life of Alison Moore could (if the evidence justified which it 
does not seem to) result in charges being brought in relation to the offence of 
threatening to kill - resulting in up to 10 years imprisonment. ' 
While these basic offences may reflect established criminal charges, there is 
also a possibility that under the new Crime & Disorder Act 1998 
additional/aftemative 27 charges could be brought for racially aggravated 
common assault'28 racially aggravated actual bodily harm '29 racially aggravated 
intentional harassment, 30 and/or racist criminal damage. 31 Indeed, these 
23 As perRvMd1er [1954] 2. Q. B. 282 actual bodflyhan includes any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with the health 
or comfort of the xictim. The mens rea requirement is the same is that required for common assault. 
24 The issue of Cnminal Damage \%ill be considered in more detail in the chapter Radst Speech & Uteratyrr'. 
25 Harassment under section 4a of the Public Order Act will be discussed in more detail in the chapter Racist Seh and . 
pe c 
LderaNre' Issues associated with the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (which requires conduct on at least two 
occasions) will also be discussed in the chapter Ra, -nt 3peech mdUterwým. 
2: Section 16 of the Offences Against the Persons Act 1861. 
27 They are additional and alternative in the sense that if the evidence so justifies a person can be charged with die basic 
offence plus the racial equivalent. It then becomes the duty of the jury to determine (a) if the defendant is guilty of the 
basic offence and, if so, if he is also guilty of the raci-A equivalent. Assuming the jury determines guilt to both charges, the 
judge is then legally bound to apply a sentencing policy consistent with the higher 'racialý tariff and must declare such in 
open court. 
28 Up to 2 years imprisonment instead of 6 months for die basic offence. 
Up to 7 years imprisonment instead of 5 year- for the basic offence. 
21' Up to 2 years imprisonment instead of 6 months for the basic offence. 
31 Section 82(2) of the Crime mid Disorder Act 1998 requires a court, in considering the seriousness of an\' offence, to 
treat racial aggravation as an Wavating factor that iuct-e-rses the seriousness of the offence. 
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secondary offences could be associated with and brought alongside the basic 
offence and, if proved, would result in enhanced sentencing for racist crime. 12 
Who are the pe1petrators of acts of mihtant racism? 
Sadly, the perpetrators of the racist crime against Alison Moore have not been identified. 
As such, it is impossible to give an accurate description of those who were the perpetrators 
of d-iis particular act. What is more, even if the police could track down the perpetrators, it 
can be seen that there exists a variety of applicable laws which inevitably begs a question 
for this thesis - Do we need any more laws to tackle racist crime? What would be the value 
of another string to the bow? 
Research conducted by the Home Office 
33 
into the perpetrators' of racial harassment and 
violence, concludes that those who corrimit racial harassment and violence are of all ages, 
37 
including young children, '5 youths, adults" and older people, even pensioners , with the 
majority of mcidents cornMitted by those between the ages of 11 and 25. ý"' Perpetrators 
mav be both male and female and often act together as groups of friends or as farnilies. To 
this extent, the perpetrators often consider that the views they hold towards ethnic 
minorities are shared by the communities to which they belong. Ihis belief is reinforced 
by the wider community failure to condemn the perpetrators, which thereby it-idirectlý 
reinforces the racist behaviour. 
" For q fuller account of this -Areq of law see the ch apter Raý-ialVolivalion anti lloslViý, ' 
-ý' The lvrpelrators ol ra,, iýd karatsment and rwial iiolewe'by Rae Sibbitt - Home Office Research Study 176. I'llis research was 
conducted by the Research and Statistics Directorate iaidLin the Home Office it die request of die Racial Attacks Group 
(RAG) Which Was Set Lip by the Government in 1987 in response to concern about racist attacks iii Britain. 
34 Perpetrators here are given 3 natural meaning - i. e. those who comriiit such acts. 
oe at Some children be"ween the ag _s of 5-10 were identified as, racist perpetr ors 
by Housing Officials. 
Tbese ale desenbed -is adults , x-lio have little respect 
for local audionties, which they see as remote 'politically correct' 
in, stitutions. 'I'hey may engage in verbal abuse of their neighbours, especially where their neighbours appear to have 
obtained resource., which they would have liked: e. g. larger accomitilodation. 'I'liev may be physically -violent and join 
forces- aith other f1milies oil all estate in abLISing or intimid-iting indradual fivnilies. 'I'lic adult male, in particular, m,. T, \ 
already be irivolved in other crianinal activity, where -6olence (or the dire-it of it) towards others, is a normal part of his 
lifC-, t\'IC. I lis \iC`a-I are such that lie mqv not 00 out of his wqy to engage in racist att. qcks (though lie may have done so in 
his youth). I lowever, if lie is drunk and finds -in excuse to attack a black person - e. g. if one has, hurt his friend or where 
someone lias accidentally reversed into his car - lie aill do so (' Source: Home Office Rese-irch ' Studv 176). 
;' 'I'liese -we elderly people who -&e black people as suitable -ýcapegoats, for all their problem,, and see these "iew, 
ivinforced by politicians -mid central government w1lich maintain, that imilligration control, are necessqn, to protect jobs 
and housing (Source: I forne Office Research ", tudy 176). 
" Ox--c'l'. iblc 3.1, page 64 of the Home Office R(-Ncfwcli Stud%, 176 
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The Home Office research provides a profile of the 15-18 year old perpetrator of racist 
crime. This suggests that his parents and grandparents may have expressed racist views 
and that on leaving school, he may have hung around with older racist youths - being 
dispirited by having nothing to do, and in a continual search for some kind of role or 
identity. He may enjoy going to football matches and the sense of belonging to a large 
powerful group that such matches engender. He finds it easy to latch on to far-right ideals 
especially where far-right parties are active loca 11 Y. 39 These ideals provide scapegoats for 
the insecurity he faces, while giving a sense of belonging to a particular group. Likewise, 
an 11-14 year old perpetrator of such racist activity has grown up in an area where racist 
views are prevalent and regularly expressed. Having little educational input from his 
parents, he has low self-esteem and bullies children he perceives as weak, in order to gain 
prestige among his peers whom he is unable to impress in other ways. Together with his 
peers, and especially older youths, he may engage in continual harassment of neighbouring 
farnilies and particular individuals at school. He is also at times abusive and threatening to 
people he passes on the street. 
While this Home Office research could conceivably be criticised for the limitations of the 
depth of analytical research, ' its findings are generally consistent with other data. For 
example, a survey carried out by Preston Borough Council in 1992 surnmansed the 
perpetrators of racial harassment and violence as being white, male, young (15-25), in a 
group and unknown to the victim. " Likewise, the British Crime Survey' found that for 
Afro-Caribbean victims of perceived racially motivated violence or threats, 82 per cent of 
39 Interestingly the linkage to far-right political parties is not highlighted in the Home Office Research summary despite 
the fact that there exists strong linkage by 3 variety of quoted sources throughout the research. For example, the BNP 
(British National Party and/or NF (National Front) had been leafleting both localities extensively and two of the three 
perpetrators interviewed liad indirect connections (via a stall at a Imal market) xvidi such far-right political activity. A Race 
Equality Officer of the Race Equality Council referred to a problem of white people in the area carrying our racial 
harassment and distributing BNP literature. He felt that the BNP and NF were active in the area - arguing that they were 
the people behind the racism in the area and 'ýotyowihs Ynder 18 "involved in racial harassment (Home Office Research 
Study 176 - page72). There was also evidence of far-right activity at the local football ground, which again influenced 
youths in the area. Despite this, and the fact that youths between the ages of 15-18 were profiled as finding it cn. ýy to latch 
onto fiir-right ideals, the Home Office study in its summary findings followed the usual politically neutral approach of the 
civil service. By comparison (see next page of my thesis) research carded out in Germany - by'I'he Uiuvefsity of Trier - 
was much more strident in its far-right political linkage and displayed less of the political neutrality found in the summarý- 
of the UK research. 
-1ý1 It was conducted principally in a small locality of just two London Boroughs. 
41 Tbýkknfmm siW4 of rwid harassment in Pienýqn'produced by Preston Borough Council (1992). This report also 
refer-, to a survey of 'visible minoritiee in Newcastle, with data that shows that 95 per cent of racist attacks were 
conducted bý white people, with ne irly half saying that the perpetrator-, were aged between 16 and 24 year- old. 
4'Aye, Maung N, and Mw1ees-Bl3ck C (1994) Racially mofit&ederime: a Biitish Crime Sung andysis' Home Office Research 
and Planning Paper 82. 
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the perpetrators were described as white, 75 per cent as male and 36 per cent as between 
the ages of 16 and 25. For Asian victin-is the figures were again 82 per cent white 
perpetrators, with 87 per cent being rriale and 53 per cent between the ages of 16-25. 
In Gem-uny, in research carried out at the University of Tner 43 anah-sis; of 1,398 records of 
(violence against aliens' identified four categories of perpetrators: 
Sympathisers: Those who are usually employed and not particularly political 
or xenophobic but become involved in violence as part of a group, being 
influenced by peer pressure. 
Criminal adolescents (thugs): Low achievers, who have grown up in 
dysfunctional families. They have a long history of offending and they use 
violence as a way of settling daily conflicts. 
Xenophobic/ ethnocentrics: They are generally poor and unemployed and 
see their own deprivation as a result of having to compete with others - aliens - 
for apparently scarce resources. They are likely to Jo groups of skirilaeads with I in 
their violence less legitirTused by political right wing ideology (but they can be 
influenced by it) so much as by personal feelings of disadvantage and being 
treated unequally as a German as compared to an alien or asylum seeker. 
PoliticaBy motivated extreme right-wingers: 'Ihese are well educated and 
well resourced and engage in systematic, organised violence against aliens, 
legitirnised by their xenophobia. They are prepared to use and organise 
violence and have many contacts with od-ier organisations. 
Balancing on a tig, _,, 
htrope of fibertarian acceptability. 
From thiS profile it is self evident that in pursuing my task of tackling militant racism I will 
stray into politics since a great deal of militant racism sterris from the far-right of politics in 
the United X-mgdom. However, in this thesis I do not seek to challenge the political 
agenda or ideas of the National Front or the British National Party. Indeed, my starting 
point is that, although I may as the writer of this thesis disagree wid-i their political agenda, 
I do respect the right of such political groups and parties to pursue their political dreams. 
Obviously as I recognise in this thesis, anv such pursuit needs to be consistent with existing 
laws and any proposed changes to our laws should not be taken without due consideration 
WHc-ins 11. (1995) raim orywith iio4wrý Expl-mung violence gfw,,; t forogi, crs in (k-rin-im. Nc%ý 
Conuntmitv 21(4), PagLý 501-523. 
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of the impact this may have on an individual's right to freedom of thought and 
expression. " 
A central feature of discussing reforms associated with race law is that it involves almost 
continually Dala&iiýg on a fightmpe of libeffarian =riep Ibis metaphor, wh ch i tabili. IY' '4-' 11 is 
consistent with that used by Sandra Coliver in her work Striking a Balance'. reflects the 
inherent conflict between the rights of individuals who wish freedom to express racist 
views and the perceived desire of society to treat people equally - Le. irrespective of their 
race and gender. Alongside this latter societal goal, is also the right of the 'individual who 
wishes to be treated equally and not have his/her rights undem-nned by another person's 
racist expressions. 
While I will be walking this libertarian tightrope, I have no intention of repeating the 
Enforcement ofMorals debate promoted by Lord Devlin in the 1960's. ' Indeed, I will not be 
pursuing this line because I believe that society has moved on since the 1960's - with laws 
tackling racial discrimination now established and generally accepted by society. 
Accordingly, I will be proceeding on the premise that in the United Kingdom, we already 
have established laws - such as the Race Relations Acts of 1976 and Part III of the Public 
Order Act 198647 - that are tackling racial discrin-unation and the stirring up of racial hatred. 
My main concern is the evident inconsistency of outcome from the application of these 
laws. 
By way of illustration, civil race discrimination cases occur on an almost daily basis in 
Employment Tribunals" - with employers being found liable for either direct or indirect 
' Indeed, Articles 9 (thought) and 10 (expression) of the 'Europe-in Convention on Human Rights' provide some limited 
guarantee of protection. 11is issue of freedom for racist expression vAl be discussed later in this thesis. See in particular 
the discussion on ECHR case 6741/74, Xv Italywithin Chapter Five in the section CwxpwiMý uijh k5e Cmaw&? n on 
Human Rý, ohts. 
45 The term qibertarian acceptability' is applied in the sense of being pleasing to those who advocate free will (see The 
Concise OVWDktionag'(1990)). This definition oflibertmianbeing synonymous mith that provided by Roger Scruton - 
'A Dwionag oj'PobYial Thought'- published by Pan Books 1982. Sandra Coliver notably adopted a similar balancing 
metaphor when she produced her book tSýiiking a Balance. Hate Speech, Freedom of E-\pression and -NIon-difaimmation' - 
(published in 1992 by Article 19 of the fluman Rights Centre of the University of Essex). 
4'ý' 'The Enyonwment ofMorals'by Patrick Devlin, published by Oxford University Press 1965. 
47 This legislation is similar to that produced by s. 6 of the Race Relations Act 1965. The Race Relations Act 1976 resulted 
in a -lightly revised offence being inserted into s. 5a of the Public Order Act 1936 - thereby re-affmning the traditional 
, 6cw that the problem of racist speech is primarily one of public order. 
41': By waýy of example, in 1995-6 there were 1,737 racial discrimination applications to the Industrial Tribunals of which 
676 went to a tribunal licqnng - vith 405 being settled though ACAS. Of the 676 that went to a hearing 109 \were 
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racial discrimination. " By comparison, there have been on average fewer than 2 Criminal 
convictions per year for stirring up racial hatred - since the Public Order Act 1986 came 
into force - with only 23 cases resulting in convictions. 
5"lhe civil case of Bur-ton and Rhule 
v DeVere Hotels [19961 IRLR 59 is a classic example of the evident legal mconsistenci, in 
this area. In De Vere, the hotel was found liable for racial cliscrinaination, and in breach of 
the Race Relations Act 1976, because they subjected their employee(s) to the detriment of 
harassment. " This finding applied even in the circumstances of the harasser being a third 
party (the entertainer and comedian Bernard Manning, a Guest Speaker at a Round Table 
Dinner) who had subjected two black waitresses at the hotel to racial remarks - such as 
IFO!? " 'Nigger" 'Sambo" With comn-ients like "Teg good that's how I like vg cocoa" and 
"Darkies are good atgiving blowjobs. " 
Quite apart from the questionable issues surrounding the liability of an orgamsation for a 
third party's racist activity, " the irony of the case is - as I will demonstrate later in the 
chapter Racist Speech &Literature' - that the racist 'jokes' of Bernard Marinirig, although 
often 'racially,, ofensive'. do not normally provide grounds for legal action against Maming. 
This applies because the criminal law does not penalise 'ýacial ofence, and legislation 
generally requires any words used to be Mreatenij ith an , g, abusive andlor 
insu&iIT wi 
mtent/fikehhood for fear of violence"/harassmene' or racial hatred" - for a prosecution 
successful - the remainder being either dismissed (375) or disposed of otherwise (114) - Source: 'Inauoial Dibuna(s' as 
published in 'Labour Market Trends'April 1997. 
411 See S. 1 (1) (- . 1) 
[direct] and 1 (1) (b) [indirect] of the Race Relations Act 1976 for -4 statutory definition of direct and indirect 
racial discrimination. 
ý"' Figures provided by the Attorney General (3 August 1998) show that there have been 53 cases submitted to die 
AttomeN, General for consent to prosecute (see appendix item 23). One application was withdrawn and 7 were refused. 
Of the 45 cases in. which consent was granted one defendant died before proceedings, no evidence was given in 2 cases 
and two cases were stayed by grant of nolle prosequi by the Attorney General. The CPS discontinued one case and one 
defendant was acquitted. Of the remaining 39 cases 13 were before the courts (which suggests an increase in requests for 
prosecution during 1998) and three defendants could not be located. Of the 23 cases in which convictions were sustained, 
12 resulted in imprisonment mid the iemainder varied from a conditional discharge to a fine or suspended sentence. 
"I A report from die Industrial Tribunal - 'Round Table d*ner "kke an NTmeefing", '- Searchlight, November 1995 - told 
how 
Ms Rule complained the Round Table dinner was 'ýý& oz 1\117 meehýe with Bernard Manning talking about the Ku IGux 
lGan. 
,2 For a discussion of this area see An o%=ýa*; qn's Aibd4 for rwial harassmenf - published by Peter Jepson 
http: //bmnWi! l, e, ý,. nadcmwidei,, Ep. net/-iWs(m/IL-ibft. h . 
53 See sections 4,4a and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986. 'Me same pre-requisite of *reat, abuse andlor injzdt" together with 
the 'intent/hkehhood of stirring up racial hatred, is also required under Part III of the same Act- This issue výill be 
discussed in various parts of this thesis but a detailed consideration is given in the chapter entitled 'Racist Speech 
Literature'. 
54 See section 4 of the Public Order Act 1986 fbr specific details. 
Svc - ons 4a and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986. Cal 
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to succeed. 3' What is more, the two barn-iaids are unlikely to have a civil means of redress 
against Bernard Manning personally - i. e. unless the words used amounted to a defamation 
of character" - because the Race Relations Act 1976 rnakes no provision for an individual 
victim of racial abuse to seek compensation from any person other than an employer or 
the provider of goods, facilities, prernises and services to the public. 
In a lirruted and mcitrect way, flais problem was recognised by the government in 1976, 
when in a White Paper" it was acknowledged that- 
"ReAviveyl, few prosecutions have been brought under Section 6 of the 1965 Act and none has 
been brought under s. 6 of the Theatres Act [i. e. for sfii7ing up racial hatrvd]. However, during 
thepast decade, 
_pmbab# 
large# as a result of Section 6, there has been a decided chaii ge in the 
strIe of racialist "qganda. It tends to be kss blatantly bigoted, to disclaim aqy intention of 
stirring mp rmial hatted, and to purport to make a conftibution to pubfic education and debate. 
lFbilst this shift awFv from crudely, rxia&t propaganda and abuse is wekome, it is not an 
unmixed benefit. The more apparent# rational and moderate is the message, the ss greater i it, 
probableiVacronpubficopinion. But it is notjust#Zabk in a democratic sodeo to inteý(ere with 
freedom of e4ression except where it is necessag to do sofor the protection qf disorder orfor the 
protection qf other basirfreedoms. "'0 
'Tbe present law does not, however, penalise the dissemination qf ideas based on the assui*tion of 
racial superiority or inferiority offaas (whetber true orfalse) whicb mig encourage racialprejudice 
or discrimination. It is arguable tbatfalse and evi1publications of this kind may well be more 
y pmsecution and that in practice the ffýcfivejl defeated ýy public education and debate than b 
criminal law would be ineffective to deal with such materiaZ Due re, ard ust a o, of course, be gm Is 
paid to allowing thefive expression ofobinion. The Govemmentis not therefore at this 
stage putting forward proposals to extend the criminal law to deal lKith the 
dissemination of raciahst propaganda in the AkeKhood that group hatted 
wiU he sdaed up by it It recognises, however, that strong views are held on 
this irnportant question and wifl carefi&y consider any Kirther 
representations that may be made to it (my emphasis). "61 
56, See Part IH of the Public Order Act 1986. 
57 'niere does e2dst a slight possibility that the actions of Manning could amount to harassment - and an offence as per S. 2 
of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (this is by way of example only, since the incident pre-dated the legislation). 
However, to comply Nvidi the PHA 1997 the conduct must occur on at least two occasions, with much depending on what 
the courts consider is reasonable in die particular circumstances. Quite whether two or more 'jokee - told in the course of 
one dinner speech - amounts to conduct on at least two occasions is not clear fx<xn the legislation. Given that the 
legislation (Section 2) refers to a 'course of conduce it seems reasonable to argue that the dinner speech itseJf amounted to 
a course of conduct. Iliat being the case - since there was only one dinn speech in question - it seems probable that 
Manning would not have fallen foul of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. For a discussion of this legislation - 
and the Public Order Act 1986 - see the chapter entitled RUid Speech xdUterature. 
t, ', '17hey may have a case for defamation. However with no legal aid, die legal costs involved mean that fevc people - other 
than those who are reasonably , vealdiv - can afford to pursue a court action (though a 'no win no fee policy could 
conceivably change this). 
'Raial Dignmination, Crnnd 6234 - Published by Her Majesty's Stationary Office 1976. 
Crund 6234 p arq 126. 
Cnind 62-74 pra 127. 
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liml fr While the government in 1976 sought to avoid taking legislative steps that eedorn of 
expression, it did provide for a counter expression approach by giving responsibilities to 
the Corrit'nission for Racial Equality (CRE) to "take action to educate and persuade pubfic 
iP62 
opinion . Indeed, in the 22 years since this statement there have been some excellent 
educational anti-racist progranuries from the Comrrussion for Racial Equality 61 (CRE). ' 
However, a notable weakness of such anti-racist programmes is that the audience that sees 
these programmes may not be the same one that sees, and may be influenced by, racist 
material. 
In this thesis I seek to remedy this weakness. One apparent remedy is for the gc)vemment 
to introduce laws that prohibit the publication /distribution of 'raeially q nfive te 64 ffie ma nal 
that may stir up racial hatred and/or discrit-runation on the basis that such materials often 
increase tensions within communities and can lead to racial harassment and violence-65 
While this may seem an obvious solution, to take such steps could be seen as seriously 
undermining the freedom of the author to express his/her views and for these reasons the 
approach could be criticised as being incompatible with human rights. 66 
Under the terms of Section 19 of the Human Ri&s Act 1998, a government rruinister is 
required to issue a written statement of compatibility with the 'Convention on Human 
Rights' in relation to any Bill which he introduces to parliament, or to explain why the Bill 
fails to comply and why the government nevertheless Wishes to proceed with the Bill. To 
this extent, incompatibility with the 'Convention on Human Rights' should be avoided if at 
62 Cmnd 6234, para 50. 
63 One example is the work done with football clubs to Wick Racism out of FootbaW. This, and others, will be referred to 
in various parts of this thesis. 
64 `Ihe establishment of this definition is discussed in deu@ in the chapter "Say No to Racismý'. However, for current 
discussion purposes 5udd offence' can be determined as "a moun*g offeeAngs as a result of e. %, bresswn &ie, *d towards a group ýf 
persons - Bntdn def-d ly refirence to -to-, -, nw%qnaAýv o, msho) or e nk or na g, '. This is based upon Mg zfi: ý tb, konal on 2ýd 
the statuton, interpretation of 'racial hatred' (with adaptation) found in s. 17 of the Public Order Act 1986 and ae Conaýe 
O., j-d Di; 6? nag'defirntion of 'offence. This approach establishes consistency with statute and the arguments presented in 
Brutus v Cozens [1972] 2 All ER 1297 (which relates to the words Yhrrat, abuse and insu&) with the issue determined as a 
matter of fact. 
See corm-pondence sent by ClIr lagdisli Shama, Deputy Leader of Hounslow Council, to the Attomev General dated 
19july 1993 (appendix item 21) for anecdotal evidence of increased racial tensions and ýnolence, following die distribution 
of racist literature. 
,,, That is freedom of expression under Article 10 of die Turopean Convention on Human Rightý, ' and the Human Rights 
Act 1998 (see Chapter FiN e and the section 'Conýbafibzhtv with the Contemign on Hyman Rights). 
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all possible. While the aim of this research is to examine existing laws which tackle 
militant racism, " the challenge of this thesis is to propose legislative steps that will 
make it more difficult for militant racists to stir op racial hatred and/or 
discrimination through the use of 'racially offensive' materials - without 
undermining freedom of expression. 69 
Saying "No" to the proscription of racist ogr_anisations- 
I do not intend in this thesis to argue that racist organisations like the BNP, NF, Combat 
18 or the Waite WolVeS, 71 shoLild be proscribed. Accordingly, I will not therefore be 
considering this issue iri detail withiri the rnain body of this thesis. 
I take this approach, because it is clear that in the UK- proscription is generally considered 
to be a solution that applies only to organisations that are involved in acts of terrorism. In 
my Judgement this does not in general apply to militant racist organisations. Certainly the 
London nail-bombirigs of April 199971 seemed to open up the possibility that the militant 
racist groups of Combat 18'2 and the White WolveS7' had moved into terrorist activim, 
thereby opening up a debate about such a ban . 
7' However, under s. 1(2) of the Prevention 
I llijý aren , Ail] be discusýed in (liapter Five 
- Existing laws could also be challenged -is being incompatible vith the Convention on Human Rights. Should an 
appropriate Court issue a statement of incornpqtibihtyý an obligation falls upon a minister to reýoew the offending 
legislation, leaving it to Parliqment, should it choose to do so, to pass amending legislation (See 'Proieaýýon Jývm 
Dismminalion'bv Geoffi-ev Bindman NIJ 11998] 1617). 
" To this extent, I vill need to pve an opinion as to whether my proposals for legislative chxiqý -we coirlp3tiblevith the 
'Conwiltioll Oil f itilliall Fight,; '. 
I' 'llic White Wolves are a -zinall pack of 4 or 5 militant racists extremist,; who Lire reported to have links vath Combat 
18. 
71 Rxe BoInbers strike agabz'- The Mail on -Sunday, 25 April 1999. 
72 Neo-Na: Zigomp admitf bonibin,, "Ihe Timess, 20'jý April 1999. 
7-1 Searchlight note that die Write Wolve-, also admitted responsibihty for the bombing, and argue that they doubt that 
Combat 18 lind been directIv involved. 'nie White Wolves - who are beheved to be a pack of 4 or 5 indi-6duals (\Aith 
the likelihood of one of die pack ha-mig a link to 3 high coiranxid) - issued a statement a week before the bombings 
that itself could provide grouli& for a prosecution of stirring up racial hatred under s. 18 of the Public Order Act 1986. 
'I'lus statement - issued in die name of the'Command Cound of the VAute Wolves' - stated: "No&v is hereby,, w'zvn 11)6d 
a, U non-wbilts &jews (sic) (delined iý, 12lood not frfigion), mustpermanent4 leaiv the Biihsh Isks befolv Mejear is wt. _le; j s& non-n 
hiles 
who remwn a#er 1999 has ended mW Iv e. %terminated". '11lis followed an cadier 15 page ptiblication in wilich the VAUte 
Wolves argued: "... Our mainUne oj attack must bv on the immýgrants themselivs, the Bla, -k- andAsiýin gl)e#os. Ij this if done 
Pon y atta-kingg whiks al random, jorrvýg thefl) og theJence and ink se#-dýlence. Thif =B bt#n ý#ý, -hitýly, mdbnltal#, tlie, 4ensm7&res db 
the. qoiraloftioknoe nh, 07 u0jone Me Eslablifhment'v hand on the rwe issue. The BnWsh pe(j, 15k wd1jiabi INII nol #-U-e ýýgýr them onýy the 
sqft ivih7g option. V- E wist pohit them in the n#,, t (krechon bT taking the necessaiy x1ion to slad the spiral oj'i iq4wce whkb ii iU u&zmately 
imbide eien the reludaml, joiliNW them lo)ý&. The iidoq, n7V eome. fm1w them on, -e M9, haze no other option, b7d the inihavin? must oome 
jivm us. Therr are a do, --en Be#ajt's am/ a himired LDndandenys in Bntax iot4,, thq, irjivst Mwilinrgjor the 3park. It iý true that the 
immigranif are innwenl qfaýy remmised etime x&i"&qy, hul -(j&c1hv6v they make an invadingo amýv uhkh tbreatens the birthnghl oj' 
ebildren xd the unborn generaYmns ql-oiir_ldk. Their preseme spe&c the kath q1-ourpeople, so #'they must befirrd oa uzM e. Ntrrme 
niolence, thenso lvi? - 
CJN'eo, "ý, ZZic,, ýUm BIZ-don Bomb'- Searchlight, Mav 1999). 
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of Terrorism Act 1989, it is not possible to add domestic terrorist groups to the schedule 
of pro scribed organisations unless they 'Are conarned in, or in pmmofing or encomrq1gi1g, termfism 
occurnng in the United fiangdom and connected xit af4 rn b d) e airs of NorMe Ireland" Since the 
London nail-bornbings appeared to be associated with domestic affairs, and not Northern 
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Ireland, there were no powers to proscribe domestic groups. 
Obviously the law could be changed so that domestic terrorist groups could be proscribed 
and the government paper - Legislating Against Terrorism's - is seeking consultation on 
such change. Ihe proposals in this consultation paper open the door to the possibility that 
militant racist groups like Combat 18 and the White Wolves could be proscribed. This 
applies, because the proposed definition of terrorism refers to: 
The use of serious violence againstpersons or"itv, or threaten serious violence, againstpersons 
orprvperýi to intimidate or coerce agovernment, thepublic or any seýfion qf thepublicforpolifix4 
reh, gious or ideological ends. ' 
These proposals suggests that any groups found responsible for threats' associated with 
terrorism could be proscribed, no twithstanding that they n-uy not have actually lit the fuse. 
Should such proposals become law, it is probably unlikely that Combat 18 and or the 
White Wolves would be proscribed, since there is seeniingly no direct evidence that they 
were actually responsible for terrorist activity or the claims associated with the activity. 
Indeed, it must be possible that the claims of responsibility were hoax calls, in an attempt 
to blame Combat 18 for the terrorism. 
Obviously should Combat 18, the White Wolves or any other groups, be found to be 
involved with terrorist activities it may be appropriate to consider proscription of them. 
However, it IS worth noting that not all groups involved in serious Violence or terror 
activities are proscribed. For example, the IRA and INLA have been proscribed, but not 
the loyalist pararyii1itaries. 1his applies despite the fact that there are loyalist groups that 
have also been involved in serious violence. 
74 See the corarnents of J ack Straw MP, the Home 'Secretary, - Ir-eu-, t let lhe--Pud ,, soie* apad' - 'Me Mail on Sunday, 
2 M-ý, 1999. For a criticism of his cormnents and a discussion - the possible effectiveness of such a ban see 'Bmn* 
organijazzonsAke Combat 18 andthe White Vdtes'by Peter Jepson - liqp: //homwi2gs. iiidoitwidciW. tict/ -jWson/banItrn . 
75 Command Paper 3178, avadable from HMSO -and pubh-hed December 1998. 
7c, it i, not clefu- fi-om the propo-ýA, whedier a claim of responsibilitv would amount to a threat in relation to future 
acti-6ty. Given that asenous of incidents may occur, this must be a possibility. 
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The approach of the UK government towards proscription has been one of arguing that it 
is an effective means of tacklmg extreme terrorist groups, while displaying a reluctance to 
proscribe all groups involved in serious violence, preferring instead to respect the right of 
freedom of association. " Ibis displays consistency with Article 11 of the European 
Convention on Hun-un Rights, which provides a right to freedom of association, subject to 
lin-utations as are necessary in a democratic society - i. e. in the interests of national security 
or crime,, for the prevention of crime and disorder etc. " 
Article 4(b) of the United Nation's CERD Convention79 calls upon nations to declare as 
illegal, and to prohibit organisations, that prornote and incite racial disCrin'llination - making 
participation in such organisations an offence punishable by law. However, when the UK 
government ratified this Treaty in 1969 they did so, 'Witl) due regard tofireedom of e. %pression 
and assoeiation" In Chapter Five of this thesis, I will discuss the scant protection that the 
ECHR provides for racist expression. For present discussion purposes, it is important to 
note that proportionality is often an essential element associated with the ECHR. VAIlle it 
seen-is likely that the European Court of Human Rights would accept a state's proscription 
of a racist organisation involved in terronsrn, it must be exceedingly unlikely that 
proscription could be applicable for ALL racial groups - i. e. whether or not they are 
involved in racial violence. " Ibis must especially apply to political parties like the BNP and 
the National Front, which display racial discrimination amongst a variety of political 
policies. Any proscription of such political parties could be seen as undermining the 
principles that form the basis of a democratic society. "' 
Concluding on the issue of proscniption, it is important to recognise that should the White 
Wolves, Combat 18 or any other group, become mvolved m domestic terronst activities, 
then it could become necessary for the government to proscribe them However, in 
77 Ibis approach is typified by the comments found in the report - L&Oslawig Against Terrorism 
78 Harris, Boyle & Warbrick- claim that there is no right to freedom of association for purposes that are illegal in national 
law - noting the powers of the Prevention of 'ferronsm (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989. See page 422 - 'Law of the 
European Convention on Human Rights', published by Butterworths, 1995. 
79 The Intemational Convention of the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination. 
'ýO In the ECHR case of Xv Federal Republic of Germany (case no 9235/81) the Human Rights court upheld the banning 
of an exhibition of brochures that alleged that '7he death ofjems under the Pird Rekh nas a Zzanist tnýkeg. " Note however, 
that the case did not involve a ban on the racist organisation. See Chapter Five for 3 discussion on this and other cases. 
-i Ibus, a challenge under Article 10 -aid 11 of the'Convention on Human Rights' 
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keepu-ig vnth the political climate in the United Kingdon-4 such proscription should apply 
because the groups pursue terrorist activities and not because they are racist. " 
As I will show in this thesis, n-ulitant racist activity takes various form and ranges from the 
distribution of racially offensive material to individual acts of serious violence. While it 
may be appropriate to consider proscribing extreme racist organisations that are involved 
in domestic terrorism, it clearly could not be morally and politically acceptable to proscribe 
all militant racist groups. This especially applies to groups that are essentially political in 
nature and may be simply involved in the distribution of material that is racially offensive. 
A preview of the approach I shaH take within this thesis. 
The traditional approach to examining a conflict associated with freedom of expression is 
to make detailed reference to the United States and the case law associated with the First 
Amendment of the US Constitution. A whole host of cases are applicable, such as 
83 84 Chaplinski v New Hampshire, U. S. v O'Brien , 
Texas v Johnson & U. S. v EiChmann, ' 
Ginsberg v New York" and Collm v Smith 87 and most have been examined by a variety of 
UK acaderrucs and authors [the most notable of which have been Street, Howe and 
Bmdman, " Barendt, "9 and Coliver9j. While I am not seeking to undermine the excellent 
K For a discussion on banning racist orgarlisations see Mo ban or not to ban? ' by Nick Lowes and Steve Silver, Searchlight 
June 1999. Note that the general tone of this Searchlight article is to reject proscribing racist organisations on the basis that 
it will force them underground, with the evidence from Germany (where proscriptions applies to some extreme right wing 
racist groups) showing that it does not prevent racial violence. 
- -ý 315 U. S. 568 (1942) the fighting words principle. 
84 391. U. S. 367 (1968) which -articulated a test to be laid down courts in determining the constitutionality of a 
government regulation that has the effect of suppressing some form of expression. 
85 491 U. S. 397,403 (1989); 496 U. S. 310 (1990) both of the cases involved the politically charged issue of flag burning. 
86 390 U. S. 629,633 (1968) which concerns the limits of protection under the First Amendment due to radio 
transmission. This case is briefly referred to in Chapter Five of this thesis - 'Say No to Facism. 
ý7 578 F. 2, d 1197 (Th C-irc 1978). This case concerned a group of Nazis who wished to march through the town of 
Skolde, Illinois, where a significant number of Jewish survivors of the holocaust lived. The town had passed an ordinance 
that proscribed demonstrations by people wearing certain military style uniforms or clothing. The ordinance was 
invalidated by the Federal Court on the grounds that the trauma caused to holocaust sunavors on seeing Nazi, marching 
in their community could not justify the suppression of the symbolic expression. 
8ý1 'Stieet Rýpor('of 1967 produced by H. Street, G. Howe and G. Bindman, which influenced the 1968 legislation on Race 
Discrimmqtion. 
ý1' T-reedom ofSpeeah'- written by Eric Barendt and published by Clarendon Press 1985. In particular, see the chapters 7he 
Character and Scope of Freedom of Speech'and To&ical S peech'. 
ý11) 'Stn6&ng a Bdm&r: 17LMe Speech, Freedom ofExpm, sion and N`on-ehsnmxa1zon'- published by Article 19 in 1992. In particular, 
the contributions bv (1) R. G. Schnieder Hate Speech in the Umted States. Recent Le gal DeteApwents' (2) R. Delgado, Camp,, s 
Anteraum Rmks. Constitutional Narrwýies x CdAvýqn' (3) N. Strossen, 'Baýmcing the Rýhts to Freedom of E%prssion and EquaU*. 
/-I Gid Id), 7YksAbproa,: h to Hate Speech on Camtws,. (4) S. Coliver, Hate Speech Ian s: Do #)5v W`ork? '. 
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work of such renowned academics, I am conscious that we do not have a written 
constitution in the United Kingdom that displays the equivalent of the First Amendment. 
Hence, since such laws do not govern us, I question the direct relevance of the First 
Amendment to the issue of freedom of expression in the UW' and consider that more 
pertinent issues 92 are raised through examining the matter by taking into account 
UK/British 93 laws along with any obligations that may exist via European and International 
Treaties. 
IhIS does not mean that U. S. case law is irrelevant to this thesis. On the contrary, it will be 
used in comparative terms when dealing with racial motivation and hostilitýy (see Chapter 
Seven). It Will also be applicable when consideration is given (in chapter five) to the thorny 
problem of controlling race hate material that IS cirCL: tlated world-wide -via the Internet. 
Preview. 
However I start, in Qýter by first considering the obligations of local authorities to 
tackle racism. I do this by exploring the legal responsibilities of a local authoritý, to 
promote equality of opportunity and by looking at what steps can be taken - considering 
the civil and criminal legal options available. 
To pursue the theme of tackling n-ulitant racism fiirther, in Choter three I proVide an 
analysis of racist speech and literature. Ibis involves analysing certain racist materials to 
see if they could possibly provide grounds for criminal prosecution under British cnrru'nal 
laws. 
This emphasis on racist literature and material derives from a perception that such material 
can be potentially damaging in a multi-ciAtural society, since it can help raise racial tensions 
between citizens, though it is important to recognise that there is no irrevocable proof that 
'I' This does not mean that U. S. case law is irrelevant to this thesis. On the contrary, itaill be used in comparative terms 
when dealing výith racial motivation and hostility (see Chapter Seven). It will also be applicable when consideration is 
given to the thorny problem of controlling race hate material that is circulated world-vAde via the interriet (see Chapter 
Five). 
ý1'2 For a critical look- at United States hate crime legislation sm - Tlate Crimes- Criminal L-, m- & I&nWy PoZ6a'by James B 
J acobs and Kimberley Potter, published by Oxford University Press. 
93 Throughout this thesis - 'UIC means the United Kingdom consisting of EngLand, Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland. Tritish', means, England, Wales and Scotland. However, no consideration is given to Scottish l3w or legislation at 
'iny stage throughout this thesis. 
'niis applies as a result of Scotland operating under a different legal system to that iat 
applies in England & Wales. As, such, this thesis is primarily concerned vath the law and legislation of England and Wales. 
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racist literature and materials are directly responsible for racist crime. As I discussed earlier 
when referring to material from Hounslow, and with regards to Searchlight material, " there 
does exist some anecdotal evidence that shows that in areas where there is a high incidence 
of racist material being distributed - racial crime is often on the increase. 
Cha, pters Four and EiLzv, are keil chapters within my thesis. In QOter Fo I outline two key 
proposals for legislative change, considering the practicalities and problems associated with 
making it an offence to stir up racial discrimination and/or hatred through the use of 
'rwially, eensive'words. In Ch4ter I develop this further, by refining the proposals and 
giving consideration to detern-uning if, as amended, ffieý- are compatible with the 
(European) 'Convention on Human Rights'. 9-5 
Having established my arguments for legislative change, I continue with Qýter in 
which I look for a philosophical basis for the changes I propose - with consideration given 
to jurisprudential elements deriving from the works of John Stuart Nhll, jean-Jacques 
Rousseau and John Rawls. 
In CbqO&rmm I look at the Crime & Disorder Act 1998 and a new approach to tackhng 
racist crime which enables courts to pursue a harsher sentencing policy where it is 
determined that there exists evidence of racial motivation or hostility. 
Choter E4ght, provides my concluding comment upon this research. 
94 'See the discu-sion eidier vn thin this chapter under the heading JF; bat is AMAwt Raism. Also --ee: 
Fmning thejlames of 
Hatreel'and The BINIP in east Lmdon -Step#ng stone to rat? warý- Searchhght, September 1998. 
, )L, Please note that the 'Convention on Human Rights' mid the European Convention on Human Rights' are essentially 
one and the same, due to the Human Rights Act 1998 which is intended to incorporate the ECHR mto UK 13w. 
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TACKLING MILITANT RACISM 
Action by Local Authorities. 
Cha pter Tmo. 
One of the recommendations of the Home Affairs Committee, *in its report on Racial 
Attacks and Harassment, ' is that an individual suffering from a harassment or 
molestation should consider taking civil action. Indeed, thev went so far as to suggest 
that police should give to complainants details of local solicitors who might be able to 
assiSt2 and even to produce leaflets in a range of languages drawing attention to the civil 
remedies available. 3 In making this recommendation it was recognised that in some 
cases the police may not be able to charge the perpetrator of a racial incident with a 
crin-unal offence either because of a lack of evidence, or because the harassment or 
molestation "nzig'htfall below the level of a ctiminal offence. " 
In its report, the Home Affairs Comrnittee indicated that the main civil weapon used is 
the tort of trespass - with the assailant being pressed for an under-taking not to repeat 
past behaviour; alternatively an injunction might be sought. If the undertaking or 
injunction is broken, the assailant may be committed to prison for contempt of court, 
or r-nay be liable to pay a fine or damages. In evidence submitted to the Home Affairs 
Conirnittee, it was claimed that in Hounslow there had been no breaches of such 
undertakings in the previous few years, with the police therefore regarding civil actions 
as being very effective. However, as was recognised, there are drawbacks in that to 
obtain an injunction the cost is likely to exceed f 1,000 - with many victims of racial 
harassment being frightened and lacking the finances to take such action. It is also the 
case that, without police assistance of investigation, it may be very difficult for a victim 
of racial harassment to establish a credible level of evidence for subrnission before a 
High Court judge. For example, assun-ung that a victim is a person who has recently 
moved to this country from say India., how can s/he be expected to identify, name and 
provide addresses for a group of individuals who may attack him/her, late one evening? 
1 RaialAtta: ks xd Harassment'- TWrd Report - Session 1993-4 - Voli ime 1 at page XV. 
2 It was noted in the RacialAttacks and Harassment'report (see footnote 1) that a project in the Hounslow Dixision of 
the Metropolitan Police ha, been successfid in this regard. 
3 '11iis practise has been followed in a joint project between Leicester City Council and Leicestershire Count% 
Council (., ee footnote 1). 
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Indeed, even if attacked in broad daylight, it is probable that any Victim of crime would 
have identification problems when thev are attacked by a group of people. Even if a 
victim could identify, given problems of language barriers etc, it can sometimes be 
difficult to present evidence before a High Court judge in an acceptable and convincing 
manner. 
There may also be the problem of the suitability of the use of a civil injunction that is 
generally used to tackle individuals and organisations - rather than directed towards a 
group of racists. Even if the Court can be persuaded to grant an injunction, there must 
be some doubt that it would prove an effective legal weapon against a group of young 
racist villains who may be rebelling against society and its rules. 
Not only is the idea of racial harassment Victims bringing there own civil action prone 
to such tremendous evidential and practical difficulties, there is also a danger that the 
police, by sending complainants elsewhere, could give the impression (falsely or 
otherwise) that they have little interest in tackling complaints of racial harassment. In 
effect, this could even provide a green light for more racial harassment, since it may 
signify that the police will tolerate this kind of racial harassment - not being prepared to 
tackle it themselves. 
Despite such criticism of this proposal of the Home Affairs Select Comn-uttee, as we 
shall see in subsequent chapters of this thesis, it is nevertheless a fact that the criminal 
law IS often unable to tackle some forms of racial harassment and organised racism. As 
I shall demonstrate in the later chapters, the reasons for this are varied - but they are 
essentially due to the construction of the law and the requirement, in criminal cases, for 
proof beyond reasonable doubt. 
One advantage of a civil legal remedy is that the proof required is lesser - being on the 
balance of probabilities. Although, many people suffering racial harassment and 
intirnidation may understandably be too poor, nervous, or frightened to commence civil 
proceedings. Indeed, they may turn to the local authority, or voluntary groups, 4 fo r 
help and assistance. As Ivnll show in this chapter, a local authority is under a statutory 
duty to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination, to promote equality of opportunity, and 
to develop good relations between persons of different racial groups. Quite how theý 
-1 Many of these voluntary groups may also be dependent of local authority funding to carry out their work An 
example of which is the Hounslow Monitoring Project discussed later in this chapter. 
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fulfil this duty may vary from authority to authority. However, it seen-is reasonable to 
argue that it is implicit, from the nature of this statutory duty, that a local authority has a 
duty to tackle militant racism - which can be simply defined as incitement to/organised 
racial discrimination, harassment and/or attack. It also seen-is reasonable to suggest this 
can extend to having a responsibility to offer help and assistance to those suffering from 
rrulitant racism. Obviously, this help and assistance can and will. take vaned forms - 
sometimes legal, but more generally practical- It could even be carried out by an agency 
working with, or acting on behalf of, a local authority. 
Powers of a Local Authodty. 
Because of its nature, this chapter will generally be descriptive in style - looking at the 
powers of local authorities, together with the type of action they can and do take, in 
tackling militant racism. In doing so, it is important to recognise, from the outset, that 
there is a difference between a local authority acting under a discretionary power and 
under a statutory duty. When actin under a discretionan- power, an authority is under 9 
no legal obligation to act - being very much governed by the availability of resources. 
In comparison, where central government imposes a statutory duty upon a local 
5 authority it may be legally obliged to fulfil or undertake a particular task . 
Parliament has provided local authorities with powers, under s. 111 of the Local 
Government Act 1972, to do "anythin n ýYd, ,g wbich 
is calculated to facilitate, or is co d, ve or 
incidental to the aiscbaqe of ag of tbeirfuncfions. " Clearly, this suggests a wide discretionary 
power without giving any definition of what precisely the fiinctions of a local authority 
are. Indeed, there is no one act that clearly defines all the ftmctions of a local authority. 
However, there exist numerous statutes which impose a legal obligation on specific local 
authorities to carry out certain fi-aictions - just two examples of which are with regards 
to providing education or help for the sick and disabled. 6 
ý An example of this is the duty imposed under s. 2 of the Chronically Sick & Disabled Act 1970 to assess and ahere 
necessary make arrangements to provide for those categorised as being in need. However, following the House of 
Lords decision in Rv Gloucestershire C. C and the Secretary of State ex parte Barry Pitýp: //WWW. V-irhimciit. the- 
stationary-office. co. uk (21-3-97)] a local authority is entitled to take into account its available resources in deciding to 
provide such services. In a majority judgement, Lord Nicholls suggested that in the event of a local iuthority acting 
with wednesbuiy unreasonableness a disabled person would have a remedy. This principle must equally apply to all 
statutory duties. The Gloui-estershire Case will be discussed more fully later in this chapter. 
ý' Some examples of the introduction of functions can be found in legislation such as the Education Act 1944 and the 
Chronical-ly Sick and Disabled Act 1970. However, it would be %-ery difficult to provide a full list of local audioritV 
functions since they may vary from authority to authority - though it is reasonable to suggest they can range from a 
duty to provide schooling to a responsibility for cemeteries. 
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'Mis apparent legislative vagueness (of functional definition) would appear to be 
consistent wid-i the widely recognised convention that demands that local authority 
powers are multi-functional in nature! To add support to this proposition, I need onlv 
refer to the multiplic1q, of powers and functions which Central Government have 
heaped upon the shouIders of local authorities throughout this century. 
" 
A Statutojy Duty under the Race Relations Act 1976. 
While the specific 6-inctions of a local authority cannot be found in one statute, Section 
71 of the Race Relations Act 1976 requires authorities: 
"To make appropriate arrangements with a view to securing that their various functions 
are carried out with due regard to the need: 
(a) to elirninate unlawful racial discrin-unation; and 
(b) to promote equality of opportunity, and good relations, between persons of 
different racial groups. " 
Not only does this impose, on local authorities, a statutory duty - it can also be argued it 
makes tJ-le elirnination of racial discrin-unation and promotion of equal opportunities a 
key fi-inction of their work. It is a key function, because all other functions and 
responsibilities must be carried out in such a manner - i. e. with due regard to this need. 
However, this imposition of a duty can, in certain circumstances, be of limited value - 
especially since along with this duty there is often no correlating provision of central 
government finance. For example, while one local authority may have a strong 
commitment to tackling racial discrimination, another authoritv may, due to finance 
limitations or even political priorities, be less committed. Clearly, an authority's 
con-in-iftment to tack-ling discrimination mav and often will, vary, due to the political will 
of the authority. 'Ibough, it is submitted that in order for central government to make a 
duty imposition viable they should introduce some form of ring fenced finance, possibli 
with some method of performance criteria. The current practice of central government 
Lni Loveland claim,,,; that the multi-fulictional nqtljre of local qtltll()tit% I -ers vvi -ell esL -d in the 1880's. pov ,sv qbhslic 
lan Lovel-aid - p393 - Consfiluhýqnal Law- A G-ifiwl InIfodudion'- Butterwortlis 1996. 
It is onlv really since 1979 that there has been a Central Government desire to limit or reduce the functions of locA 
'luthontie" - xxith opting out of schools 
but one example of i more recent approich. 
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wi simply imposing a duty upon a local authority ithout any correlating finance, has been 
thrown into a state of potential uncertainty following the Bany Case. 
9 
In this Bany Case the issues were not about race but about the statutory duty of a local 
authority to fulfil the social welfare needs of Mr Barry - an 81 year old man who was 
suffering from a slight stroke with an history of heart attacks, poor vision, and having to 
use a zimmer frame due to a previous hip fracture. 'I'he local authority assessed his 
needs and decided that he required various Home Care services - including shopping, 
pension collection, laundry, cleaning and Meals-on-wheels. However, due to a financial 
shortfall of C2.5m in their budget, thev withdrew the cleaning and laundry facilities. 
Consequentially, Mr Barry sought a judicial review on the basis that the authority had a 
statutory dutylo to provide the service. When the case reached the Divisional Court 
McGowan L. J. found in favour of Mr. Barry because of a failure to provide a 
reassessment of his need, although the judge observed that an authority would have an 
impossible task unless it could have regard to the size of the cake before deciding how 
to cut it. He argued, "an autborio is right to take account of resources both when assessin need g 
and when deci&ng when it is necessag to make arrangements to meet those needs. 
When the case reached the Court of Appeal, it was held that "in assessing or re- 
assessing whether it is necessary to make arrangements to meet them [needs], a local 
authority is not entitled to take account of the resources available to the authority. " The 
reason for the apparent fin-nness of the Court of Appeal, being that a local authority is 
under a statutory duty" to assess the needs and, where it is necessary to make 
arrangements to fulffl those needs. While this approach of the Court of Appeal may 
seem reasonable in the sense of requiring an authority to undertake something it is 
legally required to do - In extreme circumstances, it could mean that irrespective of its 
available finances, an authority must provide a statutory service. 
Not surprisingly, when the Bany Case reached the House of Lords this judgement of the 
Court of Appeal was overturned, it being held that an authority's obligation to fulfil a 
duty can be limited by its lack of resources. However, in deciding with the majority, 
Lord Nicholls rejected the assertion that by enabling a local authority to take i I into 
Rv Gloucestershire Comity Council and die Secretary of State for Health ex parte Barry. 
11-1 Under s. 2 of the Chronically Sick & Disabled Act 1970. 
II Via s. 2 of the Chronically Sick mid Disabled Act 1970. 
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account its resources in carrying out a statutory duty he was demoting that duty to a 
[discretionary] power. He argued: 
'The duýy, it was said, would collabse into a power I do not qgree. A local autbonýy must 
cany out itsfunctions under section 2(1) [of the Chronically Sick and DisabledAct 1970] in 
a responsible fashion. In the event of a local authoriýy ading witb 11--ednesbug 
unreasonableness, a disabledperson would have a remeýv. " 
Implications of the Bany Case for s. 71 of the Race Relations Act 1976. 
Applying these principles to the application of s7l of the Race Relations Act 1976, It 
seems clear that an authority remains under a duty to carry out all of its functions in 
accord with a commitment to equality of opportunity and to eliminating unlawful racial 
discrimination. However, where there are resource implications (which seems would 
inevitably apply to most situations), the duty is subject to rationing within the gambit of 
the local authorities' overall resource limitations. One resulting question - following the 
Bany Case - which has not been considered by the courts, are the circumstances in 
which a local authority may fail to carry out a statutory duty due to lirni'ted resources - 
i. e. while choosing to spend available funds in an area that falls within discretionary 
powers. It may seem logical, on the basis of Lord Nicholls comment, to trust that such 
a decision could be challenged on 11"ednesbug unreasonable grounds. Indeed, support for 
this proposition can be can be gleaned from the comments of Lord Brown-Wilkinson, 
in the case of Rv East Sussex County Council ex parte Tandy, 12 when he argued that a 
local authority in order to ftAfil a statutory duty could, if it wished, divert money from 
other educational or other applications which were merely discretionary. In this case 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson distinguished the Barg Case on the grounds that: 
"the statutog dup, in Bany was to arrange certain benifts to meet the 'needs' of the &sabled 
persons, but a lack of the benefits enumerated in the section could notpossibly, give rise to 'need' 
in any stringent sense of the word The statute prvi4&ng no guidance as to what were the 
criteria ýy which a need of an unusual kind was to be assessed"... 
In companson, in Tandy, 
"Xbe council were not required to make anyprior determination of Tandy'S needfor education 
nor of the necessiý, Jor makingpwisionfor such education. Thestateim sedanimme&a/e Po 
obigazion to make arrangements topmvide suitable education. Moreover it tben expressly 
12 The Tirries Law Reports, 21 May 1998. This House of Lords case resulted in a 16 year old girl ha-mig her home 
tuition restored after a local authority had cut her tuition hours due to financial pressures. 
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defined wbat was meant ýv 'suitable education' bj, reference to xholly, o4iective educational 
ctitefia. 43 
It is suggested this is an unfortunate if not irrational, distinction between the two cases. 
It suggests that where the statute clearly defines a statutory duty, with the use of 
objective criteria, that duty must be met. However, where the statute simply places a 
local authority under a statutory duty to investigate a 'need' and then to fiilfil that 'need', 
they may have the discretion to leave some people's needs unmet? 'IbiS IS sureiv 
nonsensical because the purpose of the statute was to provide assistance to those M 
'need'. The reason why the criteria is left open is because each case is requiired to be 
determined on its ment - due to a tremendous variety of 'needs' existing. Clearly an 
authority will be expected to pnontise within those 'needs' - but they should not be 
able to leave needs unmet - especially if they have detern-uned that the need exists, and 
are simply choosing to leave the need unmet while spending resources elsewhere. 
Duncan Forbes has proposed that the government should amend the Race Relations 
Act 1976 to impose a duty to use powers to eradicate racism and racial harassment. 2' 
Forbes argues that this widened role should encompass a duty to monitor racial 
harassment and to adopt procedures for tackling it. He proposes Minimum standards 
imposed by the Home Office, and the Department of the Environment, with wider 
powers given to the CRE to monitor such activities. He fi=her suggests allowing 
individuals 14 a right to make a complaint to the county court for an agency's failure to 
comply with its statutory duty. 15 All this is fine, but following the decisions in Bany and 
Tanýv the complainant may become embroiled in the difficult question of whether the 
local authority is acting with It, ednesbug unreasonableness 16 in failing to carry out a statuton- 
duty. 17 '11iis question can only be fully answered if the authority can explain where it 
spends its resources, and why it may spend money in areas where it has a power to do 
so, while leaving unmet a statutory duty. 18 These issues relating to priorities and the 
spending of resources are surely decisions that any Court, let alone a County Court, maý 
13 Rv East Sussex CC ex p. T-nidy - case report NLJ [19981781. 
14 Possibly \%ith CRE assistance. 
15 In the same mniller as q complaint can currently be made of discrimination. 
V, This was -uggested by Lord Nicholls in the Gloucestershire County Council Case (see footnote 5). 
17 'Mere may also be the difficult question of whether or not an authority has ful]N- carried out its dutý,, or has 
mitigated its liability by partly carrying it out so far as resources allow. 
IST'his m. iy become an especially difficult argument given the issues of ring fencing etc. 
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have tremendous difficulties in adjudicating upon. One answer, on Me basis of Tanýv, is 
for the le i lators to provide clear obiective 'dance as to what duties and needs thev gis I 9w 
require to be met. 
Application of s. 71 Race Relations Act 1976. 
Even assun-ung that an authority has the will and resources to use its powers to tackle 
rrulitant racism - it is clear, from the case of Wheeler v Leicester Cit3: Council, 
19 that 
there are lirnitations upon the duty, which encompasses wide discretionan- powers, 
which authorities have under s. 71 Race Relations Act 1976. 
Wheeler v Leicester 00ý Council. 
Leicester City Council was opposed to an English Rugby tour of South Africa, due to 
the support this implied for the apartheid regime. TI-iey were concerned that three 
players from Leicester Rugby Football Club were inVited to join the national rugby team 
on its tour. Leicester City Council wrote to the Club asking them to reply to four 
cluestions: 
1. Did the Club support the Government opposition to the tour? 
2. Did the Club agree that the tour was an insult to a large proportion of the 
Leicester population? 
3. Will the Club press the Rugby Football Union to call off the tour? 
4. Will the Club press the players to pull out of the tour? 
The Rugby Club replied that it agreed with the Council in condemning apartheid in 
South Africa, but that it could only advise its members and it was not unlawful for any 
member to join the tour. The Club did not answer any of the questions posed. The 
Council then passed a resolution banning the Club from using a council owned 
recreation ground for a period of twelve months. The rugby club sought to overturn 
this decision with both the High Court and Court of Appeal disn-iiissing the application. 
However, the House of Lords unanimously allowed the appeal - essentially on grounds 
of procedure. It was held that the main purpose of s. 71 was for an authority i relation 
to their various functions and exercising its discretion under statute, to pay regard to 
what it thought was in the best interests of race relations. However, the manner in 
ý- [1985] 2 ALL ER 1106, HL. 
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which the Council had reached its decision was unfair. Having received a reply from the 
Club, the Council did not consider whether it was satisfactory, but instead passed a 
resolution banning the Rugby Club from use of the Recreation Club because affim-native 
answers had not been given to all four questions. Since the Club had done nothing 
unlawful, the Council could not use its statutory powers in order to punish the club. 
This did not mean that the Council was bound to allow its property to be used by racist 
organisations, or by any organisation, which by its actions or words infringed the letter 
or spirit of the Race Relations Act 1976 Act. 
Implications of the Wheeler Case upon s. 71 Race Relations Act 1976. 
This important House of Lords' decision clearly suggests that correct procedure, 
consistent with the principles of natural )ustice, needs to be followed when local 
authorities reach decisions. Perhaps much wider than this, it suggests that in making its 
decisions, a local authority n-uy need to show that it has taken into account its duty 
under s. 71. Indeed, if an authority completely fails to take account of s. 71 when 
reaching a decision, and has no mechanism for doing so, the decision could probably be 
successfully challenged in the courts. 
Duncan Forbes argues 25 that the Wheeler v Leicester Qy Comil case provides grounds for 
withholding or withdrawing grants and discretionary facilities from organisations which: 
Are known to pursue unlawful practices including discrimination in 
employment or in the delivery of services under the Race Relations Act 1976. 
2. Cannot show they are taking reasonable steps to ensure they do not 
discriniinate or that racial harassment does not occur during activities over 
which they have some control. 
3. Have not established an equal opportunities policy. 20 
4. Whose members are responsible for unlawful acts of racial harassment 
outside the organisation and which actively condone the acts. 
Forbes also recognises that an authority would not be authonsed, by s. 71, to withdraw 
grants and facilities when an organisation's members are responsible for unlawful acts of 
racial harassment outside of the organisation. He argues that this also applies when the 
orgamsation fails to take steps to impose sanctions upon its members - or, because the 
organisation refuses to comply with a Council's request to condemn racist views. 
'0 Before ativ grant is given, Hounslow Council requires a Tenants Association or Voluntary Group to h3ve an equal 
opportunities policy statement within their constitution. 
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However, Forbes does suggest that actions by the authority may be Justified, by s. 71, if 
the organisation, whose members are responsible for unlawful acts or racial harassment 
outside the organisation, have no policy for dealing vnth such incidents and the 
organisation refuses to condemn acts of racial harassment. 
Thus, a local authority may be able to use s. 71 Race Relations Act 1976 to persuade 
recipients of grants and discretionary facilities that they should follow an equal 
opportunities policy. However, they cannot expect that, in all circumstances, they must 
be forthright in declaring their opposition to racial harassment. Should reasonably 
prorninent members of organisations, in receipt of grants or facilities, conduct 
potentially unlawful racist acts, or pursue policies inconsistent with good racial relations, 
it may be possible to insist that the organisation issue some form of statement 
condemning such acts. 
To use another example which many local authorities face. On the basis of s. 71 of Race 
Relations Act 1976, it seems probable that a Council could refuse to hire a hall to 
Combat 18, or the BNP - i. e. for one of its regular political meetings. The basis for this 
may exist where there is evidence of inconsistency between the Council's equal 
opportunities policy and the declared ain-is of the racist organisation(s). However, 
authorities cannot refuse to make meeting halls available to political parties fielding 
candidates in an election. 21 
Action against individual pe; petrators. 
While an authority may be able to deny organisations access to discretionary grants or 
facilities where they fail to show consistency With equality of opportunity, the position 
may be different concerning sanctions against individuals. If the authority provides the 
service to individuals under a statutory duty, it cannot be withheld unless the statute 
allows the conduct of the perpetrator to be taken into account. 22 However, where 
services are discretionary the authority is required to take into account s. 71 when it 
decides to provide a service. In doing so, it is important that the authority considers 
each case on its merits and does not fetter its discretion by applying a blanket PohCY. 31 
21 As per s. 95 of the Representation of the Peoples Act 1983. The purpose of this section is to facilitate the holding 
of a public meeting during an election. However, it may be possible for an authority to deny use of a meeting hall if 
they have proof that only q section of the public may be allowed access. This could especially apply if the meeting 
- restricted to ticket holders only. ý, N, a, for party members or xvas 
e. g. where -i perpetr3tor is homeless and applNing for housing. 
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By way of example, this means that an authonty could not refuse to provide education 
to a BNP teenage activist prosecuted for racial harassment. 'ITie authority mav, 
however, be able to deny him access to the school's youth club - i. e. provided the youth 
club is established under discretionary powers and the authority consider the decision to 
exclude on its merits. 
Local Authorities and legal accountabjW. 
As I argued earlier in this chapter, a local authority has a statutory duty to elin-unate 
unlawful racial discrin-unation and to promote equality of opportunity. Ibis can involve 
various forms of action ranging from simply giving advice to Victims of racial 
harassment to that of providing practical assistance such as fireproof letterboxes and re- 
housing. However, it is also irnportant to recognise that having wide responsibilities 
does not mean local authorities are totally free to exercise their discretion with regards 
to the type of facilities they provide. All local authority decisions must be exercised in 
accord with the general principles of adt-ninistrative law. For, without such, the validity 
and lawftilness of their actions may be challenged through judicial review or the 
23 invalidity of the decision may be used as a defence. 
The courts have identified three heads upon which they review the administrative acts 
of public bodies, including local authorities: 
(1) Illegality: 
(2) Irrationality; and 
(3) Procedural impropriety. 
24 
General Principles q? fAdministrative Law. 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to consider in detail the principles of adn-unistrative 
law. However, it has relevance to the extent that it relates to decisions of public bodies 
'3 Wandsworth LBC -, ý Winder [1985] AC 461. This case involved Wandsworth Council siting tenants for non- 
payment of rent and the tenants raising the defence that rent increases raised by the Council were ultra vires. 
'4 Council of Civil Service Unions and others v Minister for Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935, HL. For ffiller 
consideration of judicial rc\icw and the general principles of administrative law see Chapter 7 of 'Gommment in the 
United Kýýkm'by Prof D. Oliver (pub Open University Press 1991) - Chapter- 29 & 30 of Constitutional and 
Administratite Lm'by Bradley & Ewing (pub Longman 1993). Also, Administratim Law' b\- H. W. R. Wade (pub 
Oxford 1988). 
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in tackling n-iilltant racism. For these reasons I have identified, from the work- of 
Duncan Forbes, 25 four-teen generalpnnciples of administratite law relevant to this thesis: 
(1) The authoriýy must have legalpowers to make a deeision. 2' Given the statutory duty 
under s. 71 of the Race Relations Act 1976 it has already been demonstrated 
that an authority in carrying out its functions, must eliminate unlawful racial 
discrin-unation and promote equality of opportunity. As such, in general, it 
would give an authority powers to tackle incitement to/organiSed racial 
discrimination - militant racism. 
(2) The authority must have understood correctly the applicable legal powers and 
given effect to them. " 
(3) The authority must act so as to promote and not to frustrate the policy and 
objects of the statute under which the decision is made. 26 
(4) The authority must take into account all relevant matters before reaching a 
decision. 2- 
(5) The authority must disregard all irrelevant matters when making a decision. 27 
(6) The decision must not be made in bad faith or be dishonest. 2' 
(7) The facts that form the basis of the decision must be correct and must provide a 
basis for the decision. 28 
(8) The authority must not delegate decision making 27 (i. e. if a local authority is 
given power by statute to make a decision it cannot adopt automatically the 
decision of some other person or body - e. g. a Council cannot simply adopt 
automatically the decision of a political group). 
(9) The decision must be reached fairly in accord with natural justice. 29 
(10) 'Me decision must be made by full council - or by properly authorised 
comn-nttees/sub-con-itnttees/officers within the scope of their delegated 
authorityýo- 
(11) Any statutory procedural requirements must be followed. 2' 
(12) 'Me authority must not fetter its discretion (i. e. it must not refuse to exercise 
its discretion in an individual case by ni idly following a blanket PolICV .) 
31. 
, gi 
(13) The decision must not be one to which no reasonable authority could reach. 2' 
(14) Authorities must apply their policies consistently. 31 
25 Action on Racial Harassment. Legal Remedies and Local Amthoritzes' (London Legal Aid Action Group and London 
f lousing Unit, 1988). 
") Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997, HL. 
27 Associated Provincial Picture Houses ,, Wednesbury Corp [1947] 2 All ER 680, CA. 
28 Secretarv of State for Education and Science v MB Taineside [1976] 3 All ER 665, HL per Lord Wilberforce at 
p671. 
Re HK [1967] 1 ALL ER 226. 
30 S. 101 I. ocal Governinent Act 1972. 
11 British Oxygen Co v Board of Trade [1971] AC 610. 
3'R -, - Home Office ex pa Ruddock and Others [1987] 2 All ER 518. 
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Types of anti-racist actions a local authorfty could undertake. 
In this section of this chapter, I will provide an indication of the type of actiVities that 
local authorities can take to tackle nuhtant racism. It is not an exhaustive list. Indeed, 
requirements and activities will vary due to the specific demands of a particular person, 
problem or area. The purpose of this list is to briefly identify the type of actions local 
authorities can take, and quite frequenth, do take, when fulfilling a statuton, dun, and/or 
operating under discretionary powers. In undertaking these activities, as with all its 
activities, a local authority can (if the circumstances justify and a prima facie case exists) 
be open to judicial review. Their activities may also be subject to review by the Local 
Government Ombudsman or by the District Auditor. 
Establishing a Declaration against Racism. Ibis approach has been taken by 
the local authority in Hounslow and involves ciVic and community dignitaries - such 
as MPs, Councillors, Chief of Police, pop and football stars etc - making a joint 
signed declaration against racism. This can be then posted at local authority 
locations such as schools and libraries, thereby demonstrating a common policy goal 
of opposing racism. 
Offering practical assistance to victims of racial harassment. 1here are various 
ways that Victims of racial harassment can be practically assisted. A local authoritv 
may provide mobile telephones, fireproof letterboxes, CCTV video surveillance 
etc. '-' Some of these practical steps may not only comfort the victim, but they can 
also save lives, with even a possibility that Video cameras may deter crime. It is also 
possible that any film footage could be used as evidence. 
Re-housing victims of racial harassment. Sometimes the racial harassment is 
such that a tenant suffering from racial harassment my need to be re-housed by the 
local authority. This approach has been taken in Hounslow, though it is clear this is 
very much a last resort solution, with the fear being that it may provide a victory for 
those comiTutting the racial harassment. Despite such concerns, it may sometimes 
be better to move victims so that they can live nearer to friends and relatives. 
Much of this can be achieved by developing a , vorkmg relation-hip with the local police. For an example of this, 
see 'Alet L., aimehes imits to combat tidimisati-'Surrey Comet, 11 June 1999. 
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Introduce a racial harassment clause into tenancy agreements. 71-ilS issue will 
be discussed in more detail later in this chapter when I consider a local 
authority/landlord's ability to tackle militant racists. In simple terms, d-ie insertion 
of a racial harassment clause into local authority tenancy agreements is a 
demonstration of intent to tackle problems of racial harassment. However, not on1v 
does it demonstrate that racial harassment IS unacceptable, it also indicates that anv 
violation of this clause can result in eviction from local authority housing. 
Rub-out Racist o_raffiti proMmme. In Hounslow the authority have established 
a 'Rub out Racisryý hotline which consists of a place where the public can report 
racist graffiti. Once registered, the authority undertakes to try and remove the 
graffiti within 24 hours of it being reported. Obviously, they do not always succeed 
with this aim, but they do generally succeed in removing racist graffiti from on their 
own premises within this period of time. This programme also MVOlves officers 
working With owners of private property to try and encourage them to remove racist 
graffiti. In addition, the Chief Executive has written to all Council staff instructing 
them that racism will not be tolerated and priority must be given to removing racist 
graffiti. 
Establishing an Equal Opportunities Committee. A number of authorities 
now have Equal Opportunities Committees so that they can monitor their equal 
opportunities programmes. In Hounslow, the authority have established a sub- 
comn-uttee which forms a 'Racial Harassment Forurn' where organisations, 
representing ethnic rninority interests, meet and discuss problems of raciSrrL At 
times, this may involve victims of racism appearing before the Forurn relaying their 
specific experiences and seeking support or assistance from the authority. At these 
Forums, most of which are held behind closed doors, Victims of racial harassment 
may discuss housing and evidential issues - with legal officers being present to 
monitor and advise on appropriate courses of action. Because of the confidential 
nature of the Forum it is difficult to be certain as to whether this approach is 
successful. However, elected members and officers from Hounslow Council 
generally appear to value this approach and the continued involvement of ethnic 
based organisations, such as the Hounslow Monitoring Project, does suggest some 
confidence in its workings. 
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Provide Equal Opportunities training for staff. 34 All good employers provide 
staff training. Many local authorities are keen to ensure that staff understand and 
follow the local authority equal opportunities policy. Over recent years equal 
opportunities policies have tended to become more detailed and less restricted to 
just issues of sex and race discrit-nination. 'Ibis approach makes a great deal of sense 
given that discrirnination law has now moved on to important areas such as 
disability". It n-uy also be the case that local authorities have a specific local 
definition of equal opportunities" that also includes issues of age, homophobia and 
religious discrimination. Clearly, a local definition of equal opportunities which 
expands that provided by statute will generally have only moral rather than legal 
force. However, where it forms the basis of a contractual agreement - such as a 
tenancil agreement - it should be possible to rely upon this definition when issues of 
37 contractual breach anse. For these and other reasons it can be very important to 
ensure that staff are fan-uliar with, and live up to, the authorities equal opportunities 
policy. As such, training can be very important. 
Set up a Committee, or mechanism, for Pofice haison. As a result of s. 6 of the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 a local authority along with the chief officer of police 
whose police area is within the council's area, now has a statutory duty to establish a 
'crime and disorder strategy'. " While the Act is not specific, it is clear that this must 
include a stratýgy for tackling racist crime. Indeed, this is consistent with the moral 
obligation to work with the police to establish a Joint approach to tackling racial 
attacks and harassment which came out of the recommendations of the 1985/6 
report of the Home Affairs Select Committee on racial harassment. 
34'niis can be done in consultation with the Commission for Racial Equality (it could also be undertaken as part of a 
package involving disability and sexual discrimination). 
35 Disqbihty Discrimination Act 1995. 
36 For example in Hounslow, a clause in the local authority tenancy agreement says that tenants must not harass any 
neighbour of other local resident(s) on grounds of their race, sex, age, religion, mental or physical disability, for being 
lesbian or gny. 
ý7 Issues relating to the consequences of breaches of tenancy agreements will be discussed late in this chapter. 
38 'flli,; needs to be done, as per the Crime & Disorder Act 1998, in co-operation %ith any police iuthority, 
probation coninuttee or health authority. 
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While the 1998 Act sets up a formal arrangement it is clear that in the past the 
arrangements for a multi-agency approach have been both formal and informal, 
often depending upon the local arrangements. In the London Borough of 
Hounslow the approach has often been inforrrial due to the role played by the 
'Racial Harassment Forun-ý. Indeed, the police used to attend the early meetings of 
the Forurn, but representatives of organisations (like the Hounslow Monitoring 
Project) have argued that police presence at these public Forums inhibits the 
freedom of expression of Victims and their witnesses. " Thus, the local authority has 
decided to withdraw an open invitation to the Police to these Forum meetings. 
Clearly the police, in informal interviews, have expressed a desire to be involved - 
but they do respect the wishes of the local authority and they continue to work at 
officer level in tackling the issues. 
Provide gXants to org-anisations that seek to eliminate racism. While a local 
authority is under a statutory duty to promote equality of opportunity, it can decide 
upon the most suitable and indeed most cost-effective way of ftiIfillMg this duty. 
One approach which a number of authorities take, is to work with voluntary groups 
by referring people to them so that they can obtain a specific type of assistance. 
They may also provide a grant to such organisations to enable them to carry out 
their ftinctions. An example of this can be found in Hounslow with the support 
given to the 'Hounslow Monitoring Project' -which enjoys ftiriding to provide staff 
to tackle problems of racial harassment. Another less obvious example is the 
financial support given to the 'Citizens Advice Bureaux' and 'Law Centres' within 
the Borough. Many of these organisations, while using trained volunteers to 
undertake advisory work, provide a valuable service to people suffering racial 
harassment. The support can vary from assistance with filling in forms to legal 
advice and assistance. Many of these organisations depend upon the financial 
support of local authorities to carry out their tasks. 
Using giants to develop equal opportunities in other organisations. Earlv in 
this chapter - IV#cafions of the Ir7heeler Case upon s. 71 of Race Relation Act 1976 -I 
discussed the legal limitations upon a Council's ability to withdraw grants from 
39 'Witnesses' here is used in the aide context of the family and fhends of victims who come to provide details of 
racial harassment and victirnisation. It is also important to reflect that at times thev may also be critical of police 
ictivit-Y - or lack of it - pres; umably it is easier to ctiticise if no police are present. 
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organisations that act inconsistently with the authorities' own equal opportunities 
policy. As this discussion shows, a local authority has significant powers to 
encouraging organisations to which they are considering giving grants, to establish 
equal opportunities programmes and, where appropriate, to have a constitution 
which reflects this aim. Indeed, following the Wheeler Case they may have 
reasonable grounds for refusing grants to organisations whose constitution 
contradicts equal opportunities. " 
The teaching of Equal Opportimities in Schools. In carrying out its fi-inction 
under the Education Act 1944, a local authority has a legal dutý- to provide education 
for all children of school age. In carrying out this duty, and as a supplier of 
educational grants and services to local authority schools, a local authorltv is under a 
statutory obligation - via s7l of Race Relations Act 1976 - to promote equality of 
opportunity and elin-unate unlawful discrimination. As we discussed earlier in this 
chapter, an authority may have discretion as to how it carries out this duty - but it 
remains a duty it Is legally obliged to ftilfil. 'O Indeed, the Macpherson Report, into 
the murder of Stephen Lawrence, recommended that consideration be given to 
amending the National Curriculum so as to value cultural diversity and prevent 
racism. In Hounslow, the local authority have encouraged schools to participate in 
the 'Heartstone Project' which is designed to educate young children on the 
consequences of racial harassment and school bullying. While it is difficult to be 
certain that such forms of anti-raciSt education are successful, it seen-is likely that, as 
with all education, it will have some impact upon the minds of young children. If 
this form of education only makes children aware of the issue and encourages them I 
to think twice before becoming involved in such group activity, then it must be of 
value. 
The use of injunctions to tackle mifitant racism. 
Section. 222 of the Local Govemment Act 1972 promdes: 
'Where a local authofiýi considers it e, %pedientjor Me promotion orprotection of the interests 
of the inhabitants of their area tbg may prosecute or defend or appear in any legalproceedings 
and, in the case of eiii/proceediqs, may institute them in their own name. " 
" Recommendation 68 of the Macpherson Report - published HMSO FebruaýrN 1999 - stressed that Local 
Education Authorities and school Governors have a duty to create strategies and" implement strategies in their 
schools to prevent mid address racism. These to include recording all racist incidents and reporting these to the 
pupds'parents/guardians, school governors and LEA's. 
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It follows that in any legal proceedings involving a local authority, they must be able to 
show they consider it expedient for the promotion or protection of the inhabitants of 
their area. They must also be able to justify their action as falling within the general 
principles of administrative law. 
It is clear that s. 222 does provide powers for an authority to obtain an injunction 
restraining an identified perpetrator of nuisance or trespass from continued activitV. 41 
In order to obtain an injunction there must be an arguable civil case with the question 
of whether or not to grant an injunction, being at the discretion of the judge - 'on the 
balance of convenience. ' 42 In cases involving racial harassment, the request for an 
injunction could be heard ex parte - With a general expectation that the balance of 
convenience would fall in favour of an applicant who is trying to prevent continued 
harassment. However, the discretion whether or not to grant an injunction rests with 
the judge and will be dependent upon the facts and issues of law. 
The advantages of a seeking an injunction are that the burden of proof is lin-uited to that 
of a balance of probability, With the person(s) named in the injunction being made 
aware that should they act in breach of its terms, they could face a charge of contempt. 
Indeed, such contempt of court can be punishable by imprisonment or a fine 43 _ i. e. 
subject to proof, beyond reasonable doubt, of wilful and repeated disobedience of an 
order of the court. 44 These evidential reqLurements being necessarý because the 
defendant could face a term of imprisonment for what is legally a contempt of court, 
but may in practice be a continued breach of civil law. 
However, two disadvantages exist so far as injunctions are concerned. 'Ihe first IS that a 
breach of a civil injunction does not provide the police with immediate grounds of 
arrest for contempt. Indeed, the person (or in the case of a local authority, the 
authority) who obtained the injunction must generally go back to the civil courts With 
sufficient evidence of to prove the contempt. Only then, on instructions from the 
41 In the report of the Home Affairs Select Committee Raýial Altacks and Harassment'- Tliiid Report - Session 1993- 
4' reference was made to the success of civil actions with regards to the tort of trespass in deahrq_g witli racial attac6s. 
It was claimed in the Borough of Hounslow, where the police encourage this practice, there has not been one breach 
of such undertaking in the previous few years. 
42 American Cyanamid Co -, - Ethicon Ltd. [1975] 1 All ER 504, HL. 
43 Rules of the Supreme Court - Order 52. 
44 Churchman vjoiiit Shop Stewards Committee [197213 All ER 603. For a general discussion of this area see G. 
Borrie and N. Lowe Tax of Contempt'(2ýd edition 1983). R. Stone 'Civd Liberties'Chapter 6 pub: 1994 Blackstones. 
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court, can the police formally take action in relation to the conteMpt. 
45 A second (and 
major) disadvantage, as far as tackling racial harassment is concerned, is that those 
comn-utting acts of militant racism rarely act alone - they act as part of a group. It 
follows that while an injunction has legal force against those named, it only has indirect 
force upon a third party in circumstances whereby they aid and abet to break the court's 
injunction. In Z Ltd v A- Z Ltd and AA - LL (Court of Appeal Case)46 Eveleigh L. J. 
remarked: 
'A thirdparý, who knoxindly, assists in a breach [and wiffulness is required] is kablefor a 
conteVt of court ýy bimseff. It is true that bis conduct ma y teD, often be seen aspossessing a 
dual character of conteVt of court ýv himse T rt ýy n t1' _ff and aiding and abetfin 
the cou ao 7er, but 
the conduct will always amount to conteVt of court ýv itsejff 
17 Indeed in 1897 it was said, in Seaward v Patterson, that a third party is guilty of a 
criminal contempt since he is not party to the original action but is really impeding the 
court of justice. Despite such a legal position it is clear that any breach must be proved 
beyond reasonable doubt, With wi#W and repeated disobedience of an order of the coue 
generally a recluirement. Indeed, in Z Ltd v A-Z and AA-LL6 the dictum of Eveleigh 
LJ. indicates that judges, in dealing with contempt of an injunction by third parties, 
should consider whether they can be shown to have been 'contumacioas'- which requires 
not just wilfidness, but insubordination and stubborn or wilful disobedience. 
This clearly emphasises that courts will require a high level of proof before they are 
prepared to find a third party as being in contempt of an injunction. However, while 
these evidential requirements may seem onerous, they must be regarded as necessary 
given the fact that the case could result in imprisonment or a fine. 
Obviously, such evidential reqwrements highlight that an injunction may not always be 
an ideal weapon to use in tackling racial harassment by a group of racists - particularly if 
the identity of many members of the group IS unknown. Simply identifying and serving 
an injunction upon a few members from a group may not sufficiently deter the 
45 The police can of course act if they have reasonable grounds for believing that -a criminal offence is at issue. 
'16 [1982] QB 558. This case was concerned with the defrauding of a company, with a Mareva injunction being 
granted against 36 defendants to stop aný, disposal or dealings with the assets. In particular, the case concerned the 
liability of banks and other third parties that held the assets. Clearly a Mareva injunction is a specific form of 
injunction, but it is clear from the nature of the discussion in the Court of Appeal that the principle of contempt 
applies to all types of injunctions. 
"1 [1897] 1 Ch 545. 
40 
unknown comrnitted group members (and any like-n-unded racist friends) from 
under-taking further harassment or attack- This particularly applies given that the victim 
of racial harassment will want the harassment to stop. As such, s/he is unlikely to be 
qwr happy with the local authority pursuing a civil approach that re ui es fiwffier, and 
possibly repeated, harassment before ftirther grounds for action may exist. 
Despite such comment, these reservations should not be interpreted as meaning that 
injunctions night serve no purpose in tackling militant racism. On the contrary, they 
can be valuable where there exists a neighbour dispute with racism a prorninent issue. 
An injunction could also be of value in circumstances where the authority acts, as 
landlord, on behalf of tenants to tackle an identifiable group of racist individuals by 
. 
48 - stances, the authority could seek restricting their trespass to an estate In such circum- 
the consent of the court to limit the identity of tenants (who are victims of harassment) 
who produce evidential statements . 
49 In this wav, it m ay be possible to reduce the 
potentiality of reprisal attacks. 
Section 222 could also enable the authority to appear in civil proceedings, being brought 
by a victim of racial harassment - thereby additional support to the argument that 91 
racial harassment is unacceptable. 50 They could also help fund the cost of a Victim's civil 
injunctive proceedings. 
Various "es Of injunctions. 
There are various types of injunctions, with some more likely to succeed than others. 
For example, an authority should be able to obtain an injunction to restrain a tenant 
from breaching a tenancy agreement. 51 This could apply where a tenant was harassing a 
neighbour in contravention of a specific nuisance or racial harassment clause within the 
tenancy agreement. 
48 'niis may be particularly appropriate if those identified do not live on the estate. However, if the racist 
individual(s) IiNe on the estate an injunction in such terms is unlikely to be suitable. This applies because of an 
implied term in a tenancy agreement of 3 right of access to ones property (not that this gives a right to harass 
another tenant - but it can mean that evidential problems may develop, particularly if trying to establish any 
contempt). Later in this chapter I will discuss, in more detail, an authorit%, landlord's 3bilitv to tackle militant racism. 
4') See s. II of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 which gives jurisdiction to a judge to order that the name of a 
witness should not be disclosed in proceedings if there is a danger that the lack of anonymity would deter such 
witnesses from coming forward. Note that the Contempt of Court Act does not codjý- all of the law of contempt. 
'nie issLic of an 3uthonty appearing in proceedings as a result of s. 222 will be furtlier discussed later in this 
chapter. 
E, I Ilie court has limited grounds for discretion - see Dohertyv AUman (1878) 3 App Cas 709 HL 
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Another form of injunction would be to prevent nuisance or trespass. This can be of 
value in dealing with neighbours; and identifiable people visiting the area to undertake 
act(s) of n-uhtant racisrn. In making a decision to grant an injunction, the courts will 
generally consider the following points: 
" Whether damages are an appropriate remedy. 52 
" The motive of the perpetrator. 53 
" The behaviour of the authority. 54 
The interests of the public. 55 
56 
Whether the act is likely to be repeated . 
Obviously each case will need to be considered on its merits with the Court balancing 
the advantage of the injunction with any detriment the respondent perpetrator may 
suffer. However, in cases involving racial harassment damages may not be an adequate 
remedy. The motive of ffie perpetrator will always be malicious and the public interest 
would suggest granting an injunction, as there will generally be a risk of repetition. In 
practice, injunctions are always subject to the discretion of the judge, though the Court's 
may have lirrUted grounds for refusing an injunction in this type of case because of the 
Court's presumption that a person is entitled to prevent a trespass to his property 
Though, they could choose to do so if they felt mclined to accept a written undertaking 
from the perpetrator of such acts that he would not undertake any further acts. 
Injunctions for Nuisance on the Highway. 
The Highways Act gives local authorities specific powers to take action to protect and 
assert the public's right to use the highway. This includes a responsibility to prevent any 
obstruction of the highway that IS prejudicial to the area 57 - this will include the ability to 
act to prevent a public nuisance on the highway. 'Public nuisance on the highway has 
gbway, whereýv the pubkc are been defiried as "any wmng'ul act or omission upon or near a hi 
" See London mid Blackwell Raflw3ý, Co %, Cross (1886) 31 ChD 354. 
5-1 See Hollywood ' Silver Fox Fann v Enunett [1936] 1 All ER 825. 
54 S 
See Hubbard v Vosper [197212 QB 84, CA. 
5-5 Miller vj ackson f 19771 QB 966, CA. 
", Proctorv Baileý, (1889) 42 ChD 390. 
57 S. 130(3) Act 1980- 
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1jZ1)WaY., '58 Prevenfedfromfirqly and conveniently passing along Me 'Ibis very definition, by itself, 
emphasiSes the freedom of the public to pass along the highway and it is for these 
reasons that irijunctions, which may mterfere with such freedom, are not readili 
obtainable - i. e. without providing some firm evidence of a public nuisance which 
amounts to an unreasonable user"9 By way of example, it may be that it would be 
possible for an authority to use powers under the highway legislation to prevent the 
60 distribution of racist literature outside school gates , or where racists, or are 
congregating on a highway and harassing ethnic people living on an estate. 61 
In many ways some of the laws which have been used to deal with trade disputes may 
be applicable. For example, in the case of Thomas v NUM (South Wales), 62 Scott J, in 
granting an interlocutory injunction, held that regular picketing of the home of a 
working MMer, regardless of the number of people involved and regardless of the 
peaceful nature of their conduct, would constitute a common law nuisance. It surely 
follows that this principle should equally apply to a group of militant racists harassing 
people living on an estate. Although, as remarked by Lord Denning in Hubbard v pit? 3 
while using discretion to reject an application for an interlocutory injunction, if the 
grievance of a complainant IS about the placards and leaflets they may not succeed due 
to a desire to respect freedom of expression. Interestingly, in Hubbard v Pitt, reference 
was made to the undoubted right of Engfishmen to assemble togetherfor the purposes of deliberating 
upon public giievances. M 
5ý Jacobs v London CC [1950] AC 361 - Lord Simonds 
5" Lowdens v Keaney [1903] 2 IR 82; Rv Clark (No 2) [1964] 2 QB 315, CCA - In Hubbard v Pitt [1976) QB 142 
Forbes J observed that 'unreasonablenesý' was established if it can be shown that passage was obstructed. 
ý'() Appendix itern 16 was distributed outside Isleworth Primarv School in Hounslow - though, this cannot really be 
described -is racist literature. 
'1 This example could also apply to any other form of protest by any other persons - e. g. trade dispute etc. 
ý2 [198512 All ER 1. 
c'3 [1975] 3 All ER 1. 
,4A general right to freedom of assembly is to some extent recognised within the Public Order Act 1986, in that 
Under Part 1 the police do not have powers to ban an assemblv. However, following the introduction of sl4a (vii 
the Criminal justice & Public Order Act 1994) the police have powers to apply to the council of the district for an 
order, for a specified period, to prohibit a trespassory assembly where there is considered to be, inter alia, serious 
disruption to ffie life of the Community. Following DDP v Jones (NLJ reports 7 February 1997 p289) this 
restriction would apply to a trespass to the I-lighwaypiithin an area designated býý the order. 
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Racial Pickefingý 
In many ways it may seem surprising that n-ulitant racists have not adopted the picketing 
strategy of trade unionists in some kind of jobsfor Whites" campaign. Any picketing by 
rnilitant racists, protesting that an organisation employ a number of black or ethnic 
workers while white indigenous workers are on the dole, would undoubtedly appeal to 
the xenophobic tendencies of some sections of the media and public. Should they do 
so, it seen-is likely that the Code of Practice on Picketing (1992ý would not be applicable 
since it is specifically designed to deal with trade disputes. Of course any forrn of 'racial 
picketing' would not attract the same protection under the law that legitimate trade 
disputes may possess. 65 Indeed, it could result in the plaintiff organisation seeking to 
bring an inteýference with contraC? 6 or trade or business 67 action against the pickets. Assurruing 
a legal action is commenced, it may be relatively easy for the organisation to apply to the 
courts for an injunction to stop the picketing with the primary question being that of 
68 balance of convenience. Tbough, of course, whether an injunction is granted is always 
a discretionary matter that may be indirectly influenced by the peaceful nature, or 
otherwise, of the racial picketing, 69 and whether or not unlawful means are used. 70 
However, as I shall consider shortly under inducement for a breach of a statutory dutN, 
65 An act done by a person in furtherance of a trade dispute may, in certain circlamstances, not be actionable in tort - 
Section 219 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. To this limited extent, it can be 
ar, ped that certain trade disputes can operate within the law. For a fuller consideration of the liability of Trade 
Unions and their members see Chapter 11 - 'Industrzýd Law'- Smith & Wood, 51h Edition, published Butterworths 
1993. 
I'll Mediur Island Shipping Corp v La-ugliton [1983] IRLR 218 HL. 
67 In Allen v Flood [1898] AC I HL it was held that an act lawful in itself is not converted by a malicious or bad 
motive into an unlawful act leading to civil liability. It follows that for tort liability to be determined, i. e. in relation 
to interference with trade or business, an unlawful acti\itv would need to be established. It could certainly be argued 
that any -action of militant racist protesting about the employment of black workers is unlawful in the sense of being 
discriminatory and in breach of the Race Relations Act 1976 and/or likelv to stir up racial hatred as per the Public 
Order Act 1986. 
--'8 American Cýmamiid Co v Ethicon Ltd [197511 All ER 504 HL. 
69 Some e\idence of this comes from the judgement of Lord Denning in Hubbard v Pitt [1975] 3 All ER 1 vho, ývls 
prepared to respect the right to peaceful assembly and protest when he said: 'Finally the real grievance of the 
plaintiffs is about the placards and the leaflets. To restrain those by an interlocutory injunction would be contrary to 
the principle laid down by the court 85 years ago in Bonnard v Pemman [1891] 2 Ch 269 and repeatedly app bed 
ever since. That case -poke of the right of free speech. Here we have to consider the right to demonstrate and the 
right to protest on matters of public concern. These are rights which it is in the public interest that indi,, iduals 
should possess; and indeed, that they should do sowithout impediment so long as no wrongful act is done. 
70 In the case of Middlebrook Mushrooms v TGWU [1993] IRLR 232 CA. The plaintiff sought to prevent the 
union from distributing leaflets outside supermarket,,; supplied by the plaintiffs asking customers not to buy their 
mushrooms. Plaintiff- -ought an injunction on grounds of inducement to breach a contract but this failed because 
the action was not directed at the supLirnirkets (who were the contractual partner with the plaintiffs) but their 
customers. Consequentially, the act was inSted and therefore requiring unlawful means that was not established on 
the facts. 
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the fact that any words, leaflets or placards, n-uy be inducing an organisation 71 to act in 
contravention of the Race Relations Act 1976 must display the potential for establishing 
unlawfW means. 
LiabffiW for inducement of a breach of a statutogy du1y 
One area where I consider that an interlocutory injunction is a remote possibifitv is with 
regards to the inducement of a local authority to breach its statutory duty under s7l of 
the Race Relations Act 1976. The general potential for this form of liabilitv was first 
raised in Meade v Haringgy London Borough Council 72 which was a case that involved 
plaintiff parents arguing that by closing a school during a caretakers' strike, the 
Education Authority was in breach of a statutory duty to provide education. While the 
Court declined to apply the interlocutory Junction on these grounds it would have had 
the effect of making the unions liable for inducmg the authority to breach its duty. For 
this to apply, according to Deakin and Alor7isy 73 the statutory duty must be independently 
actionable at the suit of the plaintiff. 
Clearly, each incident would therefore depend upon the facts of a particular case - but it 
is difficult to imagine the circumstances where groups like the BNP or Combat 18 could 
be directly liable. 74 For example, although the local authority is under a statutory 
obligation to promote equality of opportunity, and racial tolerance, it is hard to imagine 
that any Court would readily Wish to prevent a political party (like the BNP) from 
campaigning in relation to the discretionag application of this statutory duty. Lo ically, 91 
much would depend upon the form of protest and whether or not there was 
interference by unlawful means. 75 Indeed, the requirement for unlawful means IS surely 
necessary in order to keep the tort liability within manageable lIrrUts and the central 
71 An organi-ation can breach the Race Relations Act under Part Il by discrimination in employment and under Part 
III in relation to the provision of goods, facilities, senices and premises. It is also unlawful., under section 31 to 
induce or attempt to induce a person to do any act that contravenes Part II of 111. 
72 [1979] ICR 494. 
73 Eabour Law, Deakin & Morris - Butterworths 1995. This argument is based upon the case of Associated British 
Portsv TGWU 119891 IRLR 305. 
74 This is primarily because it is hard to imagine circumstances whereby a local authority would act in breach of a 
statutory dury ns a result of inducement from such far right groups. However, it mav be possible that tlie\ý would act 
in breach as a result of pressure from other groups - býl they Tenants Associations, Trade Unions or political parties 
like the Conservqfi\-c,, [., about, Liberal Democrats, SNP or Plaid C\, mru. 
75 The need for unlaw ful means was suggested as being necessary in Associated British Ports v TG WU 
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principle, established in Allen v Flood, 76 that an act lawfiA in itself is not converted by a I 
bad or malicious motive into an unlawful act leading to civil liability. 
As discussed earlier, unlawful means can consist of trespass, nuisance, etc. However, if 
in conducting 'racial picketing7 words are used which are calling upon the local authority 
to abandon its equal opportunities policy, there may be potential for establishing 
unlawful means in light of a breach of s. 31 of the Race Relations Act 1976. 'IbiS could 
apply, depending upon the facts, because those picketing could be held to be inducing, 
or attempting to induce a person 77 to do any act that contravenes Part 11 of Part III of 
the Race Relations Act - i. e. to refuse to carry out a statutory duty. The persons being 
induced are elected members and officials responsible for the policy of the authority. 
Injunctions in relation to Criminal Offences. 
It may, in certain circumstances, also be possible for a local authority to seek an 
injunction to prevent the conunission of a crin-unal offence. '11ils extraordinary power, 
under s222 of the Local Government Act 1972, is rarely used and has only been applied 
in the specific circurnstances of norninal fines being unlikely to deter the activity of 
conunercial orgamsations. 
An obvious example of the type of use of this injunctive power under s. 222, can be 
found in the way that local authorities have obtained injunctions against large companies 
in order to obtain fWfilment of the Sunday trading laws. A norniinal fine of a few 
hundred pounds IS hardly a deterrent to a company that may make huge profits from 
continued trading. 'Me use of an injunction, in these circumstances, means that any 
breach technically results in a contempt of court - with potential serious consequences 
for the offender. The logic behind these injunctions is being one of providing a 
preventive remedy where fines fail to act as a deterrent. It follows that it must be 
unlikely an injunction would be granted for racial harassment - given that the police 
possess powers of arrest and any culprit brought before the courts could face a term of 
impnsonment. 78 
76 [IM] AC 1 HL. 
77 Assuming the racial picketing is directed towards Council policy it would seem that an elected councillor might 
logically be a person to whom the inducement is directed. 
7-1 Section 4a(5) of the Public Order Act 1986 (as amended by the Criminal justice and public Order Act 1994) 
provides for a term of imprisonment, not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale 
or both, for intentional harassment alarm or distress. 
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Appearance in Proceedings. 
Section 222 of the Local Government Act 1972 states that a local authonitv "ma ... a ear _y 
pp 
21 
in aqy ýgal proceedinTs. Forbes argues this phrase is open to two possible 
interpretations: 
That an authority can take part in proceedings in the same way, as an individual, 
e. g. when joined as a third party In proceedings. 
Mat an authority may appear in proceedings to represent the local public 
interest. 
It would seem that the phrase has not been considered in any decisions. However, a 
narrow interpretation of the powers under s. 222 would mean that an authority could 
only appear in proceedings of which it was directly interested. A wider interpretation 
means that local authorities have similar powers to that of the Attorney General who 
may appear in any proceedings with leave of the court to put forward the GoverQment's 
views on public policy. 79 
As Duncan Forbes persuasively argues, the 1972 Act gives no clue as to why the word 
"appear" was included in the 1972 Act when it had not been included in the 1933 Act, 
from which s222 originated. Section 222 clearly provides local authorities with wider 
powers than those enjoyed by private citizens. As such, it is reasonable to argue that 
s222 does provide a local authority with powers to intervene in other proceedings. 1his 
would mean that a local authority night have power to appear in any civil or criminal 
proceedings involving acts of n-ulitant racism. This could have the advantage of 
ensuring the local public interest IS placed before the court. 
Section 222 also provides: 'IVherr a local aulboriýy considers it eNpedientfor the promotion or 
protection of the interests of the inhabitants of their area, thy mqy prosecute or defend or appear in aqy 
legal procee&qs. " This clearly suggests that a local authority could bring a crinunal 
prosecution, albeit that it is primarily the duty of the police to enforce the law, with 
crirninal prosecutions being under-taken by tlie Crown Prosecution Service. 
While a local authority maýy possess powers to bring a criminal prosecution, it would be 
advisable for them first to put all the available evidence before the police and invite 
71' Adarnav Adama (Attorney-General intervenmg) [1970] 3 AD ER 572. 
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them to investigate and trýl to persuade the Crown Prosecution Service to bring 
proceedmgs. To do otherwise, could be regarded as wasteful of local taxpayer ftmds. 
However, where there exists a police policy of issuing cautions, or giving lower pnontv 
to certain types of crimes, It could be that a cnrninal prosecution by the authority would 
be justified. This though, could result in the Director of the Crown Prosecution Service 
making a decision, under s. 6(2 10 ) of the Prosecut' n of Offences Act 1985, to take over 
such a prosecution. One of the consequences of so doing, may be that the DPP then 
withdraws the case. 80 It surely follows that criminal proceedings by a local authority are 
unlikely to serve the purpose of obtaining a successfW prosecution i. e. unless the CPS 
decides not to intervene, or, if they do so, they continue with the prosecution and 
obtain a conviction. Perhaps one advantage of a decision by a local authority to bring a 
prosecution, is that because of its novelty, it would bring pressure to bear upon the 
police and/or Crown Prosecution Service to give a greater priority to certain types of 
cases (e. g. prosecute instead of giving cautions). 
Prevention from Eviction Act 1977. 
One area where a local authority is given specific powers to prosecute a criminal offence 
is under the Prevention from-Evic. tion Act 1977. r" Although the Act is self evidently 
designed to deal with unlawful eviction and harassment of occupiers of housing, 
presumably by their landlord and/or agents. The tern-is of s. 1(3) provide: 
"If any person vvith intent to cause the residential occupier of any prernises: 
(a) to give up the occupation of the preryuses or any part thereof; or 
(b) to refrain from exercising any right or pursuing any remedy in respect 
of the pren-uses or part thereof; does acts likely to interfere with the 
peace or comfort of the residential occupier or members of his 
household..... " 
For example, in situations where an identified perpetrator scrawls graffiti on the door of 
a Pakistani resident: Taki's Out'or 'Paki'sgo home'. a local authority coLild have powers to 
prosecute. This is because the words used by the perpetrator go some way towards 
-: '' '11ii,; scenario, of the CPS taking over a private local authority criminal prosecution, xk-qs made clear in 
correspondence, dated 19 Jul-v 1993, from the Office of the Attorney General to CUr Jagdish Sharma Pepuýv 
Lc-idcr of Hounslow Council) -appendix reference 22. 
1ý1 See s. 6. 
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helping to establish the required specific intent 112 to cause the occupier to give up the 
of gi occupation of the prernises. Any prosecutions brought under L. 143 this le slation 
should be tried summarily with a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months, 
and/or a fine, or on indictment to a fine or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 
years or both. 83 Should a local authority decide to prosecute using this PEA legislation, 
section 222 of the Local Government Act 1972 may also enable a prosecution for 
crin-unal damage based upon the same facts of racist graffiti. Indeed, in these 
circumstances, it may be appropriate for a local authority to bring criminal proceedings 
in an area (i. e. criminal damage) which would normally involve action by the police and 
Crown Prosecution Service. 
Cooper & Quresh184 have indicated that local authority lawyers are reluctant to take 
action against racist perpetrators via the Protection from Eviction Act 1977 because of 
problems of proof, the reluctance of the courts to convict, and the lack of any 
protection it affords to victims against reprisals. 85 
This view may be over simplistic due to the fact that lawyers are always likely to be 
hesitant about bringing prosecutions which require proof beyond reasonable doubt, in 
circumstances where the mens rea requirement is likely to be difficult to establish. Ibis 
difficulty is made all the more problematic due to an understandable expectancy that the 
courts are unlikely to find guilt where an expected motive behind the legislation is not 
evident. This situation arises due to the fact that parliament clearly designed the 
Protection from Eviction legislation to deal with the unscrupulous landlord or his agent. 
It seen-is clear this legislation was not intended to deal With racial harassment undertaken 
by individual militant racists, and a question could well be asked, unconsciously or 
otherwise, as to why the police have not decided to use the new public order offence of 
harassment. 
Given such anticipated difficulties of establishing gat beyond reasonable doubt, local 
authority lawyers may be understandably reluctant to have to justify a 'racial harassment' 
see Rv Moloney [1985] 1 All ER 1025. 
'ý Section 1(4). 
Thmugh pattems not omr ojan'- published 1993 by the New Ethnicities and Education Group of the University of 
East London -3 study of the regulation of racial violence on the council estates of East London. 
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prosecution as being. (a) expedient for the promotion or protection of the interests of 
the inhabitants of their area, 86 and, (b) a reasonable use of local taxpayers' money. 
Indeed, bearing all this in mind and the financial pressures on local authorities, it is 
hardly surprising the local authority may prefer to liase with the Police to encourage 
their actiVity. 87 
One interesting aspect of a prosecution under d-ie Prevention from Eviction Act 1977 is 
that s. 1(6) enables prosecution of a body corporate. T-iis applies in circumstances 
where the body is Vicariously liable for the actions of its employees. However, given 
that rrulitant racist organisations like Combat 18 and the BNP (who are a political party) 
are not body corporate it seems they could not be prosecuted under this legislation - 
thus would especially apply since they employ very few staff with most of the activity 
being undertaken by activists. 
New powers under the Crime & Disorder Act 1998. 
One area in which local authorities will have some clear and reasonably precise powers is 
that provided under Part 1 of the Crime & Disorder Act 1998. Under S. 1 of this Act a 
local authority has powers to apply to the Magistrates Court for an anti-social behaviour 
order in circumstances where it appears to the authority that a person (aged 10 or over) 
has acted in an anti-social manner, that is to sav in a manner that caused or was likely to 
cause harassment alarm or distress to two or more persons not of the same household 
as hin-iself. 88 The Act itself is not specific on the standard of proof required, but since 
the order is prohibitive it seems the Home Office expect that Magistrates will deterrruine 
whether a defendant has acted in a manner that has caused or was likely to cause 
harassment, alarm and distress on the balance of probability - i. e. unless the defendant 
can show that his act was reasonable in the circumstances. " Should the Magistrates 
A possible approach to assist is the use of an injunction. 'fliough, a-, discussed earlier, injunctions have 
limitations when a victim faces racial hiris,; mcnt by a group of racists. See the section in flus chapter: TI)e use oj- 
injým'fions to ta-kle Iviblani rai., 17; '. 
A, per s. 222 Local Government Act 1972. 
'/' I'liough, this may need to be action under Part III of the Public Order Act 1986 (i. e. assuming sufficient evidence 
is 3vail3ble). 
-, Section (1)(b) of the Crime & Disorder Act 1998 also enables the granting of an order where such an order 
is 
necessajýT to protect Person" in the local government area in which the harassment, alima or distress was caused or 
was likely to be caused. For a discussion on the first use of an Anti-, -x)cial Behaviour Order bv a local authoritv see 
'Crinic mid disorder - ASBO', 'by Micheal Ro-, x-mi - NLJ 11999] 1051. 
- Anti-Sociql Beha)aour Orders came into effect on the Iv April 1999. See Philip Plowden 'Love thy neighbour' 
N Lj 119991479. '1 lu,; article also discu sses the burden of proof issue. 
ýLOXDON) 
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grant this 'anti-social behaviour order', it will have effect for a period of not less than 
two years. 'Should a person, without reasonable excuse, do anything that is prohibited 
by the 'anti-social behaviour order' he will then be liable for up to six months' 
imprisonment/and or a fine on summary conviction and up to five years 
imprisonment/and or a fine on indictment. 
While these new powers have not yet been fully tested in the courts, " it seen-is possible 
that local autl-iorities will work with the police where known rruilitant racists are active 
within the communitv. It may be possible for police officers to appear in court, as 
background witnesses, supporting local authority applications for anti-social behaviour 
orders. Likewise, where a known rrulitant racist is charged before the Magistrates Court 
for matters like harassment, or even crirrunal damage arising from graffiti, we rnay see 
d-ie local authority indirectly supporting the Crown's evidence by seeking an 'anti-social 
behaviour order' in an effort to influence the individual's future community behaviour. 
A local authority/ landlords abifity to tackle militant racists. 
One area where local authorities possess notable powers to tackle militant racism is in 
their responsibility as a Landlord. These powers can be used to both assist victims of 
racial harassment and to invoke action against perpetrators of militant racism in 
circumstances where they are council tenants. 
Eviction of racists. 
As a landlord, a local authoritN- can seek to influence the racist behaviour of tenants by 
education, persuasion, and by taking practical and even legal steps. " For example, it is 
usual for landlords to include within tenancy agreements, a 'hoz'se or nui . sance to otl)er tenaes' 
clause - and it is certainly within the powers of a housing authority to include within its 
tenancy agreements terms and conditions designed to prevent racial harassment. 92 
ý, ý The only reported case in 1998 involved 3 'sex offender order' under s. 2 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, 
resulting in a eight year long night curfew being imposed on Mich3el Gordon 3 conxicted rapist. Ilie application was 
y to pmled Me pub&-lion7 se jus b made by the Cluef Officer of Police and granted on ground- th3t it w3s "ne6vssai rz( arn 
ý, jpv is put underw*wfior eý, obljears, Ilie Times, 24 December 1998. S "cc 
`tý 'Couned eacts ramt lenantý ''. rchlight, April 1995, for some example, for local mithority actions qg. qmst rqciKt S 
Scq 
tenantý. In Dundee a fiunýy were evicted for raci-ý har-assmelit of neighbours. Mule in Greem0ch tile loc. -ý 
mithority was, gr-Tritcd a possession order against Dand Bynorth, a BNP ictvost who had rqcialh, harassed his 
neiglibour,. 
ýII fousing Act 1985 2 1. 
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One obvious advantage of a racial harassment clause, vnthm a tenancy agreement, IS that 
it educates tenants by giving notice that racial harassment is unacceptable and could lead 
to eviction. 93 As discussed earlier, it rruy also assist in providing the opportuniq,, where 
appropriate, for the authority to seek an injunction prohibiting future harassment. 
Obviously an express clause within a tenancy agreement can provide grounds for 
possession 94 in circumstances where it is breached. However, this is not decided on 
simple contractual notice terms, but subject to proof that it IS reasonable for the court 
to make an order for possession. 95 Indeed, it is possible to seek possession on the 
grounds of 'nuisance or annqyance 96 even if there are no express clauses in the tenancy 
agreement. 97 It is also possible to extend the liability of the tenant to hold them 
responsible for the nuisance or annoyance by members of the family living with him or 
her. 
For example, Hounslow Council has incorporated a clause within their tenancy 
agreements that specifically refers to racial harassment. 98 Shol-ild the Council seek to 
obtain possession specifically on grounds of a breach of this clause thev would need to 
establish that the motive for the harassment was racial (or on grounds of sex, age, 
religion etc). As Will be discussed in the later chapter that deals with racial motive 99 - 
there can be significant problems in establishing motive because it involves reading the 
mind of the defendant. To this end, the authority may wish to seek possession on 
general grounds of a breach of nuisance or annoyance - where motive is not a necessary 
1)3 Issues in relation to the educational effectiveness of the law will be discussed in general terms later in this thesis. 
ý14 I lousing Act 1985 - Schedule 2, ground 1. An example of such an eviction is the possession granted to Hounslow 
Council after q man disturbed his neighbours for two years vith constant loud noise and offensive language. The 
neighbours had kept a diary to monitor the nuisance (Noisy neighbour evicted by couned' - Hounslow, Feltham and 
Hanworth Times, 19 April 1996). 
')5 Housing Act 1985 - s. 84(2). 
91, This term has its ordinary meaning - see e. g. Tod-Heatley v Benham (1888) 40 ChD 80. 
Housing Act 1985 - Schedule 2, ground 2. 
ý, s 'I'ojv must not abwse, harass, or intimidahe any neýghbour or other local resident(s) because of their ram, se%, age, Zýioa, ý, rr mental or 
physical disabdiýv, jor being lesbian or gay, or encomrage any other person to do such acts' - Hounslow Council (Housing 
Department) Tenancy Agreement (1993). 
')'ý Chapter Seven - Rwial .ý loliralim and flostihlý'- 
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factor. It should still be possible to argue that the racial motive behind the nuisance is 
an aggravating factor supporting a possession order. 100 
While a housing authority may apply to the courts for possession, it is important to 
reflect that success cannot be judged upon the granting of an order. For example, it 
may be that, in any proceedings, the defendant tenant gives an undertaking that they will 
cease any further nuisance. 101 It may also be the case that the court, firiding in favour of 
the authority, isa suspended order for possession. 102 Ibis situation arises when a give 11 
tenant is allowed to remain in his/her home provided that s/he complies with any 
conditions imposed. In many ways, this may be regarded as a successful outcome since 
it signifies to the troublesome tenant that any continuance of the behaviour will enable 
the authority to apply for a immediate warrant of possession should the conditions be 
breached. 103 
Homelessness. 
Local authorities may not only have responsibility as a landlord but they are also likely to 
be under a legal duty to provide accommodation for the homeless. Ibis can raise 
problems for local authorities that have succeeded vnth an eviction of a tenant. While 
the courts may grant possession of one property - the authority may find themselves 
With immediate responsibility to provide some form of accommodation for that same 
tenant. 
Taking the example of the 'Silvester' farTýily evicted in Hounslow for, inter alia, racial 
harassment. "' The local authority, in an effort to declare their opposition to racial 
harassment, sought publicity over the eviction. In doing so, the authority declared: 
'T/)g are deemed to be intentionally bomeless so me don't have aly intention of re-homsing them. " 
Despite this understandable press statement - Hounslow Council, as a housing 
100 When Hotmslow Council sought possession from the 'Silvester' family in Isleworth various grounds were 
submitted - vith harassment included along -, xith noise, nuisance, rent arrears etc. However, the resulting publicity 
associated with the evicted centred upon the Councils attempts to T"Oe out raasmfiom the Bomugh - Etiý*d after 3years 
of hate' - Hounslow, Feltham & Hanworth Times, 17 May 1996). See also Hounslow Council - Housing News, July 
1996, where it was reported that the eviction was for "nuisance. " - making no reference to racial harassment. 
101 For an example of this see - 'Nois ,y neighhour emý*d 
by coumd'- Hounslow, Feltham & Hatiworth Times, 19 April 
1996. Wiile the main story relates to an eviction for noise; a supplementary story indicates a suspended order for 
possession with a Feltham man being ordered to promise in writing not to cause further nuisance to his neighbours. 
See also Hounslový- Council - Housing News -July 1996. 
102 A suspended order for possession can last indefinitely - Yates v Morris [1950] 2 All ER 577 
103 Such an application can be madearithout notice being given to the tenant. 
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authority, may have a statutory duty to fulfil a housing 'priority need' to categories of 
persons who are homeless. Clearly, this does not mean they must provide 
accommodation - but it does mean they must consider the merits of any application. 
The extent of preference given is discretionary and factors such as dependent 
children /pregnancy etc must be taken into account and may even convert the 
application to one of priority. 104 What an authority cannot do is fetter its discretion by 
applying a blanket rule that a person evicted via court proceedings is intentionally 
homeless. 105 Indeed, any such blanket rule suggests a breach of the ggeneralprinqýles of 
administrative law and could be open to challenge through the courts. "' 
In reality, this can mean that a tenant/farruly evicted for racial harassment may be able 
to show just cause for housing assistance from the local authority. Thi may result in a I is 
housing authority having an 'interim duty' to accommodate often in 'temporary', 
private sector, bed and breakfast accommodation - while issues of need and liability are 
detem-uned. 1 07 To this extent, eviction of militant racist tenants may not always be a 
desirable solution - due to the taxpayer being likely to have to pay for the financial cost 
of expensive alternative housing accommodation. It follows, therefore, that eviction 
should only be taken as a last resort - i. e. when all other means have failed and, despite 
various warnings, the racist activity continues. Certainlv, eviction of tenants who 
themselves committed acts of racial harassment may be necessary. 
Racism by Children. 
Despite some limited support for the eviction of racist tenants, there n-uy be moral 
concerns about the occasionally applied practice of evicting tenants because of the racist 
activities of their children - with children as young as three reported, by the police, as 
being involved in racial harassment. ' 08 
For example, under s. 1 89(l) (a) of the Housing Act 1996 a pregnant woman - or a person with whom she resides 
or might reasonably be expected to reside - has a priority housing need for accommodation. 
105 Housing Act 1996 s. 191 - provides that a person become homeless intentionally if. "he deliberale6v does orfails to do 
anything in consequence of which he ceases to ocao accommodafion which is at-adable for his occupation and whkh it wou& hate been 
rrasonable for him M continue to ocaoýy. 
IIx, See A-G ex rel. Tilley v Wandsworth LBC [1981] 1 WLR 854. Also pages 205 and 370 of Administrafite Lj2i-'bv 
H. W. R. Wade - Sixth Edition 1989, published by Clarendon Press, Oxford - with regards to the potential for a local 
authority to act unlawfully by fettering it's discretion by applying a blanket rule in relation to homeless persons. 
107 S. 188 of the Housing Act 1996. 
IOS Police reported that this incident occurred on the Butts Farm Estate in Hounslow. lUist Chdd Outlam,? - 
Hounslow, Feltham & Hanworth Times, 12 January 1996. 
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An example of child racism, and the response of a local authority, can best bý 
demonstrated bv considering a news story from the Feltham Chronicle. 109 This ston- 
explains how Hounslow Council is prepared to take eviction proceedinLys against 
families where the children have been identified as perpetrators of racial harassment. "O 
It seems that a group of seven children, aged between six and eleven who all go to the 
same school, have been held responsible for the racial harassment of two tenants living 
on a Feltham estate - with this leading to Hounslow Council speaking to the parents 
and publicly assertingy 
"Parents are res childi ponsiblefor their children's actions and if -en are harassing people, their 
parents will be called to interview to &, scuss their actions. -ýf the 
harassment continues, and 
assumin g the parents are coundl tenants, thy may be in breach of their tenang. Thy would 
then begiven a chance to put matters ri ht, bt the harassment continued it could lead to gu 
lqal a&on [andl] or etiction. " 
Clearly, the local authority is acting within its powers - both in taking up the actions of 
the children with their parents and in deciding to take possession proceedingsill. One 
possible alternative to using powers of eviction, is to use Social Services' powers In 
relation to child protection, with the argument existing that a child involved in racial 
harassment attacks is "at risk andfikely, to saffer significant harm , 112 Obviously, this kind of 
113 - 114 
approach to tackling child racism may be open to challenge via judicial review - 
although, the local authority could defend its position on the basis that while carrying 
10ý) Tatentsface eticfion otvr race attack ýv chddren' Hounslow Chronicle, 25 July 1996. See also MoraLyl anjust to etict 
families due to child racism'- comments of Peter Jepson - The Chronicle, 26 September 1998. 
110 A case which provides a precedent for taking action against tenants even when it is their children who are 
perpetrating racial violence is 'London Borough of Camden v McIntyre, C. Vakinýý the Law Vork against Racial 
Harassment'- Report of the Legal Action Group Research Project [1990]). 
Gus John (Director of Education, Hackney LBC) suggested publicly at a Teople's Tribunal on Racial Harassment'that 
Hounslow Council could make use of Cliild Protection powers %, hen dealing with racial harassment involving 
children. However, the Director of Social Services, for Hounslow, was less than positive about such an approach. 
112 The Dept of Health provide guidelines - 'Working Together' - for child protection registration and these suggest 
that the basis for Child Protection is that of a child suffering, or is likely to suffer significant harm. 'I'lle cases of Rv 
Harrow LBC ex parte D [1989] 3 WLR 1239 and Rv Norfolk C. C. ex parte M [198912 All ER 359 recognised 
Vorkxg Together' as the authoritative guide for Social Senices Departments when dealing with child protection 
registration. 
113 Section 26 of the Children? s Act 1989, and aýo the Vorking Together' guidelines, provide for a complaints 
procedure being established by the local authoriýy. It is generally considered that this complaint procedure should 
be extimisted before seeking judicial review - though there seerns to be no legal requirement to this effect 
114 An exarnple of this is the case of Rv Norfolk CC, ex parte M [1989] 2 All ER 359 ýOiich emphasised the 
unportance of authorities cornphring with the principles of natural justice. 
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out its child protection function 115 it remains under a statutory duty 
116 to elin-unate 
unlawfLA racial discrirrunation. 
One advantage of using child protection powers to tackle child racism is that all 
children, irrespective of whether their parents live in the private sector or are council 
tenants, can be treated alike. What is more, it is not about punishment but about 
working in partnership with the farnily and the school' 37 to address the problem. 
On grounds of morality the use of eviction powers in relation to child racists seen-is 
wrong, simply because it treats those that live in rented accommodation differently than 
those whose parents own their property. Another option - which prevents 
discrimination on the basis of social background - would be to use the new powers 
under s. 1 of the Crime &Disorder Act 1998 to obtain an anti-social behaviour order in 
the circumstances where racial harassment is evident and the child is aged 10 or older. 118 
In addition, it should be noted that s. 34 of the Crime-& Disorder Act 1998 abolishes the 
presumption of Doli lncapax, "' resulting in children under 10 being regarded as not 
criminally responsible, whilst those over 10 are. 120 This means that children, as voung as 
ten, could face crin-iinal proceedings for any illegal acts, though in practice they may 
initiallybe iven a reprimand and/or warning by the police as per s. 65 of the Act. '2' 91 
11ý, Section 47 of the Children Act 1989 provides a duty on 3 local authority to investigate where they have 
reisonable cquse to suspect q child is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm. 
I I, As p4LY s7l of the Race Relqfions Act 1976 - this was discussed earlier in this chapter Linder 'P, )xerý )j a Lz), -al 
Aufhoriýy'. 
'I' In Hounslow die licartstone Project provides education on racism and bullying vrithin schools. 'I'liough, 
involvement is at the discretion of the Head and Governors of the ", chool. 
See discussion earlier in this cliqptel- Linder the title Nexpowers under Me Crime & DisorderAct 1998'. 
Doli Incapa. %- represented a legal qtteiript to recoginse the variable development of individual children and their 
capacity to appreciate the \xrongfulness of different types of actions. Tlie presumption of Doli Inapa% could only be 
rebutted by the prosecution proving tliqt the child knew wliqt lie had been doing was seriously wrong (not just 
illuolio" 01- Mischievous). l- 
For a discussion on the abolition of the presumption of Doli Incapa. %ý see page 55 - 'Blaýk3A)ne, Guide to The Crime e- 
Disorder. ýIel 199S'- written bv Rogei Lang, Ricliqrd Tavlor and Mqrtin Wasik-. 
I-" Under the Crime & Disorder Act 1998, a child (or adult) - -, %-Iio has not had a prior conviction for an offence - 
can be gcýiven oiilý, one reprimand and then one warning. 
'11-ii- is recorded and ariv offender who is given a warning 
must be brought before the courts if lie offends again aithin 2 years. In such circumstances, a conditional discharge 
is then removed from the options qvailnble to the court. For a discussion on reprimands mid wirnings see page 81 of 
'Blaekst(me'v Cuiele lo Me Crime & OisorrierAcl 199S'- written by Roger Lang, Ricliqrd Taylor and Martin Wasik. 
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In Conclusion 
A local authority has a multiplicity of ftirictions ranging from schooling to responsibihtý 
for cemeteries. However, in cam-ing out its functions - some of which it carries out 
under a discretionary power and others under a statutory duty - it has a statutory dutý 
to elirninate racial discrimination while promoting equality of opportunity and good 
relations between persons of different races. I have described this duty as a key 
function of a local authority - in the sense that all other functions must be carried out 
with this in mind. 
In this chapter I have considered the various activities, powers and duties a local 
authority can use to tackle racism. Possibly, the problem giving most concern must be 
the reports of children, some as young as three, being involved in racial harassment. 
Obviously, the criminal law has onlv limited value so far as child racist activitv is 
concerned - with other measures more likely to be appropriate. However, I have 
expressed moral concerns about local authorities using eviction powers in cases 
involving child racism - preferring instead the use of child protection procedures. At 
least this way the authorities could work with the parents - instead of punishing them 
and the rest of the faryiily - when tack-ling the problem. 'MiS forrn of solution may also 
require some form of anti-racist education at the children's school. 
I have also suggested that the statutory duty, under s. 71 of the Race Relations Act 1976, 
should be more fi. Aly defined - agreeing with Duncan Forbes that the duty should 
encompass a requirement to monitor racial harassment and to adopt procedures for 
tackling it. Forbes proposes minimum standards being imposed by the Home Office, 
and Department of the Environment, with wide powers for the Cornmission for Racial 
Equality to monitor such activities. I have agreed with this argument, but have 
reservations about providing a complaint mechanism to the County Court for an 
agency's failure to comply with its statutory duty. My reservations in this area, stem 
from the Gloticestersbire Couqy Couneil case which signifies that a lack of resources may be 
an adequate defence for not fulfilling a particular statutory duty. To this end, it is my 
subrnission that along With a statutory duty there should be some ring fencing of 
finance, possibly performance related, in order to ensure that a duty is fulfilled. At least 
this way, it may be easier for the courts to determine whether or not an authority is 
acting in accord with its statutory duty. 
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In this chapter, I have highlighted a few of the actions local authorities have taken, and 
could take, to tackle rnilitant racism - though it is clear they may be able to do more if 
central government tied finance to the statutory duty. Future chapters of this thesis will 
examine issues of racial motivation and how to tackle rnilitant racism by introducing 
some amendments to the Public Order legislation - at the same time we may come 
across other examples of local authority action. 
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RACIST SPEECH & LITERATURE. 
Chapter Thi-ee. 
In this chapter I will exan-une issues of both racist speech and literature. In order to 
conduct this exammation, I have produced two evidence assessment sheets. The first is 
of what can loosely be determined as a collection of 'Racist Mateiials 11 consisting of 
Jokes 
as told by the comedian Bernard Manning, racist material sent via a Book Club and 
other materials that are anti-Semtic. The second assessment sheet relates to BATP/AT 
, Alatei7*aldistt7'butedintl)eLondoiiBoi-ougl)ofHouiislon, '. From these evidence assessments, I 
will consider the examples, relating and applying them to the appropriate sections of the 
Public Order Act 1986, along with the Malicious Communications Act 1988 and The 
Post Office Act 1953. In exarruning racist material, using the evidence assessment 
sheets, I will not give consideration to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, since 
to establish an offence under the le islation it is necessary to prove that the conduct, 91 
which amounts to harassment, has occurred on at least two separate occasions. The 
racist material referred to in this chapter may well have been part of a sustained 
campaign of harassment, but without such evidence it is inappropriate to make such 
assumptions. However, towards the end of this chapter, I will exan-une the potential for 
using the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 as a means of tackling racist speech and 
conduct that may amount to harassment. 
I Will also, later in the chapter, consider the issue of racist graffiti and fly posting, relating 
fl-iis both to existing planning laws and the Crirninal Damage Act 1971. Finally, I will 
consider the issue of racist chanting at football matches, and the Football (Offencesý 
Act 1991. 
Possibly, ffils approach can be criticised as an analysis of racist material that is based 
upon laws preceding the introduction of the Cnme & Disorder Act 1998. However, the 
reason for this is fi-indamental to an understanding of how anti-racist cnme laws work in 
Britain. Indeed, such an approach is necessary because the Cnme & Disorder Act 1998, 
while establishing new alternative offences for racist cnme, only provides an alternative 
charging and sentencing policy. It does not make it easier for criminal acts to be 
punished. By way of illustration, the Cnme & Disorder le islation provides a new 91 
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alternative offence of racial criminal damage (with an enhanced sentence) - but issues of 
racial motivation or hostility are only applicable if the courts first determine that the 
accused is guilty of criminal damage. This emphasises that the basic offence remains 
fundamental to any to any finding of guilt, since a person cannot be found guilty of a 
racial element unless guilt has first been established in relation to the basic offence. It is 
for these reasons that this chapter concentrates on the potentiality for establishing 
criminal charges in relation to racist literature and material. 
The issues associated with harsher sentencing for racist crime will be considered later in 
this thesis, m the chapter titled: Racial Mofivafion and Hosfifiýy' 
Racist Material. 
Before considering the first Evidence Assessment Sheet, it is important to reflect that 
while these assessments are of value as an academic exercise, thev provide an incomplete 
picture. For example, I often have no knowledge of specific circumstances of the 
distribution, previous record of the accused etc. As such, the assessment relates to a 
cold analysis on the basis of the information from within the literature. However, this is 
of value, since it is probably the way that most people receive the material - usually 
through their letterboxes. 
Evidence Assessment Sheet 
-"I consists of eight items of 
'Ra(ist Material' The first, 
Appendix Item (1), involves a number of 'jokes' as told by comedian Bernard Manning at 
a dinner organised by Greater Manchester Police. APPen&x Items (2 to 5) are items of 
racist material which was sent via a book club to members of Combat 18. While 
Appen&x Items (6 and 7). are two items of anti-Sernitic material sent through the post to 
Jewish Synagogues within Hounslow. The last item, Appendix Item (8), is an extract from 
a book written by Lady Birdwood which resulted in a prosecution under s. 19, Public 
Order Act 1986. 
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Evidence Assessment Sheet (1) 
Racist Material. I BM I I Book Cl jb items I I Anti-Sernitic 
(Y = yes, -N= no, -? = PossiblelDoubtful. ) Appendix Ref: 
1 11 1 21 31 41 51 1 61 
Public Order Act 1986 (The answer to Question A must be affirmative to asrablish a prosecution under thisAct). 
A Were the words used threatening, abusive or insulting? Y Y Y Y Y Yi? Y/7 Y 
B With intent to cause harassment, alarm or distress (s. 4a)? ? ? ? /Y ?N Y ? ? Yi? 
C thereby causing any person harassment alarm or distress (s. 4a)? ?N ? ? ? Y/? Yl? Y1? Y1? 
D Within hearing/sight of a person likely to be caused h, a, or d (s. 5)? Y # # # # # # # 
E lrdentlavmre his words/writing -threatening, abusive or insulting (s. 6). Y1? # # # # # # # 
F 
i 
Use words/display material - intentilikeli hood to stir up racial hatred 
(S. 18).? 
? Y/? Y1? Yi? Yi? Yi? Yi? Y 
G Publish/distribute material - intentllikelihood to stir up racial hatred 
(S. 19)? 
# ? Y/? Yl? Y/? Y/? Yi? Y 
Malicious Communications Act 1988 (sending of letters etc. with intent to causc- distress or anxieQ). 
H Is the message indecent, grossly offensive or a threat (s. 1)? # Y? Y/? Y Y Y1? Yi? # 
I Purpose to cause distress or anxiety to recipient (s. 1 (b))? # N N N N Y Y # 
Post Office Act 1963 (prohibition on sending by post of certain articles). 
j Was the item sent via the post off ice? (can only proceed under Act, if 
yes). 
# ?N ?N ?N ?N 
I 
Y Y # 
_ K Words/designs which are grossly offensive or indecent (s. 1 1)? # Y? Y1? ? Y/? Y/? Y/? # 
L Were the remarks racially offensive? Y Y Y Y ? Y Y Y 
M Can a racial motive be inferred? N Y Y Y Yl? Y Y Y 
Public Order Act 1986. 
Nearly 50% of racial incidents that get taken to court involve the Public Order Act 
1986. ' In order to bring a prosecution in relation to racist speech or literature under this 
Act, it is essential that the words used are Ybreateiiiiýý abushe or instlltiq'. nis 
requirement applies to all relevant sections of the legislation. The fact that the words 
may be i-aciall), offensive' is certainly not sufficient to bring a prosecution. The words 
must be more than 'offiensive'- they must be Wmeateni% abusive or insulthig'. 
While the statute does not proVide a specific definition of what these three words mean, 
the case of Brutus v Cozens2 lays down some principles from which it is possible to 
establish a meanmg or understandirig. This case arrived in a Magistrate's Court out of an 
1 Figures produced by the Crown Prosecution Service for year ending 3P March 98 show that 480o of crillun.. ý 
niý_ , rljýr 1997-1998ý. cII "Irge, in relition to racial incidents, ire public order offences (See 'Racial Im-ident, 11(miti g Rtyy 
These figures ire based upon the ACPO definition of a racial incident. 
-' ( 197212 All PIR 1297. 
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anti-apartheid demonstration at the Wimbledon Tennis Championships. Brutus had 
stepped onto the tennis court blowing a whistle and throwing leaflets. He was arrested 
and charged with msultmg behaviour under s-5 of the Public Order Act 1986. At first 
instance, the Magistrate's held that his behaviour had not been insulting and disnussed 
the information without calling him to give evidence. On appeal, by the prosecutor, the 
Divisional Court ruled that 'insulting behaviour', under the Act, was bebatýour which 
affronted other people and etidenced a disrespect or contet*t for their ri: *ghts, and which reasonable 
persons would foresee as kkaly to cause resentment or prolest. Thus, irisulting behaviour, by 
Brutus, would likely be established. 3 
Brutus appealed to the House of Lords, which disagreed with the Divisional Court and 
held that the meaning of an ordinary word of the English Language is 'not a question of 
lam, but offact' In doing so, Lord Reid corrimented: 
'T cannot agree xitb that. Parliament bad to solve the difficult question of how farfreedom of 
smgpc re wvc peech or behaviour ust be limited in the eneral ubli inte st. It ould ha e been going mu h 
too far toprohibit all speech or conduct Akely, to occasion a breach of the peace because determined 
opponents may not shrink from organisiýg or at least threatening a breach of the peace in order to 
silence a speaker whose views thg detest. Therefore vigorous and it ma y be distasteful or 
unmannerly ipeech or behaviour is permitted so long as it does not go byond any one of three limits. 
It must not be threatening, It must not be abusive. It must not be insulting. I see no reason why 
any of these should be construed as baviýg a speeiaýly, wide or s pecially, narrow meaning. Tbg are 
all limits easily recognisable by the ordinag man. Free speech is not iVaired ýy ru§ýT them out. 
But before a man can be convicted it must be clearly shown that one or more of them has been 
disregarded IFIe were referred to a number o dictionag meanings of 'insult' such as treating with f 
insolence or conteVt or indgnity or derision or &shonour or offensive disrespect. Many thi, ýTs 
otbem, ise unoyectionable may be said or done in an insulting way. There can be no definition. But 
an ordinag sensible man knows an insult when be sees or bears it. " 
Applying these 'ordinary usage - natural meaning - methodology' principles to Question 
A, as shown on EAS [1], it is clear that in six out of the eight items of appendix material, 
a clear positive answer of 'YES' can be given as to whether the material has the potential 
g' Let us take the *okes of Bernard Manning (Appen&x to be Yhreatening, abusive or insmIlin .I 
Item (1)) as an example. It is easily arguable that the joke about shooting six niggers and 
a rabbit is both 'threatening and insulting' to blacks. It establishes an assumption of 
g urth th violence towards blacks, and can thus be regarded as 'threatenin 'F er, to accept e 
shooting of six niggers, while questioning the need to shoot a rabbit, can be regarded as 
insulting to blacks. 
-ý 'Me Magistrates Court would stiU have needed to heqr the case. 
62 
With regards to Appendix Items (6 & 7), it IS evident that the material has the potential 
for being considered as insulting to Jews, or to many other sections of the public. 
Indeed, the general theme from both items of literature, is one of Justification /denial in 
relation to the gassing of millions of Jews in concentration camps during the last world 
war. 
Section 4(a) of the Pubfic Order Act 1986. 
Section 154 of the Criminal justice & Public Order Act 1994 amends the Public Order 
Act 1986 to establish a new and more severe offence in relation to harassment. This 
new sAa does not replace the old s. 5 of the Public Order Act 1986, but is intended to 
run as complimentary to it. 1ndeed, s. 5 only carried a fine at a maximum of Level 3 on 
the Standard Scale, while sAa can result in a maximum term of imprisonment of six 
months and/or a fine not exceeding Level 5 on the Standard Scale. 
As With most relatively new laws, it will take mariv years for the 'impact of s. 4a to be fully 
recogniSed. What the legislation does make clear, IS that an offender must have 'intent'to 
cause harassment, alarm or distress, using threatening, abusive or insulting words or 
behaviour, or disorderly behaviour' - thereby 'causinT that or another person harassment, 
alarm or distress. 
1hus, applying such legal principles to the Bernard Mannirig material, it is likely that the 
so-called jokes would be considered as 'threatening andlor insulting' It is sufficient to 
establish that any person present was caused harassment, alarm or distress - even if the 
jokes were directed towards another. 
To prove intent to cause a person 'harassment, alarm or distress' may not be so clear cut. 
Manning may try to argue that his intent was to make the audience laugh. However, this 
should prove an unsatisfactorv defence given the 'threatening or insulting' nature of the 
words used. Such intent would be decided, as per Rv Moloney', as a matter of fact and 
according to the ordinary usage of the word. 
It IS certainly possible that anv (assurrung Manning would opt for trial) would have 
sympathy for a well known entertainer who was practising his stage act. The use, by 
Mannm& of racist words that were Vbreatem'ng and insmlting') and directed towards a 
4 or, as per 41(l) (b) diNplaý-- any writing, sign or other visible representation which is %hreatenmg, abushe or msxUmg' 
ý' [19851 A. C. 905 HL 
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coloured individual within the audience, would certainl3- indicate intent to 'embarrass'. 
However, the law requires intent to cause 'barassment, alarm or distress' Given that a 
prison sentence could be the outcome, it may be difficult for the prosecution to 
convmce a 'ury beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, it is possible that any *un- could be I. I. 
sympathetic towards the defendant once elements of reasonable doubt are raised. 
So far as the Book Club items are concerned, the strongest case would seem to exist with 
regards to Appendix Item (5). It is clear that 'threateninT and abusive'words have been used. 
It can also be argued that the words 'Nowjou have the lechnoýgy so bomb the BA STARDS ", 
together with instructions on how to make a bomb, establishes a clear intent to cause 
harassment, alarm or distress to somebody. The real legal question is whether it has 
thereýy caused any person harassment, alaim or distress? Presumably, if a person who had sight 
of the publication were to complain that the words used had caused him alarm or 
distress then the actus reus would be fulfilled. As already mentioned, the fact that he 
personally was not intended to be caused alarm or distress would not be an adequate 
defence. 
Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986. 
It can be seen from Evidence Assessment Sheet 
-Llj 
that only Appendix Item (1), the 
Bernard Manning material, is applicable with regards to establishing a prosecution under 
s. 5 of the Public Order Act 1986. 'Ibis is because there is no evidence that Appendix 
Items (2 to 8) *involves use of 'threatenin& abusive or insulting' words /display of writing/sign 
,6 etc. 'xitkn the heariq or siht ofa_person kke# to be caused harassment, alarm or distress. 
Section 5, although dealing with harassment, is constructed differently to s. 4a. Indeed, 
s-4a does not entail this lirnitation of being within the 'beariq or sight'. 1bus, sAa could 
apply to the use of Ybfrateniig, abusive or insulting' words in a leaflet that has been 
7 
produced and handed out to people, say at a bus Stop. Should one of the recipients 
then pass the leaflet on by leaving it on the bus, the person who had produced the 
leaflet could have committed an offence, if this new reader was caused alarm or distress 
ý Items 2 to 5 were sent via a book club. Thus, the words/writing was not used within the hearing or sight of a 
person: The Anti-Senutic, items 6&7, vvere sent via the post - see Chappell v DPP [1989] 89 Cr. App. R which 
suggests that the Malicious Communications Act 1988 [or even Post Office Act 19531 is applicable - not the Public 
Order Act 1986. Item 8 in-%, olx-e,, statements in a book. For further discussion of Chappell v DPP see Racist literature 
, md the Malicious Communjýat-s Act 1988'later in the chapter. 
7 Both sAa and s. 5 apply to a public or a private place. However, under both sections no offence can be conunitted 
in a private dQmIling (see below in this chapter). 
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(i. e. assun-ung an intent existed to cause a person [any person] harassment, alarm or 
distress). By comparison, under s. 5, the person who produced and handed out the 
leaflet could only be liable in connection with the people at the bus stop - since he 
would not be within the heafiq or sight" of people who subsequently got on the bus (and 
read the leaflet) at another bus stop. 
It can also be noted that s. 4a is specific, in that it requires a person to be 'caused' 
harassment, alarm or distress. Whereas, s-5 only requires a person to be 'likely to be 
caused' harassment alarm or distress. A question therefore arises as to whether the 
likelihood has to be a reasonable one, or one that a reasonable person could foresee. 
While there is no specific case under the Public Order Act 1986, the case of Jordan 
Burgp3Lne9 dealt with a similar issue. This case involved a fascist expressmg support for 
Hitler and condemning Jews. The question of law being whether the public speech was 
'Neely' to cause a breach of the peace. Jordan argued free speech and that the violent 
reaction of Jews amongst the audience, to his speech, was unreasonable. In the 
Divisional Court, Lord Parker remarked: 
P "Once as eaker uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour .. tbatperson must take his audience as hefinds them, and if those words to that audience are likely, to provoke a breach of 
thepeace, then the s peaker isguilýy of that offence. 
Also, the prosecution does not have to prove that a person was caused harassment, 
alarrn or distress, as long as the consequence was likely. In Lodge v Andrews. 'O it was 
sufficient that an unidentified driver of a car n-night have been alarmed by the sight of 
someone walking down the middle of the road late at night. 
Section 5- Mens Rea reqwhrement. 
The case of DPP v Clarke" establishes that a police officer is capable of being harassed, 
alarmed or distressed. 2 IhIS case also illustrates the mens rea requirement for s. 5 under 
s. 6(4) Public Order Act 1986. Clarke was among demonstrators outside an abortion 
' In Chappell v DPP [1989189 Cr. App. R., at page 89, Lord justice Watkins said: "Ifid to see hox aperson wifing 
,ga 
ktter to another, m1ho opens it in the absence of the sender, can, on any masonable rrach* of s. 5, be said to be a person andl or deliterin 
xho 'mses ... uwds or behaviomr .. m4thin the hearing or sýgbt of aperson... ' who mcrites it. 
" [196312 All ER 225. 
10 The Times, 26 October 1988. 
11 [19921 CriAn LR 60. 
12 This mny be applicable to any possible Bernard Mqftnmg case given that the sole black per-on in the audience was 
a police officer. 
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clinic. The police requested the demonstrators not to display posters of an aborted 
foetus. 'Me magistrates found that the pictures were abusive and insulting and that their 
display caused alarm and distress to one of the police officers present. However, under 
s. 6ý4) the magistrates found that the demonstrators did not intend the pictures to be 
'threatenin tin nor were they 'aware' that they n ght be. , g, abusive or 
insul T -u 'Mey were 
therefore acquitted. 
Clearly, this case can be criticised for its logic, in that the purpose of the posters must 
have been both to inform and distress the public. The picture of the foetus was present 
in order to grab attention and to shock people into supporting their opposition to 
abortion. If the protesters were not thernselves distressed by the abortion of a foetus, 
and thus aware that it could cause distress, what were they protesting about? 
Whatever the arguments over the case of Clarke, it IS clear that Bernard Manning could 
argue that while the words used were 'tbreatening, abusiie or insultiq' and that while it is 
'likely' that a member of the audience could feel 'harassed, alarmed or distressed bv the 
jokes, he had no intention to 'Xbreaten, abuse or insult' anyone. He was not aware that it 
may do so, With his intent being to establish joy and laughter. However, such a defence 
may be doomed to failure, given that Manning's trade mark is to obtain laughter by the 
abuse of an individual. 
As was remarked in Clarke, even if this lack of awareness defence of Manning was 
successfW, it could onlv be used once, since subsequently he would be aware that such 
jokes may ýhreaten, abuse or insult' certain groups and indiViduals. To this extent, the 
police could also consider the issuing of a formal written caution. Thereby keeping on 
record the extent of any knowledge of the accused with regards to the offence 
concerned. 
Sections 18 & 19, Public Order Act 1986. 
So far as s. 27(2) of the Public Order Act 1986 is concerned, all sections from 18 to 23 
create one offence. Thus a person cannot be penaliSed under say s. 19 for the 
, g'literature which may 
'stir up racial hatred', distribution of 'tbreateidng, abusive or insulfin 
and also be penallSed under s. 23 for possession of that same material. 
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It is also clear from Evidence Assessment Sheet [11 that s. 19 is not applicable for dealing 
with racist speech, with this section being designed to deal with the publication or 
distribution of written material. 
As can be seen from the assessment sheet, s-18 is specifically designed for dealing with 
insLilting words, or beha-viour, or the display of any written material which is 'threatening, 
abusive or insultiq, with a personguilty o f an offence ýf he intends to stir mp rmial hatred, or havin g 
regard to all the circumstances radal hatred is fikely, to be stirred up tbereýy' 
For example, with regards to Appendix Item (1), the Bernard Manning 'Jok-es'. When 
interviewed by World in Action Geoffrey Bindrnan 13 advised: 
"I think it's veg likely, indeed that there would be a case which would have to be brou , gbt 
ýy the 
Aftorng General It would be under section 18 of the Public Order Act which is the section 
which deals with incitement to rmial hatred " 
'T think there is veg strong evidence of a likelihood of radal hatred beiq slined up ýy many of the 
remarks and so-calledJokes of Bernard Mannin g. And ýf an offence has been committed ýV him, 
there's a Peg good case for sayiq the organisers [the police officers who organised the event] are 
responsible. " 
Given the extent of evidence, " and the existing law, it is clear that Bindman is correct 
when he argues that there could be a case under s. 18 of the Public Order Act 1986. 
However, before a prosecution could be brought a number of obstacles would need to 
be overcome. The first, of which, is that it is the police who have a duty- 
"to invesfigate a suspected offence, obtain evidence andform the view that a prosecution should 
be commenced Then the matter will be reported to the Crown Prosecution Seivice. the 
CPS, having reviewed the available evidence, wish to prosecute such a Part III o ence th ill 
then ask the consent of the Attorny General (once consent isgranted then the case will be 
conducted ýy the Cmwn Prosecittion Serlice), with each application consideredpersonally, ýy the 
Afforny General or Sokeitor GeneraL "' 
Obviously, the Attorney General would need to consider the available evidence and 
decide if a prosecution is in the public interest. Clearly, a key issue to be considered in 
deciding whether to prosecute, must be the likelihood of success. Ibus the fu-st 
question to deterrnimne is, did Mannmg use 'threateniig, abusive or insulting words? In Brutus 
13 See Vorldin Action progratrune shown by ITV, 24th April 1995. Also, Nemsofthe if"orld, - 23Apfil 1995. 
14 The jokes were secredy recorded for the World in Action program-me. 
15 As signified by Attorney Generql's Charnbers in correspondence to Hounslow Council, 17 August 1993. 
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v Cozens, " a case which arose out of an anti-apartheid demonstration, it was held that 
the word insulti, ý " must be in its natural meaning - and therefore ia matter of fact 'g give i Is 
not law. Given such a situation, it would not be surprising if the words used by 
Manning were found to be both 'threatening and insulling' It also seen-is reasonable to 
deterrrune that Manning must have either intended, or been aware, that his words were 
insulting. " 
Manning - whether he intended to stir up racial hatred? 
The question of whether he intended to stir up racial hatred or, havin2 rep-ard to all the 
circumstances, racial hatred was likely to be stirred up thereby, is therefore of critical 
importance. 
Manning could argue that given that his audience essentlafly consisted of pohce officers, 
he had no intention to commit an offence. He may also suggest that laughter signifies 
enjoyment and not hatred. 
As a counter to this argument, it is clear that words like 'There's a reivIvergo out and shoot 6 
nig, ers and a rabbit, "With a response of 'Why the rabbit? ", is arguably an indication of both 
being insulting to black people and hatred towards niggers. Given the overall tone of 
Manning's act it may be possible for the jury to infer racial hatred, but it IS not a clear 
cut case that Manning intended to stir up racial hatred or that this was the likely 
outcome of his jokes. It must therefore be doubtfiI1 as to whether a jury would convict, 
knowing that imprisonment is a strong possibility. 
Did Me police aid, abet or counsel Mqngýiý? 
Should the Attorney General decide to bring a s. 18 POA 1986 prosecution against 
Bernard Mannmg (which may be doubtful given the difficulty of proving racial hatred 
beyond reasonable doubt), he would also need to consider the evidence in relation to 
the organisers of the event itself. Did they aid, abet or counsel the offence? " Certainly 
if they knew 'in advance of the content, or the likely content of his Yokes, then they mav 
be equally responsible. The fact that the comedy act lasted for a reasonable period of 
time and they took no action to bring it to a halt, may be of significance. Should it be 
16 [1972] 2 AU ER 1297. 
17A. nd, therefore, presurn ly the words tbreatening and abusive. 
Iý Under s. 18(5) this apphes where , a, intent to stir up racial hatred is not established, but a likelihood exists. 
19 s. 8 - Accessorieý and Abettors 
Act 1861. 
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difficult to establish an 'intent'beyond reasonable doubt, on behalf of the police officers, 
it must surely be possible to argue that given the reputation of Bernard Manning such an 
event was likely. 
Manning - possible private prosecution? 
On balance, despite the precedent of an 'incitement to stir UP racial I)atred caSe, in Rv 
Edwards2" for racial comedy, it seems unlikely that the Attorney General would proceed 
with prosecution against Bernard Manning or the organisers, under s. 18 of the POA 
1986. One consequence of taking no action is that any aggrieved individual could seek 
to bring a private prosecution. TbiS right is specifically preserved under s. 6(1) of the 
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985. However s. 6(2) of the 1985 Act does permit the 
Director of Public Prosecutions to take over such a private prosecution and one of the 
consequences of so doing may be that the DPP then withdraws the case. 2' 
Book Club items -a loophole under the Public Order Act 1986. 
Evidence Assessment Sheet [1] shows a potential for prosecution under sections 18 and 
19 of the Public Order Act 198622 with regards to the Book Club items. ' However, this 
does not reveal the loophole, evident within the public order legislation, which enables 
groups like Combat 18 (and also the BNP) to skate around the law by sending their 
racist material to individual members rather than to the public . 
2' To this extent, the 
evidence assessment, with regards to the book club items, shows a 'Y/? ', which reflects 
an opinion that the words /material can be regarded as having an 'intentl #kefihood to stir u 
,p 
radal hatted', but it is doubtful as to whether a successfiil prosecution is possible due to 
20 [1983] 5 Cr. App R (S) 145. Edwards had aided, abetted, counselled or procured the publication of a magazine 
called 'The Stormer, which was threatening, abusive or insulting in circumstances in which racial hatred was likely to 
be stirred up against Jews, Asians and Coloured people in Great Britain. 
21 See Rv Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p South Coast Shipping Co Ltd [1993] 1 All ER 219. Also, ad'ace 
from Attorney GeneraFs Chambers in correspondence to Hounslow Council - 17 August 1993. 'Ilie irony of this 
situation is that the Home Affairs Select Committee have called for the DPP to be responsible for such prosecutions, 
instead of the Attorney General. Presurn ly starting a private prosecution could achieve this end - though, of 
course, the DPP may still liase with the Attorney General. Further, as per s. 9(3) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 
1985, the Attorney General may request the DPP to report to him on such matters as he may specify. 
22 As per s. 27 of the Public Order Act 1986, being found guilty in relation to any of the sections within 18 to 23 
constitutes one offence. Ilus a person cannot be found guilty of displaying written material that may stir up racial 
hatred (under s. 18) and also in possession of the same material (under s. 23) in relation to the same incident. 
23 i. e. Appendix Items 2 to 5. It is also possible that the publishers of Item 5 could be prosecuted under s. 3(a) of the 
Explosive Substances Act 1833. lbough, this area of Criminal Law is not the subject of this thesis. 
-4 The very fact that such members are individuals who are more likely to be influenced by the racist material is of no 
evidential concern. It is also the case that individual members of the public can telephone/write to the BNP 
bookshop and place an order for material, which is then posted to their home. No doubt the BNP will claim these 
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the fact that a defendant could avoid s. 19 by claiming that the n-utenal was exclusively 
! published'for 'distribution'to individual members of a Book Club, and not to the public. 
Despite such, it could still be argued that a potential for prosecution rnight still exist 
under s. 18. - in that the literature involved the use of 'threatening, abusive or insulfing'words 
which reflect an 'intentl likelihood to stir ut raeial hatred' The problem for the prosecution 
may be in establishing just where the words were used - since the legislation proVides a 
defence of being 'inside a dwelling and havinT no reason to believe that the matefial woald be seen ýv 
anyone otber than inside that or anotber dwelling' AssLu-ning that the racist material is sent, via 
a book club, to a member inside a dwelling" then an appropriate defence should exist. 
'Me Anti-Semitic items, Appendix (6 and 7), certainly indicate a potential for prosecution 
under s. 19 of the Public Order Act 1986. The material conveys words which have the 
potential for being insultiq" With the material being distributed Vila the post to members 
of the public at a Jewish Synagogue. Those receiving the material are not members of 
any Book Club, but members of a section of the public. It is clear that the potential 
exists for believing that an intent existed, on behalf of the person producing the 
material, to stir up racial hatred, with the words self evidently intended to insult the 
memo ry of Jews murdered in the war. 
Given the extreme sensitivity of the holocaust, grounds should also exist for believing 
that publication or distributions will likely result in stirring up racial hatred, With an 
increase in racial tension a possible outcome. Certainly, if the words expressed in 
Appendix Items (6 6, - 7) are compared to the words in Appendix Item (8) (for which a 
prosecution was proven), 2' it IS clear that strong grounds exist for believing that 
publishirig/distribution of this racist material amounts to an offence under the Act. 
individuals have joined a members club. In my case, I was careful to ensure that I did not agree to join any Club, but 
I xvas still sent material to the College address. 
25 See ChappeD v DPP [19891 89 Cr App R. which wiU be discussed in this chapter under Rac7st literature and the 
,ý lafi, -ious Communwalions ., 1, -/ 
1988' 
-6 For a discussion in relation to 'ilisulting, see earher in this chapter and the sectionPubhc Order Act 1986' and the 
case of Brutus v Cozens [1972] 2 All ER 1297. 
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Possession of Racist Material. 
APPen&x Item (19) is not shown on either of the two Evidence Assessment Sheets. 
Principally, this is because it has been sent anonymously and shows no indication of a 
publisher. 2' As such, there is no evidence to consider a prosecution under s-19 of the 
Public Order Act 1986, or any of the other Acts. 
However, it is clear that the content of the material, particularly in connection with 
AIDS, is exceptionally racist and offensive. Should It be possible to establish a 
distributor/publisher, there would appear to be grounds for arguing that the AIDS 
leaflet is insulting, in that it states 9 out of 10 niggers have a deadly contagious disease. 
Obviously, the impact of this statement could be devastating to racial relations, with a 
likelihood that people's fear of A-IDS will result in the stirring up of racial hatred 
thereby. 
For these reasons, it is important to reflect that given the evidence of being found in 
possession of such material, it would be possible to prosecute under s. 23 of the Public 
Order Act 1986. Ibis applies when: 
'a person who has in his possession written material which is threatening, abusive or insultine 
with a view to it being displajed, published, distributed, broadcast or included in a cable prtgramme 
serzice, whether ýv bimseff or another-is uil, of a offe ce be inte ds ra al ha d to be stirred g, D, nn ý' n Ci, tre 
up tbereýy, or, hating regard to all the circumstances, racial hatred is kkejl to be stimd up therely. 
A final decision on whether to prosecute under s. 23, rests with the Attorney General. It 
is submitted that should a person be found in possession of a number of these --ýS-Posters, 
then strong grounds may exist for such a prosecution. Though of course, a person in 
possession may be able to establish a defence that he did not have possession with a 
view to display or distribute. The problem of such a defence is that the onus may fall, 
indirectly, upon the defence to establish why any defendant had more than one copy. ' 
Indeed, any failure to proVide such a satisfactory answer, and establish reasonable doubt, 
27 Lady Birdwood , at an age of 
78, was successfiffly prosecuted tinder Part III of the Public Order Act 1986 and 
given a conditional discharge (fimes, 17 October 1991). 
2: S This material was supplied by both Hounslow Council and the Metropolitan Police of Hounslow. It had been 
distributed in Clements Court, I lounslow. 
29 Or a recording of xisual images or sounds which are direatemug abusive or insulting. 
30 The argument being that lie may have one copy to read - but a number of additional copies may indicate a supplý 
for distribution purposes. 
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could result in a jury being inclined to infer an intent to display or distribute n-utenal 
which, having regard to all the circumstances, is likely to stir up racial hatred. 31 
Racist hterature and the Malicious Communications Act 1988. 
The case of Chappell v DPP" held that it is not appropriate to bring a prosecution 
under s. 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 where a letter, deposited through a letter box of 
a dwelling-house, contains 'threatening, abusive or insmIting'words. Ibis is because s. 5 2 a, as 
do es s. 18 Q, provides that while an o ffence can take place in a public or private place, It 
excludes conduct taking place within a dwelling. 1hus, a person displaying a poster in 
his own home that gives an abusive message to those in the street, may commit an 
offence. However, a delivery of a 'threatening or abusive' letter to a person within his own 
home, where he reads it and is alarmed by its contents, could not be an offence within 
the ambit of the Public Order Act. 
Surprisingly, it seems this same situation is inherent in the new s. 4a of the Public Order 
Act 1986.33 Despite being designed to deal with harassment of a racial or more general 
nature, the new legislation still retains an exemption for conduct inside a dwelling. 'Illus, 
a person harassing an individual by depositing leaflets through a letterbox could avoid 
prosecution under the public order legislation. " 
In Chappell, Mr. justice Potter concluded that the conduct of pushing a letter through a 
dwelling letterbox falls fairly and squarely Within the provisions of the Malicious 
Conununications Act 1988. Section 1 of that Act provides: 
1 (1) Any person who sends to anotherperson. 
31 An example of a prosecution for possession for 'threatening, abusive and insulthng' material likely to stir up racial 
hatred is that of Combat 18 members Atkinson and Gray in 1997. They were both stiýing at Grays home in Feltham 
when the police conducted dawn raids finding copies of the racist magazine 'Stormer'and a computer disk relevant to 
production. After a finding of guilt by the jury, judge George Bathurst Norman said, in making reference tothe C18 
hate sheet 'Stormer, "In 37years in the la2v I hate neter encountered such vde outpourings of hatred and ineitement to t)ivleme as 
reeorded in these m4gaZines. " Pee 'Na! ýý -omar& terronsed Frank Bruno's mother' Searchlight Oct 1997). Reference is also 
made in this Searchlight article to two other publications which it was argued warrants similar police attention. One 
of these is The Scoqvýqn, which in its first issue contained instructions on how to bomb and maim, 
32 (1989) 89 Cr App. R. 
3ý Notably the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 does not contain a similar 'dwelling' exemption. However, as I 
shall discuss later in this chapter, this Act requires two incidents of conduct to establish an offence. 
34 A person prosecuted and found guilty tinder the new sAq Public Order Act 1986 faces a term of imprisonment of 
up to 6 rriondis and/or a fine up to Level 5 on the standard scale. By comparison, if found guilt\, under the 
M, Aiciotis Communications Act 1988 3 fine to the ma-vamum at Level 4 would applý. 
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(a) a letter or other article which conveys - (i) a message which is indecent or 
grossly offensive; (ii) a threat; or (iii) information which is false and known or 
believed to be false by the sender; or 
(b) any article which is, in whole or part, of an indecent or grossly offensive 
nature, is guilty of an offence if his purpose, or one of his purposes, in sending it 
is that it should, so far as falling within paragraph (a) or (b) above, cause distress. 
Of the iterns shown in EAS (1), Appen&x Items (1 and 8) are inappropriate for 
prosecution under the Malicious Con-imunications Act 1988, since the speech of Bernard 
Manning (1) could not be an article deposited through a letterbox, and Item (8) relates to 
a publication which was not, to my knowledge, conveyed to an individual thereby 
causing hirn distress or anxiety. 
With regards to the Book Club iterns, Appen&x Items (2 to 5), it is certainly reasonable to 
argue that Items (4) and (5) are 'Xbrvateniql ith Item (4) signifiýng a car-toon showing y wi 
violence towards blacks, and Item (5) a threat Via the rnaking of a bomb. 
However, despite such firm evidence, it is clear that a strong defence can be rriade in 
relation to Question (I), which relates to a purpose to cause distress or anxiety to the 
recipient. " The defence being. since the material is sent tia a Book Club, the reqýient will hat)e 
ordered the material and be a member of the clublorganisation. To this extent, it is unlikely that 
the distributor of the iten-is intended to cause distress or anxiety to the recipient. Thus, 
given this likely defence, prosecution under the Malicious Conununications Act for 
Book Club iterns is not really appropriate. 
The same defence could not apply to material sent to members of the public. For 
example, Anti-Sernitic items, Appen&x Items (6 & 7), were sent through the post (not via 
a Book Club). Further, as per s. 1 of the 1N. /la-licious Communications Act 1988, it is 
certainly arguable that both these items could be considered as being ýrossgl, offensive' In 
the sense that the iteryis were sent to Jewish Synagogues with a message of denial of the 
Holocaust - calling it a Holol)aux' Q1_Ute whether the words are 'grossly, offensive or just 
'offensive'Is an issue to be deterrnined by the jury-" It seems that no judicial guidance 
should normally be given as to meaning, though by analogy, it is worth noting that 
'indecent'is objectively determined taking into account the relevant circumstances. 37 For 
': s. I (b) Malicious Communications Act 1988. 
-"R %, Stamford [197212 All ER 427. 
17 Rv Court [198711 All ER 120 CA. Also, Smith & Hogan - 'Climinal Sixth edition . it pqge 449. 
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example, touching a woman's breast ryiay be indecent - but if done by a doctor, as part 
of a relevant medical examination, it rrught not be. 
Likewise, a jury could deterrrune that the material is 'gmssjl offensive' and the purpose of 
sending such anti-Seryutic material was to cause distress or anxiety to the recipient. 
Post Office Act 1953. 
Because Abpendix Items (6 & 7) were sent Via the post it may be that s. 11 of the Post 
Office Act 1953 woLild also apply - that is provided evidence exists of who sent the 
item(s). 
Both items show some evidence of a publisher, but the sender of the material would be 
prosecuted and not necessarily the publisher. " The police could also be lucky and 
obtain finger print or even DNA evidence from either the envelopes or the leaflet. 
If sufficient evidence exists of the sender of the material, this legislation could be 
applicable. Indeed, it rnay also be of value with regards to racist material sent via Book 
39 Clubs through the Post Office. 
However, to bring a prosecution, as per s. 1 (c ign the words, marks or des' s must be 
gmss# offensive or of an indecent or obscene ebaracter' 
As EAS (1) shows, the words used are clearly 'mially, offensive' But, is that the same as 
ýfvssly offensive? As argued, under the section dealing with the Malicious Conununications 
Act 1988 strong grounds exist for believing that sending this anti-Sen-utic material to a 
Jewish Synagogue should be considered as ýmssly offensive'- though the decision would 
be objectively deternitned by a Jury. ' 
Sirrularly with regards to the Book Club items, Aoendix Rems (2 to 5). While it seen-is 
that most of the Combat 18 and BNP Book Club material is sent via the Post Office, 
there is no direct knowledge that these particular items have been. Thus, EAS [11 
signifies a '? /Y' In relation to Quesfion T, with it worth noting that only material sent via 
the Post Office is subject to the Post Office Act 1953 legislation. Material sent via 
38 'fliough of course, depending on the particular circumstances and facts of a specific case the publisher could be 
solely or equally responsible for both the publication and distribution of the material. 
39 T'hough, this legislation would not be applicable for anv delivery by a private courier. 
' i. e. 3ssummg the defendant opts for trial by jury. 
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private couriers is not covered by the Act, though the Malicious Conununications Act 
n, iay apply. With regard to Items (2 to 5), aj could well deternune that the itenis are I 
lur\- 
y offensive, ' but this decis' n is not clear cut. Indeed, it n-iay well be gross/ to that they rnay be 
considered as just 'offensive' with Item (4) being marginally less offensive than the other 
items. 
Racist Material - an overaff assessment. 
The Evidence Assessment Sheet I ignifies the varied circumstances upon which -L-1 s 
sections 18 and 19 of the Public Order Act may be applicable for dealing with racist 
material. It has the capability for dealing With racist speech and literature - i. e. assuming 
,g abusive or 
insultiq' words with iintent/likelihood to stir up racial the use of 'Xbreatenin 
hatred. The legislation is diverse and flexible, in the sense that it can deal With books, 
leaflets, posters, plays, Videos, tapes, broadcasts, " and should also apply to electronic 
messages placed on the Internet. 
There are, though, lin-utations when it comes to dealing with racist material. This same 
evidential lirrUtatiOn may also exist With regards to the Malicious Communications Act 
1988. Ibis limitation derives from the fact that the legislation is 'intent on dealing with 
individuals - while the racist material is directed not towards individuals, but towards 
specific groups within society. It follows, therefore, that proving specific intent can be 
difficult. Take the Malicious Communications Act 1988 as an example. The majority of 
literature showed the characteristics of being ,9 ensive'or a 'threat'. However, it was gmssly off 
not possible to show that it was intended to cause anxiety or distress to the particular 
recipient. A sin'111ar problem is also evident with regards to s. 5 of the Public Order Act 
1986, With a requirement for the use of words within the 'hearing or sight'of a person 
likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress. 
To a certain extent, this s. 5 lirnitation is dealt with under the new s4a of the Public 
Order Act 1986, With the legislation applying where not just in circumstances whereby 
the particular person to whom the material may be directed is alarmed or distressed - 
but aly person is so affected. 
41 \Mide this the-is deals P,, ith racism, I Will not examine issues, associated with plays s. 20, recordings s. 21, or 
Broadcasts ,. 22 of the Public Order Act 1986. However, the broad legal principles of sections 18 & 19 are equA. N 
applicable to these sections. 
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However, even with the new s. 4a, the legislation would not be applicable if the leaflet 
was deposited through a letterbox of a dwelling house. This seems a strange anomaly 
given the purpose of the le i lation is to deal with harassment - with many Mcidents of gis 
harassment occurring when people are in their homes. The obvious explanation, of the 
alternative of a prosecution under the Malicious Conununications Act 1986, may not be 
sufficient - particularly when dealing with the most extreme cases of racially motivated 
harassment. Indeed, the MCA 1988 only provides for a fine, whereas prosecution under 
s-4a of the Public Order Act 1986 could result in up to 6 months imprisonment and/or 
a fin e. 
Of all the material analysed in EAS [11 only Appendix Item (8) has resulted in any 
prosecution, With a conditional discharge for the publication of literature in 
contravention of Part III of the Public Order Act 1986. This may seem surprising given 
the conclusions which can be drawn from EAS [1], with in particular Appen&x Items (3 to 
7) not showing significantly different characteristics than Item (8). Despite such, no 
prosecutions have, to my knowledge, been formally commenced. This clearly does not 
signify a strong and firm corY=tment, on behalf of the Attorney General, '2 to deal With 
racist material. 
BNP/NF Material distributed in the Borough of Hounslow. 
Evidence Assessment SheeILL21 examines literature which has been distributed in the 
Borough of Hounslow, most of which has been the subject of complaint. Hounslow 
Council and the Metropolitan Police in Hounslow supplied Appen&x Items (9 to 16) - with 
elected Councillors having made complaints about Items (9) & (16). By comparison, Item 
(17) are copies of stickers removed from lampposts on just one road in Hounslow, with 
Item (18) a copy of a letter to the local paper from a National Front Organiser. 
Before exan-uning the evidence assessment sheet it IS perhaps important to reflect upon 
the multi-cultural society which exists withm Hounslow. The Borough, m West 
London, has a population of approximately 205,000 people, of whom 24.4% are from 
black and ethnic minority communities. " In one electoral ward, 50% of the population 
4-' As per s. 27(t) Public Order Act 1986, the consent of the Attorney General is required for all Part III prosecutions 
(i. e. sections 18 - 23). 
43 SoUrCe 1991 Census. 
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are from an ethnic n-unonty background, ' thereby indicating the multi-cultural aspect of 
Hounslow. Quite clearly, because of this variance in the population of specific electoral 
wards, certain areas are more sensitive to racist activity than others. Indeed, from a 
superficial look at press and other reports, it seems that the BNP/NF are more 
politically active in areas like Feltharn and Hanworth (where a higher proportion of the 
population are white), while Combat 18 have been more physically active, in tern-is of 
racial attacks, in parts of Heston and Hounslow (where many people from ethnic 
backgrounds live). 
Despite such a broad generalisation, It is clear that Hounslow Councils Race Equality 
Officer is of the opinion that the number of racist attacks /harassment has increased in 
areas where BNP literature has been distributed. 45 The ftill-time organiser of the 
Hounslow Monitoring Project, who has been working with victims of racial 
attack/harassment within the community, has made similar claims about rises in racist 
actiVity following BNP leafleting. ' 
44 Hounslow Heath 50', o, IJounsloA- West 49'o, Cranford 48%, Hounslow Central 4700, Heston Central 440ý, 
Heston West 440'o, Heston East 410-o. This compares with areas like Feltham South 7ý, o, Hanworth 8% and Chiswick 
Hornefields 90 o. 
From a meeting with Darryl Telles held 27 April 1995 
46 At a meeting of the Hounslow Council, Racial Harassment Forum, of the 23 Mqv 1995, Suresh Grover (Co-Chair) 
indicated that the Hounslow Monitoring Project had seen an increase in casework to 7-10 new cases per week He 
asserted that the distribution of BNP/NF literature generallv resulted in an increase in racial harassment/ attack 
casework. fie also reported a rise in Comb-it 18 attacks. 
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Evidence Assessment Sheet (2) 
BNPINF Material distributed in the Borough of Hounslow. I I I I I I I I I 
(Y = yes, -N= no, -? = PossiblelDoubtful) Appendix Ref: 
1 91 10 1 11 1 12 1 13.1 14 1 15 1 16 17 18 
Public Order Act 1986 (The answer to Question A must be affirmative to establii; h a prosecution under this Act). 
A Were the words used threatening, abusive or insulting? N N N N N N N N NJ? ? 
B With intent to cause harassment, alarm or distress (s. 4a)? N N N N ? Y/? YI? ? YI? Y 
C thereby causing any person harassment alarm or distress (s. 4a)? NJ? NI? N/? NJ? ? ? ? Y ? ? 
D Within hearingisight of a person likely to be caused h, a, or d (s. 5)? # # # # # # # # # # 
T InteWavyare his vvords/vwiting -threatening, abusive or insulting 
(s. 6 )? 
# # # # # # # # # # 
F Use words/display material - intent/likelihood to stir up racial hatred 
(s. 18).? 
? /N N ? /N N ? /N Y/? ? IN N ? ? 
_ G Publish/distribute material - intent/likelihood to stir up racial hatred 
(S. 19)? 
? IN N ? IN N WN Yl? WN N ? Y/? 
Malicious Communications Act 1988 (sending of letters etc. with intenit to causc distress or anxieQ). 
H Is the message indecent, grossly offensive or a threat (s. 1)? NJ? ? ? ? ? ? NJ? # # 
I Purpose to cause distress or anxiety to recipient (s. 1 (b))? ? ? YI? ? YI? YI? ? ? # # 
Post Office Act 1953 (prohibition on sending by post of certain articles). 
j Was the item sent via the post office? (can only proceed under Act if 
yes). 
# # # # 
I 
# # # # # # 
K Wordsidesigns Which are grossly offensive or indecent (s. 1 1)? # # # # # # # # # # 
L Were the remarks racially offensive? Y Y Y Y Y Y ? N Y Y 
M Can a racial motive be inferred? Y17 Y Y YI? Y Y YI? N Y Y 
EVidence Assessment Sheet-[Z will not be exan-iined in the same specific detail as EAS 
"I , 
but Will be given a more general and overall assessment. 
In doing so, it is important to recognise a significant difference between EAS [1] and 
E&, S-P. WhIle the Appendix ltem-s (I to S) in general showed a potential for prosecution 
under the Public Order Act because of the use of 'threatening, abusive or insultin 'words, ,g 
the same does not apply with the BNP/NF matenal. Indeed, bil looking at EAS P we 
can establish a clear general theme of an answer of 'No' to Questioli A. The only item 
which signifies a '? ' is Item 1S, and only because it suggests that unless irnn-ugrants are 
returned to their country of origin, a racial war could break out on the streets of Britain. 
Obviously, this has the potential for being 'threatening' but it is not clear-cut. 
The obvious consequences of this evidential assessment, is that prosecutions against the 
BNP/NF, on the basis of this sample literature, would fall under the Public Order Act 
1986. TI-iis may cause some concern to the Leader of Hounslow Council who 
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complained to the Chief Superintendent of Hounslow Police7 about Appendix Item (9). 
In his correspondence, CUr John Chatt emphasised he did not wish to stifle or censure 
political debate, " but that he was of the opinion that 'this kind of fiterature'was intended 
to stir up racial hatred. 
While the Councillor's opinion may be justified, it is clear from EAS g that I do not 
consider the leaflet provides grounds for prosecution. ' The law reqLures the use of 
Vlmeatenhýý abusive or insulting' words and then asks whether the pubhsher/distributor 
'intended to stir up racial hatred - or is racial hatred Akejl to be stinrd mp thereby. ' 
The leaflet is 'racialgl, offensive', but it seems to contain no 'threateniq, abusive or insultin ,g 
words. " 1he NF candidate argues for spending on education, care for old folks, with 
opposition to VAT on heating charges. He uses the words Keep Feltbam 11-1)ite', arguirig 
against spending on an 'Asian Women's Centre', " and on 'Ethnic Alcohol Counselling. 
It is possible" that there exists intent to stir up racial hatred, but it IS unlikely the use of 
such words would thereby stir up racial hatred (thus, '? IN'). 
In all the circumstances, to prosecute for expressing such views could impede political 
and election campaigning, something which may be undesirable in a democracy unless a 
clear breach of the crirrunal law exists. 5 -' Given the absence of 'Xbreatening, abusive or 
ihsultiq'words, it is argued that grounds do not exist for a s. 19, Public Order Act 1986 
prosecution with regards to Ap pendix (9). 
By comparison, it is clear that Appendix Items (14) & (18) are potentially much more 
likely to stir up racial hatred. " For example, Item (14) talks of being in danger of being 
swamped by waves of i=ugrants and so called refugees, with native-born British people 
47 In correspondence dated 17 February 1994. 
415 The offending NF leaflet -was distributed in a local byýelection in Feltham South. 
41) The police came to die same conclusion after consultation with the Crown Prosecution Service. 
K, To be determined as 3 matter of fact - Brutus v Cozens [1972] 2 AD ER 1297. 
ý1 Since the election Hounslow Council have cut back spending in this area. 
52 No doubt die candidate would argue that his intent was to get himself elected and to establish a change in Council 
policy. Given such a cl-um, it may be difficult to prove intent to stir up racial hatred - particularly if it is unlikely the 
words used would therebv stir up racial hatred. 
5ý This will be discussed in more detail later in this thesis. 
54 Though the words used were not Ybtratming, abusitie or insultiýT'(thus no offence comnutted). 
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fast becoming second-class citizens in their own country. Likewise, Item (18)" refers to 
a racial war breaking out on the streets of Britain unless inunigration is stopped and 
imrnigrants currently living in Britain are returned to their country of origin. It is 
certainly the case, that if the language used had been clearly Yhrratenijg, ahusive or insulting', 
while conveying this racist theme, the grounds for prosecution would exist under s. 19 o 
the Public Order Act 1986. 
With regards to prosecution under the Post Office Act 1953, it seems that this literature 
is distributed door to door by BNP/NF members. 56 As such, it IS not possible to 
prosecute under the Post Office Act. It is though possible to prosecute under the 
Malicious Conununications Act 1988, where the message is 'indecent, gmss# offensive or a 
Yhrrat', With a purpose to cause distress or anxiety to the recipient. In a number of 
instances, HAS M shows doubt as to whether the message is 'indecent, ýmssly offensiWor 
a 'tbreat, but signifies that it may cause distress or anxiety to the recipient. This point is 
made, because a legal immigrant livmg in this country rnay be anxious or be caused 
distress by a leaflet calling for repatriation. 
Finally, in relation to this BNP/NF material, it is clear that in general this literature does 
not break our existing laws. Despite such, it is clear from EAS [21 that a racial motive 
can be inferred and that in the vast majority of instances the remarks within the material 
are radall, y offensive' With reports that an increase in racial harassment/attacks often 
follow the distribution of this racist material. 'Ibis begs the opinion, assurning reports 
of a causal link are valid - if the BNP/NF are not directly responsible for the 'increase in 
racial crime which follows their leaflets, then the leaflets themselves must stir up racial 
harassment/violence. 
Racist Graffiti and fly posting. 
In many parts of the country, and particularly in Hounslow, racist graffiti and fly posting 
is a problem, both to the environment and to the local authorities who are deemed 
responsible for clearing up the mess. " 
55 This item was a NF letter published in the Hounslow, Feltharn and Hanworth Times. As such, issues of press 
freedom are also involved (see the section on Týrss Ftredom'in the chapter 'Sq 
,y 
No To Raisx).. 
56 That is with die exception of Item (18), which was a letter pubhshed in a local newspaper. 
57 Hounslow Council run a 24-hour'Rmb OW Ratism'hodine. The aim being to remove racist graffiti from all public 
property within 24 hours. Council Officers will also negotiate with private property owners concerrung the removal 
, graffiti 
on private property. of any 
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Clearly, racist graffiti, as with any graffiti daubed on walls without the pern-ussion of the 
property owner, would amount to an offence under the Crin-unal Damagg Act 1971. 
The problem often is one of establishing the evidence to bring a prosecution. 'Me 
words: 'The nier is an infestation - say no to shit-skinned obscenities", is an indication of the 
recurring organised racist graffiti blazoned across the precinct of the town centre of 
Feltham. " 
1he words used are abusive and as such the offender (if caught) could face charges under 
both the s. 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 as well as under the Cnn-u'nal DamaW Act 
1971. While the words could amount to an intent or likelihood to stir up racial hatred, 
given the reluctance of the Attorney General to prosecute under Part III, it seems 
unlikely a s. 18, POA 1986 prosecution would be brought. 
However, it is not just graffiti that causes problems. Another major concern has been 
one of fly posting. That IS, the displaying of posters Without planning consent. While 
planners have not generally been concerned by the content of the advertisement 
posters, it is argued that racial motive may be relevant - controversially in relation to a 
decision to commence proceedings and also in relation to sentencing. 
The case of London Borough of Merton v Edmonds & TyLidall" involved Tyndall 
(Chairman of the BNP) and Edmonds (South London Regional Organiser). It was 
established that a BNP poster had been displayed on Vestry Hall, the home of the 
Merton Ethnic Minority Centre. 
The court found on the facts that Edmonds was responsible for the printing of BNP 
literature. However, both Tyndall and Edmonds argued that they had no knowledge 
and had not consented to the advertisement poster. It was established, in the Appeal, 
that the defendants had knowledge from the Council's letters that the advertisements 
were being displayed. If after being told of this display, the defendant who benefits 
from the publicity does nothing to remove it, then a Magistrate or Crown Court may 
have very little difficulty in concluding that it continues to be displayed with his consent. 
This issue, if raised by the defence, is to be decided on the facts. 
5K This was regularly spray painted (using a stencil) on advertising displays and shop frontages. 'Me police claimed 
they knew who was responsible and that it would take time to catch them in the act.. However, this involved pro- 
acnve policing and overtime - since the police racial incidents unit only worked office hours. 
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- tAý, 6 The net result of this case is that the leaders of the BNP were found guil .' 
because of 
a failure to remove the posters. 'Me precedent which the case establishes should not be 
underestimated - since it affirms the powers of planning authorities to take action to 
deal With fly posting. Further, it is argued that the Courts should penallSe any racial 
motive behind such posters, with this being particularly applicable to racist stickers. 
Applying such principles to Appendix Item (17), it would clearly be possible for Hounslow 
Council to seek to bring proceedings against the BNP leadership (Tyndall & Edmonds) 
with regards to the display, without planning consent, of such racist stickers. Given that 
these types of stickers are often found attached to lampposts, the potential for 
prosecution must be immense. Obviously, these types of stickers are commonplace, 
with also anti-raciSt and even party political stickers often displayed. To this extent, 
since the prosecution is brought on planning grounds, the Council could be open to a 
criticism of not being even handed in its plannii-ig enforcement and even politically 
motivated in a decision to bring proceedin gs 
While this kind of criticism may undoubtedly have some credence, it is important to 
acknowledge that racially motivated and offensive speech reflects an unacceptable forrn 
of debate in any open democracy. It is inconsistent with the public interest goals 
evident within society and, as such, any resulting technical breaches of law deserve to be 
punished. 
Racist Speech - Chanting at footbaH matches. 
Section 3(1) of The Football (Offences Acý 1991 makes it an offence to take part at a 
designated football match in chanting of an indecent" or racialist nature, with a 
12 " 
maximum fine at scale 3 applicable. For definition purposes , chanting" means the 
repeated utterances of any words or sounds in concert with one or more others. With 
the words "of a raciafist nature " de fmed as 'consisfin of or including maffer which is threatening, g 
,g to aperson 
bg cifi. Zensho) or ethnic abusive or inwltin y reason of his colour, race, nafionafiýy (inclu&ý 
or national origins' 
" 11is case involved four court hearings (Magistrates, Crown and Appeal Court). Finally resolved in case 
CO/1722/92 Dixision-A Court, 28june 1993. 
"I, They were fined, (100. Tyndall was ordered to pay costs of L468, EdmondsC472. 
I'l No definition of indecent is given under the Act. Although not the subject of this thesis, Rv Courts [1988] 2 All 
ER 221 deals mith motive and indecent assault cases. See also, Smith & Hogan - 'Crimiýzal Law'- 6th Edition - page 
449. 
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Research by Brian Holland 63 showed that black players were receiving a disproportionate 
amount of abuse, racial abuse and '*onk5v" chanting, being burdened up to 150 times 
more than white players. Figures produced by the Football Unit of the Xational Criminal 
Intelligence Unit, covering the 1991-2 season, showed that in total 88 arrests had been 
made under s. 3 of the Football (Offences) Act 1991. 
In Rv Phillip, Newcastle Magistrates Court'6' acquitted a football fan arrested for racial 
abuse. Phillip was charged under s. 3 of the Football Offences Act 1991 after he had 
been making monkey noises - "Ooh ooh, oob" and monkey gestures towards three 
coloured Watford players. However, the Magistrates disnllissed the charges when no 
evidence was provided which established that Phillip was chanting in concert with 
others. 
According to Holland, the lesson is that individual fans arrested for racist behaviour 
would probably have to be charged under s. 4 of the Public Order Act 1986, rather than 
Sf the 1991 Act if a conviction were to be succes U1.65 It IS submitted this is an over 
simphfication of the law since both s. 4 and s. 5 of the Pubhc Order Act 1986 are 
constructed differently from s. 3 of the Football Offences Act 1991. 
Racist Chanting -a need to prove intent? 
Under s. 3 of the Football Offences Act 1991 there is only a need to establish the actus 
rrus of the chanting. " There is no mens rea, or intent reqLurement. Whereas, s. 4 of the 
Public Order Act 1986 specifically provides for the actus reus of the use of `tbreatenijg, 
abusive or insulting words or behaviour', with: 
"intent to cause Mat person to believe that immediate unlawful violence will be used a ainst or ,g 
him 
anotber ýy any person, or to vI provoke the immediate use of unlawful io ence ýy thatperson or 
another, or whereýy tbatperson is #kely, to believe that sacb tiolence will be used or it is likely that 
such tiolence will be pmvoked " 
62 s. 3(2) of the 1991 Act 
63 For a summary see Appendix 23. Home Affairs Comnuttee - Racial Altacks emd Harassment'- Volume 11 - Session 
1993-94. 
64'Ilie Times, 12 December 1991. 
It is possible this is a mistake and he means s. 5 of the Public Order Act 1986. 
c16 On the 5th January 1999 the Home Office confirmed that the government were considering amendments to s. 3(2) 
of the Football Offences Act 1991 (which defines chanting as meaning 'the repeated utterance of -zny words or 
Sounds in concert \Nith one or more othersD so as to enable prosecution of just one person shouting alone. Under 
section 3(l) of the Football Offences Act 1991 the chanting must be of a indecent or racialist nature at a designated 
football mqtch, to establish an offence. 
8-1) 
vid iolence from GeneraU-ý, there is unlikely to be anx ei ence of intent to use Linlawfiil vi 
the football terraces to a player. Ibus, s. 4Public Order Act 1986 prosecutions must be 
inappropriate for dealing with mcidents of racist chanting. 
A prosecution under s. 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 (which is a lesser charge and a 
maximum fine under scale 3) would be far easier to establish, with a person guilty if he 
uses 'threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or &, soraerIj behaviour 67 .... within the 
hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused 'harassment, alarm or &stress' 
Clearly, many acts of racial chanting could fall into this public order category, which 
deals With abuse. Although, as we considered earlier, s. 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 
has a mens rea requirement of either 'intent, or the defendant being 'aware" that his 
words or behaviour may be Mreatenijg, abusive or insulting' 
Holland has also questioned the wisdom of prosecuting fans for racist chanting, malung 
reference to one Police Commander emphasising the concept of education rather than 
the punishment of fans. Ibis same Police Commander, also expressed that he felt that 
the Public Order Act 1986 was more than adequate to deal with racial chantin& with the 
1991 Act being an optional "luxug. " Whatever, the merits of his view, it seems that 
three other Police Corrimanders, interviewed by Holland, were full of enthusiasm for the 
Football (Offences Act 1991 believing it to be extremely usefi. 11 because it was "clear and 
sp e aft c. 
While not sharing their enthusiasni, I consider that, as Holland's research indicated, the 
core of the chanters are a distinct and vociferous minority. If these are in any way 
politicallv motivated, as evidenced from the organised activity of Combat 
18,69 it is 
unlikely that such equal opportunity measures will succeed in refort-ning them. Ibus, 
67 S. 5(j)(, . 4): or, s. 5(l)(q) 
disphys any writing, sign or other visible representation. 
('s s. 6(4), Pubhc Order Act 1986. Also, DPP v Clarke [1992] Crim LR 60. This was discussed above. 
"' 'How Combat IS Is using FootbaLl'- Searchlight, March 1995. See -also ýBritannia rules the game? - Corlrbat 18's exp(oitatign 
oj, foolball hoohýoams'nafionahsm, Searchlight, April 1995. 
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there is a need for both education 711 and punishment, with the role of the Natiotial 
CriminalIntelligelwe Unit, using video evidence techniques, of importance. 
To this end, the combination of both s. 3 of the Football (Offences) 1991 Act and s. 5 of 
the Public Order 1986 Act, may be of lirnited assistance in dealing with the extreme 
orchestrators of racist chanting - with education being of value in dealing with the less 
con-irmtted racist supporters. 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997. 
Earlier in this chapter, I considered s. 4a and s. 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 in relation 
to harassment. What seen-is clear from the wording of the legislation is that just one 
single incident can amount to harassment, alarm or distress. The legislator enables the 
courts to get around the plurality7' associated with 'haivss, 97ent, by including the words 
'alarN7 or distress- allowing the court to find one, and/or another. 
By comparison, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 establishes a new crinuinal 
offence of harassment that involves conduct that must have occurred on at least two 
occasions. Accordingly, no single and isolated act of distributing a racist leaflet, or 
expressing a racist message, can in itself amount to harassment under the 1997 Act. The 
le islation requires two incidents of conduct. Thus, it is certainly possible that the 91 
repetition of racist conduct, or a combination of, for example say pushing a racist leaflet 
through a person's door, followed bi, a verbal expression of racism directed towards 
that same person, could result in a prosecution. 
W-iat ils more, the tern-unology used need not be 'threatellilig, abusive or illsulfiq'. Ind ed, e 
as remarked by Lawson -C ruttenden & Add son '72 -e Ii peatedý, sending a rose to a person's 
sulting' but has the potential to cause place of work is not 'Mreateliinýý abusive or in 6 
'121'v Ki, -k- Ra, -islw out ot Football' is an example of a FA approach. -', ec 'Ra, -ism in loolbalZ alit v and kikin', 1', S-, archlight I 
Novcmber 1997, which gives examples of racist incidents at football matches and also tefl, of the work that is bciilg 
done bv football stars, like Alan Shcarer, Gianfranco Zola and Rvan Gigg's, to combat racism at football grounds. 
71 In general, a lack of a statutory definition nicans that the word can be given its natural evelýýday meaning. The 
Con, -ise 0. %pni Oictionary'defines har-i-inent as to trouble and annoy colitinuaBy or rqie'. Itedly. 
72 P., 
. ge 14 of 'Blackstonec 
Guide to the Prolectionjýom Harassment 
-AJ 
199 7'. 
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harassment. Quite whether delivering a rose can amount to harassment is decided on 
the facts by the rriagistrate or jury. 73 
IhIS provides a very clear distinction from the Public Order Act 1986 legislation in that 
, g, abusive, or 
i sulti 'words. Obviously, there is no requirement for the use of 'threatenin n ng 
this could have enormous consequences for the majority of the m aterial considered *in 
the evidence assessment sheets - in that while, as representative of individual incidents, 
the material, or expression, may not amount to a criminal offence - done repeatedly, or 
in combination, it could do so. 
Taking one of Bernard Mannin& racist jokes as an example (Appendix Item 1). The 
actual content of the joke about niggers and shooting rabbits is 'radall, n ive and I y offe s 
considered the words used were 'threatening abusive or insultin '. However, the problem of g 
ensuring conviction '74 should any charges be brought, IS one of proving Manningýs 
intent to cause harassment, alarrný or distress under s4a - or, of him being aware that his 
words used were 'threateniq, abusive or insulting'under s. 5 of the Public Order Act 1986. 
By contrast, should Manning pick on a member of his audience and repeat racist jokes 
directed towards that individual (which is one of Manning? s trademarks) it seems 
possible that he could face prosecution under the Protection from Harassment Act 
1997. 'IbiS is applicable even in circumstances where Manning uses no 'Xbreatening, 
abusive, or insultiýT'words - or has no intent to cause 'harassment, alarm or distress'. This 
applies because a person must not pursue a course of conduct - which amounts to 
harassment of another, and which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment 
of the other. " However, to comply with the PHA 1997 the conduct must occur on at 
least two occasions, with much depending on what the courts consider is reasonable M 
the particular circumstances. Quite whether two or more jokes - told in the course of 
one dinner speech - amounts to conduct on at least two occasions is not clear from the 
legislation. Given that section 2 of the PHA 1997 refers to a 'course of conduct, it 
seems reasonable to argue that the dinner speech itself amounted to a course of 
conduct. That being the case - since there was only one dinner speech in question - it 
73 Lodge v DPP (Me Times, 26 October 1988) determined that criminal harassment is to be determined by the 
magistrates' on the basis of the facts and only to be interfered with by an Appeal Court if the decision is totalIv 
perverse. 
74 See Evidence Assessment Sheet 1. 
75 Section I of Protection from Harassment Act 1997. 
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seerris probable that Mannmg would not have fallen foul of the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997. 
However, given the potential for a wide definition of harassment - i. e. due to a varietv 
of situations being decided upon the facts - it would seem the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997 legislation could be of value in relation to a whole host Of rnilitant 
racist activities. For example, suppose the BNP were to leaflet a sheltered housing 
scheme specifically catering for elderly people from the ethnic communities - the 
leaflets containing messages of 'start repatriation' (see Appendix 17). Clearly, one such 
leaflet would not amount to harassment. However, should the BNP repeatedly put 
these leaflets through the door, it mail be possible ffiat it could amount to harassment - 
or, it could be concluded that the defendants 'ought to know' that it could amount to 
harassment. Under the tern-is of s. 1 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 this 
can amount to an offence since: A person wust notpursue of course of conduct wNcl) amounts to 
barassment of anotber, and wbicl) he knows or ougl)t to know amounts to I)arassment of anoMer'. 
If the material were part of an election campaign, there may exist a reasonable defence 
of legitimate political campaigning. However if, on the facts '76 the material is perceived 
as a means of harassment, the courts may reJect such a defence. 
This also raises another interesting legal problem - the legislation is specific to a person. 
It says a ýerson must notpursue a course of conduct' Since the BNP is an organisation it 
follows that the BNP cannot face a criminal prosecution. In the case of London 
Borough of Mer-ton v Edmonds & Tyndall' it was held that national /regional BNP 
officials Edmond and Tyndall, were liable in relation to a BNP poster displayed on a 
door, by Virtue of them having consented to its display. While there was no direct 
evidence that Tyndall and Edmonds had themselves displayed the poster, their consent 
was established due to the ongoing situation. Tyndall and Edmonds were found, on the 
facts, to have failed to take down posters when advised by Merton Council that BNP 
handbills had been displayed in breach of planning regulations. 
It is subi-nitted that the case, which found leaders of the organisation liable for the 
organisations posters, should not readily be a precedent to suggest that as 
fý Lodge v DIT (nie Tirnes, 26 October 1988) held that ciunmA harq, ýment is qn i, -ue determined on the basis of 
the ficts only to be interfered vith by an appeal court if the deci,; ioii it totafly pen-erse. 
II'; cc Ra, -istgraflilz and. §), Posting' V6 thin thiý chapter. 
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national /regional leaders, Tyndall and Edmonds would be automatically liable in relation 
to any offending BNP leaflets. 'Mis lo icallý applies because, in the planning law BNP 91 
Merlon case, the defendants could have removed the posters within the authority's 7-day 
notice period. By comparison, if they are not personally liable for instructions in 
relation to the distribution of leaflets, it is difficult to see how they can be found guilty 
in relation to their repeated distribution. As judge Buckley pointed out, in the B-N-P 
Merton Case: 
"there are practical difficulties that arise in these cases, and AIr Týndall has drawn our 
attention to them on behaff of himsejff and his Parýv, for exa)VIe he says: It is well known that 
thg have opponents, if not enemies. There ma be miscbiýf-makers who, on coming into Y 
possession of handbills, (and indeed the advertisement in this case was a handbill not a poster), 
migght quit defiberaiely,, dis n plqy these i all sorts of places in order to make trouble for A Ir 
TyndaA 
Can it sensibjI be suggested that the moment Mr Tyndall becomes aware that has habpened, 
and I am assuming,, without his consent that he should automatically be guiln, of a criminal 
offence? The obvious answer in ourjudgement to that is 'no '" 
711iis requirement, for some form of mens rea, is generally always necessary In crin-unal 
cases. In the circumstances of the BNP Merton Case the Appeal Court ren-nitted the case 
to the Crown Court to consider the issue of consent. Ultimately, it was decided that 
Tyndall and Edmonds had consented to the advertisement display in breach of 
regulations because they had failed to take the BNP posters down when requested to do 
so by the authority. These circumstances are very different to that of leaflets being 
delivered to people's homes or handed out in the street. If the deliverer is not known 
and no evidence exists they are working directly on behalf of individuals such as Tyndall 
and Edmonds, there exists no likelihood of evidence, beyond reasonable doubt, as to 
their guilt. 
Although, it would seem that any election candidate, and or election agent, could be 
liable. This must apply because they are perceived as being responsible for the conduct 
of their election campaign. Each and every leaflet distributed in an election campaign, 
requires the authorisation of the agent who acts on behalf of the candidate. 
Accordingly, they must be personally responsible and liable in relation to the conduct of 
their campaign. Despite such a situation, it IS to be hoped that the Crown Prosecution 
Service will recognise the importance of the need for freedom of expression for 
candidates during an election campaign - with widespread leafleting by all political 
parties. As such, unless there is some evidence of malice aforethought, the CPS could 
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decide that it may not be in the public interest to instigate criminal proceedings in 
re in g- yet cause relation to election leaflets that are not 'threateniq, abusi , andlor ' sultin ' may 
a limited level of harassment. However, this discretion need not apply outside of an 
election campaign - i. e. in circumstances where the facts suggest that the repeated 
conduct of leafleting establish harassment. What is more, this CPS public interest 
discretion can only apply in relation to criminal proceedings. Indeed, the Protection 
from Harassment Act 1997 also provides for a civil approach. In effect, this means that 
any individual who feels he is being harassed by any repeated (more than one) conduct - 
in this example the distribution of racist BNP material by a political candidate - could 
apply to the courts for an injunction 78 to cease the distribution of the material . 
7' Again, 
should the defendant, without reasonable excuse, do anything he is prohibited from 
doing by the injunction/ an application can be rriade for a warrant for d-ie arrest of the 
defendant" with the possibility of up to five year's imprisonment. " 
This issue of legal interference with political campaigning raises a serious issue of 
freedom within a democracy. It is obvious that not just BNP candidates, and/or agents, 
but any political candidates /agents could find themselves the subject of a civil action in 
relation to political literature that is perceived as providing harassment. Obviously, the 
courts will consider the merits of each and every individual case - with the facts and 
circumstances differing accordingly. Although, in general, it must be recognised that 
since I am not talking about literature that is 'Mi-eateninT, abusive or hisultiq', this new 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 provides the potential for a significant 
interference with the concept of freedom of expression as we know it. Indeed, it seems 
inevitable that the courts could experience defences associated with freedom of 
expression, now that the government has taken steps to incorporate the European 
Convention of Human Rýights into UK Law Via the Human Rights Act 1998. 
In Conclusion. 
This chapter has also shown that there exist various laws that can be of lirnited value in 
tackling rrUlitarit racism. The Crin-unal DamaW Act 1971 can deal With graffiti, with 
7 As I derrionsttited in die chapter on Adion by Local --bithorilies, this 
injunction could be directed towards 
indixiduil, -aid organisations. 
I- 'Mis viU be dcterrmned on the b-ý-nlce of convenience - Americ-. m Cyanimid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] 1 All ER 
504, HL. - For a fiffler 
dicusioný ý- the ChTter 'Action 4, Lo, -alzlidhorilies'. 
3 (3) (b). 
3 (9). 
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planning laws able to deal with unlawfiil fly posting- The Malicious Communications 
Act 1988 can be of value in dealing with material which is a 'threat'or ýrvssly, offensim, but 
it is lirnited by the fact that the law reqwres specific intent, with literature often directed 
not towards the individual - but a group. 
Of particular concern must be the lirnitations of penalty enforcement under the 
Malicious Communications Act 1988. A simple fine m aximurn, is hardIv sufficient to 
deter the conuyutted militant racist. To this end, it is disappointing that the new s. 4a of 
the Public Order Act 1986 (which can result in a fine and/or six months imprisonment) 
was not adapted to include material deposited through letterboxes and into a dwelling 
house. After all, a great deal of racist harassment is directed at victims living in their 
homes. 
So far as prosecutions under Part III of the Public Order Act 1986 are concerned, by 
looking at the two evidence assessments, it is clear that B: \PI. L\T material avoids the 
prospect of prosecution because the words used are not, in themselves, 'threatening abusive 
or insulting'. By comparison, the Racist Material, sent via Book Clubs or of an anti-SerrUtic 
nature, has much greater potential for prosecution under the Act - simply because the 
language can be considered to be not just offensive, but possibly 'threatening, abusive or 
insulting'. 
Assessing all the material, it seems that 9 out of these 19 Appendix Items show some 
potential for an intent/likelihood to stir up racial hatred. However, only one has 
resulted in a prosecution. Obviously, this could indicate a lack of commitment from the 
Attorney General (whose consent is needed for prosecutions) to tackling rnilitant racism 
and dealing with the problem of racist material which is likely to stir up racial hatred. 
Perhaps another and better explanation, IS that those producing the material are wise as 
to the law and are deliberately producing material which may stir up racial hatred by 
using words which are obviously 'racialgl, offensive' but not directly Wreatening, abusive or 
insulfing' The added advantage, to the BNP/NF, being that their 'rwially' offensive' 
material is more appealing to the electorate - because superficially it gives an appearance 
of being moderate in tone. 
The fact that following distribution of this BNP/NF literature, racial harassment/attacks 
are reported to have increased is obviously of concern. If this increase is not directly 
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due to the actions of BNP/NF comrades, it must indirectly be due to the impact of 
their literature. Given that 'racially offensive' literature may increase tensions in a multi- 
cultural area, it is not unreasonable to make this deduction. To this end, in the next 
chapter I will examine changes to our current pubhc order laws which wiU help deal with 
the problem of 'racially offensive' hterature. Inevitably, such legal changes wfll impact 
upon freedom of speech, which will also need some detailed consideration. 
Despite the lirrUtations of existing legislation, it is pertinent to look at the positive 
elements of existing laws. The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 provides not just 
a criminal means but also a civil means of tackling n-: ii1itant racism. It IS clear the 
Football (Offences) Act 1991 provides the potential for dealing with instances of any 
extreme orchestration of racist chanting - but it does not and cannot produce a solution. 
What is needed, and what is provided by the Football Association, " is an education 
programme that deals with the less comi-nitted racist supporters. Indeed, it is a 
combination of education and the law, which helps provide a relevant solution. 
Obviously, both approaches have indirect implications upon each other - in the sense 
that education may limit the eventual need for prosecution. Likewise, a lack of an 
education programme could result in the need for more prosecutions. 
,'i. e. a , Aunt3rý, program in consultation \%ith the Commission for Racial Equality. 
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PART ONE - "SAY NO TO RACISM" 
The Legal Options For Change. 
Chapter Four. 
In Chapter Three, I discussed the fact that offensive literature, which may stir up racial 
hatred, will not in itself provide grounds for a prosecution under British Law. ' 'Ihe 
literature must be 'Xbivateniiiýý abusim or lllsultiq'to establish an offence under the Part III of 
the Public Order Act 1986. 
I argued that there is anecdotal evidence which shows that following the distribution of 
racist literature, an increase in racial harassment/ attacks mail be found. Clearly, if this is 
not due to the direct actions of militant racists, it must indirectly be due to the impact of 
their racially offensive literature contributing to an increase in tensions in a multi-cultural 
area. It follows, that so far as criminal law is concerned, two obvious approaches exist, 
(a) Prosecute where evidence exists of racial harassment/attack. 
(b) Prosecute those who stir up racial discrimination or hatred through the use of 
material that is threatenin& abusive, insulting and/or offensiVe. 2 
So far as (a) is concerned, various criminal laws exist which can be deployed to enable the 
police to tackJe such nulitant racism, 3with the Crime & Disorder Act 1998 providing 
enhanced sentencing where a person is found 'Ity of racjallyýaggravated crime. ' While (b) 9W 
could be tac Id-ed by amending Part III of the Public Order Act 1986 to rruke it an offence 
to stir up racial discrin-unation (as well as hatred) and by adding 'racial offelice' to those of 
? bi-eat, abuse orinsult'as a pre-requisite to a prosecution. 
I British memis Engolmid, W. Aes andS codvaid 
In pr-icticýd terins it would be sufficient to add the terrii 'offence' to die pre-requi-sites in relation to Part III of the Public 
Order Act 1986. TI-ii, is becquse since the terni is by necessity c(mnbined vith incitement to racial h. qtred [discniriui3tioll) 
there is fittle practic-ý difference bemeen 'offence, mid racial offence'. 11iis must logically apply siiice due to the 
corribin, ition requirements 'race' must be -ni element of any 'offenc& that is given - i. e. in order to estabfish criaiin: dity 
under the proposed section. Hence ill future 1; 6dlill this thesis, I uill make reference to the tmn 'raci. -A offence'. In reality, 
due to the col-nbiiiqtioii r(-(IL6r(--lnclit, whether the word(s) 'offence? or 'racial offerice' wis to be used by any legislqti%, e 
draightsincii shoLdd liq-%-e little practical mid legal difference. 
arnples of lqw, are the Riblic Order Act 1986, Protection from Mirassment Act, Crirnin. il D. age Act 1971 mn 3 Some ex- 
etc. Iliese and other Im- vvere discussed in detail in Chapter Tliree. 
I lkýc Chapter ", cveii 
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The previous chapters have considered various laws applicable to (a) - i. e. militant racist 
activity that results in racial harassment or attack- Accordingly I will not be treading 
further down this path, but intend to exan-une (b) on the basis that to develop such reforms 
will make it more difficult for rrulitant racists to distribute racist materials. In order to 
consider (b) I will break the proposals into two options. 'Option One'will deal with the 
relatively straightforward proposal of making it an offence to 'stir up racial 
discrbrzination or hatred, while 'Option Two' will give consideration to including 
'racial offence', 2 along witb 'threat, abuse or insult', as a prereclWisite to a prosecution 
under Part III of the Act. 
Q ption One - 'Stirring up racial discrimination or hatred'. 
Ihe PublIC Order Act 1986' states: 
A person who uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or 
displays any written material which is threatening, abusive or insulting is guilty of 
an offence ifi. 
(a) he intends thereby to stir up racial hatred, or 
(b) having regard to all the circurnstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred 
up thereby. 
However, statute provides no guidance as to what 'to stir up' means, and as such it is given 
a natural meaning. Indeed, there appears to have been no serious problems with its 
application, though Bailey, Harris & joneS6 report that there have been some difficulties 
widi regards to the prosecution of offenders who send material to clergymen or Members 
of Parliament, since such public figures are thought to be less likely to be stirred up to 
racial hatred. Conceivably this could be a difficulty, though a prosecution could still be 
established under s. 18(l)(a) with regards to an intent to stir up racial hatred. 1his must 
apply, because although it may be unlikely that the clergy would be stirred to racial hatred 
by a leaflet, the intent could still have been for the material to do so. 
5 Seesections 18-23 of the Public Order Act 1986. 
ý'Page 666 -'C-ivil Liberties Cases and MateriAs'- Butterworths 1995. 
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It seems reasonable to argue that the words 'to stir up' are broadly synonymous with the 
term 'incite'. ' On this basis, the 'stirring up of racial discrin-iiination or hatred' in 'Opidon 
One'can be considered as synonymous with 'incitement to racial discrimination or hatred'. 
However, it does seem probable that 'stirring up, 'Mcitingý or encouraging 'racial 
disctiminalion' would be evidentially easier to determine than 'inciting racial hatred'. To 
racially discrin-unate is 'to treat less favourably' on racial grounds", while 'racial hatred' can 
be interpreted as being to dislike intensely' 9a group of persons because of their race, 
nationality etc. 
Applying these definitions, it follows that treating another less favourably involves, some 
form of treatment that can be objectively measured as providing disadvantage to a person, 
or group of persons, on the grounds of race or nationality. " 
By comparison, encouragement to 'dislike intensely' IS potentially much more problematic, 
since it involves a consideration of the mental process involved. VA-lat degree of emotion 
is necessary to deterrnine 'intense dislike'? Since a synonym is also 'Violent or forceffil'" - 
does this need to be ftilfilled to reach the natural meaning of 'intense dislike'? The answer 
to these questions IS left to the discretion of the jury or magistrates - with a combined 
statutory and natural meaning of the words 'racial hatred being applicable. VAiile the 
courts can and do currently grapple with the difficulty of determining racial hatred, 
changing the law so as to tackle the stirring up of racial discrit-nination should produce a 
more readily definable threshold. 
It also follows that to introduce 'Opdon Onemust broaden the scope of the law. By way 
of illustration, we can examine Appendix Reference 9 and note that the National Front says 
"Keep Feltham VA-lite". The leaflet does not stir up racial 15atred, but it can stir up racial 
aisaimination, with it being clear that it is proposes that black and Asian farriilies are kept out 
of Feltham. " As this demonstrates, changing the criminal law to penaliSe the stirring up of 
7 Seethe Oxford Thesaurus 1991. It is also worth noting thatinciteis synonymous with'stir', 'to stir up' and 'encourage. 
8 This represents a paraphrase of the definitions given in s. 1 of the Race Relations Act 1976. It alsso reflects a natural 
mearting as given in '1he Condse OVWDi,. ýnag'- published 1990. 
ý, Section. 17 of the Public Order Act 1986 does not define hatred; it follows therefore that the natural meaning applies. As 
per The Condse OVW DL*mag ' Vi&ke xtenseo'c an he con sidered apphc able. 
'0 A magistrate or jury should be able to determine such -in issue, on the basis of the facts, Nýithout too much difficulty 
II In q-he Con&e O. VW Di6*anag'these are given a: synoným-s in relation to intense'. 
1--l1ierebv treating black and Asian people less favourably on ground- of race. 
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, ýacial discriminationwill inevitably extend the opportunities for prosecution. One superficial 
concern, may be that the proposals suggest criminalising acts related to racial 
discrimination, while racial discrimination itself is considered to be a civil offence under the 
Race Relations Act 1976. However, there is a definite difference between acts of racial 
discrimination and the stirring up of racial discrimination. The difference being that those 
applications In relation to 'racial discrin-unation' are generally claims for compensation 
ansing from an organisation's racial discrimination. In terms of the stirring up of racial 
hatred, I am talking about society penalising a person who incites others to pursue a course 
of conduct that the rules of society consider is unacceptable. While Yncitement to racial 
discrimination' suggests a purposeful decision to encourage others to treat others less 
favourably, it should be noted that intent need not be proven, since the legislative 
proposals could provide for guilt in circumstances whereby a likelihood exists that racial 
discrimination will be stirred up thereby. " 
Option Two -A 'racial offence' pre-req uisite. 
As Chapter Ibree 14 demonstrated, a great deal of literature which in all likelihood has the 
potential of inciting racial hatred is 'racially offensive'. but not 'tbreatening, abusive or insubing' 
EVIdence suggests that rnilitant racists careftilly produce literature that will give 'ra6ial 
ofence' but which avoids prosecution under the existing law. " This is in effect, an attempt 
to stir up racial discrimination and possibly even hatred, without being in breach of the 
Public Order Act 1986. Ibis argument is strengthened by exarrunirig the analysis of the 
16 racist n-utenal developed earlier in this thesis. 
As already acknowledged, there is no evidence that 'radaLjI ofensive'rriatenal directly incites 
conflict or violence within communities. However, it is certainly possible that 'raciýi#y 
13 This proposal is consistent with the law as it currently stands in relation to the stirring up of racial hatred (see s. 18(l)(b) 
of the Public Order Act 1986). It should be noted, however, that s. 18(5) establishes that any person who is shown not to 
have intended to stir up racoal hatred is not guilty of an off-ence if he did not intend his word-, or behaviour, or the written 
material, to be, or was not aware that it might be, threatening, abusive or insulting. 
14 'Racist Speech & Literature' 
I-' Wid-iiii the BNP web site (hqp: L. www. bnV. net/) published 20 September 1997, the British Nationalist Home Page 
peech in Britak -A BriefLega(Piimer'which explains BNP support for the European Editors produced an article Freedom o(S 
Convention on Human Rights and gives a legal summarv of s. 18,19, and 23 of the Public Order Act 1986. Ineffect, thev 
Lritici-e those in the nationalist ranks who argue for abusive language in publications, arguing that the POA 1986 prevents 
such language stating. 
*e legidafi(m can work enfirelj to our adpwztage, ý(ody a 6-y mhwriýv ofteoA mm&just sV sen&ýý out abushv s 
and degd materzýd anonynwuý '' 9,. Me whole context of the article emphasis that language used should not be 'abmsizv, 
threatenmg, orinadfiq'and that 'ingeneral, there if neady a4vays a w,, ýyof saying whatjou wantAg s,? )v wik5out bnaking the 1=,. 
See E-, idenceAssessment Sheets I and 2ui CbapterThree- RaistS!. eechmdl-ilerabm'. 
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offensive' material may lead to the raising of racial tensions . 
17 Clearly, anv rise of racial 
tensions can have serious community consequences with incidents of Violence a possible 
consequence. Thus, in order to maintain the peace it is important that racial tensions are 
not significantly inflamed. 
It IS also appropriate to consider the extent to which 'racially ofensive' rrutenal has the 
potential to incite racial discrin-unation. To stir up racial discrimination, material must 
encourage others to treat an individual or group of people, defmed by race, less favourablv 
than people from other more accepted groups. Applying such a criterion, it is important to 
recognise that it is almost symptomatic of 'racially o nal fensive' mate i that it undermines 
support for a racial group's existence within the community and thereby treats people from 
that group less favourably. Naturally, depending upon the nature of the leaflet, the resulting 
discrimination can take various forms ranging from abuse, directed towards members of 
that group, to them simply being ignored and frozen out of the general life of the 
community. Whatever form of action may, or may not, result, 'racially, ofensive'n-iatenal is 
often inherently discriminatory. While this may suggest that an intention to 
discrirninate/stir up hatred often exists, intent is not a necessary ingredient since the 
offence can be committed if "hating mgard to all the dnumstances radal hatred [disaimination] is 
likely to be sfiired up thervýy. Despite such an objective approach, the law returns to 
subjectivity with regards to words used that are '[raciaýly, ffiensive] insulting, tbreaAening or 
abusive'- with a requirement that for a person who is not shown to have intended to stir up 
racial hatred he is not guilty unless he intended, or was aware that, his words/behaviour 
rnight be '[racialyl o T"9 However, while clear that the ffensive/ threateniig, abusive, insultin - it is 
words Yhreat, abuse and insult'require elements of subjectivity there may also be objective 
elements that help a jury measure the subjectiViry. For example, In subjectively 
deterrniriing words like Ybrrateniig'we often apply certain objective criteria to determine the 
extent of the threat -was there an indication of violence etc. Again with ý7busive'- did the 
ing, in ive aris T, is cl ly words involve swearin i what way were they abusi ? By comp ri on, Ynsyltiý i ear 
more subjective, With few objective criteria to help claný. 'Me same can be s idfor lrada45, Iy al 
17 For arguments that the distribution of racist literature can lead to the raising of racial tensions see 'Farnung the flames of 
hatred, Searchlight, ' September 1998. 
16 See Part III of the Public Order Act 1986. 
", As per s. 18(5) Public Order Act 1986. 
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I an in o#e'nsipe', with offence being almost entirely subjective and objectivity sing from a 
determination as to whether the words are 'racial'. 2" 
Racist speech and its audience. 
In order to discuss rriatters, further, I intend to examine the practical implications of a 
combination of 'Opdon One and Two, by loolung at the i act they would have in IMP 
relation to first racist speech and then racist literature or materials. In considering speech, 
it is important to reflect that in determining incitemenC" to racial discrirrunation or hatred, 
the words themselves are not the sole criteria for deterrruning incitement - what should 
generally be of ortance is to whom they may be directed, or bv whom thev mai- be IMP 
heard. For example: 
Suppose Tom - while mixing with a group of Combat 18 members - 
shouts to Mohammed, "Niggers go home. " 
Ibis situation could result in a prosecution, because Tom must22 have been aware that his 
words could give 'racial offence' and a likelihood of incitement to racial discrin-iiination or 
hatred exists. This derives from the fact that Tom could incite other C18 members to 
discriminate or hate people because of their colour. The same would apply even if those 
observing, and likely to hear the words shouted, were just members of the public - because 
a likeld-iood exists that the words expressed by Tom could incite others to discrinuinate or 
hate on grounds of race, nationalit-N-, etc. The intent of Tom to incite may matter little 
since, having regard to all the circumstances, the stirring up of racial discrirnination or 
hatred, is likelv ffiereby. 
What this illustration demonstrates is that Tom may be relatively free2' to express 'raciall y 
ofensme'words, but in doing so he must ensure that he does not incite others. Ibis principle 
can be related to that advocate of individual freedom John Stuart Nfill, who argued: 
'An opinion that cont-dealers are starvers of the poor, or Mat private pmperý, is mbbeg... may 
jusýly MCUI-punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembkd before the house of the 
com dealer, or when handed out amorýig the same mob in theform qf a placard. 
' 'Racial Grounds' qrc deterinivied under s. 17 of the Ribic Order Act 1986.. 
'Imilement'is qg-un beiiig given -4 natural mealling which coal ýiclude ciicourage. 
'Might' Iii-ve been 3ware is sufficient under -,. 18(5) Public Order Act 1986. 
'11lat is ill criminal Ixa, tenns. 
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In a sense, this combination approach helps qualifýT the subjectivity of 'offence, since 'racially 
Offiensive'words in themselves could not lay grounds for a criminal offence, they need to be 
combined wid-i inciting others to 'ra, ýial disoimination or bafted' to provide a basis for 
prosecution. 
TI-ils approach is consistent with the philosophy of J. S. Nfill and can also be found in the 
exhiting pubKc order low in relation to inSult' Indeed, under Part III of the Public 
Order Act 1986, a person who uses insultiq words is guilty of an offence if- 
(a) be intends thereo, to sfir up racial hatned, or, 
(b) having tegard to all the cb-cumstances mcial batred is likely to be stined up thereby. 
Problems associated with incitement in relation to sole recipients. 
This clearly penallses the incitement of others. Indeed, the existing public order 
legislation seen-is to enable a prosecution where racial hatred can be stirred up within a 
sole recipient, i. e. notwithstanding that racial hatred is defined as meaning hatred against a 
, group of persons - 
by reference to race etc - and not against an individual. 
'5 Thus, a person 
21 using insulting words on a verbal one to one basis, could commit an offence if it can be 
proven that he intended to, or it is likelv that racial hatred will be stirred up thereby 
Obviously, problems of evidence would exist with it being one person's word against 
another. However, assuming the problem of evidence could be overcome, there is no 
reason why a person could not be successfWly prosecuted. Though there could be a few 
problems that could anse. Byway of illustration: 
Suppose in a private conversation Tom turns to a woman, and fellow 
indigenous citizen, called Lis and says: 'Don't go with any of those 
blacks, they are infested with Aids. " 
Ihis involves Tom using an insult to incite Lis to have some level of resentment or hatred 
towards blacks. 
-4 'On LA qýl by j -S-Mifl - 
11 1 ý Section 17 lliibhc Ordet Act 1986. 
, woidd ftpplv oiilv in a pubhc or private place - bUt not Vitilin i dvk, eUiiig uiilcqs licird or ; mi by -4 person outside ' '11ii- 
th-adweffing A8"(2)). 
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In theory at least, grounds may exist for a prosecution in that the words used may be 
insulting and incite Lis to racial hatred (or discrin-unation under Qpiion One). While that is 
the theory, the practicalities of formulating the evidence could result in problems for 
bringing a prosecution. Given that it is a private conversation, where would the evidence 
of any offence come from? Obviously a third party n-uy have a complaint that Tom incited 
Lis to racial hatred/discrimination, but given that it is a private conversation between Tom 
and Lis where would the evidence come from and how reliable could it be? 
Let us assume that Lis is unhappy with the remark of Tom. Consequently, she complains 
to the police that Tom has used an insulting remark to stir her into racial hatred (or 
discrin-unation under Option One). If we also assume that Tom adrnits he rnaýle the 
remark (but pleads not guilty to incitement), evidence would exist of a comment that is 
potentially insulting -and to a racial group and thus could lay the foundations for a s. 1,8 
Public Order Act 1986 prosecution under the existing law. The problems for the 
prosecution are numerous. First, they must establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that the 
words are 'insulting' - which is determined as a matter of fact and not law. 
" 'Secondly, they 
would need to prove an intent, or that it is fikely,, that racial hatred would be stirred up 
thereby. Further, if the prosecution is brought upon the basis of a #ke#hood of sfirfiýT UP 
raeial hatmd, thev must prove an intent or awareness, on behalf of the accused, that the 
words might be insulting. 
In the case of Jordan v BurgL)3ý! 2e ' Lord Parker held that "Once a speaker uses insulting words, 
that person must take the au&ence as be finds them , 29 In this illustration concerning Lis, the 
defence argument could be - assuming that no intent is evident - that the audience was not 
likely to be stirred into racial hatred. Proof of this comes from the fact that the audience, 
consisting solely of Lis, complained to the police about the remark of Tom - rather than 
being incited into racial hatred. While this seen-is to be the logic of the Jordan ratio, it can 
be criticised because such an interpretation nullifies the impact of the legislation and serves 
to undermine the complainant's legal rights. 
27 as per Brutus v Cozens [197212 All ER 1297 - the word insulting must be given its natural meaning -3 matter of fact 
not I apv. 
28 [196312 ALL ER 225 - The question of lqw being whether the public speech was likely to cause a breach of the peace 
2ý1 AXII-Sinitli argue-s'Offences against thePer-ons Act (1987)'- p. 14, notwithstanding Lord Parliers statement there is 
room for 3 rrasonable man ks/ in detemuning whether the words are msWting in die first place. 
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Should the Public Order law be changed as proposed in 'Option One' - i. e. 
establishing incitement to racial discrimination - the prospect of prosecution could be 
stronger. This is because the words: "Don't go with any qf tbose blacks, tbýy are infested n4th 
Aids", show the potential for insult and provide a clear indication of a likelihood of inciting 
others (Lis) to treat blacks less favourably - with incitement to discrimination 
demons tratively easier to establish than incitement to hatred. To this extent, changing the 
law to tackle racial discrin-unation as well as hatred broadens the scope for prosecution, 
with the case of jot-dan serving to limit the prospect in circumstances where the 
complainant is the sole receiver of the message. 
Let us consider another illustration, albeit that this one does not readily signiý- the 
broadening of the scope for prosecution: 
Suppose Tom, sitting alone with Mohammed, turns to him and says: 
"All you niggers are infested with Aids. " 
Should Mohammed complain to the police, and Tom adrnit he made the remark (but plead 
not guilty to incitement), it seems that grounds may exist for bringing a prosecution 
under the exiýqiing s. 18 of the Public Order Act 1986. Again, the problem for d-ie 
prosecution is one of establishing that stirring up of racial hatred is likely or intended. 
Assurrung the court detern-unes that Tom is aware his words Might be insulting, there 
remains a problem of deten-nining a likelihood of stirring up racial hatred. Is it likely 
beyond reasonable doubt that Mohammed would be stirred up into hating his own race? 
Or, is Moharrimed Ilkelv to be stirred up to hate Tom, and people of the same race and 
nationality as him? This may be possible, but it seems problematic - because it suggests that 
the hatred develops as a result of the unlawful use of insulting words (rather than likely 
thereby). This would be the e 'valent of arg-ii . rig that any criminal act by a person of one qui 
race on another, inevitablil would likeh- result in the stirring up of racial hatred between the 
races. 
Likewise, with regard to the intent of Tom to stir up racial hatred, it clearly is possible that 
a court could deten-nine, on the facts, that Tom intended to stir up hatred between the 
races, though much will depend upon the reasons that he may give for making the remarL 
Did he express the words as part of a warning about safe sex - or as a means of antagonism 
levelled towards Mohammed? Even if he was antagonistic towards Mohammed, did he 
intend to stir up racial hatred? 
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If we were to move from the existing public order law to that proposed. In applying 
'Option One' - did he intend to incite racial discrimination? 'Me answer to this last 
question involves the difficulty of Mohammed being incited to discriminate against other 
people of his own race (which he mav do, if he was to believe the claim and does not wish 
to risk catching Aids). It certainly seems unlikely that Mohammed could easily be Mcited 
to racially discriminate against members of his own race. To this extent, the proposed 
changes in d-ie law would not extend the boundaries in relation to incitement to sole 
recipients. 
Indeed, such sole recipient cases raise difficult issues for a jury to determine on the basis of 
fact, essentially because it is likely to be one person's word against another. Even if the 
facts can clearly be established, the case of Jordan v Burgoyne seerris to underrruine the 
prospect of a successful prosecution, due to the fact that the sole recipient would be 
demonstrating that they are unlikely to stir up racial hatred or discrin-unation by virtue of 
being the complainant. For such reasons, it seems probable that the Crown Prosecution 
Service, and/or Attorney General, may decide that - unless there is an admissiOn/eVidence 
as to intent - it is inappropriate to bring charges where the complainant IS the sole 
recipient. 
Raciaffy offensive literature. 
In considering 'Option Tivo'in relation to verbal speech, I have argued that expressing 
I mcial# q ftnsive'words, in themselves, should not constitute a cri al offence. However, 
the use of 'raci*ally offensire' words in combination with incitement to racial 
discrimination /hatred provides some justification for amendments to current legislation. 
Cleariv, this form of division mai- be relatively easy to detern'llne when verbal words are 
involved, With the existence of persons within hearing of the 'racialý, offensive'words being 
expressed, a critical requirement. Thus, a person would be free to verbally express 'raciaýly 
offensh, e'views so long as they ensure that the words cannot and do not incite others. 
However, this simple division cannot apply to 'incialý, ofensire' literature since there can 
rarely be a guarantee that the literature Will be seen by Just the one reader. Indeed, a leaflet 
given wholesale distribution is designed for public consumption and thus once it is 
established that the words used ive 'racial offence, it must be possible fl-iat it would incite 91 
others to racial discrimination and/or hatred. To consider this point ftirther, I intend to 
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consider the practicalities associated with a leaflet designed to advocate a fizffier restriction 
on imn-ugration. 
Advocating immigration controls under Vptions One and Two. 
use immigration as an example, because it emphasises a potential conundrum so far as 
ffe ' 'literature i concemed. In effect, material arguing for racially, o iisive 1 is in-irnigration controls 
can easily ve racial ofeiice, since by its nature it generally advocates treating persons ot gi 
certain races differently, and often less favourably, than those of indigenous origin. To this 
extent, such material would be openly advocating racial discrin-inatim, quite whether fl-iis 
would amount to an offence of stirring up racial discrin-mination would obviously depend 
upon the facts in relation to words used. 
However, materials that discuss irr=gration - in the lirrUted tem-is of people cornMg to the 
United Kingdom - should not lead to a prosecution for stirring up racial 
hatred /discrimination 
- Byway of illustration, 
Suppose, the BNP extend the leaflet to say- "We will stop Pakistanis 
from immigrating into the UK" 
While these words may, or may not, give racial offence and stir up racial discrin-unation, 
they should not provide grounds for a prosecution due to s. 17 of the Public Order Act 
1986 which defines 'racial group' as meaning hatred against a group of persons in Great 
Britain. 'Mus, bv definition, since the in-in-ugrant group referred to will be outside of Great 
Britain there can be no offence. 
Discussing issues associated with repatriation. 
Should a policy leaflet go a stage further and argue for repatriation, there could be grounds 
for a prosecution. By way of example: 
Suppose a BNP leaflet were to say: "We have too many Pakistani 
immigrants, they should all be sent back home". 
Diis refers to Pak-istani in-in-ugrants who are currently resident in the United K-ingdorn, as 
such the statement is discriminating against a group of person in Great Britain defmed by 
race, nationality etc. Accordingly, grounds could exist for a prosecution under the 
proposed legislation incorporating Options One and Two. 
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The first thing to establish is do the words give racial 'racial ofence, as per the proposed 
Option Two? Obviously, the legislature could provide a statutory meaning of 'racial offence', 
while requiring that the accused intended or is aware that his words may give ofence. ' 
However a more preferable way forward may be to take a combined statutory and natural 
meaning approach, with a statutory definition applying for the term 'ratial'and a natural 
ffence' 'I'his may mean slight amendmen th meaning applicable for the term 'o t to s. 17 of e 
Public Order Act 1986, re-fining it to read: "In Mispart "racial ofence'; "racial hatird" or "racial 
disaimination " derives as a result of exprssion refer7ing to agrou of sons in Great Bi itain defined b p per _y 
rý(erence Ag colour, race, nationality (including citi. Zensho) or ethnic or national ongins". Ibis would 
leave the definition of 'o , 
jence'to the courts to detem-une in accord with the 'ordinary usage 
- natural meaning - methodology' already established in Brutus v Cozens [197ýfl 2 All ER 
1297 . 
31 Inevitably, this would result in 'ýfence' being 'interpreted according to its natural 
meaning - which is 'a wounding offeeliqs` - and detern-uned as a matter of fact. Indeed, this 
approach is preferable because it would retain a consistency of legal approach concerning 
the words Wivatening, abusive, insulting 'and the proposed 'radaljl offensive'. 
Simply expressing 'racially, ffiensim'words would not in itself amount to an offence. Indeed, 
the words also need to stir up raciil discrimination [or hatred]. So far as stirring up racial 
discrimination IS concerned, it would be necessary to determine that those responsible for the 
BNP leaflet intended to stir up racial discrimination, or the words were likely to stir up 
racial discrimination. Obviously, without a confession, intent is difficult to deten-mne with 
any degree of consistency and for these reasons it can be difficult to determine beyond 
reasonable doubt. By comparison the Wke#hood'approach is easier to determine, since the 
jury are able to reason from their own understanding of the words and the circumstances 
surrounding the use. It could certainly be argued that the BNP illustrated leaflet, with its 
words 'JVe have too maqy Pakistani immigrants thg should all be sent back home" discrin-unates 
against Pakistani people. But that in itself IS not enough to constitute an offence under the 
proposals, since the words need to incite others to discriminate to establish a criminal 
30 This requirement of 'intent or awareness' is consistent with s. 18(5) of the Public Order Act 1986 and will be discussed a 
little later in this chapter. 
31 As discussed in Chapter Tliree Rwid Speech wdL. *r, 5jture', Brutus vCozens involved an -viti-apartheid demonstration at 
Wimbledon, with the courts determining thit inmking must be given its natural meaning. 'nus has also been applied to 
'threalew? ýg mid abwite'. 
" 'nus is based on the meaning of the word 'offence' found within 'The Concise O. -, ford Dkfionag' (eighth edition, 1990). 
Thus the term 'raid offeme'could be determined as a mixture of law and fqct, based upon "the mounAig offielings aý a lesmlý of 
e %pre, wn directed /on ards aqmrp of penons in BnZah7 defxed ýy re*rmr 49 x6zrr, race, nafiona4ýv (indualkg aýnship) or ed)nzý or 
nahýnal or; #v" - 
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offence. It could certainly be argued that the leaflet by its use of words is urging people to 
be less than welcoming to Pakistani people - which in effect means that they are inciting 
people to treat them less favourably than other nationals. To this extent, a 'urv could - on I, 
the facts - deten-nine that the words are inciting racial discrimination (though t1-i1S is far 
from certain). 
Despite such, there still remains one additional hurdle for the prosecution to overcome, 
albeit one that is so limited in height it hardly constitutes an hurdle. 'Mis reqLurement 
clam-is its foundations from s. 18(5) of the 'Public Order Act 1986 and, as an-iended by 
Option Two, determines that where the defendant IS not shown to have intended to stir 
up racial discrmination, he would be not guilty if he did not intend or was not aware that the 
words used might be rxially, offensim (threatening, abusive or msultmg). On the basis of the 
BNP illustration, a defendant may have difficulties in convincing a jury that he was not 
aware that Pakistani people might be racially offended by the words " fVe will stop Pakistani's 
fmm lmmý gratiq into the UK 
However, even if it is felt that the words amount to the use of threatening abusive, insulting 
andlor radaýv offensive words that stir up racial batred or &saimination the Crown Prosecution 
Service and/or Attorney General may still consider it is not in the public interest to bring a 
prosecution. In deciding whether to prosecute, two questions are generally asked. The 
first, whether reasonable grounds exist for believing that a court will establish guilt, with 
the second being whether it is in the public interest to instigate a prosecution. 
So far as the public interest question is concerned, this is clearly not easy to determine and 
can often be dependent upon a number of factors including the consequences of bringing 
an action that may fail. Also relevant must be the need to respect the intent of genuinely 
being involved in political debate about goven-iment legislation. How can a political party 
discuss and promote its policies on an important issue, if to do so may put it in breach of 
the crin-unal law? As a counter to this argument, it is also important to recognise that some 
extreme parties may have little desire for genuine political discussion and be more mclmed 
to use the issue of immigration as a disguise for promoting their offensive and racist views. 
Given such circumstances, it could be that a noticeable failure to bring prosecutions against 
political organisations would undern-une respect for anti-raciSt legislation and even the law. 
Let us now consider a new illustration. 
104 
Suppose the BNP produce a further leaflet that says, "We have too many 
immigrants, they should all be sent back home". 
This leaflet is very similar to the previous leaflm in that its words call tor repatriation uid 
thus most of the previous arguments apply. However, a kev difference is that it does not 
call for a specific group of nationals to be repatriated, it applies to all immigrants. This new 
illustrated leaflet does discrin-iinate against immigrants, but it does not d1rectIv seem to fall 
within the criteria of 'racial group' as per s. 17 of the Public Order Act 1986. 'Mis applies 
gi gahist a gmup qf persons ... 1ý, 'refei-ence to race, colour, because the le slation refers to hatred '1ý7 
nalionaliý, (includiqg ciliZeliship) or etl)nic or natimal oighis it does not refer to 'races' (plural). 
The words of the BN-P are not specific in tem-is of colour, citizenship or national identit-V 
and as such they do not readily fall within the category of race. Indeed the only way that 
such an offensive leaflet could be considered to fall within the definition of race, is on the 
grounds of a purposive interpretation of the law, with ethnic origins equated to persons 
whose origins are other than indigenous. For such an approach to be legally acceptable, it 
rnav be necessari, to arriend s. 17 of the Public Order Act 1986 to enable the Jury to 
determine such issues purposively ith d-iis having the added advantage that reli i wi igious 
. 
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terrns that are shorthand for racial descriptions, could also be encompassed . 
However, a purposive interpretation in relation to crin-unal law seems an adventurous leap 
- with d-iis term only recently having been developed in civil law. -" 'Mough, in support of 
such a leap it can be argued that, in effect, the government requires the courts to give a 
Ive effect to section 28(3) of the r' purposive interpretation to legislation in order to 9' C ime 
& Disorder Act 1998. This section relates to racially aggravated crime and is designed to 
enable the law to penaliSe hostility that may also be based upon rell 'on. Indeed, d-ie 91 
wording of Section s28(3) specifies: 
It is immaterial .. wbether or not 
Me offenders bosfiliýy IS also based, to aq), e. %tent, on (a) tbefact 
, gious, gnoup, or 
(b) aq), orpnesuVfion of that aq), person orgromp ofpersons beloqs to aily rek 
otberfactor not mentioned in Mis parqTrapb. 
Certainly, this Crime & Disorder Act re res the courts to detern-une the purpose and/or ql-u 
motive behind both the activities of the accused and to a 1=''ted extent requires the court 
to establish if this purpose falls within the definition proVided bv statute. This, it is argued, 
'; -l"he i,, ueof T-eligiou, tenns that mav incite racial discrimination or hatred aill be discussed later in this chapter. 
, s4 Lit-terN,, Fortli Dry Dock EngincelingCo 
Ltd [1989] 1 AUER 1134- 1 louse of Lords is a lea&igca,; e on the issue of 3 
purposive constniction. Essentialh, this derives from the reqLuxements of the European Union and a need to interpret 
Directives consistently uith domestic legislation. 
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does require a Im-uted form of purposive interpretation in order to give effect to the statute. 
While this may not be an exact replica of the purposive approach taken in relation to the 
interpretation of EU directives and UK domestic laws, it is noneffieless a form of 
purposive interpretation. This demonstrates that in order to give effect to legislation, 
parliament expects that it may be necessary to look at the purpose behind the legislation 
ith the le islati n. Th ii- and apply the facts withm a case, so as to comply wi gi 10 is signities some 
form of recognition, that the traditional literal interpretation of le islation is not always 91 
appropriate. 
The impact of '-Opdo-ns One and Tivo'on militant racist materials. 
Having considered some theoretical examples, I intend to consider the proposed changes, 
to Part III of the PubliC Order Act 1986 by examirimg BNP/NF materials distributed m 
the Borough of Hounslow. " In order to fulfil this task, I have produced Evidence 
Assessment Sheet [3]. It can be seen &om the earlier Evidence Assessment Sheet-M, 
shown in Chapter 3), that none of this material provides grounds for a prosecution under 
the existmg Part III of the Public Order Act 1986. Obviouslv, these assessments are to a 
large extent subjective and thus open to question. However, the assessment has been 
produced by applying the appropriate questions of law and serves as a valuable aid to 
deten-runing if grounds could exist for bringing a prosecution. 
Evidence Assessment Sheet (3). 
BNP/NF Material distributed in the Borough of Hounslow. 
(Y = yes, -N= no, -? = PossiblelDoubfful) Appendix Ref: 191 10 Ill 112 1 16 17 18 
Part Ill of the Public Order Act 1986 - [Options, or proposed changes, shom in bracket!; ]. 
A Were the words used threatening, abusive or insulting? ? N N N N IN N N NI? ? 
B Were the remarks/words racially offensive? [OptionTvvo] Y YI? Y Y Y Y ? N Y Y 
C Intent/aware his words/writing -threatening, abusive or insulting 
(S. 1 8 (5))? 
# # # # # # # # # # 
- D Intentlaware his wordslvziting - racially offensive? [Option Two] Y YI? YI? Y Y Y N # YI? Y 
E Use wordsidisplay material - intent/likelihood to stir up racial hatred 
(s. 1 8). ? 
N N ? N N YI? ? N ?I N 
_ F 
I 
Publishiclistribute material - intent/likelihood to stir up racial hatred 
(S. 19)? 
N N ? N 
1 
N Yi? ? N ? YI? 
* Intentil ikeli hood of inciting racial discriminationihatred? [Option 
One] 
Y Yi? Y Y Y Y N N Y Y 
__ _ * Can a racial motive be inferred? 
rY 
I? Y YI YI? Y Y Yi? N Y 
ýý 11ii, inqtcdal is shown in die I-)Ilciidi--, xid, ývas considered ýi det-61 in (Impter Three, 'RaistSNech, ineiLiýerililr,, '. 
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Indeed, Evidence Assessment Sheet [31 -f Question I- demonstrates that none of the 
BNP/NF material was considered to be either threatening, abusive or insulting. 1bus, the 
prerequisite for a prosecution under the existing Public Order Act 1986 has not been 
fulfilled, and a prosecution would not be applicable. However, from Question we can see 
that, in eight out of ten cases, grounds exist for believing that the BNP/NF material is 
iwia, ov offensive '36 and, as such, capable of ftilfilling the prereqLusite for an 'Option Two, 
(racial offence) public order prosecution (see above chart). 
Question D also signifies that in all cases where 'racially offensive'words have been used, it is 
possible that an intent or awareness that the material may be 'radal# offensive' could be 
established. Clearly, any answer to this question must be potentially erroneous because we 
have not heard the defence of any accused. However, it is difficult to irnagine how a 
person may not be aware that comments like, "Keep Feltham Ehite", have the potential of 
being 'ratialyl offensive' No doubt, rruilitant racists would argue that it is 'racially eensive' that 
foreign people are offered accornmodation in Feltham - but this kind of corntrent simply 
provides justification for a prosecution. 
What is especially interesting about Evidence Assessment Sheet 4331 is that even after 
introducing the 'Option Two'prereql-usite of 'racial offence'to the Public Order Act 1986, 
we will not see a significant increase in prosecutions. This is because in only two out of the 
eight instances of the material being potentially 'racial# eensive, IS it possible to conclude 
that grounds may exist for either a s. 18 or s. 19 (stirring up racial hatred) prosecution. In 
the first of these (Appendix 14) the BNP candidate in a local election claimed: 
'The white community is under attark- 2\7afive-born Biifisb people arefast becoming second-class 
amZens in their own countg. Onjl the BNP will defend their j&s, the n&s of the white 
community. Ve are now in danger of being swaVed ýy waves of immigrants and so-called 
rý(ugees. " 
In EAS N this statement is considered to be a [Y/? ] - in the sense that a likelihood exists 
for believing that the words can stir up racial hatred. Likewise, ýAppendix 18 is a letter, 
from the National Front, published in the local Hounslow, Hanworth and Feltharn Times 
Newspaper, which says: 
3,5 This assesunclit is deterrnined by applying the naýural meming approach advocated in Brutus v Cozens [1972] 2 AU ER 
1297 with regards to the word loffenz, threa*mkg, abxdtvmdimdtmg' However, a statutory definition, consistent with S. 17 
of the Public Order Act 1986, is applied to the word 
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Nobody wants to see a racial war break out on the streets of Britain, but unkss immigration is 
. ), resident 
in Britain are returwed to their countg of origin, Me st"d, and immi grants cun-entl 
scenes that we see on our tektision eveg nightfrom Bosnia will bappen in Britain. " 
By exan-unmg EAS N- Question G, we can see that by also adopting 'OpHon One', and 
making in4itement to rxial disctimination1hatred a criminal offence, it opens up the potential for 
a prosecution in all instances where words have been used which are 'racia, ýv oJensive' (i. e. 
eight out of the ten instances). " 
What the assessment also demonstrates is that, in order to make 'Option One' - 
incitement to racial discrimination /hatred -a viable new offence, it may be necessary also 
to imclude 'Option Two', i. e. 'raeial ofence'along with 'threateniý g, abusive or insulting. ' Indeed, 
as HAS N shows, in all eight instances where racial discrimination /hatred appears evident, 
there are no grounds for arguing that the words used were 'Mrratenijg, abusive or insultin '. g As 
such, it would not be possible to bring a prosecution unless the legislation was changed to 
include 'radalofenee'as a prerequisite. 
Ibis clearly suggests that simply changing Part III of the Public Order Act 1986 to include I- 
"in, citement to racial disaimination would not produce a significant Impact. lbough, it would 
make prosecutions for a likelihood of incitement to racial discrin-nination easier to 
determine than currently exist in relation to the stirring up of racial hatred. 
Evidence Assessment Sheet N further indicates that grounds may also exist for believing 
that some level of racial motivation may be inferred in nine out of the ten examples given. 
Such motivation should not in itself provide evidence to Justify a findirig of guilt, but it may 
result in a judge determining that some element of racial hostility exists which could justify 
a tougher sentencing policy. " 
Wider implications in relation to a racial offence prerequisite. 
Obviously, a more detailed and thorough analysis of 'ratialj1 offensive' literature rnight be 
appropriate before firm conclusions coLild be made on the need for changes to our existing 
law. An analysis of just ten iterris of racist material cannot be regarded as sufficient. 
37 Likewise, it i, less obviously ý-acialyl offinmir'. 
-3ýý See Chapter Se-mn - 'Raid. llofirafion wzd-HosAýý'. 
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9 me ot racist ma i However, It is worth notin that the materials used are tý-pical of the n ter al 
distributed bv rmlitantracists. 19 
What is also clear from the HAS [3] analysis, is that none of the material was considered to 
be in breach of the existing public order laws. In applying 'Option One' (incitement to 
racial discrimination), no additional items of literature would be in breach of any amended 
legislation - principally because the existing prerequisites of Wmat abuse or hisult 'act as a 
shield to prosecution. By applying just 'Option Two'(racial offence), two additional items 
of literature could likely be considered as being in breach of the proposed legislation - with 
the remainder' failing to be considered in breach due to the stirring up 'racial hatred' 
criterion. However, by amending the public order legislation to include both 'Options 
One and Two' - i. e. to make it illegal to use racially offens ve words to ,. I 11 stir up racia 
discrin-unation -a total of eight items are considered as being in breach (see Area Chart 1). 
Area Chart I showing the potential effect of ýOptions One and Two'on iracist 
material. 
By applying Options One and Two 
80% of the BNPINF samples could 
result in a criminal prosecution. 
80 
60 
401-r 
0 
20 
0% under existing 
Public Order Laws. Options Option 
One & Two 
Option 
Two One 
From this chart, it is clear that the application of 'Option Two'alone" has only a limited 
impact upon racist materials - with some 20% of racist materials likeh, to result in a 
, Example,, of more extreme militmit r-icit literiture c-ni be found in the Tpeii&x and referred to in Chapter Three - 
'R, A-ict, Vvec/) Lmd Illeratilfe. ' 
-1 i. e. Appendix Items 14 -nid 18. 
4 RacA offi-tice isa pr(-rcquiýite- 
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criminal prosecution . 
42 However, such a partial approach still displays a potential for some 
lirrUtation upon the concept of freedom of expression' and will leave United Is: mgdom law 
inconsistent with the CERD convention, which requires nations to tackle incitement to 
racial discrin-unation. ' 
By comparison, as the area chaft demonstrates, the application of 'Opdons One and 
Two'certainly shows a wider potential for tackling rrulitant racist matenal. '5 However, this 
gives rise to the problem that the combination may be so wide as to limit what may morally 
be considered to be legitimate discussion of racial issues. 'IhiS can be considered by 
considering a hypothetical leaflet in relation to Kosovo refugees. 46 
Suppose a political campaigning group produces a leaflet that says: 
"We should not be accepting so many Kosovo refugees. The Serbs don't 
want them - why should we have them? They are immigrants who are 
exploiting our good nature. They are quick to claim state benefits and 
are a drain on our country's resources. They should be flown back home 
to Kosovo as soon as possible. " 
Such discussion is commonplace, and illustrates a political debate amongst UK citizens. 
TI-le words used may not indicate an intent to give '=ial ofence' but it is clear that an 
awareness of a likelihood of giving '=ial offence'could exist. 47 Ibis inevitably would mean 
that such a leaflet could possibly fall foul of any new legislation that contains 'Options 
One and Twd, since the words used suggest that indigenous people should not welcome 
Kosovo refugees and they should be sent back home. " 
Irrespective of one's opinion on the uncharitable nature of such conmr&nts, it is worrying 
that sIMPly expressing such views could result in a person cory=tting a crirninal offence. 
To this extent, the illustration helps indicate that the combination of 'Opdons One and 
4: ' The figure is limited to 220' o due to the problem of the prosecution proving that the words. are intended, or likely, to stir 
up racial hatred. 
4-1 Thiý is self evident, since the law currently only limits the use of words that are threatening, abusive or insulting. By 
extending the law to also deal with racially offensive words the parameters are being extended to include words that are 
racially offimsive. The issue of interference -kith freedom of expression will be discussed in the remainder of this 
chapter and also in the next chapter. 
44 See discussion later in this chapter on the CERD Convention. 
4ý 800'o of militant racist materia1s, sampled could result in a criminal prosecution. 
Sce 'Britain to take 1, (XX) reffigeesa week' -nie Times, 5 May t999. 
47 It would certainly be offensive to a Kosovo refugee who has fled from Serbia amidst bombs etc. 
48 '11jerebV jilciting racial discrirmnation. 
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Two'n-lay seriously threaten freedom of expression. Indeed, such is the interference with 
freedom of expression, it may become unlawful for a political party to publicly debate, and 
give specific detailed infon-nation of its policies, on a vitally important issue like Refugees 
and Asylum seekers. 'Me consequences for our society can be iudged by the cor-riments of 
Feldman: " 
"It is impossible to imagine a propetýly functioniq democraq in a counto, wheir people by and 
laige are not guaranteedfiredom of e. %pression, a free press, a iight to vote, a right to petition 
Parliament, freedom of pi-otest, andfivedomfi-on. 1 ai-bilraq, amest and detention by goveniment 
a naes. ge Such rights arefundamental to the notion of democraq, and could not be abrqazed 
democratic decision-makers in the public sphei-e witbout undermining the req demociao, n hich i's 
said to 1ýgifimise public decision making. " 
While some limitations already exist in many of these areas - e. g. on freedom of protest 
under the Public Order Act 1986"' - on the whole such freedoms are respected in the 
United Kingdon-L Obviously, introducing the lin-nitations in 'Option.,; One (incitement to 
racial discrimination) and Two' (racial offence prerequisite) will not amount to the 
abrogation of the right of freedom of expression - though it would add to limits already 
imposed by various laws ranging from defamation to race relations. 
As Area Chart I shows, separately Options Oneand Two do not appear to produce an 
overtly restrictive impact upon racist materials. However, the combination of the two can, 
in certain circurristances, have a direct and negative impact upon the democratic process. 
It clearly cannot be considered as acceptable that morally legitin-iate debate, on an issue of 
such political importance as Refugee and Asylum seekers, may in part become unlawful, 
with a ryune field existing as to what is, and is not, a statement that leads to crirninality. To 
this end, it is argued that the combination of 'Options One and Two'could seriously 
undermine freedom of expression and may not be considered as acceptable in a 
democratic society. 
The CERD Convention. 
Despite such strong reservations, it is clear that International Conventions5' do conarnit the 
UK government to take action to introduce legislation that tackles 'Option One' - the 
Vs in En (liapter One of 'Chil Libedks ýYd Huimýw Rý', q/ glmdand Vaks' - Dmid Feldinan pubh-hed 1993. 
` Ccrt-ýli aspects of racist -nid fniti-racist protest mid the Ribhc Order Act 1986 , %iB be considered lqter. 
'1 'llic lViciina Convention on die Law ofTreafie, ' defines -i tre-ity as -xi intemation3l 3grectuent coticluded between st3te-,; 
in xvritteii forin -vid governed bv internaticni-ý 13xv, whether embodied in 3 single instnu-nelit or in m'o ormore reInted 
instnurictits ind whatever its pýwtiicular dusigmiquori (see Wade -nid Bridlev - Law'published 
by Lonprimi 1993 it pige 331). Under UK bw such Iiit(-niqtioli. A Treltics ýwe generally signed by Mhusters under Cro-I 
prerogative powers mid x-c not, -is q result, incorporated into UK 1mv (thev xe not expressly incorporated , ii in Act of 
III 
incitement of racial discrimination. Indeed, in 1969 UK Ministers, under Crown 
prerogative powers, ratified the International Convention on the Ehrnination of All Forn-is 
of Racial Discrimination (the CERD Convention). 
Article 2(1) of the CERD Convention requires state parties to "condemn racial discrimination 
and undertake to pursue ýv all appmpriate means and mithout delay a polig of efiminatiýT racial 
&scrimination in allfotms... "Y with Article 7 encouraging the use of "teacbhýý education, -u&ure 
and information, with a view to combating prejudices mbich lead to racial &scriminafioiL... " More 
pertinent to this thesis is: 
Article 4. State Parties condemn allpizpaganda and all organisations which are based on 
ideas or theories of smperiorýty of one race orgroup qf persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or 
which aaet*t to justi 2ý or promote racial halred and disaiminafion in any form, and 
undertake to adopt imme&ate andpositive measures aesýgned to eradicate all incitement to, or 
acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the prinoles embodied in the 
UD-HR and the r; gbts expressly setfortb in Article 5 of this convention [a catalogue of rights 
including freedom of o pinion, and expression and peaceful assemb/ y and assoczatio r], ir n nte 
alia. - 
(a) Sball declare an ofew punishable ýy law all &ssemination of ideas based on radal 
sAperyonty or batred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all aas of violence or 
inatement to such acts against any race orgroup oftersons of another colomr or ethnic on n, gi 
and also Mepruision of any assistance to racist actitifies, inclmdiq theftnanciq thereof 
(b) Shall declare illegal andpmhibir organisations, and also organi. Zed and all otherpropqganda 
activilies, which pmmote and inale rmial discrimination, and shall rrcqgni. Ze parricipation in 
such organisations or activities as an offence punishabk bj law., 
("I Shall notpermitpubAc authorities orpublic institutions, national or loca4 to pmmole or incite 
radal discrimination. 
Ihe United Kingdom is among sixteen of 150 countries'2 that have ratified the CERD 
Convention, expressing a reservation or declaration concerning Article 4. In particular, the 
UK has stated that it interprets Article 4 to require the adoption of further legislation, for 
subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c), 'only, in so far as it may consider with due regard to the priwiples 
embodied in Me UD-HR and setforth in Article 5 qf the Convention" [in particular the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association]. The government accepted that some legislative changes were required for the 
Parliament). This memis that such unincorporated Intematiotial Treaties cannot be direcdy relied upon in domestic courts 
(Chei icy v Conn [ Inspector of Taxes 11 1196811 All ER 779). 
5,2 As of 31st December 1997 - source 'Unded Na2igm publka6gn ', VkWA,; Zaera1 Tma25ýs Deposited nith the Semtag-Genffal' - 
publi, hed 1998. 
112 
achievement of the purpose set forth in the first paragraph of Article 4. narnely to eradicate 
all inciteryient to, or acts of, racial discrimination. 53 
Despite this British legislative change, it is evident that over the years, academics and 
officials of CERD have criticised the UK and claimed that it has failed -5 4 to implement fun y 
Article 4. Oyediran claims that the UK position on legislation to restrict racist speech and 
organisations, stands half-way between that of the United States and the rest of Europe. 
1he traditional US approach, with its strong comrnitment to freedom of speech, onlV 
regards restrictions in this area as legitimate if they in ike guard agai st a Ii ly breach of the 
peace. British law will restrict racist speech (that is Yhrealeni% abusive or insulting), if It is 
likely to stir up racial hatred on the grounds that racial hatred can, in the long ten-ri, lead to 
a breakdown in public order. By contrast in France, Italy and Austria, laws crm-unalise the 
expression of views that merely insult or vilify racial groups. " 
VVhile this view of Oyediran is no doubt justified and balanced, I would cnticaflv argue that 
the British approach is insular. It is typical of the British - "we knon) best" approach, which Is 
likely to stick in the craw of the Convention members. 1he UK has only ratified the 
CERD Convention on its own terms, With its reservation indicating that it will decide the 
parameters of the "xitb due mgard"clause. In effect, this signifies the sovereigntý- of the UK 
Parliament and a reftisal to accept the jurisdiction of the CERD Convention. 1his 
situation is exacerbated by an "intentl likely, Ag stir up racial hatmd" clause" which requires the 
personal approval of the Attorney General and has resulted in an average of fewer than 
57 two convictions per Vear. 
A fin-ther example of this British insular approach, IS demonstrated by the definition of 
racial hatred proVided in s. 17 of the Public Order Act 1986. According to British 
legislation, racial hatred means hatred against agmup ofpersons in Great Britain defined b y re ference 
to colour, race, naftonalýly etc.. 
53 This resulted in an addition to s. 6 of the Race Relations Act 1976 (having regard to all the eircymshmixs raad hvWd isAkely to 
be sarred Yp thereý). Thiis was later incorporated into Part III of the Public Order Act 1986. 
S4 33 UN GAOR Supp No 18 UN Doc. A/ 30/18 (1975), para 144. See also joxma Oyediran - The United )ýangdoms 
CompLmx uith A r6de 4 of the Internakonal Conwntion on Me EUmina6on ofý-W Forms of Radd Dif aiýý' (S&ikhig a Balm, e' - 
edited by Sandra Coliver). 
Except in certain very linuted contexts. 
Part III Public Order Act 1986. 
57 See (: haptff One - 'IntrViiiaion - T6ACk&MgAT1&4Mt Ra&M'. 
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This means that it is lawftý for Tom to express: "Kill the blacks in South Africa", 
but it maybe unlawftiI for him to sar. 'KI1 the b1acksfmmSouthAfnca " 
,, stir up raci 
Given that the first statement rnay indirectly I al hatred towards blacks from 
South Africa living in Britain, this seen-is a Strange anornalv. One logical explanation for 
this UK/British approach, IS that the government considers that expressions of hatred 
towards peoples in other nations may at times be justified. For example, the government 
may find it easier to justifý- a war with another country by stirring up racial hatred towards 
that countr\- and its leadership. 5' Whatever the 'ustification for this anomah-, it is worth 
noting that a purpose behind the UN international treaties, is to avoid hatred between 
nations. 'Rie British definition of racial hatred does not fully comply with d-iis grand 
international ideal, indeed it enables hatred to be stirred up towards groups living in other 
nations. 
Clearly amendment to UK legislation so that the law penalises incitement to racial 
discrimination is justified on the basis of the CERD Convention. However, it also seen-is 
that additional support for such change can be found in the ratification by the UIK, 9 (again 
under Crown prerogative powers) of the 'International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights UCCPR Article 20 of this Treaty includes a requirement that 'aiD, adto, ýý, of 
liatimal, racial or irfiTious hatted that hicites incial aiscriminatioli, hostility or Violence shall be pmhibited 
ýy law As already argued, Ul, ý- law currenth- falls to tackle incitement to racial 
discrimination and the proposals within 'Option Onewould clearly fulfil this international 
cornmitment. 
The need to tackle refigtkous terminology that stirs up racial discrimination/ hatred. 
'Me issue of religious discrin-unation is outside the scope of my thesis and as such I will not 
be considering this area in detail. However, where religious terminology is used by n-ulitant 
racists as a camouflage for their racist activity, it clearly must have some relationship to MT 
research. For example, clearli- relevant to my research is a slogan painted on a London 
tube station wall which says 'K// a Pakifor Cbn'smlas 91 with grounds existing for a Part III 
Public Order prosecution, "" since the words are threatening and capable of stirring up racial 
hatred towards a racial or ethnic group. However, an almost identical slogan that says, 'K// 
-- For e-, fanple, the vilific3fioii of 'Woso-, ic mid die ' Serbs'. 
' Rnaficd 20th Wiv 1976. 
t j, a,, , tumlig those responsible c. ai be identified. 
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a Aluslimfor Christmas "" would not, since Mushms are considered to be a religious and not 
an eflinic group. 62 
Ihis apparent anomaly stems from parliaments decisiOn to exclude relig"On from both the 
Race Relations Act 1976 and the Public Order Act 1986.1he approach to encompassing 
Sikhs as an ethnic group sterris from the case of Mandla v Dowell Lee, " which defines an 
ethnic and racial group on the basis of seven characteristics deterrynned by Lord Fraser. 
(1) Tbg bame a Iong. sbared bistog of 2vbicb the gmup is conuious as disfiqmishiq itfmm 
otbergmmps, and the memog of wbich keeps it alive, 
(2) A cultural tradition of their own, zncludingfamýly, and soeial customs and manners. 
In addition to these two essential characteristics, the following were also considered to be 
relevant In determining an ethnic group: 
'phical 
oii., (3) Either a commongeqng ýin or deseentfrom a small number of common ancestors, 
(4) A common languqrge, not necessarijI pecufiar to tbatgroup, 
(5) A common literature peculiar to the grou , ,P (6) A common reZgion ýffervnt from that of neighbounng groups or fmm the communýly 
surrounding it, 
(7) Bein ga minortýi or oppressed ýv a dominantgroup within a larger communio. 
Agroup defined ýy reference to enoagh of these eharaderisfics would be capable of inclu&jg cont ents, for 
exat*le, persons who many into the grou S 64 p p, and of excludin vi, dape o whojoinsthe ,ga WA S. 00 ? rv 
de rs n 
grvAojeels bimseff or herseff to be a member of it, and is accepted bn he is, fo the y other members, the r 
purposes, of the Act, a member. 
Applying this criterion, gypsies have been held to be an ethnic group, 65 Jews a racial and 
religious group'66 but Rastafarians are not protected, being regarded as a religious sect . 
67 
See Therese Murphy - 'Imdtement to ha*vd. - I iessovs fmm JN'Torthem IreZmd' published: 'S#2king a Balana, ' edited by Sandra 
S 
Coliver. 
C2 It is also possible it may not -amount to an ofience under s. 4 or 5 of the Riblic Order Act 1986, since any 'threaknmg, 
abujite or tým&ng'words need to be directed to a person rather than a group. As such, the oniv offence that may have been 
committed relates to crumnal damage. 
63 [19831 HýLR 209. 
ý, 4 It Neerns unfortunate that Lord Fraser in Mandla v Dowell Lee should have used such terminology as apostates, which 
on any natural meaning of the word seems to relate to a belief often associated widi religion. To this extent, his judgement 
can be criticised for producing religious termiriologyp6thin a racial definition - thereby clouding the issue even further. 
05 CRE v Dutton 11989] IRLR 8. 
, -, (, Scide v Gillette Industrial Ltd [1980] LRLR 427. This decision was reached on the basis of the shared cultural tradition 
of those ofjevi-,; h descent (rather than on the religion of Jud. usin). 
67 Dawldns v Crown Supplier- [1993] IRLR 284. In this case die Court of Appeal determined that Rastafarians did not 
fulfil the criteria because therewas no group histoiý-, descent (only 60 yeqr-) or language. 
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However, an Industrial Tribunal decision confiri-ning that Muslims are a religious group, 68 
and cannot be directly considered as a racial or ethnic group, has developed a state of 
perplexity. Logically, the tribunal decision appears consistent with the ratio of Mandla v 
Dozvell Lee, with Muslin-is not possessing a clear-cut 'common geqgraphical origin' due to them 
being too broadly based as a world-wide religion. 69 While this may, on the basis of Lord 
Fraser, be only a relevant (rather than essential) characteristic, it is clear that Lord 
Templeman, while agreeing with the conclusion that Sikhs did constitute a racial group, 
took a much firmer line than Lord Fraser. Indeed, Lord Templeman discussed whether 
Sikhs were a race and reasoned that a racial group must have the characteristics of a race, 
namely ýmup descent, a gmu p of geographical origin and a gmup histog' As a result of these 
arguments, it may be difficult to disregard the relevance of a 'common geqgraphical origin , albeit 
that one of the consequences IS that a religious term like Muslim'is often depicted, and 
considered, as being synonymous with a person of foreign descent (i. e. foreign to the UK). 
Sadly, the net result of the 'categoriSation of Muslin'IS as being a religious group and not an 
ethnic group', is that rnilitant racists have become significantly involved in stirn g up racial 
discrin-iination/hatred through anti-Mosque campaigns, 70 applying a warped racially 
political message that turns the term YVIuskm' into a shorthand description for ethnic 
foreigners who are not welcome. In fact, materials seized by the police have been 
considered to be insulting, but the Crown Prosecution Service has declined to prosecute a 
BNP actiViSt who was allegedly found in possession. 71 The basis of this refusal being inter 
alia, that the material - although stirring up racial hatred - uses religious terminology, with 
the term Muslim'relating to religion rather than race. 72 
68 In Malik N, Bertram Personnel Group (1990) No: 4343/90, Muslims were not considered to be protected by the dn-ect 
discrimination provisions of s. 1(l)(a) of the Race Relations Act 1976., but may be able to show indirect discrimination on 
the basis the majority of Muslims may be coloured. 
L'ý' It is estimated there are more dim 1,000 million followers of Islarri across many continents, with around 2 million 
existing in the UK (Source: comments of Georde Gollway MP - Hansard, 3 February 1999, Column 887). 
70 Craniky Mosque Vandalifed' - Searchlight, April 1995. Anh-mosque catffpaýgn prowkes tiokna, ' - Searchlight, August 1996. 
'Vekran nwý& behind anfi-mosque campaýw'- Searchlight, November 1996. See also Searchhght, january 1998 for a report on a 
mail benig convicted in relation to an attack upon .1 Mosque in Leeds. 
71 A prosecution fbr possession of material that maýl stir tip racial hatred, would be brought via s. 23 Public Order Act 
1986. 
7-' 'Me London Borough of Merton is seeking a judicial review in relation to this decision of the CPS not to prosecute the 
BNP activist found in possession of anti-Mushm material. 'I"heir argument ioder dia is that Mushms are capable of fulfilling 
most of the characteristics established in Manda v Donell I 2e and should therefore be considered as an ethnic group along 
with Sikhs, Jews etc (information supplied by Merton Council Legal Departinent, in 3 telephone conversation of the 8 
j ariuatýý 1999). 
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This situation is made all the more problematic when you consider the possibility of a 
9 religious conflict' between Sikhs and MUSI=73 within Britain, resulting in a Muslim 
distributing a leaflet saying. "Stab a Sikb" 'Iliese words would provide grounds, on the 
basis of Mandla v DowellLee, for a prosecution in relation to the stirring up of 'racial hatred', 
since Sikhs are considered to be an ethnic group. However, an almost identical leaflet 
produced by a Sikh that said, 'Stab a Musfim"would not. 
This religious/race anomaly is censoriously emphasiSed by the fact that a leaflet which says 
"Stab a. Muskm" could amount to racial discrimination, notwithstanding the ratio of Alandla 
PDowellLse. This applies because . 111andla v Dowell I -ee simply suggests that the term Muslim 
refers to a religious rather than a racial group, it does not rule out the possibility that 
indirect racial discrimination may anse. 74 
In its 'Second review of the Race Relations Act', the Con-u-nission for Racial Eýiality 
criticised the law saying. ' 
"... it cannot be any mote acce , 
piable to stir mp batfed against people because thy afe seen to be 
Musfims than to do so because thg afe seen Ag be Pakistanis. 
This CRE staternent, in expressmg that Muslims should not be disCnrrUnated agamst, 
seerns to be advocating the need for a new law to tackle religious discruT miation. While 
not vnshmg to undermine such an ain-i, it is not necessary to plug the legal religious/racial 
loophole in the public order legislation. " An alternative approach is to arnend s. 17 of the 
Public Order Act 1986 in accord vnth the approach taken in s. 28(3) of the Crime & 
Disorder Act 1998.7' This 'involves enabling a purposive approach to detern-immg guilt. In 
sirnple terrm, this would probably involve amending s. 17 of the Public Order Act 1986 so 
th at It wo uld re ad " it is immaterialfor the pur poses qf this section whether or not the offender's hatred or 
73 Problem of this nature have occurred in Hounslow over recent years (see Cdlege blames extrrmiýts for 1EZýOvs liot, in 
which the I-lizb-Ut-Tahrir were said to have been active in a riotwhich involved the use of sticks and knives - Hounslow, 
Felth am & Hanworth Times of 13 January 1995). 
7" For an example of this, see Malik v Bertram Personnel Group (1990) Industrial Tribunal case No 4343/90. 
75 Commission for Racial Equality - second review of the RRA 1976 [1991] 58. 
76 In the House of Commons, james GoUway NIP referred to 'Islamaphobia as being the last "acceptable" form of racism, 
suitable even for the dinner tables of Islington and Hampstead'Hansard, 3 February 1999: Column 888 
77 S28(3) of the (, rime & Disorder Act 1998 v. -hich relates to 'racial hostility' reads: "It is irrurnaterial for the purposes of 
paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (1) whether or not the offender's hostility is also based, to any extent on the fact or 
presumption that any person or group of persons belongs to any religious group.. ". The Crime & Disorder Act 1998, QL-M 
be discussed in Chapter Seven. 
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discrimination is also based, to any exknt, on thefad or prrsumption that any person orgromp qfpersons 
beloqs to any relt, ýýious gromp. " 
Such legislative change should give the crin-unal courts an element of discretion in assessing 
whether the words used relate to religious discrimination, or are used as a means of getting 
around the racial sections of the public order legislation. In effectý it would require a 
purposive interpretation and thereby enable the court to consider the motivation behind 
the words used. If the courts consider that the words used were influenced by race, thev 
would be entitled, on the facts, to determine a guilty verdict, notwithstanding the use of 
religious terminology. 
Additional support for some legislative change, can again be found in Article 20 of the 
ich in th y Intemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights whi i cludes a requirement at 'an 
advocag of nationa4 racial or reli gious hatred that inaks racial disaimination, bostikty or violence shall be 
prohibited ýv law " 
An overaff analysis. 
On the basis of compliance with obligations under the CERD Convention, there does exist 
a ground for introducing legislation to tackle 'Option One' (stirring up of racial 
discrimination). However, as the analysis of the Evidence Assessment Sheet [31 shows, 
simply changing Part III of theBblic Qrder to include 'Option One, would not produce 
any real i act upon rnilitant racist materials, since the requirement for the words to be IMP 
threatenirig, abusive and/or insulting acts as a shield to prosecution. Indeed, it seems likely 
that those who are responsible for such materials will continue to avoid prosecution by 
producing material which stirs up racial discrimination or hatred and which is purposely 
not quite 'threatening, abusive or insulting' In other words, they will continue to produce 
literature that is 'nwiahý offensive' 
In comparison, producirigy legislation which tackles 'Opdon Two'alone, does extend the 
ability of the law to tackle racially offensive material. However, such a legislative change - 
while still IMPacting upon freedom of expression - fails to bring UK law In line with the 
CERD Convention requirement to tackle material that incites racial discrimination. 
A combmation of 'Opt-ions One and Two' fulfils such an objective. The problem is 
that such an approach displayS a clear potential to undern-une freedom of expression. As 
highlighted by the illustration on refugee and asylum seekers, it seen-is inevitable that by 
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expressing a detailed view that refugees should not overstay their welcome there will be 
some level of racial offence given, with a possibility existing that the words expressed 
may stir up racial discrimination. One way of ensuring that such important debate could 
take place (i. e. assuming the law was changed to include 'Options One and Twoý 
without fear of prosecution, would be to provide an exemption under the law for either 
political parties or in relation to infort-nation concerning immigration, refugees and 
asylum seekers. The exemption for political parties must be considered as unacceptable 
on a number of grounds. The most obvious being the difficulty of justiýing giving 
political parties a privileged position in society - with democracy also implying that critics 
of political parties should have the right to debate and criticise any party policy. A 
further obvious problem being, that to give a carte blanche immunity for political parties, 
would not fulfil the aim of tackling mi sm. ilitant raci , 
78 with the application of the laws to 
certain parties and not others, likely to be considered as discriminatory and politically 
unacceptable. 
However, this should not be taken to mean that the example of refugees and asylum 
seekers completely undermines 'Opt-ions One and Two. ' Indeed, as I Will show in the 
next chapter 'Part Two - Say No to Radsm -A Counter-messqge'. it may be possible to 
introduce laws, which tackle the stirring up of racial discrimination or hatred through the 
use of racially offensive words, without seriously undert-ruining freedom of expression. 
As I will argue in 'Part Two, this can be achieved not through exemption - but as a result 
of the refinement of 'Opt-ion Two'. 
7S It would not tackle r-x3st material produced bv political parties like the NF or BNP. It could even ressult in 3 group like 
Combat 18 becommg n political party to 3voiýd prosecution. 
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PART TWO - "SAY NO TO RACISM" 
A Counter-Message 
Chapter Five. 
In Chapter Four, I considered the legal options for change. I concluded that a 
combination of 'Option One' (incitement to racial discrin-unation or hatred) and 
'Option Two'(a racial offence prerequisite in relation to prosecution) rnay be politicallý . 
and even legally, problematic due to the undermining of free expression. Ulus, I 
suggested that the only realistic way that this combination could be applied is through 
some form of refinement of 'Option Two' In this Chapter, I intend to consider this 
matter. 
To look for refinement, I turn to ffie policy of counter-speech adopted' by the National 
Council for Civil Liberties [Liberty]. 2 At its base, counter-speech or expression suggests 
that where racist words are used, it is important that the counter argument is put. 
Obviouslv, this is sound common sense and to a large extent the work of the 
Commission for Racial Equality reflects this approach. ' Examples of the CRE's use of 
counter expression can be seen in the poster campaigns which demonstrate that people 
are equal no matter what their colour or nationality' and which emphasise that 'racial 
attacks are cnmes'. ' Further, the CRE have worked with well-known sports personalities, 
and sports companies, to: 'Sq), iio to racismý. 6 Though it should be recognised that not all 
of the CRE advertising campaigns have been regarded as notable successes. A shock 
tactic campaign in 1998, which depicted powerful negative irriages of black and Asian 
people and carried a telephone number of a fake 'company' which people could ring to 
complain about ffie images, resulting in controversy. A few weeks after the introduction 
of the shock tactic campaign the offending posters were replaced by some that said, 
ý At the 1995 AGM of Liberty q motion w3s approved which instructed the Executive to explore the encouragement 
of counter-speech as an approach to problems of r3cism atid sexism. 'nis included possible forms of legislation that 
would mandate publicly-funded counterspeech. 
I Pie National Council for Civil Liberties use, 'Liberly' is it, shortened carnpaigning name - see letter from Atija 
Lockwood of Libc-rtv - New Lavjournal -9 Fcbru3r%l 1996. 
In 1998 the CRE lind an advertising budget of, (250,000. 
An example vvere tile qdvertisements on the underground which demonstr. qted that Asian, Europe-.: nis etc. an have 
the same size brailis - while ricists do not. 
In 1995 the CRE undertook a rqcial equalitýý- poster c., nnpaign - 'RaaalAmýwks arr 6ý, wes'. 
Fric Cantorin and the Nike sportswear TV advertisements. 
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'IVhat was worse? This advert oryourfailure to cotVlainF As a consequence of complaints 
made to the Advertising Standards Authority, the CRE became the first organisation 
within the country to be required to submit advertising campaigns in advance, for 
approval. ' 
While Liberty has cited the advertising work of the CRE as an example of counter- 
speech, ' they do not propose that counter-speech should be an alternative to legislation. 
Indeed, their proposals suggest that counter-speech should work alongside legislation. 
In addition, Liberty also argues that changes are needed to our current laws to deal more 
effectively With racism. ' 
Perhaps though, an alternative approach is to see counter-expression as part of 
legislation. For an example of this in practice, we can look at the government's 
approach to the production /distribution of cigarettes. The government has been clearly 
aware of the dangers to health that may exist from the smoking of cigarettes. Despite 
such dangers, they have not attempted to ban smoking. Indeed, since 1971 they have 
worked with the tobacco industry to establish an industry-wide code of conduct, 
resulting in government health warnings being added to the side of cigarette packets and 
on any tobacco advertising. Undoubtedly, when they were first introduced the health 
warnings were ridiculed by some, with a few children deliberately flaunting their desire to 
smoke. " However, this was just the initial reaction, over the years the warnings have 
chipped away at societal attitudes, helping to educate people to the dangers of smoking. 
Now, nearly 30 years later, there is a much greater acceptance of the need to limit 
smoking in public places and places of work. 
Obviously, the smoking health warnings have not stopped smoking - but they have 
undermined support for the habit. " By adapting this health warning, or counter-message 
7 The Advertising Standards Agency confirmed (in a telephone call of 12th March 1999) that they had received in 
total 27 complaints nationally about the CRE campaign. It is understood these complaints came from members of 
the public and anti-racist organisations. Oearly, one complaint is undesirable, but 27 complaints is not a significant 
number nation-wide and for these reasons it may be considered that the ASA have taken a he3vyýhanded response in 
requiring the CRE to obtain advance approval for any future advertising campaigns. 
In a telephone conversation held 24 January 1996. 
There are various examples of this, one such example is the motion, approved at the 1995 AGM, calling for an 
inclusion in the law of a formal concept of racially motivated crime. 
I am indebted to Mrs Elisabeth Woollard, a Leeds teacher, for this observation. 
For example, the actress Joan Collins was on Good Morning TV reporting on the 1999 Oscar ceremonies mid 
remarked that "Iou are not aUonrd to sojoke at any of tke parties - it is politicaqy imvma". 
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principle, to 'racial# offensive' material the comparison and intent of Influencing and 
educating people over a period of time is self-evident. Anýý legislation, requiring an anti- 
racist counter-message, would be directed at the publisher or distributor of the 'racially 
offensive' material (sIrnIlar to the producer/distributor of cigarettes), With the individual 
free to read the material just as s/he is free to smok-e. An example of the kind of 
message that could be required to be displayed, is given in the tide of this chapter - i. e. 
'Say No to Racism -a arning parts of this material could be racially offensive. 11 An alternative 
could be more general in tern-is, with a message that sa3-s: "Committed to equafiýy of 
opportunio - lVarning this material could be racially offensive " 
An outfine of the legislative approach. 
In establishing a counter-message health warning on tobacco packets, the government 
developed a voluntary code. This voluntary code worked because the tobacco industry is 
structured and identifiable, With consultation achieved through the Tobacco 
Manufacturers Association. Despite co-operation from the tobacco industry, the 
government complied with European Union requirements 12 and introduced the 
Tobacco Products Labelling (SafeW RegIAations of 1991, which can result in the 
imposition of fines should there be any reftisal to display a health warning. " 
While a voluntary approach was reasonably successfi. 11 With regards to tobacco, it seems 
inevitable that it would fail with regards to material that is 'rwialj1 offensive. ' This applies 
because militant racists are ill-defined individuals (unlike tobacco companies who have 
an identifiable structure), many of whom are likely to reject any form of voluntary 'anti- 
racist counter-message' process. It follows that, in order to enforce a counter-message 
process, a prohibitive and punitive approach will be necessary. Given that the proposals 
for reform relate to people who intentionally stir up racial hatred/discrirniination, it 
seen-is appropriate, and consistent with existing legislation, to take a public order 
approach. Indeed, the proposal that I make is to amend Part III of the Public Order 
Act 1986 so as to make it a crin-unal offence to incite racial discrimination or hatred 
12 It seems the need for an EU regulatory approach was more about enforcing a common standard across all 
members states, than it was about obtinung the co-operation of the tobacco companies to display a counter message. 
13 'Me Bntih Government has indicated that they intend to introduce legislation to prohibit newspaper, magazine 
and billboard advertising by tobacco companies. This is to take effect in December 1999, two years ahead of a 
European Union timetable staged process that seeks to outlaw tobacco advertising. Four British companies and the 
German Government have challenged the validity of the EU agreed ban, at the European Court of justice, on the 
basis of an inconsistclicywith freedom of expression and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
'I'his challenge is unlikely to be rules on by the ECJ until 2001 (see 'Smoking adirds to be stubbed out eady, - The Times. 18 
june 1999). 
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g or racially offensive' words. This involves through the use of 'threatening, abusive, insultin 
extending the current law so that it tackles 'racial# offensive'words" that are intended or 
are likely to stir up racial discrimination or hatred, while also providing for a counter- 
message - say no to racism - defence for words that are 'racially, offensive"' 
Defining 'racial offence'. 
In the case of cigarettes, a cigarette can generally be readily identified and accordingly the 
need for a counter-message health warning - in accord with regulations - IS self-evident. 
Bv comparison, words that are 'rxialyl offensive'may not always be so easily recogrused 
and the need to display a counter-message may be not so obvious. 
'Mis problem of 'identification, interpretation, and/or definition' is inevitable with laws 
that tackle issues associated with morality, in that what gives offence to one person - 
may not give offence to another. However, this problem is not new or insurmountable. 
In Brutus v Cozens 16 the problem of defining 'insulting behaviour' 17 was discussed in a 
case that involved an anti-apartheid protester who blew a whistle and threw leaflets, at 
the Wimbledon tennis tournament. The defendant protestor was charged with 
undertaking insulting behaviour contrary to s. 5 of the Public Order Act 1936 and the 
Magistrates found, on the facts, that the defendaries behaviour had not been insulting - 
dismissing the case without calling on him to give evidence. On appeal by the 
respondent prosecutor, the Divisional Court held that insulting behaviour is 'somethiq 
xhich affmaed other people and evidenced a disrespect or conteVt for their rights. ' On further 
appeal, by the defendant Brutus, against a decision that the case should be referred back 
to the justices for a re-hearing, the House of Lords rejected the approach of the 
Divisional Court and applied an 'ordinary usage - natural meaning - methodology. " In 
doing so Lord Reid suggested there should be no legalistic definition of insulting, just an 
14 In the last chapter, I argued that words that are offensite'could be determined on the basis of a combined 
statutory and natural meaning approach. This would mean that the racial element is determined in accord with die 
definition of a 'racial group' in s. 17 of the Public Order Act 1986 and 'offence or offensive' determined in accord 
with the principles laid down in Brutus \- Cozens [1972] 1 All ER 1297. This would result in words that are 
threatening, abusive, insulting or offensive all being determined as a matter of fact and not law. 
15 It is suggested that a new s. 18 (5a) be created which states: 'A 
_person 
who attaches to rarially, offensite words or material a 
warnmg and anti -racist wunler message, which is consistent with saying no to radsm, is not guilo of an offenz under this kechýon. 
10 [197211 All ER 1297. This case was Aso discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
17 The same legal principles apply to words that are 'thrratening or abushe', though it is clear that a greater degree of 
objectivitv maN, esist in deterrutrung if the words used were threaterung or abusive. 
1ý In applying this definition a person using insulting words must take the audience as he finds diem. . -, ee Jordan v Burgoyne [1963] 2 All ER 225 and the discussion in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
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acceptance that "an or&nag sensible man knows an insult when be sees or hears it. `9 This 
establishes that the courts should apply a natural meaning approach to words that may 
be 'threatening, abusive andlor insulting'q and it seems that there have been no serious 
difficulties in the application of this principle. Accordingly, it is sug-gested that - for the 
sake of legal consistency -a combined statutory and natural meaning approach should 
be taken with regards to words that may be 'raeial# offensive. ' This would mean that the 
word 'race'should be determined on the basis of a statutory definition, 2" with the word 
'offensive'being given a natural meaning based upon fact and not law. 
Inevitably, such a combined statutory and natural meaning will result in a strong element 
of Subjectivity 'in establishing just what IS 'racialgl' offensive'. Thus, while an ordinary 
sensible man can recognise a cigarette, so he should also have the aptitude to recognise 
that the use of certain words can - in certain circumstances - give 'racial offence'. 
The advantagýs of a counter-message defence. 
As acknowledged in the last Chapter, to prosecute a person for distributing/publishing 
material that stirs up discrin-unation /hatred, through the use of raclallv offensive words, 
could mhibit freedom of expression. It would certainly make discussion of issues 
associated with refugees, asylum and possibly imn-ugration, exceedmRIv problematic due 
to an interference with freedom of expression. 
The introduction of a counter-message defence will enable such discussion without an 
expectation of being prosecuted. Indeed, all that would be necessary to avoid 
prosecution, for the use of raclallv offensive words that stir up racial discrimination or 
hatred, IS to display a counter-message consistent with the government aim of saying 'no 
to raeism'. 
Further, the approach shows the potential of enhancing freedom in the sense that it 
does not absolutely deny expression of 'racially offensive' words, but provides additional 
authoritative counter-message information for the receiver of the expression. " In this 
sense it provides freedom, while developing responsibility. If we take a discussion 
19 S 
See comments of Lord Reid in Brutus v Cozens [1972] 1 All ER 1297. 
20 This deffiiition of race is synonymous vvith the definitions of q 'racial group' applied under s. 17 of the Pubhc 
Order Act 1986, s. 3 Race Relations Act 1976 and s28(4) Crime & Disorder Act 1998. 
This issue vill be discussed more fully when consideration is given to Article 10 of the Convention on Human 
Rights. 
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concerning refugees as an example, a 'counter-message approach' facilitates open and 
frank debate about the issue of refugees and asylum even in circumstances of providing 
'radal offence'and the probability of mciting racial discrin-unation. 
Those opposed to racism, may be incliried to criticise the counter speech proposals on 
the grounds that they provide a form of le itirriacy to 'racially, offensive' material, nuking it 91 
clear to those offended that they cannot sue because of the existence of the counter- 
message. While there may be some merit to this argument, it is important to reflect that 
material which is purely 'ratialyl offensive'is currently given legitimacy in the sense that it 
cannot be considered to be in breach of existing laws. Under the proposals I submit in 
this thesis, to use 'ratiay offensive' words, with intent or likelihood of stirring up racial 
discrimination /hatred, would be a crin-unal offence. The counter-message defence is 
only proposed as an Mi-built defence for 'raeiay offensive'material - it IS not intended as a 
defence for material that may be 'threatening, abusive or insulting' and also 'likely' (or there 
exists an intent) to incite racial discrimination or hatred. As such, it IS not lirniting the 
existing law, but extending the parameters for prosecution with regards to racist 
material. 
The educational value of a counter-messagg defence. 
It is also clear that a counter-message approach can have some educational value. For 
example, many journalists could fear producing articles that related to racial attacks in 
case the story gave 'racial offence' and resulted in a prosecution. It follows, that one 
advantage of the proposed counter-message defence would be that it could provide a 
visible safety net from prosecution for incitement to racial discrirruination - i. e. so long as 
the material was not also 'thneateninT, abusive or insulting. ' It follows also, that newspaper 
proprietors would be required to display counter-message equal opportunities statements 
along with any story, within their papers, which might cause 'racial offence'and be likely to 
incite racial discrin-unation or hatred. Thus, they would be thereby sending out a 
message that was consistent with the government's desire to say no to racism. This may 
also result in readers of newspapers and journals becon-ung more aware of material that 
provides the potential for being 'racially offensive'and therefore aware of the legislation. 
By which I mean the disphy of ý q counter message on material what is racially offensivc and is likely to stir up racial 
discrimination or hatred. 
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Clearly, this would serve to help educate the general public to a policy of saying "No to 
radsm " Indeed, the philosophy behind this thesis proposal is one of education, with 
the law being used as a means of developing societal acceptance of equality of 
opportunity and equal treatment of all citizens irrespective of race. Sociological 
arguments In relation to using the law to help develop anti-racist education, as a means 
of societal change, will be discussed in the next chapter. For the purposes of discussion, 
in this chapter, it is important to note that the proposed counter-message legislation is 
intended to educate - possibly more so than it is intended to penalise. This can be of 
special value 'in relation to n-ulitant racist literature that is 'radally o ffensive' rather than 
'Xbreatening, abusive or insalting'. Ibis applies because such racist rnatenial often ýurporrs to 
make a contribution to public education and debate'2' 'ne value of the counter-message is that 
it helps warn the reader of the potential of racial offence, while bneflv iig them an givin 
alternative viewpoint. 
Other consequences may also develop from the existence of such counter-message 
legislation. Using the National Front or BNP as an example - would the publishers of 
material, which may be 'racially, offensive'and capable of inciting racial discrirrunation, be 
prepared to face prosecution by refusing to put within the material an equal 
opportunities statement? It is possible they may wish to be martyrs to their cause and 
distribute material that is in breach of the law, but does not contain a publisher imprint, 
in effect, hiding the existence of those directly responsible for publishing the material. 
In these circumstances it may prove difficult to prosecute the leadership of any 
organisation which, although benefiting from the literature, is not evidentially 
responsible for its publication or distribution. Should the literature display the emblem 
of the organisation, it is theoretically possible, on the basis of London Borougj2 of 
Merton v Edmonds and Tyndal, " that the leadership of the organisation could be 
prosecuted. However, the prosecution of the two BNP leaders in Merton, was in 
relation to the display of a BNP poster and in circumstances of them being made aware 
of its ongoing display by the local authority. 'Mis may suggest that the leadership of an 
organisation could be held criminally liable in circumstances where they have been 
formally notified that a leaflet being distributed, with the organisation's logo, is offensive 
See comments of Roy Jenkins (Home Secretan'). Para 126 Radd Discyimination' white paper presented to 
Parliament September 1975 - published IIMS0 1976. 
24 Case number CO/1772/92 Divisional Court. For a discussion of this case see Chapter Tbree and the section 
'Racist graffiti and fly posting'. It should be noted that a key element that established guilt in this case was the fact 
that the two defendants knew that the BNP poster w3s being displayed and took no action to rectffi- the situation. 
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(and should contain a counter-niessage), and where members of that organiSation 
continue to distribute the leaflet without a counter-message being displayed. 23 
An organisation's habilily for the stirring up of racial discrimination /hatred. 
It is also possible that a militant racist organisation itself could be criminally prosecuted 
and open to a fine. " This view is supported by the comments of Smith & Hogan, 27 who 
argue that unincorporated associations could be convicted of a cr1MM' al offence. This 
arises as a result of the effect of the InteMretation Act 1978, which establishes that 
unincorporated associations are "persons" and are liable to be convicted of any offence 
where the definition uses the word 'person', as is usual. It follows that an 
unincorporated association, like the BNP, NF, or Combat 18, can be convicted as a 
result of the acts of superior officers who carry out the function of management and 
speak- and act on behalf of the organisation. " 
As SrrUth v Hogan argue, by analogy the same legal principles that apply to corporations 
should also apply to unincorporated associations. Ibus, as Denning Lj said in Boulton 
Engineenng Co Ltd v Maile: " 
"A coVanj may in maly wqys be likened to a human boýv. It has a brain and a nerve centre 
which controls what it does. It also has hands which hold the tools and act in accordance with 
directionsfrom the centre. Some of the people in the cozVanj are mere servants and a ents who g 
are nothing more than the hands to do the work and cannot be said to represent the mind and 
wiIZ Otbers are &reaors and managers who represent the &, redin g mind and will of the 
company and contml what it does. The state of mind of these managers is the state of mind of 
the coVanj and is treated ýy the law as such. " 
30 Sirmlarly, in the leadmg case of Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v NattrasS it was held that the 
company can be cnrnMally liable for the acts of "the board of &reaors, the manqging &rraor 
25 Clearly this kind of case would be determined on the facts and dependent upon proof of distribution by persons 
belonging to or associated with the organisation. Also at issue may be what steps the leadership of the orgarlisation 
miy have personally taken to stop the distribution of the offensive material. Any person who tried to set up or frame 
another, by duplicating the logo, could be charged with perverting the course of justice. 
ý" I do not intend to discuss the civil or criminal liability of unincorporated associations in detail since it may take me 
outside the parameters of my thesis. I raise the point by way of illustration and would add that this stibject is a thesis 
in its o, ý, -n right, with limited substantive case law in this area. 
27 Page 176 of Criminal Lxý%ý (Sixth Edition) published by Butterworths 1988. 
This comes from the comments of Lord Reid in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass 11972] 1 AC 153. While this 
case was in relation to a corporation, bNI analogy the same principles should apply to unincorporated associations. 
"-' [ 1982] RTR 260, [1982] Crim LR 5 10. 
31-'[19721 AC 153. 
127 
ps otl)er senior officers of a coVanj [who] cany out the functions of -nanqement and speak andperba: 
and act as the conpany" Applying these principles to an unincorporated association (like 
the BNP or Combat 18), it seems that if it can be proved that dlegal racist materials have 
been distributed in the name of the organisation, and with the approval of the leadership 
of that organisation, then both the leadership and the organisation could face 
Prosecution. 
It follows that the leadership, of such organisations, will be careful and likely try to take 
steps to avoid prosecution. Indeed, all the evidence of my research shows that 
prominent rrUlitant racist organisations generally comply with the law With regards to the 
open production of racist materials . 
3' There is no evidence to suggest that groups likke 
the BNP or NF have openly defied the law with regards to their literature. 2 
Obtaining the views of militant racists. 
Based on the assumption that such militant racist organisations will comply with any 
new counter-message legislation, I decided to interview some 33 rnilitant racists and ask 
how they felt members would respond to a legal requirement that an anti-racist counter- 
message should be displayed on material that may i racial offence. " I deliberately give 
decided to approach activists, rather than the national leadership of the BNP, since I 
was Interested in establishing if volunteer activists would readily accept and distribute 
literature that displayed an anti-racist message. In addition I obtained the views of Phil 
Andrews, who IS a former youth officer of the National Front and now an Isleworth 
Community Group Councillor on Hounslow Counci 1.35 
Hounslow BNP member, and local government candidate, Warren Glass criticised the 
proposals for a counter-message on the grounds that "it would degfreedom of eNpression and 
31 Indeed all the evidence, from my research, shows that BNP material - although racist in tone - is generally 
consistent with the law as it currently stands under Part III of the Public Order Act 1986. 
32 There is suspicion that they do produce material that is racially insulting and likely to stir up racial hatred, but they 
simply do no place a printed and published by emblem on the material. However, this is no direct and provable 
evidence of such activity. 
33 This approach was preferred to a formal questionnaire since the likelihood was that they would ignore such 
requeAs or present a party line. It was agreed that I would quote the main activist (Warren Glass) and that he should 
approve the accuracy of statements attributed to him - i. e. before publication. 
34 A meetmg was established on the 1 March 1996 in the Rose & Crown, in Heston, via a representative of the local 
press. 
'ý Phil Andrews was elected to Hounslow Council in 1998 beating the writer of this thesis b%, 2 voteý 
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t9 to ProPel words out ofPeoples momths. "36 Despite such criticism, he expressed a belief that 
the BNP would comply With any new law requiring the inclusion of an equal 
opportunities statement within 'racial# offensive' literature, his argument being that the 
BNP respect the law and always complv. Likewise, although not now a member of the 
National Front, Phil Andrews expressed his belief that the NF would also follow this 
approach. 
Assuming this to be the case, it is clear that much of the current BNP/NF material 
could continue to be distributed (albeit with an anti-racist counter-message displayed). 
However it is possible that, as a result of this decision, there could be some internal 
political consequences. To illustrate, how many rnilitant racists would be prepared to 
walk the streets to deliver material that expresses 'No to racism? Obviously some will, but 
it must be possible that a number would resent the leadership's decision to comply with 
the law and display a counter-message that they have little support for. The 
consequences for the leadership of the racist organisation could well be that they would 
lose support as some of their membership rebel against compliance with the law. " 
Warren Glass argues that he does not believe that the BNP would lose support. 
However, he does suggest that some disillusioned activists could turn to distributing 
racist materials without any indication of a printer and/or publisher 38 - with some even 
joining forces with Combat 18 (which is renowned for proactive style racist attacks). " 
By comparison, Phil Andrews expressed a view that NF activists would also be very 
unhappy about being required to display an anti-racist counter-message on their 
materials. He suggested the NF would make every effort to work around the law - using 
the material to criticise the counter-message, while arguing their right to freedom of 
expression. " 
36 This aspect of his criticism will be discussed later in this chapter (see the section 'Consistency with the CERD 
Convention'). 
17 There are reports that some BNP members, as a result of the loss in electoral support following the election of its 
first Councillor in Tower Hanilets, have lost patience vith tactics designed to gain votes and that they have joined the 
more pro-active and at times violent National Socialist Alliance and Combat 18 - 'Tyndall at the Lad Oance Saloon' 
Searchlight, September 1995. It is further suggested that a number of BNP branches have either defected wholesale 
or are closely collaborating with the NSA and C18 - BNP, ýký day'deseends intofane'[Searrh4hi - Darmber 95]. 
18 'Me inference is that those producing such non-attributable racist materials - because they cannot bc readily 
identified - will feel free to be more openly threatening, abusive or insulting. 
'9 Warren Glass emphasised that he was a member of the BNP and not Combat 18, though he -admitted he a-as 
farniliar with C 18 and some of its members. 
-ýC'niis undoubtep, is tnie, but ifter the first few leaflets or pubhcations such -in approach wiU ine-, itqbly die down. 
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Concern that a counter-messaV could act as a siggpost for racist materiaL 
It may also be feasibly possible that n-u'litant racists could benefit from a counter- 
message approach, i. e. because the message - although anti-racist - will indirectly act as a 
signpost for racist material. Clearly, if firm evidence exists that an anti-racist counter- 
message will only serve to attract people towards reading racist material, it could 
seriously underrrune the value of such an approach. 
To consider this issue, I have examined a report initiated by the government and 
produced by the British Broadcasting Corporation, Broadcasting Standards Commission, 
and the Independent Television Comn-ussion. This joint WOrking Party report" was 
primarily concerned with content-wamings rather that counter-messages. ' Its findings 
rejected the notion of set rules and TV censorship - preferring broadcasters to promote 
viewer choice and operate via a statement of common principles, based upon content- 
warnings with regards to TV Violence " 
The TV coverage of the joint Working Party report talked about consideration of concerns 
that certain viewers n-iay use their rernote control to channel hop - i. e. hopping between 
stations and selecting progranunes that display aV for violence syrnbol. However the 
published report, while conunenting that, 'Thq! were a teg basic and a Amited mechanism 
which may not be as eeefive as a specific descrýbfion ofproblemalic content'ý ' stated that the working 
party "do not wish to c6scourage the ado g ymboý techniques ption of these [rafi, ý 
What IS clear is that the joint 11' 7orking Paqy, in recommending the use of some forin of 
content-wammgs, emphatically rejected the idea of censorship through utilising a V- 
chip. 45 Ibis rejection of censorship being primarily based on arguments that the V-chip 
41 '1 'iolence and the Viewer'- Report of the joint Wodung Party on Violence on Television 1998. 
42 Ile distinction between the two being that a content warning is designed to warn the reader of material content 
with a view to parents excluding certain vulnerable sections of society - i. e. children. In comparison, 3 counter- 
message is more educational in content - in that its primary purpose is to remind and educate the public of a societal 
goal. Obviously, a counter-message may also be a warning in that it enables people to choose whether or not to view 
(or read) the content knowing that it may contain material that is offensive. However, its primary purpose is not the 
exclusion of certain sections of societý 
41 The report of theJoint Vorking PaiV rejected the notion that identical rules can be established to cover A service 
providers and agreed upon a statement of common principles or guidelines. This statement utilising the 9pm family 
viewing watershed and recognising the value of on-air announcements and warnings (working towards a new 
initiative utilising teletext page numbers) prior to programming and during any 'IV break. 
44 See page 23 of the report 'Viioýcr and the I 'iý? m er'. 
45 The V-chip is a computer chip that can be inserted into the television thereby enabling parents to prevent children 
from wqtching certain unacceptable TV programs. 
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is imprecise technology that has not yet been proven in the USA or Canada - with it also 
taking many years to introduce. ' Noticeably, in reaching this conclusion, the joint 
11"'orking Parýy failed to give detailed consideration of the legal and political issues 
associated with freedom of expression. 
Naturally, this joint Workiq Party report does have some relevance to the issue of 
counter-messages, but it is important not to overstate that relevance. Indeed, the TV 
report was concerned with content-wamirigs, while the arguments in this thesis are also 
about counter-speech legislation. Clearly a counter-message also acts as a content- 
warning, in that the counter-message alerts any potential reader that the material could 
contain racially offensive content. 47 However, there is a subtle but significant difference, 
with a counter-message extending beyond the parameters of any straightforward 
warning message. To reiterate, the arguments in this thesis are not for a big 'R' to be 
placed on racist material with the intent of discouraging readership by a certain category 
of people . 
4' Rather, the aim is to append to material that may be 'radal# offensit'e'. a 
counter-message, educative in itself, and consistent with the government's aim of saying 
No to radsm' Obviously, on reading the counter-message the reader may opt to refrain 
from reading the n-uterial content - but that is not the principal aim of the counter- 
message. Indeed, the principal aim is to educate by re-affirrning into the mind of a 
potential reader, Viewer, or listener, that racism is unacceptable within society. To this 
extent, a counter-message should not become a form of magnet that pulls in readership. 
Applying the counter-message principle to a TV programrne that may express 'racial 
offence', the counter-message legislation would require the broadcaster to display a 'Say No 
to Racism'message at the beginning of the programme. Therefore, it would be targeting 
'iacially, offensive' material at its source of distribution, being proactive in the sense that it 
serves to educate the viewer as to the law and the societal aim of saying no to racisn-L 
To this extent, the counter-speech proposals would appear to be broadly consistent With 
41, For example, the report points out that on average people replace their television sets once every 10 years and 
even then they often give the old TV set (with no V-chip installed) to their children for their bedrooms. They also 
qrgued that this could result in children whose viewing is unsupervised, or whose families carmot afford the latest 
technology, will be put at risk if, with the excuse of the V-chip behind them, broadcasters are encouraged to relax the 
standards on which they reply. The V-chip would therefore be an inadequate 'quick f& solution that would not 
protect the most vulnerable vic-kvers. 
47 It could even saysuch as part of the agreed counter-message. 
48 In the case of TV violence the primary purpose is to protect children - enabling parents to opt to prevcnt children 
from watcl-unju! a program that displays violence. 
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the principles laid down by the joint IT"Orking Pary-tY on Violeme on Teletision' What is 
more, any concerns that anti-racist counter-messages m ay encourage racist readership 
would seem to be even less justified than those that may exist concerning the promotion 
of TV Violence by the use of TV content-warnings. 
Clearly there will inevitably be instances where it is not possible to warn in advance of a 
racially offensive comment. For example, in any chat show it is possible that a guest or 
audience member could unexpectedly express a view that is raciall, ensive and likely to y off 
stir up racial hatred/discrirnination. Obviously, the person making the racially, offensive 
statement may be liable, but so too could be the producers of the programme. In the 
case of the producer, assuming he were to be prosecuted, he could argue in his defence 
that he was not aware that the words might be racially offensive - i. e. because he was 
not aware that those particular words rrught be used. While such a defence seems 
logical, it could be underrruned by any failure of the production team to alert the 
presenter of the programme (i. e. Via his earpiece) of the need to make a correcting 
counter-message. 
Consistency with the CERD Convention. 
In his comments, concerning the likely response of the BNP to counter-speech 
legislation, the BNP activist Warren Glass criticised the proposals on the grounds that 
ý749 
th ey wo ul d "denj freedom of eApression and tg to propel words out of people's moutbs . 'MIS 
argument has a legal basis, on civil libertarian grounds, and is not reconciled by the 
likelihood that the BNP may make it clear that the counter-message statement derives 
from a government requirement and is not of their own volition. 
Despite the chansn-utic appeal of this civil libertarian argument , it is weakened 
by the 
fact that in both international and UK law, there is no such thing as absolute freedom of 
expression. Indeed, under existing British public order laws there are restrictions on 
freedom of expression in situations where Yhreatening, insulfing or abusive'words are used 
that can stir up racial hatred. The United Nations propose that incitement to racial 
discrirrunation should be made unlawfiil by nation states. As such, the proposals for 
legislative change are reasonably consistent with international requirements, 50 under the 
- By this it is assumed that he means that producers of racially offensive materials would be forced to express an 
suiti- racist message. 
50 For i discussion of this qrea see Chapter Four. 
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United Nations CERD Convention, for dealing with incitement to racial discrin-unation. 
The counter-speech defence being designed to enable responsible discussion of racial 
issues. Accordingly, n-uhtant racists are free to espouse whatever views they consider fit 
- but if they do not temper their views in accord with the law, they may face 
prosecution. " 
Possession of IrociaZlv offensive'material. 
Section 23 of the Public Order Act 1986 deals With the possession of racist material that 
is 'threatening, abusive and insultiý 'With 'intent or a likelihood' of stirring up racial g hatred. 
Clearly, the application of 'Opt-ions One (incitement to racial disctimination) and Two' (a 
racial offence prerequisite) would mean the law is also extended with regards to the 
possession of 'racially, o la 11 irnin ffensive'n-lateri I that may stir up racial discri i ation/hatred. 
Assuming that a counter-message - say no to racism - defence is to be introduced, the 
application of an amended s. 23 should not create any serious problems. In that if a 
person is in possession of racially offensive material-52 that stirs up racial 
discrimination /hatred, with a view to distribution, he is open to prosecution if that 
material does not display a counter-message. 
Obviously, a defendant could argue that he possessed 'racial# offensive' material that is 
likely/intended to stir up racial discrimination or hatred, but did not intend to distribute 
it. While this may be a reasonable argument with regards to a single item of material, '-' a 
ffensive'rriatenal is unlikely to succeed with thi person possessing a quantity of 'racialgl, oI is 
form of defence - since holding a quantity of material infers distribution. Alternatively, a 
person possessing material could accept he possesses but argue, since the material is not 
of his design or within his copyright, he is not in a position to add a counter-message to 
make the racially offensive material lawful. While this may seem to be an appealing 
argument, it is possession with a view to distribution that results in a fmding of guilt, 
with possession of a quantity of 'racially, offensive' materials likely to result in the court 
inferring intent to distribute. 
'-, ' Tlus same principle could be said to apply to tobacco companies vith regards to tobacco advertising. 
ý'That is applying a natural meatung to the -words. 
53 He could have received one and simply had an intent to read it. Hence, he has no intent to distribute. 
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Possibly a stronger defence for a person found in possession of a quantity of raciallv 
offensive material is that he did not realise that it was 'rwialgl, offensive -- Le. due to the 
-4 lack of a counter-message being displayed. " This in itself could be a viable defence in 
accord with s. 23(3), " but its success - in light of the Brutus v Cozens", 'ordinary usage - 
natural meaning - methodology' - would obviously depend upon the facts of the case 
and whether an ordinary sensible man is likely to recognise the material as being racially 
offensive. 
Seizing 'raciaUy offensive' material. 
Section 24 of thg Public Order Act 1986 provides powers for entry and search, with 
s. 19(2a) of the Police and Crin-unal Evidence Act enabling seizure. Clearly, the lack of a 
counter-message equal opportunities statement, on racist material which has indications 
of being 'racial# offensive', should provide grounds for seizure. It may be that for first 
time offenders, this will result in a police reprimand being given. ' which may well have 
the impact of warning them of the consequences of handling 'racial# offensive' material, 
with the possibility that they will not re-offend. It will also mean that grounds would 
exist for removing the unlawful material out of public circulation, which can only be to 
the benefit of society generally. 
Applyigg the principle to speech. 
So far as 'radalyl offensive'literature /material is concerned, the principle of establishing an 
equal opportunities counter-message defence is clearly viable. In order to prosecute for 
the stirring up of racial discrimination or hatred, four questions will need to be answered 
positively in relation to a person who IS responsible for the material: 
54 n-li_, should be a complete defence if say he had sought advice from the Commission for Racial Equahtýl and they 
had advised that they did not consider it w3s racially offensive. In such circumstances, a defendant could easily 
establish that he was not aware that the material could be racially offensive. 
55 The existing s. 23(3) provides for a defence for the accused to show that he did not suspect, and had no reason to 
suspect, that it was threatening, abusive, insulting. Under the proposals for reform, it follows that this would be 
amended to provide a defence for the accused to show that he did not suspect, and had no reason to suspect, that it 
was threaterting, abusive, insulting and/or racially offensive. 
ý` 119721 1 All ER 1297. This casewas discussed earlier in this Chapter under the heading 'Defirung racial offence' 
and was also discussed in Chapter's Tbree and Four. 
57 Possibly, for a specified introductory period a reprimand and/or warning as per s. 65 of per the Crime & Disorder 
Act 1998 should be given. In theory a reprimand is the first step, a warning the second and prosecution the third. 
I lowever, these -ire only applicable if the offender has no prexious conNictions (see page 82 of 'Blackstone's Guide to the 
Crime & Disorder Act 1998' by Roger Leng, Richard TqylOr and Martin Wasik). The advantage of applying a 
reprimand approach is that it would allow people to get used to the new legislation. 
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(1) Can the words used by the person be considered to be 'raeial# offensive'- i. e. 
applying an ordinary usage - natural meaning - methodology? 
(2) Did the defendant intended the words to be raciaRy offensive, or was he 
aware that they rr: iight be racially offensive? " 
(3) Do the words stir up racial discrit-runation or hatred? 
(4) Is there a counter-message displayed on the material that is consistent with 
legislative requirements of saying no racism? 
The logic behind the approach is relatively straightforward, the use of a counter-message 
provides a defence in relation to the stirring up of racial discrirrunation /hatred through 
the use of racially offensive material. If no counter-message is displayed, and the material 
is considered to be racially offensive and likely to stir up racial discrimination or hatred, 
the any person responsible for the material is open to prosecution. 
However, the application of this approach to speech maý- be prone to some practical 
difficulties because it is not so easi, to see and thus establish that a counter-message has 
been given. Even if a counter-message is given at the beginning of a speech, it is 
possible that its content may be lost an-ndst a speech that may be littered with detail and 
include phrases or an overall message that is 'racially, offensive' By way of example, taken 
from Chapter 1hree in this thesis, a recorded Bernard Manning Show could provide 
evidence of a warning that its content may include 'racialyl offensive'lokes and material, 
but nevertheless Bernard Manning is opposed to and says No to racism' 
However a live Bernard Manning show could create a few problems. Firstly, the 
organiser of the show must apply the 'ordinary usage - natural meaning - methodology' 
of Brutus v Cozens in determining if 'racially offensive' words are to be used. Clearly, 
the organiser may not know M advance that Manning might express racially offensive 
views. Hence, he cannot be expected to give an advance counter-message warning in 
circumstances where he may not be aware of the likely racially offensive comment. 
Secondly, what if the counter-message is given in derogatory terms? For example, what 
if the counter-message was incorporated into one of Bernard Manning7s jokes and 
therefore given with possible contempt or limited sincerity? IhIS kind of situation 
clearly establishes a problem, but not so much for the prosecution as for the defence. 
This applies because, the legal principles associated with prosecution in relation to 
- This is consistent \xith s. 18(5) as currently Vphes to words that are threaterung, abusive or insulting and stir up 
racial hatred. 
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racially offensive speech would be synonymous With those used in relation to racially 
offensive literature or materials - except that, due to the nature of speech it IS obviously 
not possible to finish every sentence with a counter-message. It follows, therefore, that a 
counter-message would need to be given in association with the speech and could be 
delivered before, during, or after the performance. 
In practice, the prosecution would be required to establish, bevOnd reasonable doubt, 
that- [1] 'Me words used were 'racially, offensive; [2] The defendant was aware the words 
used nrught give racial offence; [3] An intent or likelihood of inciting racial discrimination 
or hatred is evident. Once the prosecution has established this aspect of the case, the 
burden of proof - to the extent of convincing the magistrates or jury of a viable defence 
- moves to the defendant. IhIS may and could involve the introduction of a draft of the 
speech given - the use of witnesses from the audience, or even a tape of the 
proceedings. All that the defendant would need to show IS that associated with the 
words that gave 'racial offence', and Incited racial discrimination /hatred, he expressed or 
displayed a view consistent with the required counter-message. 
Naturally, this approach could establish a degree of a problem for the Crown 
Prosecution Service (and/or Attornev General) in deciding whether or not to instigate 
legal proceedings, since they may not have full details of any defence. However, it can 
be assumed that the police will primarily bring requests for prosecutions and that they 
will have made ftffl and diligent enquiries before referring the case to the CPS. 
If not, the CPS would be justified in returning the file with an msistence that this 
defence element is thoroughly examined. Certainly, if the police were present while the 
speech was made, or they have a number of witnesses who are prepared to give evidence 
of a 'racially offensive' speech, they should have no difficulty in presenting the relevant 
evidence before the courts. 
Public Interest issues. 
Under the existing Public Order legislation the Attorney General must give consent to 
any racial prosecution. " In practice, the Attorney General or the Solicitor General 
personally consider each and everýl application for prosecution subrrutted by the Crown 
59 S. 27(l) of the Pubbc Order Act 1986. 
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Prosecution Service, 60 with grounds of public interest often playing a prorrunent part in 
61 his determination of whether or not to prosecute. Obviously, with no details of 
specific cases published, it is only possible to speculate upon the public mterest grounds 
that relate to particular cases. An iRustration of the issues involved can be deduced 
from the famous Enoch Powell 'Rivers of blood' speech that talked of a flood of 
immigrants underminu-ig the British culture. 62 It may be that doubts exist over whether 
the words used by Powefl were Wmatening, abusive or insulting, but assun-ung thev were, 
would a prosecution of such a prominent Conservative 63 politician be in the public 
interest? An obvious danger is that a prosecution would have brought a much greater 
media focus upon his words, with campaigns of support and opposition possibly 
developing. This could have heightened community tension and even led to the 
incitement of racial hatred. The alternative of failing to prosecute, is that it legitin-uses 
the racist view - giving racism a norm of respectability - and leads the public to 
understand that such expressions are legitimate free speech and not in violation of any 
laws. 
Over the years there has been much criticism of the need for the involvement of the 
Attorney General, With a common argument being that the Crown Prosecution Service 
should be the body responsible for determining whether or not to prosecute. In 
particular, Searchlight has been critical of the role of the Attorney General, arguing that 
he had refused to sanction the prosecution of the BNP leaders Tyndall and Morse in 
two 'Vaterfig*. bt cases", with soundings from the CPS indicating they were 'ýood cases". " 
The Comn-ussion for Racial Equality has also indicated they consider the Crown 
Prosecution Service should undertake the role of determining whether or not to 
prosecute. 65 
60 This was confirmed in writing to ClIr jagdish Sharma, Deputy Leader of Hounslow Council, in correspondence 
from die Attorney Generals Legal Secretariat (17 August 1993). 
61 See comments of Sir Ivan Lawrence QC, Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee - see paragraph 417 - Racial 
Attacks anti Harassment' Third Report - Session 1993-94, 
62 11-iis speech of Enoch Powell was made on the 20th April 1968, a date that marked an anniversary of Hider's birth. 
See 'When the Tiber Failed to Foam' - Searchlight, June 1997 biip: //www. s-Wlbt. demoii. co. tik/,; torie, -; /`poweU. htm. 
Also see 'Enoch Powell' a biography by Robert Shephard, published Pinilico 1997. 
,, 3 At the time of the speech he was a Conservative MP. 
, -e paragraph 416, 
Home Affairs Committee `4 Se - Third Report - Racial, -Ifzacks and Harassment, - Volume II session 
1993-94. 
- Thiý; view u-is confirmed to the writer by the Cluef Executi%, e of the CRE at a meeting held on the 30 January 
1996. 
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Should 'Options One and Two' be adopted, it is clear that people such as Enoch 
Powell would be free to speak of what they perceive are the undesirable consequences of 
a course of action, i. e. so long as they do not stir up racial discrin-unation /hatred through 
the use of words which are 'Xbreatening, abusive and insultinT' In expressing their views, 
they can stir up raci I discrirrunation /hatred through the use of 'raciall, la iy offensive'words, so 
long as they associate a counter-message with their speech. 
Even allowmg for a counter-message defence, it seen-is possible that many more 
opportunities for prosecution would develop - in the sense that incitement to racial 
discrirnination, by giving 'racial offence'. is much easier to fi-ilfil than incitement to racial 
hatred by the use of 'threat, abuse or insult' As a consequence of this, it seen-is likeh- that 
the public interest question would become a very live issue in what could be a significant 
number of cases. 
VAiatever the merits, or otherwise, of the Attomey General's role under the existing 
public order legislation, it seems the introduction of 'Options One (incitement to racial 
discrirnination) and Two'(a racial offence prerequisite) may Justify a different approach. 
1his justification stems from the proposed movement of the legislation into the sphere 
of 'racial# offensive'literature, and the prospect of a great deal of imrnigration, refiigee and 
asylum material from political parties being open to legal scrutiny. Given the political 
office of the Attomey General, it is clear that conflicting interests may anse, with 
suggestions developing that, in nuking a decision on whether it is in the public interest 
to proceed with a prosecution, he might use the law for party political purposes. 
Consequently, by distancing himself from the deciSiOn-rriaking process, he should be 
able to demonstrate that prosecutions stem from a politically neutral legal process. 'Ibis 
could be achieved by the provision of guidelines being issued by the Attorney General, 
with the CPS given the responsibility for deciding whether or not to prosecute in accord 
with those guidelines. It may also be desirable for the Director of Public Prosecutions 
to keep the Attorney General informed of their prosecuting intentions. 
The nature of any gmidehnes that may need to be introduced. 
Under existing legislation, the issuing of anv o-ýidelines would be at the discretion of the 
Attomev General, possibly after consultation with other interested parties. " However it 
", 'In order to extend netitrality, the guidelines could be agreed, in Pailiament,, "ith the L&3derslup of the Opposition. 
One suggestion for such guidelines are those considered later in this section which apply to racially motivated crime. 
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is important to recognise that the Crown Prosecution Service currently have ample and 
adequate experience in determining whether or not it IS 'in the public interest to bring a 
prosecution - indeed, on each and every occasion that they bring a prosecution they are 
required to consider this issue. 'ne CPS prosecution manual provides guidance on racial 
motivation cases in the following terms: 
'When considering the pubAc interest test, jou must balance the factors for and against 
prosecution earefiul# andfairyl. However, cases in which there is a raeial motivation are almost 
invariably, serious; prosecution will usually, take place unless there are Peg poweýful public 
interestfaclors tending againstprosecution which clear# outweigh those ten&ng injavour" 
Given that this public interest test applies to all racially motivated cases, it seems 
reasonable to argue the same criteria should apply to Part III of the Public Order Act 
1986 prosecutions - essentially because by definition all such cases are inherently likely 
to have a racial motive. Indeed, such an approach would be consistent with the 
recommendation made by Sir William MacPherson, in the Stephen Lawrence Public 
Inquiry Report, " who argued that once the CPS has satisfied the evidential test, there 
should be a rebuttable presumption that the public interest should be in favour of 
68 prosecution. 
While this approach may suggest that there could be a relatively high number of Upfion 
One and Two' prosecutions, '9 this could be reduced by the proactive use of police 
cautions. Ibis form of approach may be especially of value in the early application of the 
legislation, since it is likely to help balance the public interest question with the 
possibility that the accused was genuinely not fiiUy aware of just where the boundaries to 
'raeial offence'and discrimination apply. 
Tackfin2 Racism on the Internet. 
The Internet IS a global network of connected computers, " belonging to different 
indiViduals and organisations, " with over 200 million world-wide users. These 
67 Recorru-nendition 33. 
0,1 The Home Secretarv accepted this recommendation in the 'Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Home Secretary's Action 
Plan'published 23 March 1999. 
1ý9 That is relative to the n Limber of prosectitions that occur tinder the existing Part III of the Public Order Act 1986 
70 The roots of the Internet go back to 1969 when the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) in the United 
States conu-nissioned work on the 'A"An,! e, en experimental wide area computer network designed to withstand 
the effects of q nuclear strike. By 1971 there were 23 hosts on the network, bv 1981 it had reached 800 and in 1996 
die number of hosts reached 9.4 mdbon, with an estimated 200 rudhon, world-wide users by 1999 (I'llis is an 
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organisations include governments, universities, schools, libraries, 72 large and small 
businesses. 
To help monitor the Internet in the UK ffiere exists the 'Internet Watch Foundation', 
which is an industry led, regulaton, body designed to monitor and report upon 
73 
unacceptable web-based materials In contrast to such regulation, there is a Blue Ribbon 
CaVai or Online Free S '7' which seeks to enhance the freedom of an individual to , gnf peecl 
75 display his talents on a world-wide stage . 
Despite such a situation, it is clear that the Internet is open to abuse. .A three-year 
study of Internet Crime found that crimes committed include paedophiha, pornography, 
71 hacking, hate, fraud and software piracy. For example in Germany, an investigation 
into the transmission of illegal pornographic material on the Internet resulted in 
Compuserve, the world's leading global service provider, suspending 200 Internet 
Services. This action being taken following the raiding of Compuserve's German Office, 
with government officials identifying 200 services as being illegal under German Law. 77 
The services were later re-introduced after Compuserve established new controls that 
enabled parents to restrict the access of children to pornographic sites on the Inteme t. 78 
estimated figure based upon the comments of 
_justice 
Stevens in the USA Supreme Court decision in Janet Reno, 
Attorney Gerieral of the United State,, et al, Appellants N, Ain(-. Tic, -ni Liberties Union et a] - case No 96-511. 
Although, q press report in October 1998 suggested that the Internet usage was thought to be much higher - výith an 
estimated 1000 rnflbori people signed up for the Internet - See 'Cqjý Soiely? Il'i a pieý-e of cake' - article by Adam 
Barnard pubhslied 'flie Times, 7 October 1998).. 
71 For xi insight into some of the difficulfie. ý of applying the law to the Ilit(-rnet see: Edivards & Vaelde - 'Lax e- The 
Inlernel' -I lad Publishiq 19 9 7. 
1' 'Millennium Plea Ibr Libraries' - The Guardian, 21 March 1996 - gives news of q C45m lottery ftind bid, to the 
Millennium Commission, so all pubhc libraries can be connected to the Internet. Hounslow Council's main library 
-ii ma already provides the Internet Senice to the public. Students at schools and universities can also oftL ke use of 
the Internet Service "for study purpose,. " 
1; Ilie Internet Watch Foundation was set Lip in 1996 after discussion between Internet Service Providers and the 
Police. It was reported, by the I Ionic Office Minister Kate Hoey, that the hitemet Watch Foundation established 453 
actionable reports of illegal material on the Internet between December 1996 and August 1998. Almost 90"o of 
these concerned child pornography. See 111'-Ysays t)orn is inc-reasz'na'- pubhslied'llr3ctic3l Internet' - Issue 26,1999. 
(March 1996). 
'llie freedom the Internet gives to die individual is clear to see, -%vitli turn not being dependent upon an editor or 
pubbsher to obtain recognition. 
76 See Intp: /, " ncw,. b13-c. co. uk, /hi, 1' qiLýlidi/ er sci/ tech /newsid 375(YK)/375156. sLm -a report on Project Tra -1 by 
Internet correspondent Chris Nuttall (25 June 1999). See also tin for the report: 
Troject Trawler: Crime of the Information Highway' published by the National Criminal Intelligence Service 
o. uk/ncRraL! cI. htm 26june 1999). (ba 
Tirnes Newspaper, 29 December 1995. 
'Aftelvpf to block Zundal 1, aiZs'- Searclihght, March 1996. '11iis parental control of pornography cari be found by 
searching for '(, V)erPa1rrX on the Internet (ref: liqp:, ", 'cýN, beiiiet. co. iiz.; I/cvbei: Vatrol/wa, -elcoi-ne. litni ) (March 1996). 
For a review of various cornmercial software/intemet censorship controls, such is 'C ybersifter' mid ý'\el Vinni, cc 
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One of the biggest Internet providers in Germany - Webcom - has cut off access to 
Ernst Zundel, the German-Canadian nazi who used the site to deny the Holocaust. " 
This decision of Webcom came after prosecutors said they were considering brin i ging 
incitement charges against the company for facilitating the distribution of neo-nazi 
propaganda on the Internet. This threat is reported to have failed, as students of a 
number of US universities made copies of Zundel's web site available world-wide - on 
the grounds that they were upholding free speech and the First Amendment. " 
Searchlight" has undertaken research into ! Hate on the Internet', "2 producing evidence of 
ftill-colour web pages which show and incite skinheads to beat up blacks and even give 
details of how to make bombs, " with networks from Austria, Germariv Netherlands, 
Norway, and the USA - representing just a few of the countries from where rnilitant 
racists operate to spread their message world-wide. 
The European Union's Council of Nfinisters Consultative Cornrnission on Racism and 
t84 Xenophobia has set its sights on cleaning up the Interne rom the evil of its radstfilth 
Indeed, as Glyn Ford MEP has remarked: 
'The propqrgation of racial hate, anti-Semitism and na, 54sm is growing and the youq are 
gerous/ dan y susceblible to beinT influenced ýy this pmpqganda because it is dressed up in 
Internet Tecbnology. 
The problem though, is in establishing a viable means of controlling the Internet. 
Indeed, it seerns that in general, there have been three approaches to this: 
'Sensible Censorsho'- PC Advisor June 1996. See also 'Software stopspuplys seehýg I'Vetporn, - The Times, 13 January 1999. 
See also Torn: the darker side ofthe Internel'by Gervase Webb and Mark Hughes-Norman - Evemag Standard, 12", April 
1999. 
79 Under German Law it is illegal to deny the Holocaust. 
8" See "Iftempt to block Zundel Fails'- Searchlight, March 1996 
81 London based International Anti-Fascist organisation. 
8ý Article written by Louise Bernstein - Searchlight, March 1996 
. 1,3 'niere was no direct instruction to bomb certain people, but the inference was evident via the site linkage. 
84 However, the Council of the European Union has opted to undertake a self-regulatory approach with industry 
users being encouraged to develop and implement adequate systems of self-regulation. For details see: Ue Eunpean 
Unian adopts Alzon P1, an on Pmmofing Safer mse of the Internet' published 21 December 1998 by the European Union 
http: //www2. echo.. Iti/i. --v. /Vre,; srd. htm1. See also the Thposalfor a European Pa&ament and Coundl Directite on Certain 
Legal Aspects of EA? amnk Commerve in the InternalMarkel, which deals with electronic commerce but suggests making. 
Ilie EU proposes to encourage 'quality licensing' by developing an exemption from legal liability for Internet Service 
Providers who play a passive role and act as a mere conduit of information from third parties. Ho'a-ever, to be 
eligible for a form of EU quality licence it is clear that ISPs will need to comply with "ethical" codes of conduct 
dra, arn up by professional associations. htW: //, wWW2. cclio. iii/i3p/pressiel. htnil 
ýýE, E Ctargetc rwism on the Internet'- Glyn Ford MEP - Searchhght, March 1996 
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[a] To prosecute those who are directly responsible for the unacceptable 
electronic mails or web pages appearing on the Internet. 
[b] To make the Internet Service Provider liable for unacceptable electronic 
messages that are sent Via his service. 'Me idea being that this wotild then clean 
up the airways. 
[c] To make use of counter-messages, so as to warn people about the content of 
unacceptable rnatenals. 
[a] Prosecuting those that directly produce /pubfish unacceptable materials. 
While an individual IS generally free to publish rmtenal on the world-wide web, it is clear 
that he will be legally responsible for that publication. ' He could still be sued for 
defan-lation" or held liable for the content for any pornographic m- aterials, " with 
individuals also being liable should they download unacceptable materials. "' 
A person could be prosecuted under-s. 19 of the-Public Order Act 1986 for the 
distribution of 'tbreatenin is g, abusive or insulting' material that, in all the circumstances, 
likely to stir up racial hatred. On examining the BNP web-page, 90 it would seem that the 
literature displayed is typical of the vast majoritý- of its material - i. e. while it is 'raeialyl 
offensive" it is unlikely to be found to be 'threatening, abusive or insultiig' As such, under 
existing laws, BNP leaders are unlikely to face prosecution" for stirring up racial hatred 
via the 1nternet. 
86 A stark example of this comes from the USA case where anti-abortion activists were found guilty of inciting 
violence and fined $107.9m for posting a 'wanted' list of doctors' names. See T7ree speech anger oter Nurembouýg Fdes ban' 
- Practical Internet - Issue 26 [1999]. 
87 See the Defamation Act 1996. 
8', ' For example in the UK child pornography is dealt with Linder the Protection of Children Act 1978 and s. 160 of the 
Criminal justice Act 1988. These acts were amended by the Criminal justice and Public Order Act 1994 so as to 
make it easier for the courts to deal with computer data. 
6" For example, the pop star Gary Glitter was arrested and charged with a variety of sexual offences after he took his 
computer in for repair to Computer World and they allegedly found child pornography on his hard drive. It is alleged 
that a number of indecent pseudo images (digitally produced computer photographs) of children under the age of 16 
had been downloaded from the Internet. Subsequently Gary Glitter (under his real name of Paul Gadd) was also 
charged in relation to other offences concerning sexual assault on two girls between 1975 and 1981 - 
hqp: / /www. nmc. com/newsvdrc/ 199980811132751news1trol 
- hM: //iigwwmdl. co/fnmtier/biil2/ (March 1996). 
91 One article - Voing the enemy`suvrk'b\, BNP Leader John Tyndall did refer to "sending bAwks bome in boýv bags. " This 
Tyndall argued is a breach of the Public Order Act 1986 and is typical of the illegal acti\ities of Combat 18 (the 
is an attack upon Combat 18 - urging BNP members not to join them). 
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Indeed much of the BNP material is mild, 92 in comparison to some of the race-hate web 
pages sterruTung from the USA. For example, while searching for the BNP web-page I 
came across a link to the USA based organisation 'Stormfront'. " Their web-site, 9' 
includes a graffiti page which is certainly racist. For example, among 13 pages of racist 
discussion group materials, the Storrnfront site conveyed the following. 
lf-dl Dave, jou know how Ifeel about our in-house Monkg. Hell there is nothing worse 
than gelfiq mad at a fittle nigger like Mat, and thenjou are not able to beat him or shoot 
him. Frustrafiq isn't it? Can I kick him in the ass on the way out? " Your Gern-mn 
Comrade Eoroman/MB. " 95 
Such comments can only be described as Wmatening wid insultiq', whilst indicating a 
desire to stir up racial hatred. Ibis would almost certainly be unlawful, under s. 19 of the 
Public Order Act 1986, if published within Britain - though it seems it may be 
considered as acceptable under US laws. 
In addition to the Storrnfront web-site, there exists a variety of racist 'Newsgroups' 
which proVide a specific Internet forum for n-ulitant racists to enjoy. At such locations, 
you can find some of the vilest forms of racial discrin-unation and hatred imagmable. 
On this basis, it may seem rather pointless to introduce le islation that could outlaw a 91 
comparatively Mild UK distributed BNP world-wide web page, when material emanating 
from other countries is far more extreme and 'raeially' offensive' This particularly applies 
when it is just as easy to obtain the information from these other countries, as it is from 
the UK. 9' Quite apart from the fact that the BNP could get around the legislation by 
operating frorri, for example, Norway, 9' it seeryis a ffitile exercise to try to tackle such 
" An example is a BNP article written for, and at the request of, Bath University's student magazine 'Spike'. As a 
result of internal politics the article was not published due to a likely breach of "union policy. " Consequently, the 
BNP reproduced the article on the Internet (261ý, January 1996). Mile the article can be considered -is 'racia&y 
offensiWit cannot be regarded as being unlawful under the Public Order Act. 
93 Stormfront is a white supremacist organisation. 
V4 http: //ww%Lstormfronr. oro 
o)5 See appendix reference 20 for the full extract taken from www. storinfi-ont. oig, on the 5 September 1998 (there are 
links to die BNP web site from this location). 
ý- By using search tools it is elsy to locate almost my web-site - no matter where it is published - by just the click of 
a mouse. 
07 At one stage, in 1994 the BNP sent messages from Norway to British bulletin boards announcing that it had 
banned cross-membership with the xiolent terror organisation Combat 18. 
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problems in isolation. Indeed, such is the extent of the problem it seen-is evident that 
only world-wide action via the United Nations could have any impact, and even then it 
would only be as good as its weakest link. For, if the First Amendment enables 
distribution in the US, it also enables distribution in the United Kingdom - it not being 
possible to isolate the UK from the telephone-linked network. 
[Lb] Maldng the 'server' liable for unacceptable electronic data. 
It is possibly because of such practical difficulties, that governments have been 
attempting to make the domestic based Internet Service Provider (the server) 
responsible for unacceptable electronic data. This approach has been taken in Germany 
and the United States. 
In Germany, as a result of an investigation into pornographic materials, the authorities 
raided the German Offices of the global Internet Server Compuserve, eventually 
arresting and prosecuting FeliX Somme the Managing Director of the company for the 
distribution of pornographic materials. " Again in Germany, as discussed earlier in this 
chapter, one of the biggest Internet providers - Webcom - responded to a threat of 
them being prosecuted for incitement charges in relation to neo-nazi propaganda by 
cutting off the Internet access of Ernst Zundel a German-Canadian nazi who used his 
web-site to deny the Holocaust in direct defiance of a domestic law. " 
In the USA, the Clinton adn-unistration introduced a 'Communications Decency Ac 
1996' which made the 'server, whether domestic or foreign, legally responsible for 
ensuring that a person under the age of 18 did not bave access to se. ýxal or excrelog activities or 
organs in teims wbich are Yndecent' or ýatený/ y offensive' b 'conteVorag communiýy standards' y 
While this legislation is related to sexual matters, and not racist materials, it is 
nonetheless typical of a governmental desire to make servers responsible for electronic 
materials that they facilitate. Despite such, the CDA 1996 has been declared, in the case 
of Janet Reno, Attorney General of the United States et al v American Civil Liberties 
LLnion et al, '" unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court, on the grounds that the 
legislation breached the First Amendment of the US constitution. However in declaring 
9ý Tlus applied notwithstanding the fact that the operation was effectively run from computers in the USA and not 
Germanv. For a translated case note see hn: //w, %-w. gyber-rights. org/iýps/somm-dec. htm 
')9 See brief report earlier in this cli-Tter and 'Attempt to block Zirndel Fails'- Searchlight, March 1996. 
'X Case No 96-511 decided June 26,1997. 
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so, the Supreme Court held that the interest of encouraging freedom of expression in a 
democratic society 'outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship'. The 
Court accepted that users cannot accidentally walk into indecent material, With them 
needing to make a conscious decision to locate it and to overcome the variety of 
warning signs which exist - with Wmost all sexual# explidt images'beirig ýreceded ýv warniqs 
as to the content' In this sense, the court was accepting the principle of a counter-message 
- in that the warning signs themselves portray a message that sexually explicit material is 
ahead and juveniles should not enter. Indeed without the existence of such counter- 
messages, it seems probable that the outcome would have been very different. Ibis can 
be deduced from the majority judgement of justice Stevens who distinguished the case 
of Ginsberg"' because that case had involved a radio medium which as a matter of histog' 
had received limited First Amendment protection because 'warnings could not adequatqly 
protect the listenerfrom the unexpectedprtgram content' 
In 1996 the then Labour Party Women's Spokesperson Tessa jowell MP, talked about 
the need for a future Labour Government to introduce sirrUlar Communications 
UK 102 Decency legislation in the However, as a result of a developing consensus in the 
European Union, 103 there seems to be a move away from making a server directly liable 
for electronic materials that it may facilitate. The Home Secretary in 1998 indicated that 
new laws were not needed since the 'National Criminal -Intelligence 
Unit'would tackle the 
problem of racist sites by liaison with police in other countries, to trN- and get them to 
persuade servers to remove racist sites. "' It seems this shift in emphasis, derives from 
the practical and evidential problems associated with determining mens rea in 
circumstances of 'innocent disserrunation'. 'O-' Indeed, the very nature of computer 
101 Ginsbeiýq v New York, 390 U. S. 629,633 (1968). 
113'2 TVatural Pom Killers'- Mike McCormack -net, Aprd 1996 
103 The Troposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive On Certain legal Aspects of Electronic 
Commerce In the Internal Market' proposes to encourage 'quality licensing' by developing an exemption from 
liability for internet Service Providers who play 3 passive role and act as a mere conduit of information from third 
parties. In return for this exemption servers vill need to comply with certain ethical codes of conduct drawn up b\ 
professional bodies. See also Decision No/98/EC of the European Parliament mid of the CounciF which adopts an 
action plan to promote safer use of the Internet by combating illegal and harmful content on global networks. This 
4-year F25m action plan takes 3 industry self-regulation and content-monitoring approach to child pornography or 
content which incites hatred on grounds of race, sex religion, nationality or ethnic origin. 
II" '-Idion Pmmised oi rr Intemel raý: ým'- The Times, 16 September 1998. 
116 What is termed as an 'innocent dissemination' defence originated in common law and was effectively built into s. 1 
of the Defamation Act 1996. The defence applies in circumstances where (a) the defendant was: not the author, 
editor or publisher of the statement complained of, (b) he took reasonqble care in relation to its publication, and (c) 
lie did not know, and had no reason to believe, dint what he did caused or contributed to the publication of a 
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technology makes the establishment of a server's Imowledge of material content often 
difficult to determine. While a television broadcaster may not know in advance that a 
guest may express unacceptable views, he can generally make subsequent 
announcements - while the show is on air - to counter anN- comments that are 
considered to be unacceptable. In comparison, a server facilitates niillions of words of 
data, to and from thousands of users, in any one second and as such a server generalli 
has no real meaningful knowledge, which goes to mens rea, of the data content. To 
prosecute a server for unacceptable electronic data, which it facilitates, seer-ris as 
nonsensical as proposing to prosecute British Telecom because someone may have been 
abusive over the telephone. 
However, where a server is aware that its service is being used to conduct iflegal 
activity and does not take action, it becomes liable to prosecution as an accessory to the 
crime. If it co-operates in identiýying ffie perpetrator and ceases to provide the service to 
him or removes the illegal material concerned, it will be protected against prosecution. "' 
[c] Using a counter-message to warn people of unacceptable materials. 
Should the law be amended to include 'Options One (iiicitement to racial discriminatioll) 
and Two' (including 'offence'or 'rxial offence'as a prerequiisite), it seems ffiat a great deal 
of the racist literature that the BNP display on the Internet would be illegal. However if 
the counter-message principle were to be applied, they would still be able to display such 
material so long as the appropriate counter-message was displayed. 
11-le problem is that racist offensive materials produced outside of the UK - which may 
be more unacceptable in tern-is of stirring up racial discrInunation or hatred - could still 
be displayed on computers based in the UK. By illustration, there mav be no value in 
asking the US authorities to close down such a web-site, because the First Amendment 
prevents such an action. Likewise, there would be no point in making the receiver of d-ie 
racist materials liable, since he would have no knowledge that it may be racially offensive, 
and in breach of the law, until he had downloaded and read it. 
dcftnnatoný stiteincia. " In Godfrev v Demon Internet Ltd i":, ' ww, ýv. cou rterxice. ýov. uk, ' ýX)d frev2. h till 126'ý 
Nlarcli 19991) Mr justice Morland - in a pre-trial judgement - rejected an 'innocent dissemination' defence, because 
die server lind not responded to a request by the plaintiff to remove a iie-wsgroup posting that w3s defarn3tory. 
I' Source: 'I 5h UK Periodic Report to the UN Comnuttee on the Elimination of All forms of Rqcial Discrumn3tion 
tel-iting to the period tip to 31 March 1999'. Produced by I lome Office EqL]. 'Ibt%' Unit, 1999. 
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To make the server responsible for distributing racially offensive material wid-iout a 
counter-message seems doomed to failure, since it is generally an 'innocent 
disseminator'. 1117 Accordingly, it may be necessary to take an altogether different 
approach, which involves tackling racially offensive materials as they enter the UK's 
computer airways. To use an analogy, to establish a form of customs' checkpoint at 
which all computer data is searched for tvcialý, offensim'words, with the material being 
stamped with a counter-message consistent with the government's aim of saying '11o to 
racism' On the basis of this stamping, the material is then authonsed for circulation 
within the UK. 
A key element of this form of approach is that all 'raciaýly offenshe'materials would be 
allowed into the UK airways. "" Indeed to tryý electronically to refuse entn, to materials 
that convey certain racist termmiologm- would be exceedingil- difficult, since the 
'c3-bersitter' sty-le of computer censor technoloT- is exceedingly lirnited in its search 
criteria, with key words the basis of excluding web-pages. "' The obvious problem with 
this form of approach is that it would involve excluding web-pages because they, contain 
key words such as 'race', 'black', 'white', 'nigger' etc. This would result in an 
unacceptable form of censorship, and also a pointless exercise since I am not proposing 
that ffie law should tackle the use of 'iwialyl offensipe'words in isolation. My proposals 
for legislative change are onl3, concerned with the use of 'Xbreatenhig, abusiie, insulti, ý - ,g 01 
offensire'words that stir up racial discrimination or hatred - this requires a legal analysis 
based upon intent or likelihood, which is far beyýond the capabilities of the current 
'cyýbersitter' style of software. 
What could be done, however, is for the government to reqtnire anti-racist counter- 
messages to be displayed in circuryistances where the web-page contains certain defined 
expressions or words. It is possible that this form of counter-message approach could 
be achieved by consensus, with the computer community responding to the prospect of 
le islation by introducing its own code that promotes the use of a uniform anti-racist 91 
!ý 'n-lis aspect wis discussed cirher in this chapter. 
1(k Albeit voth an miti-racist counter-rneý-sage being 3ssociated vnth the web page. 
109 In the USA, Vice-President Gore has given his personal support to 3 business funded web-site that encourages 
parents to use 'CyberSitter, and other sofrýware apphcqtioii,;, which prevent the computer from displaying web pages 
that display certain words. '17his could mean the word "gay" is allowed, but not "gay right, ", "gay community" or 
Icýbia: n"- Likevise. "sex" by itself is acceptable, but unacceptable is "sexual", "sqfe sex" or "have sex". Also banned 
"n- are words like jUghtv", lence and "fain, ". See tý, bersifter: 11 )ere do me 2ranfjou to go lod, ý)? '- Avadible from the 
%Iýeb site of Cyberights & Cybe-r-liberties - (23 March 1999). 
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counter-message. "' This could be backed up with a voluntary undertaking from Internet 
Service Providers that they would disconnect any web-site that failed to conform. 
Despite hopes that such an approach could work, the evidence from the approach taken 
by the European Union with regards to its action plan on promoting safer use of the 
Internet, suggests that self-regulation may not be wholly successftil. After over 15 
months of a 4-year IE25m action plan, there seems to be no obvious evidence of any 
Euro-wide self-regulatory filtering and rating system, that is designed to tackle Internet 
content which incites hatred on grounds of race, sex, reh "on, nationalltv or ethnic 91 
origin. 
Clearly any approach built on self-regulation, is lik-elv to be prone to difficulties, but this 
applies more so when there are problems due to international boundaries and differing 
legal requirements in each member state. For these reasons it may be more effective for 
the UK government, in co-operation with the European Union, to legally require 
software production companies, Eke Nficrosoft and Netscape, to programme all Internet 
browsers (intended for the UK n-urket) so that they display a counter-message when 
certain conditions materialise. The alert counter-message would reflect the values of an 
anti-racist equal opportunity statement such as - Varning this site could be racialyl offensive - 
'Say no to racism'. 
This form of counter-message approach, would at least alert the potential web-page 
reader that the material rrught be 'radalyl, offensive' However, it must be recognised that 
there may be civil libertarian concerns that such an approach may lead to counter- 
message legislation being applied to a whole range of issues - e. g. drugs, smoking and 
even religious or political ideas that some societies disapprove of. There may also be 
some medical concern that such a counter-message approach could lead to a form of 
brainwashing or indoctrination, with excessive usage of messages possibly unnaturally 
influencing the minds of individuals. Thus any usage of counter-messages on computer 
110 The US computer community responded to concerns about legislation by introducing warnings on all sites that 
contain sexually explicit miteri-qls. Indeed, the existence of such warnings was a key deciding factor in die Supreme 
Court in the cqsc of Janet Reno, Attoniev General of the United States et a] v American Civil Liberties Union et al 
(see above in dus chapter). 
", See 'Decision No/98/EC of the Luropean Parliament and of the Council' which promotes safer use of the 
Internet by combating illegal and harmful content on global networks. TTýs action plan commenced 1 janu irv 1998 
and also tackles child pornography. 
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and television, needs to be used moderately and responsibly, possibly only after a 
detailed research study of the medical effects of repetitive messaging. 
Possibly a price that society must pay for the advancement in computer technology, is 
that n-ulitant racists are able to exploit its use and spread their message. just as it is not 
practical to denv the use of the telephone, because it can be used to deliver threatening 
and/or abusive messages, so it is not practical to deny the use of the computer. For 
such reasons, laws are needed to deal with the worst examples of abuse. A counter- 
message approach to racially offensive Internet materials, certainly seems preferable to 
outright censorship, but detailed research may be needed to establish the most effective 
and safest means of achieving this aim. 
Averting the threat to freedom of expression. 
In the last chapter I acknowledged that the combination of 'Options One (incitement 
to racial discrirnination) and Two' (a raci qui i ial offence prere site), mav threaten freedom 
of expression. 'Me real test of the advantage of a counter-message defence is whether it 
would help avert this threat. So far as the discussion, bv mainstream political parties, of 
issues such as refugee status goes, it is clear that it would provide a shield from any 
likelihood of prosecution for inciting racial discrimination by the use of 'racial# offensive' 
words. It seen-is probable that all of the major political parties in the UK should have 
no difficulty in incorporating an equal opportunities - sav no to racism - statement 
within their literature. They may have reservations about giving an indication that their 
manifesto warrants such a requirement, but they could comply without any undermining 
of their political beliefs. As such, they could easily avert prosecution for inciting racial 
discrimination, i. e. so long as their material does not become either `Mreatening, abusive or 
insulting'. 
It may well be that political parties like the BNP and National Front, who can be 
described as Militant racist, will be less than happy at being requi'red to include an equal 
opportunities statement, " but the fact rernains that if thev choose to do so, they could 
avoid grounds for a prosecution for incitement to racial discrin-unation by the use of 
1' '11-ie BNP web ýite Oirqi: Z 20 SkTtember 1997) carried a ýIog. m Týgbfiq anti-while ra, -i. fw' * Thi, 
cannot be considered to be i statemmt collýi,, tent xith equal opporruniticý since it reflectý opposition to onlY aliti- 
white racism. 
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racia yl offensive' literature. Likewise, any militant racist citizen could avert a prosecution 
by the use of this simple and straightforward counter-message statement. 
To this extent, the counter-message can provide a basis for averting a serious threat to 
freedom of expression. However, there can be no doubt that the overaff impact of 
'Options One and Two, even with a counter-message defence, can be argued to 
amount to a limited form of restriction upon freedom of expression because it 
may place a contradictory statement on the author's material. Whether on balance, 
after taking into account the benefit to the rights of the receiver, a counter-message 
restriiction is justilfied, is a matter of political Judgement. It can certainly be argued that i I it 
is in the public interest, in a democratic society, to root out and lirruit the evil of n-ulitant 
racism - the aim of which is to obtain support for the undermining of equality of 
opportunity. 
Indeed, equality of opportuiaitýy must be considered as one of the cornerstones of a 
democratic society, in that it offers to all people a degree of understanding that men and 
women, no matter what their race and ethnic origin, are equal under the law. In this 
sense, it undermines ariv racist message that suggests any expressions that people 
belonging to certain groups, or races, are of a lesser value than those of another. To this 
extent, equality of opportunity enhances freedom of expression, with counter-messages 
helping to develop a climate that signifies that no matter what a person's race, that 
person's Views should be given respect. In this sense, it mav help liberalise individuals in 
their use of expression. 
Compatibihty with the 'Convention on Human Rights'. 
While it may be practical to introduce le islation to ensure that racists display counter- 91 
messages on material and/or computer screens, it is important to reflect that any such 
proposals for change benefit from being consistent with the 'Convention on Human 
Rights as introduced into United Kingdom law through the Human Rights Act 1998'. "' 
This inevitably means considering if the proposals for change - in particular 'Option 
One' (amending the public order laws in order to tackle 'incitement to racial 
discrin, unation and hatred) and 'Option Two' (adding 'racial offence' to the 
'llic tcnn 'Convention' is per the I lumm Rights Act 1998 me. -ins the Convention for the Protection of I luman 
Rights mid Fundamcrit. -ý Freedoms agreed by die Councd of Europe at Rome on the 4 November 1950. 
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prerequisites for such prosecutions) - are compatible vnth the 'Convention rights'. To 
consider this point, it seen-is evident that it is obviously necessary to establish if the 
proposals may breach Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rýýts. 
However, before considering this issue, it is important to recognise the special position 
that the ECHR now holds in UK Law. As a result of the Hurnan Rif-rhts Act 1998 the 
ECHR, unlike the vast majority of other international treaties, is being introduced into 
UK law, "' albeit that the UK Courts would not be directly bound by the Judgements of 
the European Court of Human Rights. "' 
While the Human Rýýhts Act 1998 does not give the Courts power to strike down an 
Act of Parliament that is incompatible with the 'Convention rights', it does provide 
powers for a Court to nuke a 'declaration of Mcompatibilitýý, with the responsibility 
then falling upon an appropriate government Minister to enable Parliament to decide if 
it wishes to amend legislation. 116 
However, the influence of the Human Rights Act 1998 is not just legal, but also political. 
Ibis applies because the 1998 Act places a Minister under a statutory duty, in relation to 
any Bill he places before parliament, to provide a written statement as to compatibility 
with the Convention on Human Rights. 'ITie political consequences of this are 
significant, because while the Bill could still become law if it is declared by the Minister 
to be incompatible with Human Rights, it must be accepted that any such legislation will 
114 llie Human Rights Act 1998 was given Royal Assent on 9 November 1998 vith a decision as to when it will 
become fully introduced resting with the Secretary of State as per section 22(3) of the Act. It was widely expected 
that it vd1l be the year 2000 before the legislation comes fully into force with this time being used to carry out the 
training of judges and magistrates and to allow public bodies time to understand and absorb the implications of the 
Act (Tanyrs and Human Rights' by John Wadham of Liberty NLJ [1998] 1667). See also, 'Fears of huge caseload deZq), 
human rghts The Times 5 May 1999. However, on 18 May 1999, the Home Secretary issued a press release 
(153/99) announcing that the HRA 1998 will be brought fully into force on 'Human Rights Day, i. e. Monday 2 
October 2000. The HRA 1998 will give statutory force to a general presumption that A legislation (past or future) is 
intended to be compatiblewith the ECHR. It will require the courts to interpret all other laws so as to conform to it. 
Most importantly, it will require public authorities to act in compliance with the Convention unless they are 
prevented from doing so by statute. Failure to do so will be unlawful. This provides an applicant with a light to relý 
upon the Convention in any case that involves a public authority. A public authority is to be widely interpreted and 
will include courts and tribunals, government departments, local authorities, the police, prisons and NHS trusts. 
Indeed, paragraph 2.2 of the white paper explains that it will also include, to the extent that thev are exercising public 
functions, companies which were responsible for areas of activity which vere previously in th e public sector - such 
as privatised utilities (Incwporatingo human thts - thepmeess begins'by Philip Leach NLJ [1997] 1595). 
115 A domestic court or tribunal is not directly bound by the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, 
Though section 2(l)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998 makes clear, that the court must 'take into accoune anv 
judgement, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights. Further, s. 2(t)(b) and 
(c) extends this to opinions and decisions of the Commission. 
116 VAule an accelerated process is provided, it is at the discretion of the relevant Nfiruster to choose to take it. See 
Pmteehon)'mm Diserimination, by Geoff-rey Bindman NLJ (1998] 1617. 
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have a troublesome passage through parliament. Applyin these principles to the 19 
proposals for legislative change within this d-iesis, this means that it is clearly desirable 
that 'Options One and Two'are not incompatible, in particular with Article 10 of the 
'Convention on Human Rýýhts'. 
Article 10 states: 
(1) Evegone has the right to freedom of eVression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinion and to receive opinion and iVart information and ideas xitbout intqference ýy public 
authorio and regardAess offironfiers. This Article shall not prevent States fiom requiriq the 
licensing of broadcasfi)ýý television or cinema enterptises. 
(2) The exerase of these freedoms, since it caryies with it duties and responsibififies, may be 
subject to formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed ýv law and are 
necessag in a democratic sodqy, in the interests of national secunýi, terutorial integ"O or 
public safetv, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the pm/ection of health or morals, for 
the protection of the reputation of others, forpreventiq the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, orfor maintainiq the autbority and iVarfiafiýy of Mejudiciag. 
The very nature of the wording of Article 10, emphasISes that there is no such thing, 
under the ECHR, as an absolute right to freedom of expression. Indeed, the emphasis in 
Subclause (2) IS that along With the exercise of the freedom are duties and 
responsibilities. Where there is a conflict between freedom of expression and some 
other interests, the Strasbourg authorities are inevitably engaged in some sort of 
balancing exercise to determine the priority of one over the other. 117 Despite such a 
position, it is clear that the European Court of Human Rights gives a high pnorltv to the 
protection of expression, with the term 'expression' having been interpreted to include 
not merelv words, "' but also relating to pictures, 119 images, 120 and actions intended to 
express an idea or to present infon-nation. 121 Equally, the means of protecting expression 
go beyond speech to print, 122 radio 123 and television broadcasting, '2' artistic expression, 125 
117 See Chotherr v Austria A 266-B para 32 (1993) where the government of Austria justified its interference with 
expression by reference to its positive duties to protect the tight of assembly under Article 11. 
111: Freedom of expression includes the negative freedom not to speak as well as the more usual freedom to speak. 
See the reliance of die Commission in Kv Austria A 255-B (1993) Corn Rep paras 45,49. 
11" Muller v SP,. itzerland A 133 (1988). 
1'0 Chorherr,,, Austria A 266-B (1993) 
121 Ste-, ýens v UK No 11674/ 85,46 DR 245 (1986). 
1" Hatidyside %, UK A 24 (1976). 
123 Groppera Radio AG vSv6tzerland A 173 (1990). 
124 Autronic ,ý Suritzerland A 178 (1983). 
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film" and probably electronic inforrnation systems. In Handýýide v UK'27 the Court 
said: 
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essentialfreedoms of a [democrafic/ sociqy, one of 
the main basic conditions for its progress and for the development of eveg man. Su4iect to 
paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is Opficable not only to information or ideas that arefavourably 
received or regarded as inoffensive but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the state or any 
sector of the population. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness 
without which there is no "democratic sociqy "' 
11iis judgement clearly gives strong emphasis to the protection of information and Ideas 
that may be 'offensive' As such, it displays a potential for seriously undermining the 
arguments presented in this thesis in relation to tackling material that gives 'offence' 
However, it is important to note that freedom of expression is subject to enormous 
limitations, with the courts consistently providing protection for individuals who suffer 
as a result of someone's use of expressive terms that may sexually or racially 
discriminate. 128 It is argued therefore, that the lin-utations I propose in this thesis are not 
in any sense revolutionary or ground breaking, they are simply a continuance of a 
principle that is firn-dy established within domestic law. Further, through my proposals, I 
am not advocating legislative change with regards to material that IS 'offensive' in the 
non-nal wide meaning of the word. Indeed, I have related my concerns to information 
that stirs up racial hatred/discrin-unation through the use of 'racialyl offensive' material. 
This is clearly much narrower than the term of 'offence'and can clearly be considered as 
being more specific due to its relationship to race. This point is especially of value when 
it can be shown that the protection offered, under Article 10, to militant racist 
expression is scant compared to that offered to expression in general. 
The ECHR and Tackling Mifitant Racism. 
Indeed so far as Tackling Militant Racism is concerned, the ECHR 129 guarantees non- 
discrimination only m the exerciSe of a right specifically protected by the Convention. 
Muller v Switzerland A 133 (1988). 
126 Ot-to-Premmger-In-titut v Austn3 A 295-A (1994). 
127 A 24 para 49 (1976). 
12", In the UK through the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and the Race Relations Act 1976. It is also worth noting that 
freedom of expression is likeNkrise limited by the laws concerning defamation. 
1-'9 On which the Humm Rights Act 1998 is based. 
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At first glance this appears to be less than positive. However, the wording of the ECHR 
does provide grounds for arguing that rights such as expressed in Article 9: freedom of 
thought, conscience and rehgion; Article 10: freedom of expression; and Ar-ticle 11: 
freedom of peaceful assembly and association; are all subject to: 
* Article 14: The enjojment of the rights andfreedoms as setforth in this Convention shall 
be secured mitbout discrimination on aqground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion. 
Political or other opinion, national or soeial origin, association with a national minorio, 
properý,, birth or status. 
9 Article 17., Nothing in this convention may be interpreted as i)V! yingjor any State, gromp 
orperson any right to engage in any acfiviýi orperform any act aimed at the destruction of anj, 
of the nghts andfreedoms setforth herein or at their limitation other than is protidedfor in the 
Convention. 
Ibereby, the ECHR can be interpreted to provide that a person can only secure his/her 
right to freedom of expression, under the ECHR, if the claim displays no discrimination 
on grounds such as sex, race, colour, national origin etc. The potential for this is 
significant because it priontises the rights of individuals and gives credence to the 
argument that equality (or at least the absence of discrimination) is a prerequisite to 
freedom of expression. No doubt as a result of this, the European Commission of 
Human Rights has taken a limiting approach to protecting racist expression. 
For example, the Comn-ussion in the case of Xv Ital "' considered clairris in relation to 
freedom of expression, 131 association" and Article 14. Ibis case concerned an issue of 
whether criminal law in Italy was justified in making illegal engqgement in intiigiie aimed at 
reconstructing a fascist party, as being necessary on the grounds of public safety and to 
protect the rights and freedoms of others. 'Me Commission took the view that a 
difference in treatment, directed towards fascist ideology. had a le itimate purpose in 91 
order to protect democracy and thereby rejected the application. 
In the case of Glimmerveen and others v Netherlands '133 the European Commission 
took both the CERD Convention and Article 17 as its gLude, in ruling that the Chairman 
of the racist Nederlandsde Tý'olks Unie party, "' nuil not MVOke the provisions of Article 10 
ý Cie No 6741/74. 
131 Article 10. 
1'2 Article 11. 
13-18348 and 8406/78. 
134 The political pirtý, supported the idea that it is in the general interests of the state for its population to be 
ethnicafly homogeneous. 
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to challenge a Netherlands' Authority decision which imposed a two-year prison 
sentence, on the grounds of mcitement to racial discrin-iination, for distributing literature 
addressed to "Netherlanders of the xhite race" 
Two other cases, concerning freedom of expression and revisionism, ftirther strengthen 
the restrictive approach of the Commission. In Xv Federal Republic of German , 
135 
applicants complained about a judicial decision banning an exhibition of brochures that 
alleged that "the death of Jems under the Tbird Reich was Zionist trickeg. " The Commission 
held that the murder of Jews in the Second World War was 'an hisloricfact" established 
beyond doubt. Thus, In the interests of the protection of others, it did not disagree with 
the judgement of the domestic German court banning the exhibition on grounds of 
defamation. Likewise, in Tv Belgium, 136 the author-publiSher was deemed responsible 
for the publication of a text, written by a former leader of the Belgian Rexist movement, 
entitled '7-elter to the Pope concerninT Ausch2vit. Z', which questioned the extermination of 
millions of Jews. The European Cornmission took the view that 'T had not been 
punished for being co-author, but for having participated in the publication of a Nazi 
leaflet which was insulting. The Comt-nission, therefore provided no protection under 
Article 10. 
Clearly these declarations - which show lirnited or scant protection for racist 
expression"' - are those of the European Comrnission and not of the European Court, 
but they do reflect consistency with the ECHR. However, a word of caution must be 
sounded in that proportionality.. is always a criterion that weighs in the rrimid in relation 
to the ECHR. 139 
1359235/81 
131,9777/82 
137 See Harris, Boyle and Warbrick - 'Law of the European Convention on Human Rights' - page 374 for a 
discussion on the scant protection offered to rncist expreýsion. 
138 'Proportionality' was referred to in Handyside v UK (1976) 1 EHRR 737 as being ')Pymportzonate to the legitimate aim 
pursued. " In the case of Dudgeon v UK (1981) 4 EHRR 149 the court considered whether a law which made buggery 
between consenting gay men a criminal offence found against the UK government stating. 'On the issue of 
pr"rtionalio the Coud wnsiders that such justifwa&ins as there are for retaining the Ian) in jone unamended UK goternment aqued 
thal the law was needed to proted vulnerable members of soieoj am outuez , ghed 
ýv the detrimental ejects whiýh the tery existeme of the 
legislathe proviýiqns can hatie on the qe of apersom of homosexual orientatign like the 69ýýant ". 
13" 0 See 7 he right toftreaom of opinion and e. %prrssion'bý Turk and Joinet, Chapter 6- 'Striking a Balane: ' edited bý Sandra 
Coliver. See also, "Blacksione's Guide to the Human Ri ghts Act 1998' bv John Wadhatn and Helen Mountfield at page 13. 
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An indirect example of proportionalitý- can be seen from the case of jersild 
Denmark, " which considered the conflict between the freedom of the press and the 
disseryunation of insulting racist Views. In Jersild, the European Court of Human Rights 
expressly endorsed the practice of the Cornmission of giving only scant protection to 
racist expression. 141 Indeed, this restrictive admissibility, and scant protection, approach 
of the Comrnission was effectively distingwshed in Jersild because the press was not 
propagating racist views - it was in effect reporting on the activities of others who were 
racist. 
Press freedom and racist material. 
jersild involved a journalist who had filmed a group of racist teenagers known as the 
"Greenjackets", for a television news documentary. The Danish -authorities were 
concerned by the broadcasting coverage that, inter al' , compared "Ni, ' ers to o Zas" ia & 'g riz 5 
and gave details of how the members of the Greenjackets had been involved in an attack 
upon an immigrant family. Not only were the teenagers prosecuted under Danish laws 
for raclaUy insulting members of the targeted groups, the journalist was also charged and 
found guilty of 'Aidiq and abelfing the &ssemination of a statement wl)ich mas t1matening, abusive 
or insultinT or degraded a group ofpersons on account of their race. ' 142 
When the case reached the European Court of Human Rights it was held, by 12 votes to 
7, that the Danish Authorities had violated the rights of the journalist by establishing this 
prosecution. IhIS decision was founded upon Article 10 of the European Convention 
of Human Rýýhts. on the basis of what is necessary in a democratic society. 
In upholding the journalist's appeal the European Court reiterated that, while the racist 
teenagers did not enjoy the protection of Article 10,, freedom of expression constitutes 
one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and the safeguards to be 
afforded to the press are of particular importance. It was stressed that it IS incumbent 
on the press to impart information and ideas of public interest, while emphasis was 
placed on the need to counterbalance the extremist views. The Court rejected the 
Danish Authority's view that the broadcast material did not contain counterbalancing 
140 A 298 para 37 (1994) 
141 A 298 parn 35 (1994) 
142 As per Article 266(b) of the Penal Code. 
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matenal and held that, "Faken as a xhole the broadcast contained a number of counterbalancing 
elements. " 
The European Court stressed that the punishment of a Journalist, for assisting in the 
dissemination of statements made by another person in an interview, would seriOuslý 
hamper the contribution of the press to discussion of matters of public interest and 
should not be envisaged unless there were particularly strong reasons for doing so. It 
was argued that news reporting based on interviews, whether edited or not, constituted 
one of the most important means whereby the press was able to play the vital role of 
'_ýubfic watchdog. " 
Amongst the dissenting judges' views, was the argument that the Danish courts had 
taken into account the conflicting interests between freedom of expression and its 
international con-imitments under the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (CERD). 1hus, the Danish Courts had applied the correct 
principles of law and concluded that such outrageous racist and insulting statements 
could only be justified if balanced by opposing considerations that could have 
outweighed the wrongfulness of the statements. It was clear the dissenting members did 
not consider that the counterbalance provided by the journalist was adequate. "' 
There was greater emphasis placed by the dissenting members on the importance of the 
United Nation's CERD Convention. judges Ryssdal, Bernhardt, SPielrnan and Lolzou 
argued that the CERD Convention manifestly could not be ignored when the European 
Convention was being implemented - It is binding on Denmark- It must also guide the 
Eurvpean Court ofHuman Fights in its decisions. " By comparison, the majority took the view 
that: 
"Denmark's obligations mndei-Article 10 must be interpreted, to the e%tentpossible, so as to 
be reconcibble with its obligations under the UX Convention. In this respect it is notfor the 
Court to interpret the 'due regard'clause in Arhýle 4 of the UN Convenlion, which is open to 
various constructions. The Court is however of the opinion that its interpretation ofArficle 10 
of the European Convention.... is cox)ýble with Denmark's obligafions under the U-N- 
Convention. " 
Despite these subtle differences between the majority and n-iinoritý- judgements, it is 
clear they agreed that the United Nations CERD convention cannot be ignored when 
14' Mrs Jane Liddy in a sole dissenting judgement argued that there was no counterbalancingmaterial. 
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the ECHR is being implemented, with it being relevant to the European Court of 
Human Rights in any of its decisions. Also accepted, by all of the Judges, was the need 
I in views. for journalists to provide some form of counterbalance to racially i sulting i 
Indeed, the dissenting argurnent between the judges was not whether an absolute 
freedom of expression should be given to journalists, when reporting racist material, but 
whether there had been an adequate counterbalance provided. 
To this extent, the proposed establishment of a formal counterbalancing statement 
should be welcomed, since it should remove any degree of uncertainty from the 
proceedings. If government legislation specifies the form and nature of the counter- 
message statement, then it should be relativelv easv to detern-une if this condition has 
been met. Indeed, it would provide a clear counterbalancing statement on the face of 
any racist material being circulated. 
A rigr_ht to receive expression. 
It is also important to recognise that Article 10 is not just concerned with the rights of 
the expresser. In fact, Article 10(l) specifically refers to the freedom to 'receive' 
information - with the European Court of Human Rights asserting, in the case of 'Me 
Sunday Times v UK, that this extends to being "willing7 receivers of information. "' 
Consequentially, it is argued that a counter-message recognises the freedom of the 
expresser - i. e. by enabling publication in accord with conditions - while enhancing the 
freedom of the receiver by alerting them to the fact that the material may contain 
elements that could be 'racially offeiiSiVe' Indeed, as receivers of information, a person can 
only exercise a right to be a 'willing' receiver if they have some form of prima facie or 
prior knowledge of the nature of the content of the material. Once they have this prin-U 
facie knowledge, d-iev can then exercise a right of choice as to whether thev should read 
or ignore such material. 
1,14 See Sulid: Times v UK A 230 piras 65-66 (1979) in which the Court said that there was a tight to express ay 
opinions mid there was an independent right of a villing hearer to hear such opituoný. 'flie Sunday Times case was 
concerned voth the freedom of the newspaper to publish xticles about the merit, of pending litigation. The 
govern. ment argued that to publish created 'trial by newspapee and that it was, therefore necessirv to restr-tin 
publication in order to maintain public confidence in the courts. The majority rejected this argument for a varietv of 
reason, including that the UK court had not given proper v-cight to the right of freedom of expression that the 
litigation was dormant, mid that there was substantial public interest in the else. 'niercb\,, they recoglused and 
respected the right to hear opinions. 
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In Conclusion. 
Over the past two chapters, I have considered the practical implications of amendments 
to Part III of the Public Order Act 1986. Chapter Four outlined and considered the 
y M1 ism principal options for change. option One' relates to the need to tackle ilitant raci 
by changing the law so that it penalises incitement to racial discrimination as well as 
hatred. In addition, 'Option Two' proposes the inclusion of 'racial offence' as a 
prerequisite to prosecution. 
By considering racist material, distributed in the London Borough of Hounslow, I have 
shown that legislative changes involving just 'Option One' - incitement to racial 
discrimination or hatred - would have limited impact due to the evidential shield of 
prerequisites that require material to be 'threatening, abusive or insultingý. By 
comparison, also including 'Opt-ion Two' - "radal offence' - as a prerequisite would 
certainly tackle rnilitant racist material, but it could have potentially serious consequences 
in relation to the undernruning of freedom of expression. Indeed, it could seriously 
impede open political discussion on important issues such as the status of refugees and 
asylum seekers thereby threatening the value of a democratic parliamentary process. 
While these Options, in themselves, would present a threat to the undermining of 
freedom of expression, it has been argued in Chapter Five that enabling an equal 
opportunities counter-message defence helps avoid this situation. That being said, it is 
acknowledged that a combination of 'Options One and Two'along With a counter- 
message defence could result in arguments being made that the proposals amount to a 
form of restriction on the ideal of freedom of expression because the counter-message 
may contradict the author's opinion. QUIte whether such a restriction is justified in the 
interests of lin-uting incitement to racial discrimination is a matter of political judgement, 
but grounds exist for believing that the combined proposals do not amount to a breach 
of the 'Convention on Human Rights"" and to this extent they can be considered as 
compatible, and certainly not incompatible. 
The advantage of tacklmg 'raeial offence'in such a restrictive legislative manner is that the 
proposals show a consistency of approach between speech and literature, while also 
145 This qrgurnent is consistent with the interpretation of the ECHR that suggests that a complainant can expect only 
scant protection if he wishes to claim fi-cedom of expression for the purposes of expressing a racist opinion. It Is 
also consistent with the European Court of Human Rights decision in jersild v Denmark-, where the ECHR accepted 
a need for a counterbalance approach. 
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laying the foundations for enabling domestic legislators to tackle the problem of racism 
on the Internet - notwithstanding the practical difficulties involved. Further, these 
legislative options, because of the counter-message defence, display respect for freedom 
of expression - while also helping to underrnine the fermentation of support for extreme 
right wmg political parties who espouse 'racially offensive'views. 
Possibly a strong argument for the counter-message approach is that at its core it 
enhances freedom of expression. It does this by recognising not just the rights of the 
expresser, but also of the reader or receiver. Indeed, it does not deny a person the right 
to publish 'ratial# offensive'material - it just lays down the conditions for such publication. 
Further, it enhances freedom of expression by alerting a potential reader to the probable 
content of the material and enabling then to choose whether they wish to proceed. 
One worrying downside of a counter-message defence, so far as the distribution of local 
leaflets is concerned, is that the proposals may force rrulitant racists to choose between 
legality and illegalitýy. The racist organisation may, as seems likelv decide to comply with 
the law and include an equal opportunities statement within the material. By doing so 
they may find support for the partys ideals ebbing away, as activists within the party feel 
little enthusiasm for delivering a leaflet that would say no to racism. The obvious worry 
is that these militant racists would, as a result, turn to the extrerruity of attacking racial 
victims in their homes and in the streets. While this is an ugly thought, it is important to 
recognise that this form of illegality is already evident amongst some militant racists. " 
"I Reports in Searchlight indicate that Combat 18 mid the National Socialist AIliaince are quite often involved in this 
kind of violence - 'BoIlling it oyt in Biwkpool'- September 1995. 
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A COUNTER-MESSAGE - EDUCATION AND THE GENERAL WILL 
Cbapter six. 
I have consistently argued that the law should be used to tackde militant racism. In 
particular, I argued that the existing law on stirring up racial hatred is inadequate because 
it only tackles material that is 'threafeniný abusive or insulting' - with it failing to deal with 
material that is 'racially offensive' and intended to or likely to stir up racial 
hatred /discrimination. As outlined in the Chapter Five, my solution to this problem is 
to add 'racial offence'to the prerequisites necessary to bring a prosecution for stirring up 
racial hatred. ' In addition, I have argued that this proposed law should provide for a 
counter-message defence. That is, an applicable defence in circumstances where the 
'racial# offensive' material2 also clearly displays a counter-message consistent with the 
legislative intent of equality through racial tolerance. ' It is, therefore, onh, if citizens 
re'ect the rule of law, bv deliberatelv refusirig to display a 'Say No to Racism' counter- 
message, that criminal punishment would be appropriate. 
'n-le traditional philosophical justification for introducing criminal laws that limit the 
freedom of individuals, stem fromj. S. Mill and his 'harm principle'. With his essay'On 
Liberty' presenting the argument in the following words: 
cl cit The on# pinpose for which power can be righo, exer sed over aq), MeVlbel- of a 'ilised 
communi n, a , gainst 
his will is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either plysical or 
mora4 i's not a st_. ficient wan-ant. ' ' 
This harm principle is intent on giving political priority to individual freedom from 
coercion. However, it has two central wealmesses. The first is that it provides no 
means of measuring harm and providing justice consistent with that measurement. 
ý Under Part III of the Public Order Act 1986 the current three prerequisites are that the words, or beh-unour, used 
must be Ylmaleniqo, abushv (ir insulling'- \Aith aii intcrit/likelihood of titring tip racial hatred. For a discussion oil the 
tived for racial discrimination to be included with the stirring Lip of racial hatred see Chapter Four. 
"I'lic couliter-mc-age defence should ov& apply to 'r6wa4y o lie current law concerning the stirring ýOnsiiv'material. 'I 
tip of racial hatred through die use of Ybreatenzqo, abilsite or insullvý_g' words should remam. Indeed, as preNiously 
argued, this area of law should be strengthened by also making it an offence to stir up racial discrunniation. 
-' In simple terminology this means saying 'no to racism'. However, the tenn 'equality through racial tolerance' 4ill 
be more fully defined later in this chapter, but for preserit purpose,; it can be understood as an acceptance and 
respect for the rights and cultures of people from other r3ces. 
I. S. Mill -'On IJI)Mý'. III ; tCf-, Ul Collmi (ed) 'On Liberly and OtherVnhip, CxnbridgeUniversit%, Press (1989). 
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Hence, as remarked by Wilson, society crirninahzes theft because it is a violation of that 
which one is entitled to keep - thus a worker stealing a packet of cigarettes can face 
criminal charges. By comparisoný society does not crirninalize a failure to reward an 
employee in accord with his or her value. This applies despite the fact that financial 
exploitation rnay produce a sense of inferiority and injustice - also providing harm by 
preventing the exploited worker from finding satisfactory accommodation and enjoying 
a meaningfiA life. Indeed, all such harms may be far more damaging to the individual 
than the theft of a packet of cigarettes. 5 
The second weakness stenis from the first, in that because there is no objective way of 
measuring harm there is no real method of deterrninirig the level of harm that is 
necessary to justify the undermining of certain freedoms that may be regarded as 
fundamental. For example, 'rwially offensive' material can produce harm to both an 
individual and society as a whole. ' The problem with this simple interpretation is that 
harm is like a piece of elastic - on face value it seems lirruited in length, but it can at times 
be stretched sometimes beyond understanding. Thus, our political leaders could use the 
argument of harm to justify almost any le islation they see as being in the public good - 1 91 
even if this legislation may undernrune an important freedom like freedom of expression. 
To this end, in seeking to establish a philosophical justification for counter-message 
legislation, I will endeavour to look beyond the harm principle and try to find a 
philosophical justification beyond that of the subjective values determined by our 
political leaders. I do this because I consider that the harm principle has been met, with 
strong arguments existing for saying that racist material has the potential to do harm to 
society and individuals within society. As such, the government can claim justification 
for legislation that tackles rnilitant racism. However, what I want to exan-une is the 
philosophical basis for the government restricting freedom of expression in the interests 
of promoting equality of opportunity and establishing people's freedom from racial 
discrimination. 
Indeed, I Will start from the premise that a counter-message approach is not Pst about 
tackling potential racial harm within society, but also about establishing an educational 
5" See 'Criminal Law. Doctrine and I heorý'by William Wilson - published bv Longman Law series 1998 at pages 31-34. 
It can do harm to the individual by upsetting or frighterung him/her or malong him/her feel inferior or threatened. 
Likevise, it can do harm to society because it may undennme community relations and possibly lead to friction 
Mithin -ociety. 
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role for legislation. This chapter will consider how this applies from a sociological and 
jurisprudential perspective. I will then go on to consider the relevance of philosophers 
such as Sun-mer, Rousseau, and Rawls. 
Legislation and education. 
Lester and Bmdrnan ms1st that "legislation and education are not incoVafibleý " In particular, 
they concurred with the first annual report of the Race Relations Board in April 1967 
summarismg the role of anti-raciSt legislation as follows: 
1. A law is an uneqwvocal declaration of public policy. 
2. A law gives support to those who do not wish to discriminate, but who feel 
compelled to do so by social pressure. 
3. A law gives protection and redress to minority groups. 
4. A law thus provides for the peaceful and orderly adjustment of grievance and 
the release of tensions. 
5. A law reduces prejudice by discouraging the behaviour in which prejudice 
finds expression. 
As rernarked by Cotterrell, ' several of these purposes go well beyond the use of law to 
redress grievances or to control behaviour. Although these may not give a green light to 
the arguments for counter-message legislation - they do signiý- the importance of the 
educative ftinction of law, i. e. to change ideas by irifluencing behaviour. 
While the educative function of law was behind the Race Relations Act of 1968 - by 
1975 the government was acknowledgmig both the success and the lin-nitations of such an 
approach. In a white paper presented to Parliament in 1975 the Home Secretary (Roy 
Jenkins) stated: 
"... dwfing the pretioms decade, probab# large#, as a result of Section 6, there has been a decided 
change in the style of racist propaganda. It has tended to be less blatantly, bigoted, to disclaim 
y intention of sfit7inga up racial hatred, and to purboa to make a contribulion to pubAc an 
edwcation and debate. 
'Rax and Lax'(l 972), Penguin Books at p86. 
-1 The Smiokgv of Lam-'(1992), Butterworths 3t p53. 
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ge, the ater its probable impact n The more apparently, rational and moderate i's the messa gre 0 
public opinion. ' " 
What this clearly signifies is that the government recognised that, in the name of public 
education and debate, racist propaganda was being distributed. Despite the probable 
success of its impact on public Opinion, it was felt that "... it is notyustiftable in a democratic 
socieýy to inteý(ere xitbfreedom of e, %pression except where it is necessagfor the prevention of disorder or 
for the protection of other basicfreedoms. "9 
1he problem with this governmental approach is that it leaves a n-ussive hole in its anti- 
racist defences. While the Race Relations Act 1976 can deal with individual acts of 
discrimination and offences by corporations, the Public Order Act 1976 n-uy deal with 
crin-unal acts of stirring up racial hatred where 'Xbreat, abuse, or insult'eXiSts. However, the 
problem of dealing with 'racially offensive' material, which may stir up racial hatred, has 
been largely ducked. The best ffiat can be said, is that the work of tackling 'radally 
offensive'rriaterial (which purports to make a contribution to public education and debate) 
has been left to the efforts of the Comrnission for Racial Equality. While the CRE do a 
worthwhile job by advertising within newspapers and on television, they have budget 
considerations and the impact is lirruted because the anti-racist message is not directly 
related to the racist message in time, place, or person. It follows that a person may read 
or hear a racist and not an anti-racist message, or vice versa. 
In comparison, the principal aim of the counter-speech proposal is to reqWre a form of 
public advertisement, displaying a commitment to equality through racial tolerance in 
situations where 'ra6ially offensive' material is published or distributed. This counter- 
message legislation operates as educative legislation in a number of ways: 
Ihe counter-message visibly demonstrates to the reader that the law is committed 
to equality through racial tolerance and that society does not find raciSn-i, and/or 
racist behaviour, acceptable. 
2. It signifies to the reader the type of cornrnents that are 'racially, offensive'and may 
be unacceptable within society. 
3. Perhaps more importantly, it requires the speaker, author, and/or publisher, to 
exarrune the content of their material and to ask themselves if they could be 
" Parn 126 - 'Raaal Disaimination'presented to Parliament - Sept 1975 - published HMSO 1976. 
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overstepping the tolerance levels of society by expressing views that give 'racial 
offence' 
4. It tends to discredit the contrary racist statement in the material to which it is 
appended. 
(1) A demonstration of the law. 
The first report of the Race Relations Board in April 1967 echoed these airris by 
specifying that the role of anti-raciSt legislation is to provide an unequiivocal declaration 
of public policy. In particular, this involved saying no to racial discrimination and yes to 
racial tolerance. 
However, it is important to reflect that simply passing anti-racist legislation may not be 
enough. Indeed, jowell has referred to some laws as being simply 'dead letters' and 
conspicuous symbolic gestures designed to reassure the mass public, making them 
quiescent, while conferring the real benefits on small organised groups. " Clearly, it 
cannot be realistically argued that the Race Relations Acts have been dead letters, with 
many successful applicants at Employment Tribunals and some constructive work from 
the Conirrussion for Racial Equality. Though, with just a token number of prosecutions 
under Part III of the Public Order Act 1986, and the buffer of the Attomev General 
before prosecutions can be instigated, it can be argued that the criminal arm of dealing 
with racism is essentially symbolic and 'almost a dead letter'law. I prefer the term Wmost a 
dead letter law, because the common usage of dead letter law refers to a law that has 
become obsolete by long disuse" - it would be a n-usnomer to give this tag to Part III of 
the Public Order Act 1986 given its recent introduction and occasional use. 
Obviously, a counter-message would also be symbolic, in the sense that it displays the 
public policy argument of being opposed to racism - acting as an ongoing, and possibly 
daily, rerninder of the public policy goal. The purpose of the counter-message being to 
provide an alternative to the intolerant message of 'radal offence' As such, it needs to be 
placed, as a symbolic demonstration of the law, where acts of 'radal offence'may display 
its ugly intolerance. Ibis could be in newspapers, on Internet pages, in publications of 
political parties and extrernist organisations, even on television or at cinemas. 
11' See Comment of Jeffrey jowell on Fiiedman's 'General Theog of Sodd Change, - published hi Lqv, - & Social Change 
(1973) Osgood Law School. 
II See 'Black's Lan - Dictionary'- Centenmal Edition 199 1. 
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Any counter-tTiessage needs to be consistent with the ideals of existing laws on race 
discrimination. " Thus, in a few words, it needs to warn of material content, whIle saying 
'no to racism'and reflecting `equaliýv thmugh racial tolerance'. By this, I mean an acceptance 
and respect for the rights and cultures of peoples from other races so long as their 
customs and practices do not directly conflict With our domestic laws. 
(2) Signif&a the 13Te of comments that may be 'ragjgUy qffensiveý 
Clearly, the existence of a counter-message and warning displayed on a leaflet, 
publication, computer or TV screen, will signify that somewhere within the material may 
be a statement that can give 'racial offence' Thus, to a limited extent, it should help 
educate the reader to the type of conu-nents and material that possesses the potential for 
gi migy '), acial qffenceý In addition, it operates as a warning, alerting people to the likely 
content and them the opportunity to choose not to read the material. In this 91 
sense, this should help develop freedom, since freedom is not Just about the rights of 
the author to express his views, but also the audience to receive. 13 A counter-message 
can give a reader the opportunity to exercise his or her freedom by turning away before 
s/he reads the offending material. In an important way, a counter-message can enhance 
freedoms. 
This statement, however, assumes that the reader can rely upon the author/publisher in 
his use of the counter-message. Indeed, it is possible the material may not be 'racially, 
offensive', but that the author has erred on the side of caution so that he would not fall 
foul of the law. There is also the possibility that the material may be 'racially, offensive'and 
it does not display a counter-message. " To this extent, it is important for the reader to 
regard a counter-message as being no more than an indication of the type of material 
that may give 'racial offence' Indeed, the very nature of a reader examining material -while 
looking out for a 'racial# offensive' passage - must itself be of some educational and 
intellectual value. 
12 Principally the Race Relations Act 1976 and Part III of the Public Order Act 1986. 
13 Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights stresses that freedom of expression includes freedom to 
hold opiriions and to receive and impart information and ideas. 
14 JjjiS is discussed below. In such circumstances the reader should have a right of complaint to the CRE. 'Mey 
could then havc, and be able to use, powers of prosecution where it is considered appropriate. 
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It must also be the case that a reader could exan-une some material and take the view 
that it is 'racial# offensive'. where no counter-message has been displayed. To help deal 
with this, it must be of importance to provide a channel for complaint. One possible 
solution to this problem, would be to enable a complainant to make representation to 
the Corrimission for Racial Equality and/or the Police about the offending material. 
With the CRE, as well as the police, being given powers to issue warnings and refer 
cases to the Crown Prosecution Service requesting prosecution. In effect, the proposed 
mechanism is that it should be an offence 15 to publish /distribute 'raciall, ,y offensive'matenal 
that is intended to, or likely in all the circumstances to, stir up racial hatred or 
discrirnination. A defence against this Public Order offence should be that the material 
displays a counter-message consistent with societ-y's general will of saying. 'no to racism"' 
(3) Requiring the author/ publisher to examine the content of material for racism. 
While some authors of 'racially, offensive' material may have intent to be intolerant, it may 
be that an author or distributor of the material has genuine doubt as to what is 'racialgl, 
offensive '. 16 It was suggested in the last chapter that the term 'racial' has an easily 
recognisable and accepted statutory meaning, with 'offence' holding its own natural 
meaning that it is widely recognised "thin society, with the dictionary promding an 
adequate reference on what may be considered appropriate. Indeed, this form of 
ordinary usage - natural meaning - methodology17 is preferential to a statutory definition 
of 'offence', which can often result in the tautology of law and even reliance upon natural 
meanings to clarify fiirther. 1' 
In any cases of genume doubt about what IS, or may be considered to be, 'raeialyl offensive' 
the author/publisher could seek assistance from the Comrnission for Racial Equality, 
Is It is suggested a proven offence should be subject to the same penalties for distributing 'threatening, abushle or 
iu-Ifing'material likely to stir tip racial hatred - see s. 27 Public Order Act 1986. Of course the Courts would have 
discretion as to the appropriate sentencing in the usual manner. 
I(, See Chapter Five, 'Say No to Raism, for a more detailed consideration of these issues. 
17 See the comments of Lord Reid in Brut-us v Cozens [1972[ 1 ALL ER 1297 and the discussion in Chapter Five. 
16 A classic illustration of this is s. l(lb) of the Race Relations Act 1976, ; there despite statutory definitioiis, aithin 
the legislation, the courts have been moved to rely upon natural or other defined meanings for certain phrases. For 
example'racial grounds' is defined in statute as colour, race nationality, ethnic, or national origins. Despite such, the 
House of Lords, Mandla xý Dowell Lee [1983] IRLR 209, in interpreting the statute in relation to the word 'ethnic', 
did not feel happy with die dictionatý, definition. As such, they produced their own essential characteristic-- that a 
group needs to meet. Critical to these is the first that requires a long sharedhiftog. Tliýs helped establish that Sikhs are 
an ethnic group, also Jews, but in Crown Suppliers (PSA) ,- Dawkins [1993] ICR 517 it was decided that Rastafarians, 
with a shared history going back just 60 years, are not. 
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which could advise as to whether the material should carry a counter-message defence. " 
At anv rate, it should be relatively easy to err on the side of caution and display a 
counter-message where any doubt as to the possibility of 'raeialoffence'may exist. 
Clearly, this process of effectively requiring authors and publishers of material to 
examine content for any area that rnay possibly give 'racial offence; has significant 
potential for being of educational value. It may be that they could edit the material so 
that it no longer gives 'radal offence; or that they consider it is essential to include the 
material without editing. It could also be that an author, or publisher, does not 
genuinely recognise that their material is 'racially offensive' For example, a person writing 
a historical publication about Jews could inadvertently cause 'radal offence'by questioning 
certain aspects of the holocaust. IhIS could mean that the actus reus of an offence of 
publishing 'radalyl offensive' material - Without a counter-message - has been established, 
but it is possible that gWilt would not be deterrnined due to a lack of intent or mens rea. 
However, in such circumstances, it may be that a caution, or wamm& that any future 
occurrence could result in prosecution would prove worthwhile. 'Mis too would 
establish an educational process, and could be deterrnined by the Commission for Racial 
Equality working with the police to help educate authors and publishers. 
(4) It tends to discredit the contramy racist statements in the material to which it is 
appended. 
In the process of (a) demonstrating the law, and (b) signifying the type of comments 
that may be 'racially offensive, a counter-message also tends to discredit the contrarý- racist 
statement in the material to which it is appended. It does this by the symbolic action of 
displaying the official state line and by appealing to the conscience of the reader - 
expressing what IS to be considered to be right - while contrasting it with what may be 
considered to be wrong. 
While this combination of a demonstration of the law and the tendency of their material 
to be discredited by the existence of the counter-message, may encourage authors to 
change the style - and possibly content - of their writing, this should not necessarily be 
the intent behind the counter-message proposals. Indeed, the prionty intent should be 
19 Indeed, it seern, probable that any person committing the actus reus of distributing 'raciaUy oJensite' material, 
without q counter-message, should be able to establish that the mens rea element has not been fulfilled on the basis 
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to enable free expression while requiring a counter-message to be displayed. What is 
intended is to educate readers and authors that certain material may be 'racially, offensire, 
and that this could lead to the stirring up of racial discrimination or hatred. If, as a 
result of the realisation of the impact of their words, authors choose to edit their own 
material, that would be their own choice. In one sense, this would prove the value of 
the educational process of the legislation, since authors or publishers, on reflection, 
would be choosing the road of tolerance and equality of opportunity rather than the 
giving of 'racial offence' 
Establishing a sociological basis for using the law to educate. 
Ibis thesis is concerned with using the law to promote racial tolerance. In a sense, this 
involves the state trying to educate people to accept a policy of racial tolerance. In 
contrast with this, the American sociologist William Graham Sumner argues that 
'stateways cannot cbanTe)o1kxqys'. Should his sociological argw-nent be correct - using the 
law to educate people within society could well prove to be futile. This section seeks to 
examine this issue. 
In his classic work Folkways' Sumner argued that the first task of rrian is to survive. 
This was achieved for early man by trial and error, with the ability to distinguish pleasure 
and pain the only physical power that was to be assumed. This experience of pleasure 
and pain provided the test of success; if a man felt pain he would avoid a repeat, if he 
felt pleasure, the process was worth repeating. 
As a result of man being a pack anin-al and tending to struggle for survival in groups, 
men tended to learn from each other's experience and come to sin-ii'lar conclusions as to 
what was likely to produce pleasure and pain. Consequently, over time, a common 
approach became a custom from which instincts developed. In this way Folkways arose, 
with these being the group ways of doing things and solving problems. For Sumner "the 
1ýfe of human beiigs in all ages and stages of culture is pnmanjl controlled ýv a Past mass offolkwais 
handed downfrom the earliest existence of the race. " 
of CRE qpproval. 
211 W. G. Swuner (1907), 'Folkaqp, Boston, 'llie Andienaelun Press. 
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The basic concept of Sumner's theory is that law derives from folkways. 2' In particular, 
he argues, 'Stateways cannot change folk2vajs' - essentially because folk-ways derive from 
instincts handed down from primitive man. This view has been criticised by progressive 
sociologists such as Monson and Friedman, both of whom have described the classic 
work of Sumner as being conservative and essentially codifying existing mores. Both 
Morison and Friedman convincingly argue that the law can change society, with Monson 
citing the decade of Thatcherism as an example of how the law was used to change the 
folkways of society. " 
Further examples of this are the laws on sex and race discrinuination, which have had at 
least some influence on the way organisations treat their staff and customers. This in 
turn has had an impact upon individuals who have used the laws to help pursue their 
rights. There are also other less obvious societal changes. For example, the changing of 
the property laws earlier this century enabled women to own property in their own 
right. This, combined with women being given the vote, has helped develop a centurý 
in which women's role within society has been significantly transformed. 
All of these are clear examples of law being used to help develop social change within 
society, albeit that the change may develop in ways not fiffly appreciated by those who 
draw up the legislation. Perhaps an obvious example of this is the introduction of the 
Beveridge Report. 2' Legislators could not have imagined the medical and technological 
developments that have helped push up the costs of the welfare state. Likewise, those 
who responded to women suffragettes' demands for the vote are unlikely to have 
envisaged the electorate and the Conservative Party putting into Downing Street a 
woman Prime Minister. 
Not only do the above examples signify that Surrmer may be wrong when he argues 
stateways cannot change folkways - there could also be problems, in a multi-cultural 
society, with any reliance upon Sun-mer's concept of folkways. IhIS could particularly 
apply when the mores or customs of one race, conflict With those from another. Given 
such a conflict, whose folk-ways would take priority? Sumner suggests an evolutionary 
For a sununqry of Sumner's theory see: The Socmhýy ofLaw'(1 992) Butterworths p 18-20. 
22 How to change things mith rules' - J. Morison in 'Lav, Soaý* and Change' edited by Lix-mgstone and Mori-on and 
published by Dartmouth publishing Co (1990). 
, '3 The Beveridge Report, a blueprint for a social security and welfare state, wqs published in 1942. 
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solution. The problem with this is that it would take generations for mores and customs 
to adapt and change. With the application of the old adage 71-ben I'll Rome do as Me 
Romans do, it seen-is obvious there would be little change, with indigenous mores 
generally prevailing. 
An illustration of this point can be seen from the way that folkways have developed into 
the law of blasphemy. The domestic courts in The Satanic Verses case, 2' have interpreted 
the law on blasphemy as applying exclusively to Chnstianin-, thereby denying access to 
Muslin-is wishing to protect Islam. While such a decision is justified on legil grounds, it 
says little for the values of our society that the religious ideals of the state - based upon 
folk-ways of the past - are given priority over the mores of people who have settled in 
the UK from other continents. While the court may have been sympathetic to the 
ideals and mores of the Islarruc faith - they were bound by existing law which was built 
upon the foundations of indigenous folkways. 2' 
Clearly, where folkways of different cultures conflict, tolerance may be a more desirable 
outcome. Indeed, applying Sumner's theory of pain and pleasure we should recognise 
that the causes of pain and pleasure also change. Thus, pain and pleasure should not be 
seen as an absolute barrier to change. Further, man, in following an instinct and desire 
to avoid pain, would likely accept tolerance if it meant that his folkways remained 
reasonably consistent. To this extent, Sumner's theory could be stronger if it were to 
accept that where folkways conflict, tolerance and understanding might become an 
overriding more. However, making the theory of Sumner stronger would not make it 
right. It is abundantly clear that his theory IS flawed, because our own experiences tell us 
that government action can help change the way that society responds to certain issues. 
24 See Rv Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Choudhary 11991] 1 All ER 306, [1990] 3 WLR 986, 
Queen's Bench Dixisional Court. Also Eaw, B&95bemy and the Afulti-Faith Socie*'- report of a seminar organised by 
the Commission for Racial Equality and the Inter Faith Network of the United Kingdom - September 1989, 
published by the CRE. 
--'Ilius, in Sumners terms, reflective of the abiding nature of fbLkwavs. 
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Changing folkways. 
Another critic of Sumner's folkways theory IS William Evan. He has argued" that 
Sumner's conception of the law assumes that the law is passive rather than an active 
social force, which gradually emerges into a formal or codified state only after it has 
taken root in the behaviour of members of society. For Sumner, whenever an effort is 
made to enact a law in contradiction to existing folkways and mores, conflicts arise 
which result in the eventual undoing of the law. 
However, Evan explains the contrary view, arguing that law IS not merely a reflection of 
existing customs, morals or codes, but also a potentially independent social force that 
can influence behaviour or beliefs. He argues that these opposing views of the function 
of law suggest a hypothetical continuum of the amount of potential resistance to the 
enactment of a new law. Where there is likely to be a zero resistance to a new law, one 
would obviously question the need for it, since complete agreement between the 
behaviour required by the law and the existing customs or mores, apparently exists. In 
this situation, there would be no need to codify the mores into law. At the other 
extreme, where there is likely to be 100 per cent resistance to a law, one would expect 
the law to be totally Ineffective because nobody would enforce it. According to Evan, 
no law would ever emerge if these two extremes always existed. Between the ends of 
Evan's continuum there are two important thresholds. He concedes that the point at 
which a new law provokes the majority of citizens to Violate it so as to nullify it, is not 
known. 
Evan argues that whenever a law is enacted in the face of appreciable resistance, it is 
somewhere in the middle of his hypothetical continuum, with the legal system involved 
in an educational as well as a social control function. If the educational task is not 
accomplished, a situation arises in which individuals are obliged to obey a law with the 
threat of punishment, while not having any belief or respect for that particular law. This 
produces forced compliance and a situation in which any resulting tensions may lead to 
disobedience of the law - i. e. depending on the nature of the sanctions and the 
consistency and efficiency of enforcement. 
2ý5 Eaw as an insftmenl of Soeid Change' (1965) by William M Evan - printed in The Soýiologv of Law. A so, 7ial-shwctural 
perc, tvditt'- (1980) New York Free Press. 
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William Evan, writing in light of American experience with race relations' law, suggests 
seven necessary conditions for the law to perform an educational fi-inction: 
, 
ýious. The source of Ian, is perceiied to be authontafiie and presti 
, gal, as xell as 
historical and 2. Tbe rationale behind the nem, Ian, is articulated in tems of /e 
cultural confinuiýy and coVatibilirK 
PrqTmatic ivodelsfor coVAance are identified. 2" 
A conscious use of the element of time in /e , gislative action. 
He stýgests the shorter the 
transition time the easier the adaptation to the chaýTe required bý, law. Reduction of delay 
MinimisiýT the chancesfor organised, or unorganised, resistance to cha. ý 2" , ge. 
5. The enforcement agents are themselves committed to the bebarl'Our required Iq the lauý 
6. Positive, as well as nýgafive, sanctions are eVlojed to buttress the law. "' 
Effective protection is providedfor the rights of those persons wbo would sufferfrom evasion 
or violation of the lawý 
On the basis of the argument of William Evan, it can be seen that the law is involved in 
a continual process of education. Ibis must apply because citizens are not bom with a 
complete knowledge of the law, but acquire this knowledge through interaction with 
other humans, through reading, the media and their general experiences of life. The 
establishment of new laws will almost certainly result in some formal announcement, 
with individuals within society becoming aware - through newspapers, teleVision, and 
discussion - that to do X in future could result in a punishment or a finding of liabilitv. 
In introducing new legislation, the government are seeking to form and mould public 
opinion, to persuade the public to accept and respect the law, with punishment only 
necessary for a minority of the citizens who may break the law. 
One criticism of Evan's theon,, it is that it does not differentiate between the purpose 
and the method of the application of the law. For example, if society agrees with the 
27 11iis c-ni be ichieved by drxailig 3 companson aith odier communi6es. 
Coucirdl, The Swzolo g qj'Lau, '(1 992), at page 60, has ciiticised this aspect of Evall's theorv arguing that dus is not 
alwivs a neces-arv condition. He cites the Equal Pay Act 1970 as an example of complex legislation that works 
bet-tC'r if org-nusations are givcn more time to plan chmige- 
An ex-unple is the use of tax incentives to lielp -icourage the learning -mid adoption of a neQv behmaour or 
attitude. 
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purpose of eradicating racial discrit-nination, but not With the method of restricting a 
person's freedom of speech, it is possible that his hypothetical continuum would dlSplaý 
a false reading. Likewise, a person may have reservations about the method applied but 
accept the legislative approach, because of his moral support for the purpose. 
Clearly, the use of the law as an educational tool would help overcome any reservations 
as to method and/or purpose. Possibly a good example of the law as an educative 
force, can be found in the law relating to indirect race discrimination. The law is not 
only a symbol of public policy - it also educates various people and professionals in 
p un different ways. In applying the "butfor" test, of James y Eastleigh Borouh Co c' it 
can be relatively straightforward to determine direct discrimination on grounds of race 
or sex, in the sense that 'but for' the fact that Mr. James was male, he could have swum 
free of charge in his local baths. However, indirect discrimination law can be much 
more complex with the law seeking a requirement or condition which is applied to 
persons not of the same racial group - which is such that the proportion of persons of 
that racial group who can comply with it, IS considerably smaller than the proportion of 
persons not of that racial group who can comply with It. 31 Even if this aspect is proven 
on the balance of probability, the employer may still be able to justify his action - with 
the employee needing to show that it IS to his detriment because he cannot comply. In 
the case of a schoolboy being refused adn-ussion to a school because he wore a turban, 
this amounted to race discrin-unation because the boy could not comply with the ban 
while remaining consistent with the customs and cultural conditions of that racial 
group. " Not only was it necessary to show that a ban on turbans indirectly discrin-unated 
against Sikhs, it was also necessary for the Lords to determine that Sikhs are an ethnic 
group and covered by the legislation. What is more, the Lords became embroiled in the 
question of religion, rejecting a defence of Justification that the ban was necessary 
because the Head wished to run a Christian School and the turban conflicted with the 
school's uniform since it was an outward manifestation of a non-Christian faith. 33 
11990] IRLR 298. 
For the exact wording of the legislation see s. 1 (1) (b) of the Race Relations Act 1976. 
32 'l-Ijis is another example of the mores of one racial group conflicting with the mores of the indigenous group. 
However, in this instance the mores of the Sikh group took precedence because the ban on the turban was not 
justifiable (Lord Fraser). 
33 M andla N, Dowell Lee 111983] IRLR 209.. 
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With complex issues and laws such as this, it is necessary not Just to educate the public 
to respect the principle of non-discrin-unation, but also to educate those directly 
involved in its process as to the ways and means the law applies and may be breached. 
This clearly involves an educational ftinction of both method and purpose. It IS also 
about modifying the customs and practices of organisations, so that they can comply 
with the law. In this sense it brings about changes in society - by its very act of 
educating and requiring compliance with the principle of equality of opportunity and 
racial tolerance. 
In relation to Sumner's theoryý it can be argued that stateways have priontised 
conflicting mores. Applying the traditional concept of folkways to employment law, the 
law provides for freedom of contract - which means the employer can choose to 
employ whom he wishes. The discrimination laws do not deny the employer that 
freedom, but the law does impose parameters for refusal -a breach of which may result 
in the employer having to pay compensation. Thus, the employer can refuse to employ 
a person for a whole range of reasons (e. g. they do not have the appropriate 
qualifications, a dislike of their interview technique, or possibly their scruffy dress 
style"). However, the employer may be liable should he refuse to employ someone 
because of his or her race or sex. Indeed, the law IS such that a tribunal may be entitled 
to draw an M'ference from the primary facts, "while beating in mind the difficulties wbichface a 
person who coVlains of unlawful discrimination and thefact that it isfor the coVlainant to pmve his 
or her case [i. e. on the balance ofpmbabifiýy]" " What the legislator is doing here is embodying 
folkways into law, while prioritising any conflicting mores. He is putting the will of 
society (opposition to discrin-unation) over and above the particular will of an individual 
employer. While the law is pursuing a government policy of promoting equal rights it is 
also, in a sense, using the law as a form of government health warning - penalising those 
who breach the rules and thereby alerting society to the dangers of discrimination. 
Ilils also takes us back to the discussion on mternational covenants, " when it was 
argued that vnthin the HCHR is the principle that equality takes precedence over 
34 There can be situations in which a dress code may breach the law - e. g. rejecting a person because their dress is 
e6dently related to their race or sex may amount to discrimination - i. e. unless this can be justified as objectivelý 
necessary. 
Neil Lj - Court of Appeal in King v Great Britain China Centre 119911 IRLR 513. 
ee Chapter Five and the section - 'CompatibiliO uith th, Human Rights. SS 
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freedom of expression. Likewise, in applying UK discrimination laws, statewaý-s have 
deterrruned, on public policy grounds, that freedom from discrimination takes higher 
precedence over the freedom to discriminate and/or freedom of contract. Ibis can 
suggest conflict with Sumner's folkways theory because it appears that the government, 
in applying these laws, has used the law to bring about societal change. However, after 
close exaryunation it can be recognised that the government has only priontised 
conflicting mores so as to conform to a societal goal. 
Rousseau - Sociejy and the General Will. 
It can also be argued that the concept of an anti-racist counter-message is not about 
changing society, but about re-affirming to individuals, within society, certain moral and 
legal principles that are widely accepted and respected. -" For example, suppose the law 
requires an author to display a counter-message on material that may give 'radal offence' 
If the author (who is sympathetic to racism) rationally decides to recogniSe the morality 
behind the law, and displays a counter-message, this should not be considered as societal 
change. This is self evident, because it is not society that may be changing but the 
individual author - albeit that the author is one of many and together they may form 
societý,. Perhaps, as argued by Rousseau, in these circumstances choice and freedom 
would be taking on a moral sense. " The individual author (possibly) surrendering his 
private will for his perception of what is the general will of society. Indeed, the idea of 
the counter-message is not to change society, but to prick the conscience of an 
individual reader, or author, and rernind them of a recognised societal goal. To rernind 
individuals of a'general will'which recognises equality through racial tolerance. 
Certamly the idea of forcMg an mdiVidual author of racist material to be free - that is to 
suppress his private writing in the wider interests of racial tolerance and the perceived 
general will of society - can be prone to civil libertarian objections. " However, the idea 
37 It seems possible that even racist perpetrators may recognise that racism is unacceptable, with them often denying 
that thev are racist. For an example of this, see Rae Sibbitt (Home Office Study 176) and the comments of Mrs 
Pittering who had been identified by the local authority and the police as being racist. Speaking in relation to service, 
provided by the local authority Mr- Pittering said: 'AE these colouredfamilies come oter to our couno and take all our 
benýflts... Don't get me wmng - I'm not a racist. Im gotfnýnds who are coloured. I like the gid iýbstairs - X. You know who I can't 
stand? The Asians - thýy stink thg do, but there arent any around here. " (ThepejqWrators of racid harassment and racial iio"ee'by 
Rae Sibbitt - Home Office Study 176 11997]). This kind of inconsistencv could be reflective of an inner conscience 
. Alerting her into recognising that racism is generally regarded as unacceptable within society. 
38 See chapter 'Jean-Jacques Rousseau" written by Allan Bloom in the 'Histog of PoAtical Phi4gsopl? y' by Str3uss and 
Cropsey - p569. 
ý- It can be said to interfere N%ith freedom of expression. 
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of forcing him to take a step towards freedom, bi, putting on his racist material a 
counter-message, is a compron-use solution. The author would be recognising the 
general will of society, as displayed by the anti-racist le i lation, albeit he would be gis 
continuing with expressing his private will. In this sense, assun-ung that racial tolerance 
accurately reflects the general will of society, he would be going some way towards 
freeing himself from the chains of his inner passions. As Rousseau has argued: man can 
be distinguished from other animals by his freedom of will. He is not a being 
determined bv instincts; he can choose, accept and re'ect - while being aware of the 
consciousness of his liberty. ' 
The problem with Rousseau's concept of a 'general will', is in recognition of just what is 
the 'general will'. Is it just another way of describing public opinion, " or is it more 
profound than that? Rousseau argues that the 'general will' is recognised from one's 
inner self and that it is not simple majontananism, since laws can only be properl3 
instituted if the citizens possess the virtue to suppress their private W11142. MiS Suggests 
that a 'general will' must be more profound than public opinion - since that itself is no 
more than a reflection of a majority view on a particular subject. Despite such 
comment, it IS clear that a general will cannot exist which is contrary to public opinion - 
simply because a general will can only Will what all would conceivably will. 
Is there a difference between a gggeral will and pubhc opinion? 
To discuss this issue ftirther, I intend to provide an illustration by reference to the 
'Public Inquiry concerning Heathrow Airport. " Indeed, there are many objections to the 
plans for a Fifth Airport Terrninal. For example, the Director of Kew Gardens, 
Professor Sir Ghillean Prance, has placed formal objections because he considers the 
expansion could bring noise that would "sbaffer thegardens'peace and tranquillio. " Such an 
objection can be best described as a particular will being expressed. It is particular 
40 See 'Histog of Politkal Philosophy'by Straus and Cropsey at p564. 
4L This must be relevant in relation to racism because often those carrying out acts of racism believe that those in 
their peer group share concerns about foreigners taking jobs etc. To this extent, perpetrators may reject the political 
correctness of the state because thev feel that at grass roots level there is deep down support for their racist attitude. 
42 See page 570 - in the chapter jean-Jacques Rousseau'- 'Histog of Polifiýal Phdosophy'by Strauss and Cropsey. 
4' Obviously this is a contemporary illustration in a form of society that may be different to that envisaged by 
Rousseau. However, by relating popular expression to either a particular or general will it serves as an applicable 
illustration. 
44 'Kew GarrkwsftgbIs to bl&-k Terminal 5'- Evenmg Stmidard, II June 1998. 
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because it relates to the sole interest desires of an individual or organisation. Likewise, 
many residents have signed petitions about aircraft noise that have been submitted to 
the Public Inquiry. All of these objections are particular in the sense that they reflect 
individual concerns about aircraft, noise, safety etc. However collectively, they may also 
reflect a public opinion. Naturally the Airport Authority which submitted the 
development plan, has its own particular interest, as do the Trade Unions who support 
the application in the interests of employment. 
It IS the job of the Inspector at the Public Inquiry to consider the plans and any 
objections, making recommendations to the Minister of State in the general interests of 
the wider community. " It is essential to the public inquiry process, that he does not 
have a particular interest - he must be impartial, balancing conflicting opinions and 
making an objective assessment of the general needs. It seems obvious that the 
Inspector will not find a general will already existing - simply because there exists deep- 
rooted conflicting particular wills if not public opinions, on the subject. He may make 
efforts to bring the parties together by making recommendations that seek to enable a 
tern-unal to be built, while also providing some environmental protection for the 
community. Despite such efforts, it is certainly possible that one side of the debate will 
be upset by any outcome - With even a vow to protest and disrupt construction should 
the plans be approved. All of this would clearly suggest that there is a split in public 
opinion - with sections of the community being for and others against the proposals. 
Despite such deep-rooted objections and split public opinions, it is just possible that out 
of such bedlam, an outcome synonymous With a 'general will' could develop. This is 
possible where after an open and public scrutiny of conflicting opinions, an impartial 
adjudicator reaches an outcome that seeks comprorruise and which is given legislative 
authority through a perceived and accepted democratic process. Once this happens, 
the people could see the outcome as authoritative and the issue becomes one of respect 
for law and order and the general will of society. 6 
45 'Me Frmk's Comnuttee Report Cmnd 218 (1957) para 293 aigued that "the ideal uiguld befor the Minister himseff to hold 
the enquig and thus hear the evidence atfirst hand, but since this is clearly out of the question the next best course isjor one of his on, " 
Offices, who can be kept in touch uith the detelopments h7 poluy, to perform thisfivndign. " 
4ý, 'I'lus can imply a form of dictatorship, in that if all laws are sýmonymous with the 'general then citizens must 
follow the will of the state. This issue of Rousseau's dieory advocating a form of dictatorship will be discussed later 
in this chapter. 
178 
Seen in this way, it suggests than an almost essential ingredient of establishing what 
Rousseau terms a 'general will' could be legislative authority. Once legislative approval is 
obtained, any individuals or groups acting outside of the scope of the decision, by using 
unlawftd or illegal means, are likely to be seen as acting outside of law and order and 
against the general will of society. Ibis implies that the 'general will' is as much about 
respect for a democratic process, as it is for the actual decision that has been made". 
Central to the concept of Rousseau's general will is equality - in that all citizens have an 
equal say and an equal vote in the process. Going back to the contemporary illustration 
of the Public Inquiry, an essential element IS a Public Inquiry Inspector who displays 
complete and utter impartiality. Indeed, It IS essential that all people, going through the 
public inquiry process, must be treated equally. Should preferential treatment be seen to 
be given to one side - i. e. Without valid justification - it is probable that it would 
undern-une the whole process and Invalidate the perceived neutrality of the outcome" - 
thereby resulting in widespread resistance to any resulting le . slation. This perception of ý 91 
equality may not be as extreme as that proposed by Rousseau (since he proposed that 
every man should give himself, with all his rights and property, to the community with a 
social contract existing between the individual and an artificial person [the state] which 
has a will like a natural person - obtaining legitimacy from the general will of the people) 
but it IS of the same importance. Indeed, the perception of equality displays synon i I yrnity 
in that all men, no n-utter what their property rights and interests, bow to the authority 
of the Public Inspector. Thus complying with the social contract theory of Rousseau. 
Rousseau and the state of nature. 
Rousseau develops his concept of equality from a state of nature. For him, a state of 
nature goes back to a time prior to civil society - i. e. to find man as he is, naturally. 
Rousseau differs from philosophers such as Hobbes who see man, in the state of nature, 
as a beast naturally hostile to every other member of his specieS. 49 For Rousseau, man 
47 Albeit that Rousseau's perception of democracy differs from the representative form of democracy we experience 
- in that he sees legislation as coming direct from the people with the fullest participatory democratic process 
possible (i. e. výith citizens voting in the interests of the community rather than their own self-interest). 
48 'Me Poll tax is a classic example of legislative authority being given to a proposal despite public opinion being 
against. However, what really helped undermine the poll tax legislation was the fact that a miflionaire could be 
expected top pay the same tax as his poverty stricken neighbour. While this suggested some level of equal treatinent 
- the perception was that those with higher incomes should pay more due to them having so much more disposable 
income. 
-1- Hobbes T., 'Letiathan'introduced and abridged by John Plamenatz (Fontana Paperbacks, 1963). 
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in a state of nature - cannot be in such inevitable conflict because he lives alone with 
little knowledge of other men and only the simplest needs of the sort that are easily 
satisfied. He is not frightened of death, because he cannot conceive it - he only avoids 
' so pam. 
According to Rousseau, this animal-man has only two fundamental passions, a desire to 
preserve himself and a certain pity or sympathy for the sufferings of others of his kind. 
This latter passion preventing him from being brutal to other men, so long as it does 
not conflict With his own preservation. He has no morality, because this has not 
developed. Whatever he does, he does for pleasure, and since he does no harm, he 
demonstrates a certain goodness. 
In his state of nature man lives independently. If men have differences in strength, thev 
have little meaning because the individuals have no contact with each other. From this 
natural state can be derived no right of one man to rule another. One man can never 
enslave another, because men have no need of one another. Likewise, man cannot 
discrirrunate against others - because he has little knowledge of, or need for, the 
existence of others - because men all have equal worth. As remarked bv Bloom, " 
"considered in this way it may be said that all men are I ýv nature equaZ" Rousseau's state of 
nature, is a state of equalip, and independence. 
It is only through the development of ciViliSation, that political societv and laws become 
necessary. Rousseau argues that the founder of political society and the man who 
brought the greatest evils to mankind, was the first who said: 'This land beloiýrgs to me. " 
This cultivation of the soil being the source of private property, and the basis for 
Rousseau's claim that, 'Man was bornfree, and evegwhere he is in chains... " 
Ibus, from the works of Rousseau, it can be argued that man is bom free and that men, 
by nature, are equal. Applying these principles to this thesis, it can be argued that the 
equality described by Rousseau is one of actual equality in terms of economic values and 
rights and privileges. By comparison, equality through racial tolerance is not economic 
50'jean-jacques Rousseau - The Sodal Contract and Discourses, translated by G. D. H. Cole (Everymanýs Library 1913). 
51 See chapter jean-jacques Rousseau, written by Allan Blcýom in the 'Histmy of Politkal PhilosophN? bv Strauss and 
Cropsey - p564. 
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equilibrium, but equal treatment so far as rights, privileges, and immunities are 
concerned. Obviously, this may be politically less radical than a concept of equality 
based upon economic values, but it can be considered as a synonym of the concept of 
equality referred to in Rousseau's state of nature. 
Criticisms of Rousseau's theo; y. 
Rousseau's theory IS more collective than individual. His view that private property is 
unnatural, always a source of inequality and the root of power within societyý has been 
described by Bloom as 'not wbolyl unlike lKarý Marx. 52 Not surprisingly therefore, in a 
predominantly capitalist society, Rousseau's philosophy has found a number of critics. 
Since this thesis is not principally concerned with political philosophy, I do not intend 
to give a detailed analysis of his work, or to examine in depth the views of his critics. 
Instead, I have given an outline of his basic theory and intend to exarnine four central 
criticisms relevant to this thesis. These being. 
1. That the philosophy of Rousseau is vague, Justifies dictatorship, and is not 
readily adaptable to contemporary society. 
2. That Rousseau's desire to force an individual to be free can be seen to be 
anti-libertanan. 5' 
I Concern about Rousseau's reliance upon a 'social contract'. 
4. Rousseau develops a notion of freedom and equality from his state of nature 
- i. e without any consideration of the need for justice. 
In looking at the last of these I will also give consideration to the arguments for 'a 
theory of justice'as developed byjohn Rawls. 
(1) Rousseau's 'General WiU' - is vagge, justifies dictatorship and not adaptable? 
Rousseau's philosophy is often considered as vague, due to a problem of differentiating a 
'general will' from a 'particular will'. This issue of vagueness will be considered shortly, 
but it IS fundamental to the problem of Rousseau's philosophy because it leads to a 
second central criticism - which is that Rousseau Justifies dictatorship. The dictatorship 
argument sterrin-ung from the theoretical circumstances of a leader claiming that his 
Histog of Politkal Philosophy'bý Strauss and Cropsey - p577. 
53 'Libertarian' in this sense refers to a form of liberalism that believes in freeing people not merely from the 
constraints of traditional political institutions, but also from the inner constraint imposed by their mistaken 
attribution of power to ineffectual things (see 'A Dktionary of Politwal Thought' by Roger Scruton, published Pan 
Books, 1982. ). 
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'particular will' is in fact a 'general will' - thereby using his powers to enforce his will on 
society. 
On face value this criticism that Rousseau justifies dictatorship seems appealing, but 
such criticism can easily be challenged due to Rousseau's rejection of dictatorship 'in no 
uncertain terms. Indeed, he argues that the death of a government occurs when 
particular wills substitute themselves for the general will, with this leading to either 
anarchy or tyranny - anarchy when individuals go off each in their own direction, and 
tyranny when the private will of a man or group that directs the govemment. 5' 
1his inevitably indicates that the perception of Rousseau Justifying dictatorship, relates 
to the central issue and problem associated with Rousseau - how can you distinguish a 
general will from a particular will? " In dealing with this question, I intend to give a few 
illustrations, which lead to the argument that in tem-is of government of a political 
society the philosophy of Rousseau may be lirrUted. It can work in a locallSed 
communinT, but it does not seem to be readily adaptable to a large political structure 
such as a national government. 
In a localised community, it is possible to involve all members in determining certain 
moral and political objectives. Thus, it may be possible to have even an unwritten 
understanding about certain moral principles that are generally accepted within the 
community. One classic example exists from my days of living at Ruskin College in 
Oxford. You knew, from vour inner self, that the general will within the college was 
respect for women's rights. The very idea of having a few pints and taking a sexy blue 
movie back to your student room for some friends to watch, would be totally alien to 
that community. There were no signs that said - 'no blue movies. But you knew, 
without the existence of such signs, that to undertake such an act could offend the 
moral principles of the community and result in you being condemned by all within that 
locallSed community. In effect, you were indirectly and internally pressurised to accept 
an unwritten public morality and reject any selfish particular will. 
ýý4 For colifinnation of this argument see Bloom at page 562 in 'Histog qfPolifical Pbilosopby'by Strauss and Cropsey. 
- -, An examination of diis issue often comes across as circular, in that what is perceived to be 3 'general wilr could in 
fact be q 'particular that is being pursued as a 'general Nvilr and demanding the authoritative support of a 
'general 
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'Me fact that there was no direct legislative authoriitý- for the blue movie restrictions does 
not mean that it is inconsistent with there being a general will. This applies because the 
blue movie restriction is synonymous with openly debated rules of the College and 
Student Union that demand respect for women's rights. However, while such deep- 
rooted moral suppor-t for women's rights may exist within the small Ruskin community 
these high 'no blue movie' morals are not generally so firr-nly established outside that 
narrow community. This comes from the fact that within the small confines of Ruskin 
College you can develop, from the general meetings which involve the active 
participation of students, an understanding of the moral principles that weld together 
the community. 'Ibis is possible because all of the students can participate, and often do 
participate, in moral and political debates. By comparison, a great deal of contemporary 
society is developed not Within small community environments but in large highly 
populated communities that are modelled on the principles of a representative 
democracy. Within such large communities you need detailed le islation to spell out the 91 
parameters - you cannot expect the morality associated with legislation to be consistent 
in all comers of the land. It IS possible to gauge public opinion - Via polls - on specific 
issues, but there is no real method of determining if such support is reflective of a 
societal trend or from a deep felt desire embedded within the heart and soul of the 
people. As such, specific and detailed legislation is reqLured to establish legitimacy for a 
general will to develop. 
The obvious problem with this argument is that a government could abuse the 
democratic process (and that of the general will) by pushing through le islation which 91 
reflects particular interests and then use the law and order argument to demand popular 
support. Indeed, over the years there have been examples of this, with the issue of poll 
tax a prime example - With the result that popular resistance resulted in a repeal of the 
legislation. In general, critical to such legislative climb-downs IS popular resistance on 
grounds of a perception of unjust or unequal treatment. " However, this must be 
regarded as a questionable safeguard given that people in general may be regarded as 
law-abiding and not prepared to challenge the state. 
56 in the case of the Poll Tax, the Thatcher Government claimed that they were establishing equality by requiring 
every taxpayer to pay the same amount. However, this argument was seen as unjust because of the vast inequality of 
disposable income that existed. The argwnent being that a millionaire should pay the same sum as a poverty stricken 
pensioner was rejected on grounds of inequality of outcome - with the millionaire having much more disposable 
income than the pensioner. 
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To surnn-iarise with regards to point one: As a model towards an idealistic society the 
theory of Rousseau may have a useftil purpose - but his concept of the 'general will' 
seems vague and can be open to abuse. This essentially being due to the difficulty of 
deterrnining just what is the general will of society - with a danger that politicians will 
seek to exploit the theory of a 'general will' so as to advance their own particular policy 
or Will. 57 The safeguard that the people will rebel against unjust laws that are produced 
from particular wills must be questionable - particularly 'in a society where strong 
policing enforces law and order. 
That being said, there are many laws within society that do demand popular respect and 
reflect a general will. For example, 'thou sball not steal'would appear to be reflective of 
the general will of society. Obviously, there are individuals who steal and show disregard 
for the principles of law and order - but society sees these individuals as pursuing their 
own particular interests and forces them to be free. The force in this instance being via 
a crin-unal justice system which punishes theft. " 
(2) Forcing an individual to be free? 
Ibis also leads to the question of an apparent inconsistency in the philosophy of 
Rousseau with regard to his claim that society can be justified in forcing an individual to 
be free. The very concept of forcing an iridividual seen-is antithetical to his claim that 
man is by nature free and equal. However, as the last illustration concerning theft 
demonstrates, there is no such thing as absolute freedom in our contemporary society - 
the law being littered with examples where an individual's freedom IS restricted for the 
good of society. A further example, discussed already in d-us thesis, IS the wav that 
public order law punishes people who display racial hatred by the use of 'threatening, 
abusive or insulting'wo rds. 
Such restrictive laws apply because the ideal of absolute freedom within a clVihsed 
societý- is essentially a fantasy -a pipe dream. It seen-is only possible in a theoretical state 
of nature where we live a lone independent life - and where there are no obligations, no 
masters, no servants, and where resources are plentiftil and available to all. In the realitý- 
', 7 There is also a danger that in a tyrannical society a despotic leader could impose his particular will by sming: '7 
know this is the general uO of swiely. 
Coupled with this exclusion punishment is generalýl a desire for a convicted criminal to return to society (after 
sen-ing his time) as a free person all the viser for his experience. 
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of a civilised society we are never totally free from the period immediately after our 
birth. As a baby, we have parents that we depend upon to survive. As children we have 
rules - respect your elders, conform to society etc. As an adult we have rules, 
regulations, laws, a need to show respect for your boss, your bank manager etc. We are 
continually fightin for our freedom, but are often prepared to comprornise in the wider I-9 
interests of society and out of respect for others and their freedom. Rousseau is simply 
recognising this conflict and suggesting that we ourselves take steps to limit our 
particular selfish freedoms in the wider interests of the general will of society. 'Ibis, in 
itself, enhances the freedom of society. We (in our rniind) force ourselves to be free - 
just as society may also force us to be free. 
Rousseau's theory may be unpopular to some, because his statement Yoning an in&tidual 
to be free' challenges the absolute concept of freedom sometimes argued for within 
society. But at its simple core, this statement does little more than urge an individual to 
recognise that along with freedom there is responsibility. He urges an individual to 
accept a 'general Will' which deep down he recognises as being correct. Once the 
individual faces up to this reality, he becomes a free person within hmi-Iself - escaping 
from the chains of his selfish interest. 
(3) Refiance on the social contract theogy. 
Rousseau's theory centres upon man having certain rational and intuitive desires - based 
upon freedom and equality. In order to achieve his desires, wid-lin a political and 
civilised society, man enters into a social contract with Rousseau's theory of the general 
vnll central to this contract. 
As KyrnhCka observes" there are a number of reasons why social contract theories are 
thought to be weak-. Central to these is that social contract theories seem to rely upon 
implausible assumptions. They ask us to imagine a state of nature before there was 
political authority - With each person on their own and with no higher authority. The 
question is what kind of contract would such individuals agree upon concerning the 
establishment of political authority. Different theorists have used this technique - 
Hobbes, Locke, K-ant, Rousseau, Rawls, and come up with different answers. But they 
',, ý 'An introduction to Contemporafy Political Philosopl? y'- Oxford press 1997 - page 58-76. 
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have all faced the same criticism - namely there never was such a state of nature or such 
a contract. Hence neither citizens nor government are bound by it. 
We can counter this criticism by saying that it is not a formal contract of modem 
contemporary standards - it derives from a d-ieoretical state of nature and is merell- a 
hy othetical contract. But as Dworkin sa, _S611 'a 19potbefical q ,p rgreement 
is not sbzpý), a paleform 
of an actual contrant, it i's no contra6 tat allý 
Dworkin does, though, note that there is another way to interpret social contract 
arguments. We should think of the contract not as an agreement, hypothetical or 
otherwise, but as a device for teasing out the implications of certain moral prernises 
concerning people's moral equality. We invoke the state of nature not to work out the 
historical origins of society, or the historical obligations of government and individuals, 
but to model the idea of the moral equalitýy of individuals. " As Rousseau said, 'maii is born 
free alidjet ei)egw1)ere he i's i*n chai'iis' 'Me idea of a state of nature does not, therefore, 
represent an anthro po logical claim about the pre-social existence of human beings, but a 
moral claim about the absence of natural subordination amongst human beings. 
This Dworkin analysis is also of value because it helps rationalise the relevance of 
Rousseau's theory to the present day. On present day anah-sis, the claim of Rousseau 
that man is bom free and equal seen-is a complete nonsense - i. e. because we can all 
recognise that some men were bom into a wealthy and/or royal family, while others 
were bom into squalor. However, by seeing Rousseau's state of nature and social 
contract theory as a device for teasing out the implications of certain moral prernises, it 
helps us to rationallse the moralltyý of the value of our laws and the community they 
serve. If we View the 'contract' as a device for debating the values or offierwise of 
certain moral prerruses, it is of value to this thesis. It is of value since this enables us to 
establish a theoretical and analytically jurisprudential consideration of the moral equalin, 
of individuals. 'Mis is central to the analysis within this thesis, since the debate 
concerning an anti-racist counter-message is, likewise, directlv concerned with the 
concept of freedom and equality. 
'I akiq Rý, uhlsScrious4, - pub Duckwoith, London 1977. Page 15 1. 
", ee K%, 3nbcka - 'Introdudion lo Conlemporap'PolItcal Philo p -1 ng so t p. e 60. 
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(4) Equality and justice? 
Rousseau was highly critical of justice in a political society. He argued that justice, as it 
can be seen in nations, consists of maintaining the privileges of those in positions of 
power, all known states being full of inequalities of birth, wealth and honour. These 
inequalities can perhaps be justified in terms of the preservation of the regime, but that 
does not make them more tolerable for those who do not enjoy them. Rousseau 
considered that laws institute and protect those differences of rank. 
Rousseau saw such inequality as an outcome of a politicised society. He considered that 
if there are natural inequalities, those existing in the nations do not reflect thern, since 
they are the results of human deeds and chance. Since he considered civil society as not 
being natural, he sought to go back, prior to the existence of a civillSed political societi-, 
to a state of nature - i. e. to find man, as he is naturally. a prirnitive man existing alone 
before civil society existed. 
One problem With this approach is that this means that his concept of equality is 
established before any concept of Justice is necessary. Indeed, it is only when resources 
are scarce that justice in tem-is of equal treatment becomes necessary. If man had no 
need for justice - on what basis can it be argued that it IS possible to have developed a 
rational need for equality? 
This is indeed a valid concern that goes to the route of using a state of nature as a means 
of determining philosophical arguments. But it is a little like the chicken and egg 
argument. Which came first the chicken or the egg? Rousseau suggests that man, in his 
origins, lived in a state of nature before society developed. As such, following the 
analogy, let us assume that a hen finds herself in a state of nature. She is, to her 
knowledge, the very first hen - before she had laid an egg and before other hens became 
commonplace. 
Clearly, as the first hen in this state of nature she was independent having plenty of food 
y, she would cert ih be equal to any other hens she and absolute freedom. AccordMg1 ainy 
may accidentally come across (or that may drift into the nature reserve). It is only when 
the eggs arrive, and more hens follow, that it becomes necessary to share food etc. 
Thus, justice only really becomes necessary when the hens start fighting due to an 
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insufficient food supply. Indeed, it is only then that the hens recognise the need for 
justice based upon equal treatment - with it being fundamental to a system of justice that 
the hens are treated equally, for without such equal treatment they would recognise that 
to survive they must fight for their food. As such, they intuitivelY yearn for what existed 
in the state of nature - independence based upon a clear and unequivocal notion of 
equality. 
Due to evolutionarv change man, like the hen, will never be able to return to the ideal of 
the state of nature. While he intuitively yearns for the ideal of absolute freedom and 
equality, he rationally recognises that the second best option is to share the available 
resources equally. In this way he has some hope of guaranteeing his own freedom and 
survival. 
In a sense, as this analogm, demonstrates, the issue of whether the egg or the hen came 
first is a diversion from the essential issue. For the species to survive their must be 
secondan- hens - to produce secondarv hens, an egg needs to be laid. Likewise to 
establish justice, the foundation of equality needs to be laid so that man can recognise 
the value of that Justice. Without a system based upon equal treatment there can be no 
justice. 
Absolute freedom, compatible with that found within a state of nature, is the ideal. 
Fundamental to this is that man is equal - neither dominating another, nor dominated 
by another. Should another dominate him, he does not have and cannot have absolute 
freedom. To this end, interlined within the concept of absolute freedorn, is the concept 
of equality. justice only becoming necessary once that man moves from his idealistic 
state of nature to a civilised political society. 
Rawls -A Theomy of justice. 
John Rawls in 1971`2 argued that political theorýl was caught between two extremes - 
utilitarianism on one side and an incoherent jumble of ideas based upon intuition on ffie 
other. He argued that such intuition is an unsatisýing alternative to utilitarianism since 
'intuitionism' provides no real principles that underlie or give structure to the jumble of 
ideas. 
"2 A Theory qljuslice'- pubtished Oxford Universirv Press, London. 1971 
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Rawls describes intuitionist theories as having two features: 
it Yirst tbg consist of apluralio offirstprinciples which mqy conflict togive contrag directives in 
, tarticular týpes of cases; and second, tbg include no e4licit method, no prioriý, rules, for 
, gainst one another we are siVyl 
to strike balance ly intui on, weigbiýg theseprinciples a fi by 
what seems to us most near# riht. Or if there are prioriýy rules, these are Mom& to be more 
or less trivial and of no substance in reacbi. ýg ajudement' o63 
This can, indirectly, be seen as a criticism of Rousseau since his philosophy lacks a 
determining methodology and consequently seems to be based upon intuition. Indeed, 
Rousseau's method for determining moral conflicts rests with his solution that every 
rnan gives himself entirely to the community with all of his rights and propertý,. The 
deposit is being made with the whole, not With the individual. In this way no one puts 
himself into the hands of another, nor reserves any rights by which he can claim to 
judge his own conduct. Hence there is no source of conflict between individual and the 
state, because the individual has contracted to accept the law as the absolute standard of 
his acts. The social contact forms an artificial person, the state, which has awill like the 
natural person; what appears necessary or desirable to that person is willed by it and 
what is willed by the whole is the law. Law is the product of the general wilZ Each 
individual participates in legislation, but law is general, and the individual as legislator 
must make laws that can conceivably be applied to all members of the community. He 
makes his will into law but now, as opposed to what he did in a state of nature, he must 
generallSe his will. As le islator he can only will what all could will; as citizen he obeys 91 
what he himself willed as legislator. 
IhIS solution of Rousseau, seems to expect man intuitively to know what is the correct 
course. He provides general guidance, which puts communal interests based upon 
equality before individual desires, but Rousseau gives us no real method of distinguishing 
a 'general will' from a 'particular will', other than the individual recognising from deep 
down the general will of society. Nor does Rousseau deal with a problem of conflict 
between a perceived 'general will' relevant to one area, conflicting With that of another. 
For example, I have argued that treating people as equals reflects a general will of 
socletv. However, I would also concede that a 'general will' exists which recognises 
freedom of expression - with this being an essential ingredient in a modem democratic 
c, 3 Rivis, 'A Themy ofjmstix'- Oxford Univcrsity Press 1971 3t p. 34. 
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society. What Rousseau's theory does not do, is provide a method of enabling us to 
deterrnine which is the priority 'general will' should there be a conflict between two 
In contrast, Rawls seeks to produce a theory that provides Principles for detern-uning 
justice - albeit that it is a snapshot based upon the needs of society at that time. He 
does this by tying the idea of justice to an equal share of social goods, but he adds an 
important twist. He argues that you treat people as equals not by removing all 
inequalities, but only by those that disadvantage someone. If certain inequalities benefit 
everyone, by drawing out socially useful talents and energies, then they will be acceptable 
to everyone. If giving someone else more money than I have (to do a specific job) 
promotes my interests, then equal concern for my interests suggests that we allow, 
rather than prohibit, that inequality. 
This in itself is clearly a limited theory of Justice - since it provides no formula for 
deteri-runing the value of the task or goods being produced for the benefit of society. It 
does suggest that I may well accept that a Doctor is paid more than me because his 
work benefits society - since I may also benefit from his work - but it provides no 
means of determining what is a socially useful talent and what IS not socially useU? 
Rawls, while accepting that inequality may exist, rejects the usual pure market forces 
argument and suggests that we need a system of priority to sort out disadvantages in 
liberty and opportunity. He produces two principles that he orders lexically. 
First principle - Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive 
total system of equal basic liberties compatible vnth a similar system of liberty for 
all. 
Second principle - Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that 
they are both: 
(a) to the benefit of the least advantaged, and 
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equal opportunity. 
First Priority Rule (rhe priority of liberty) - 'Me principles of justice are to be 
ranked in lexical order and therefore liberty can be restricted only for the sake of 
liberty. 
Second Priority Rule (Me prionty of justice over efficiency and welfare) -Ihe 
second principle of justice is lexically prior to the principle of efficiency and to 
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that of mamn-using the sum of advantages; and fair opportunity is prior to the 
difference principle . 
64 
These principles form the 'special conception' of justice, and they seek to provide the 
systematic guidance that intuitionism could not give us. According to these principles, 
some social goods are more important than others, and so cannot be sacrificed for 
improvement in those other goods. Equal liberties take precedence over equal 
opportunity - which takes precedence over equal resources. Within each category Rawls 
basic idea remains - inequality is only allowed if it benefits the least well off. " 
Ibis lexical formula of Rawls is however subject to modification in light of his 
'difference principle', which is conceived from behind a theoretical 'veil of ignorance'. 
The basic idea of this 'veil of ignorance' is that we do not know what position we will 
occupy within society, or what goals we will have - but there are certain things we will 
want to enable us to lead a good life. 1ndeed, as humans we all share a desire for a good 
life. Thus, certain things are needed - what Rawls calls primary goods - in order to 
pursue this basic desire. There are two kinds of primary goods: 
(1) Social Primajy Goods - goods that are directly distributed by social 
institutions, like income and wealth, opportunities and powers, rights and 
liberties. 
(2) Natural Primary Goods - goods like health, intelligence, vigour, 
imagination, and natural talents that are affected by institutions but are not 
directly distributed by them. 
According to Rawls, when choosing principles of justice, from behind the veil of 
ignorance, people seek to ensure that they will have the best possible access to those 
primary goods distributed to social institutions. The theory suggests because nobody 
knows of their existence beyond the veil of ignorance, they will put themselves into the 
shoes of everyone in society and decide in the wider interests of the community, or 
everyone m society. 
It is also clear that the ideal of equality of opportunity that Rawls talks about, is very 
different to that which prevails in our market forces society of today. Within our 
contemporary society economic distribution is founded upon a concept of an 'equality 
64 A Tljeog ofjusti, -e'by J. Rawls page 302-3. 
ý, 5 See KNmbckq - Tntroduction to Contemporary Political Philosophy'at page 54. 
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of opportunity' that is market orientated. Inequahties of income and prestige (etc) are 
assumed to be justified if, and only if, there is fair competition in the awarding of the 
offices and positions that yield those benefits. It is acceptable to pay someone a 
-L100,000 salanl when the national average is L20,000, if there was fair opportunin- - so 
long as no one is disadvantaged by their race, sex or social background. Such an unequal 
income is considered just, regardless of whether the less well off benefit from that 
inequality. " Rawls would not accept such a pure market forces argument. A Rawlsian 
society may pay people more than the average, but onlil if it benefits all members of 
society to do so. Under his 'difference principle', people only have a claim to a greater 
share of resources, if they can show that it benefits those who have lesser shares. 
In this thesis there has been a central conflict throughout - i. e. a conflict between the 
right of an individual who may wish the liberty to express racist views and those who 
may be offended, or suffer, as a result of those views. Certainly, it could be argued that 
such racist Views do harm to society, hence on purely J. S. Mill 'harm principle' grounds 
there exists a justification to restrain such liber-tT. This thesis has so far argued that a 
(general will' has developed that rejects racism and promotes treating people as equals, 
with a variety of international treaties reflecting this will. Rawls is of value to this thesis 
because he provides a formula for prioritising our liberties. This must be of value, since 
in this thesis we have a conflict between two essential liberties - i. e. 'freedom of 
expression' and that of 'equality'. The question facing us being: "Should a racist be entitled 
to use hisfi-eedom of speech to undem, -ine The concept of equak, ý, )or others? " 
Rousseau would seek to limit those who express a 'particular will' inconsistent with a 
(general will'. Thus, if the 'general will' says that people should be treated as equals - 
then a particLilar selfish racist will is unacceptable and should be restrained. This 
approach of Rousseau I call 'intuitive', because man recognises from within his inner 
self, the general will of treating people as equals and, as such, he should put that general 
will before any par-ticLAar selfish will he may possess. The problem With the Rousseau 
approach, is that you cannot, as an individual, be certain that your interpretation of the 
general will is one hundred per cent accurate. You may deep down believe that you 
have recognised the general will, but there is a danger that you could be confusing your 
sec Kvinlicka - 'Inlroeluc6- to Conte-p-ar ýal PI 7 polit" VlosopýVqt pnge 55-58. 
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particular will with the general will. As such, because it is intuitive, it is not possible to 
prove its existence. 
Rawls, however, provides a much more ordered route. His lexical approach inevitably 
means that priority is ven to liberties that serve the wider community rather than the gi 
individual or the narrow community. Indeed, Rawls theory emphatically accepts that the 
approach to freedom should be based upon the concept of equality - with inequalit-. ý 
only acceptable if it benefits the least well off. This implies that Rawls accepts that you 
could restrict freedom if a person, by using his freedom, was undermining or 
disenfranchising another person's freedom. 'Ibus, if freedom of expression for white 
(or black) racists means that they will use that freedom to undern-une the freedom of 
others - society would be justified in limiting the freedom of those racists - i. e. so as to 
benefit the freedoms of those who may be unequal. 
Rawls argues that justice needs to be founded upon equality and/or his idea of equalm- 
of opportunity that follows a 'difference principle'. In contrast, Rousseau advocates a 
wgeneral will' theory that is intuitively linked to core principles of freedom and equality 
emanating from his state of nature. Central to both philosophies is a social contract 
ffieory -a cornerstone of which is again freedom and equality. If we take Dworkin's 
suggestion that we can view this hypothetical social contract as a device for teasing out 
the implications of certain moral premises concerning people's moral equality, we can 
see the philosophical value of the exercise. However, for this exercise to become of real 
value to d-iis thesis we need to establish that contemporary society does intuitively accept 
the principle of equality. 
The concept of equality in contemporajy law. 
TTie concept of equality in contemporan- law can be found ii-i the United Nations 
, gs are 
bom Declaration of Human Rýýhts- Under -Article 
I it emphasises: A// bumaii behi 
y and iigbts' free and equal in di gnit 
'Me very concept of a principle of equality can also be found within the common law. 
For example, Dicev has argued 67 that the Rule of Law requires formal equality" thus 
67'7he Lam, ýf Me Conshhdion'- Mamulm, London (10di edition) 1959. 
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prohibiting laws from being enforced unequally. Although, as jowell suggested, this 
does not require substantive equality, since it does not prohibit unequal laws being 
enacted by Parliament. 69 
Jowell also argues, citing Dwork-m '70 that the notion of equal worth is a 
fundamental 
precept of our constitution, with his argument being based upon the Principle that the 
concept of equality requires government not to treat people unequally without 
justification. just like free speech, this is a principle that derives from the very nature of 
democracy itself, because basic to democracy IS the requirement that every citizen has an 
equal vote, and therefore an equal opportunity to influence the composition of 
government. 
Further, while the UK does not have a written constitution, it is clear that the principle 
of equal treatment can be found in the directly effective Treaty of Rome" - i. e. in 
relation to discrimination on the grounds of nationality, " and 'in pay on the grounds of 
sex. " It is also clear, from the case of Nold, " that the European Court of justice cannot 
uphold measures that are incompatible with fundamental rights and subsequent cases 
have accepted that the European Convention on Human Rights has a special 
significance in this respect. The Maastricht Treaty states that the Union sball respect 
.y 
the European Convention ... are general ptincoles of law. "7' fundamental iights, as guaranteed b 
Since Article 14 of the ECHR outlaws discrin-unation on a number of grounds including 
sex, race colour, language, and religion, it follows that in cases where Community law Is 
directly effective, equality of this kind - i. e. preventing discrimination without objective 
1,8 'Formal equality' means that no person is exempt from the enforcement of the law, rich and poor, revenue official 
and individual taxpayer, are all within the equal reach of the arm of the law Uowell at page 4- see next footnote for 
reference). 
69 'Is Equalio a Constitutional Prindple? '- Professor Jeffrey Jowell - Current Legal Problems (1994) p. l.. By illustration, 
he suggests that the rule of law may constrain racially biased enforcement of laws, but could not inhibit apartheid- 
style laws from being enacted by Parliament. 
70 Ronald Dworkin, Equaliýy, Demoaag and the Constitution'(1 9901 Alberta L. Rev 324, 
71 Now see 'Fhefreaýy on European Union 199Y (the Maastricht Treaty). 
72 Article 7. 
-13 Article 119. Note that Bayefsky has also said that non-discrimination and equality are simply different %ays of 
saying the same thing [1990] 11 HRLj 1. 
74 Nold v Commission Case 4/73 [19741 ECR 491. 
75 Article F(2). 
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61 Ulill. 
76 1 
justification -maybe the general mill, or at least afundamental , withmEurope. While 
this may suggest a hesitant formulation by cross-reference, it is important to reflect that 
most European nations have also shown a commitment to the European Convention 
on Human Rights by incorporating it into their domestic laws. The UK government are 
signatories and also legislated to incorporate the ECHR into domestic law. 77 
To this extent, it can be seen that the concept of equality under the law, within its 
differing guises of formal equality, substantive equalityý equal treatment, equal worth, and 
equal opportunity, is well founded within our contemporary European laws. Applying 
jowell's argument that its apparent violation will provoke strong questioning, and require 
rational justification, it suggests that a concept of equality holds a place within the heart 
and soul of individuals within society. The principle of equality may be abused and/or 
breached by a particular will, but such abuse is likely to be questioned from within. This 
may indeed equate to the argument that a concept of equality, under the law, typifies the 
general will of society. It IS certainly fundamental to our legal system. This does not 
mean that equality exists within society, or ffiat the laws on equal treatment have always 
been respected. It does, however, suggest that in applying Rousseau's theory, man may 
be claiming his freedom within the restraints of a developed political society. 
Possibly the strongest argument against the concept of equality through racial tolerance 
reflecting the general VVIII of society, is that for century after century, society has not 
recognised the value of anti-discrimination laws. Indeed, it is only in the latter half of 
this century that man has introduced laws that tackle inequality. 
An obvious explanation for man's recognition of the value of laws that reflect racial 
tolerance, can be found in the way that society responded after the Second World War. 
In the aftermath of the horrific ugliness of a war - which produced Nazi concentration 
camps and came to a conclusion through the use of an atorruic bomb - the United 
Nations" developed a Universal Declaration of Human Itights, taking this further in 
1965 with the CERD Convention. The self-evident purpose of these conventions was 
76 For a fuller consideration of the argument that Article 14 is a fundamental aspect of the ECHR see Chapter Five 
and the section 'Compatibilio nith the Contention on Human Rýohts. 
77 Human Rights Act 1998. For a summary of its proposals see 'Incorporating Human Rights - thepmeess begins'by Philip 
Leach 
, 
Legal Officer of Liberty - [1997] NLJ 1595. See also in this thesis, Chapter Five. And the section Compafib&* 
aitl) 11ye Contention on Human W)ts. 
T, 'The CE RD Convention' - see Chapter Four of this thesis. 
195 
to try and hrrUt the potential for national and international conflicts by dealing with Its 
source - which is racial intolerance. As remarked by Schwelb 
79 and Partsch, " the revival 
of anti-SernItism and apartheid also contributed towards the decision to establish the 
CERD convention in the 1960s. 
Thus, in order to prevent racial disagreements developing into war - and the possible 
destruction of mankind via nuclear weapons - man has concluded that limiting racial 
intolerance is important, since he cannot survive as a ravenous beast in a society of 
conflict. In almost Hobbesian fashion, he has concluded that a social contract IS better 
than a death through conflict. In doing this, man is seeking characteristics found within 
the state of nature depicted by Rousseau - i. e. developing a society built upon a state of 
equality and freedom. " Thus, the aim being, perhaps subconscloushl, to free himself 
from the chains of any particular racist Will and move towards his own inner freedom. 
These inner freedoms only being possible when he can live free of fear of violence from 
other men. Thus the general will of society is evidenced in man's desire for survival, 
through recognition of a social contract which typifies equality through racial tolerance. 
An overaH analysis. 
A great deal of this thesis has taken a positivist approach, in that I have sought to 
observe what really exists within the data of experience. I have also sought to look 
behind what really exists in order to find a philosophical basis for changing the law so 
that those who produce '=ialyl offensive' material, which can stir up racial hatred or 
discrimination, may not continue to be immune from the rigours of the law. The 
proposals for counter-speech involve using the law to educate society as to the values of 
the 'Social Contract' that our political leaders (in keeping with the general will) have 
determined are of Importance - Le. a corrinutment to equality through racial tolerance. 
In conflict With this ideal, Sumner argues that stateways cannot change folkways. 
Lo ically, this theory is flawed given that the state regularly introduces legislation that 91 1 
71 S Schwelb - The International Convention on the Elimination of AZ? Forms of Raial Dismmination, - Int and Conip Law 
Quarterly 996,997 [1966]. 
'peech 
and Fluman Ri hts' Partsch - RL&ial S9- in 'Sfiiking a Balance'by Sandra Cohver. 
This equates to Rousseau's state of nature. 
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impinges upon the traditional folkways of societ-y-82 Sumner's theory has Justifiably been 
criticised, bv Monson and Friedman, for being conservative and codifying existing 
mores. An illustration of this is that, in a multi-cultural societv, an over-reliance on 
existing mores can result in disagreement due to the desire of people to follow the 
mores of their race - despite a possible conflict with mores from another race. 'ýýIle 
the outcome may be that indigenous mores will prevail, it is possible this will add to aný 
conflicts between the races. 
However, I do accept Sumner's premise that certain elements existing within society 
cannot be changed by stateways. I believe this is limited to folkways that are, and 
remain to be, consistent with the general will evident within society. Accordingly, I 
would argue that a general Will of society can be determined from Rousseau's argument 
that A men are by nature equal, With society signing up, via the United Nations, to a 
Social Contract that promotes racial tolerance and accepts that human beings are bom 
free and equal in dignity and rights. It follows, from this argut-nent, that man will 
rationally recognise laws that relate to, or are synonymous With, this ideal. Should any 
individual reject this general will within society, he will recogniSe from his inner self the 
counter arguments, and thus society may be justified in forcing him to be free - i. e. to 
recognise his own conscience from within. 
Clearly the concept of using force may appear, at first instance, to be anti-libertarian. 
However, the force, in this instance, is not a means of denying the individual the 
freedom to explore and examine racist views and thoughts. Rather, It Is to enhance the 
freedom of others by giviirig them a choice as to whether or not they Wish to read 
material that is 'rwial# offensive'and in conflict with the general will evident within society. 
Ibis counter speech proposal should not conflict with the concept of the freedom of 
the individual as espoused by John Stuart All - since it enhances the freedom of the 
reader, without denying the freedom of the publisher/distributor to express his views. 
Thus, arguments for counter speech legislation are centred upon the freedom of the 
individual within a democracy - i. e. accepting the rights and entitlements of others. 
1-' Illustrations of this were gix-cii earlier in this chapter and included reference to the Sex and Race Discrimination 
legislation, vith particular reference to changes in property 13ws a-hich have enabled women to become more 
emancipated as property oNvners. 
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1he net result of counter speech legislation is that, by its application, it will perform an 
educational ftinction. Indeed, William Evan has argued that in various forms the law is 
always involved in a continual process of education, with his hypothetical continuum 
suggesting if the educational task is not accomplished, a situation arises in which 
individuals are obliged to obey a law at the threat of punishment - while not believing in 
it. 'MIS situation should not arise with a law which conforms in principle to the general 
will. However, a government committed to the ideals of democracy, and equality of 
opportunity through racial tolerance, needs to do more than simply pass legislation - it 
needs to continue the educational process so that its laws become recogniSed and 
accepted within society. 
The counter-message proposals - sex and rehgion. 
In theory, if the anti-racist counter-message proposals are applicable for tackling rnilitant 
racism, the approach could equally be applied to other areas - such as sex or religion. 
For example, any material that gives sexual offence, and is intended/likely to stir up 
hatred, could be subject to the same requirements - i. e. it provides grounds for a 
crin-unal offence unless an appropriate counter-message is displayed alongside. 
Ibis approach would appear to be consistent with the combined 'General Will/Social 
Contract' theory advanced in this chapter. That is, with the UN Declaration on Human 
ftights, insisting that all human beings are bom free and equal in dignity and rights" - 
without distinction of any kind such as, inter alia, race, sex and religion. " However, I 
would argue, so far as the UK is concerned, society is more troubled by issues of race. 
Evidence of this comes from the fact that Parliament has legislated to tackle race and 
sex discrin-unation in civil terms, " but it is only for race and religion (religion in 
Northern 1reland only) that a criminal offence"' has been determined for incitement to 
hatred. Obviously, this decision of Parliament reflects a political judgement based upon 
priorities. But this seen-is a reasonably sound judgement, given that there is no firm 
83 Article 1. 
', 4 Article 2. 
85 Race Relations Act 1976 and Sex Disciimination Act 1975. 
ý6 Part III of the Public Order Act 1986 and Prevention of Incitement to Racial Hatred (Northern Ireland) Act 1970 
as amended by Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 and Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987. 
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evidence of incitement to sexual hatred 87 to justify crin-unal legislation. Likewise, so far 
as England & Wales are concerned, there is no firm evidence of organised religious 
hatred. "' While in Northern Ireland, despite prima facie evidence of religious hatred, 
there has not been one single prosecution, under public order legislation, for incitement 
to religious hatred. " 
Clearly, this thesis has primarily examined the criminal law and ways of tackling n-ýIitant 
racism. lt has not been directly concerned with discrimination law and civil remedies. 
Also, I have only commented upon religion in a comparative sense and when it is 
possible that a racially based criterion is evident within religious issues. The fact 
remains that it seems possible to apply counter-message legislation for religiously 
offensive material that is intended/likely to stir up hatred or discrin-unation. However, 
this issue is outside the scope of this thesis, which remains limited to tackling n-nilitant 
racism. 
Conclusion. 
Anti-racist counter-message legislation suggests an educational role for the law. In d-iis 
chapter I have examined this issue from a sociological and jurisprudential perspective, 
looking at the relevance of philosophers such as Sumner, Rousseau and Rawls. 
The conclusion I have drawn from this exarnination is that the United Nations 
declaration that 'all human beings are born free and equal in dgnip, and rights' has an almost 
umbilical link with Rousseau and his state of nature, in which: 'man is bornfree and ýy 
nature is equal' From this analysis, I have argued that 'equalitV through racial tolerance' 
87 There is plenty of evidence of sexual discrimination sternming from decisions of many Industrial Tribunals - but 
this is of discrimination - not sexual hatred. Hový-ever, there is evidence of hatred towards people who are gay or 
lesbian, particularly from the far right groups such as Combat 18 and the BNP (Appendix Item 12 reflects a limited 
BNP attack on homosexuality). Ironically discrimination, on the basis of sexual orientation, does not amount to 
sexual discrimination as a result of a Court of Appeal decision in the case of Rv MOD ex parte Smith & Grady 
[19961 IRLR 100. Though, this approach would appear to run counter to the logic applied in PvS and Cornwall 
County Council C-13/94, where the ECJ held that dismissal on grounds of transsexuality was contrary to the Equal 
Treatment Directive 76/207 - i. e. amounting to discrimination on grounds of sex. Gay rights campaigner Peter 
Titchell (Equal R, ýhtsfor--W'NIJ [1997] 233) has called for the establishment of a new Equal Rights Act that would 
provide 'equal treatment for all' irrespective of peoples race, sex, class, religion, age, political opinion, disabilitv, HIV 
status, gender identity or sexual orientation. Noticeably, this did not include a call for provision- to tackle 
homophobic hatred. 
`, 8 That is unless vou include the IRA acts of terrorism as indicative of religious hatred. To tackle this there exists the 
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989. Issues of terrorism are outside the parameters of this 
thesis. 
"ý' For a discussion on this topic see 'Incitement to Hatred. Lessonsjivm Northern Ireland'by Therese Murphy - published 
in 'Slrikiýig a Balane'by Sandra Coliver. 
199 
reflects the 'general will' of society - with man recognising from his inner-self the value 
of this ideal. Indeed, there exists significant evidence to support this 'General Will' 
philosophical theory - with a principle of equality well founded within the laws of 
Europe and the UK, albeit that it exists in the various guises of formal equalin, 
substantive equality, equal treatment, equal worth and equality of opportunit=y. As 
remarked by Jowell, any apparent Violation will provoke strong questioning and require 
rational justification. 
Given the existence of such a fundamental or general will within our society i , it seen-is 
reasonable to argue that the state should take action to educate people as to the value of 
such laws and help rernind them of this general will. By introducing counter-message 
legislation the state would be attacking any racist particular wills, when and where thev 
may arise - appending to racist material, a message consistent with the general will of 
society. In this way, they will be inviting citizens to re'ect, and possibly turn away from, 
'racially, offensive' material that stirs up racial discrimination or hatred and is inconsistent 
with the ideals of society. As argued, d-iis would not deny d-ie individual author the right 
to publish his material and pursue his own particular will. Though, by reqwring him to 
display a counter-message, it would help him realise his own freedom through his 
ackriowledgement of the general will. 
Additional support for the principle of freedom based upon equality can be found in the 
contemporaný works of John Rawls. Like Rousseau, he advocates principles of equallt, 
based upon a social contract theory. However, unlike Rousseau, his theon- accepts 
inequality - but only in circuryistances where the aim is to benefit the least well off 'in 
society. TTie specific advantage of the Rawlsian approach, is that it provides a 
methodology for detern-uning any conflicts that may arrive between competing ideals. - 
with the 'lexical priority' used by Rawls being emphatically based upon each person 
having an equal right to an extensive system of equal basic liberties (i. e. compatible with 
a similar system of liberty for all). 
Central to both the philosophies of Rousseau and Rawls IS a social contract theory -a 
cornerstone of which is again freedom and equality. Taking Dworkin's suggestion that 
we can view this hypothetical social contract as a device for teasing out the implications 
of certain moral pren-uses concerning people's moral equality, we can see the 
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philosophical value of the contract theory. The argurnents put forward for anti-racist 
counter speech legislation can be seen as consistent with the philosophical ideals of 
Rousseau, with Rawls providing a mechanism for priontising conflicts that may arise 
between rights to freedom of expression and freedom from discrimination. 
Indeed, a Rawlsian would apply lexical methodology and conclude that an individual 
should not exercise his freedom at the expense of the freedom of others within the 
community. Likewise, the arguments for counter speech le islation are centred upon 91 
the freedom of the individual within society - i. e. accepting the rights and entitlements 
of others. Should an individual put his own private and particular racist Will first - 
society can be justified in forcing him to be free. 
RACIAL MOTIVATION AND HOSTILITY 
Cbapter 7. 
"Punishment has a point to it. Punishment is deserved Iq those 
, gatory norms of conduct..... who 
break obli 
These words of William Wilson relate to a crin-unal's liability for being found guilty of 
corru-nitting a criminal offence. In this chapter I will examine the possibility of the law 
further penalisirig a criminal, because in breaking the rules2 of society his/her conduct 
displays inconsistency with the obligatory norm concerning racism. In other words, I 
will consider whether it is appropriate that a person should be given a longer sentence 
for his crime because of the racism associated with the offence. In order to consider 
this issue I will first explain the general rule that motive does not normally affect liabilin, 
going on to consider its relevance in relation to sentencing. This will lead to my 
exan-unation of the government's proposals to introduce some new additional offences 
that will tackle any racial motivation/hostility while a crime is being corr=tted. I will 
also consider if the government could and should have taken a different approach, 
based upon ignoring motive and applying a race discrimination - 'butfor the race of Me 
victim'- approach. 
Ag eneral rule -'motive usually does not affect fiabifiW. 
A general rule of criminal law is that motive has usually no effect upon crin-iinal liability. ' 
For example, if I steal some bread to feed the poor, the motive is irrelevant. I have 
stolen, fulfilling the actus reus while displaying the necessarýy mens rea. Accordingly, I 
should be found ilty. gul 
. 
'Mis long established general rule emphasises that the law, in deterrruning guilt, is simply 
concerned with the act of the offence. ' It matters little, so far as criminal liability is 
1 Wilharn Wilson, t: ýiAinal Lývr'- published by Longmari 1998. Concluding comments to the chapter 'Punis1? men1'3t 
page 57. In this chapter Wilson examines retributive and utilitarian theories of punishment. 
' 'nie tel-iri 'rules' here is referring to laws. But it is also synonymous with the term 'noi-rn'. See the reference to 
'norm' in the '0. -, ýi)rd Nesaums'publihed by Oxford Uni\'erSity Press (1991). 1"his usage also seems consistent vith 
that applied by Wilson. 
"llie example which Clarkson and Keating give is that a desire (motive) to help the poor n-Light cause me to steal in 
order to feed them: this motive would be ignored by the 1qw: I would clearly have an intent to stea] and would be 
convicted of theft. 
4 Wilson argues "Cruni-lial liability typically hangs upon the establishment of some prohibited conduct, usually an act 
but exceptionally an orrussion, together vith mi accompanying, and concurrent, mental attitude. 'llie former is known 
as actus reus, the 1qtter qs mens rea" (Cm7imal Lan,, published by Longman (1998) at page 63). 
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concemed, whether Mohamed is hit over the head because he is a Spurs supporter or 
because he is black. The act (or aaus reus) of hitting him is sufficient, together with the 
intent (or mens rea). 
Sn'Uth & Hogan, 5 while agreeing with this general rule, point out that in some 
exceptional cases motive is an element of an offence. For example, in the case of 
blackmail, contrary to s. 21 of the Theft Act 1968, the motive of the accused mav be 
relevant in ascertaining whether his demand was unwarranted. 6 Likewise, as evidence 
motive is always relevant - since proof of a motive to commit a crime can make it more 
likely that D (the defendant) in fact did cornmi't it. Smith & Hog-an also point out that 
motive is important when the question of punishment is at issue - with the law giving a 
judge discretion in sentencing. Logically, a defendant whose motive is benign, could 
expect a more favourable sentence than one in which the motive suggests that the 
defendant acted out of pure greed - with little regard for the victirrýs welfare. 
Racial Motive and Sentencing. 
The approach of considering a racist motive in sentencing, can be described as being 
consistent with the traditional approach. In determining sentence a judge, or magistrate, 
is generally always influenced by facts within a case that may indicate aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances. These features can result in the courts either taking a tough or 
more lenient approach to sentencing. For example, a common assault on an elderli- and 
vulnerable person is considered more harshly than say an attack on a football fan. 
Likewise, attacks on certain categories of workers, such as traffic wardens, are dealt with 
harshly, since it is in the public interest to indicate the unacceptability of such attacks. 
In his evidence to the Home Affairs Select Conunittee in 1994 7 the then Home 
Secretary, NEchael Howard remarked: 
'11-hen it comes to passing sentence, the court can take all relevantfactors into account, I 
mould have little doubt that in an appropriate case the fact that an offence mas racially- 
motivated mould be or couid be relevant and therefore could be taken into account b y the court 
5 Criminal L.. am, '- 611, edition published Butterworths 1988 at page 78-79. 
6 Example: It could amount to blackmail if I threatened to expose A to the authorities unless he makes a chantable 
donation. I may not be liable if my motive was simply to compensate the charity for say some improper business 
practices conducted by A. Thus, in cases of blackmail, much depends upon the facts - \xith both fact and motive 
relevant issues to be taken into account. 
Para 80. Voltune I -fliird Report - `RaidAfiacks and Harassment'- Session 1993-94. 
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ght it appropriate, lead to a raper se ten e passed I think it is and could, ýQhg thou '0 nc 
being 
preferable to leave the disaefion with the court, rather than make it depend Ypon the 
commission of a particular offence. After all, if there is a racial element in the offence, that is 
something which would have to be proved to the standard of the criminal burden of proof - 
bgond reasonable doubt, lFhereas if the court is satisfied - without being satisfied to that 
same ewent - that racial motivation was afactor, it could take it into account in sentencinT. " 
These words of the Home Secretary show a rejection of allowing a jury to determine a 
racial element. It can also be inferred from the comments of the Home Secretary, that 
he has faith in the judiciary to use their expertise and discretion to analyse the evidence 
and impose a harsher sentence where they are satisfied that a racial motive is evident. 
This statement, of the then Home Secretary, also accepts that a person, found guilty of 
an offence, could spend a period in jail for a racial element of a crime that has not been 
proved beyond reasonable doubt. Possibly this is understandable to an extent, because 
judges in passing sentence, are always likely to be mfluenced by unproven perceptions. 
A particular judge may consider that the evidence suggests a particularly Vicious attack 
and pass sentence appropriately. Whereas, a different judge may take a slightly different 
view of the viciousness of the attack - being more lenient in sentence. 
Case Law -A racial element. 
The case of Rv Rankin & Irvine [1993] 14 CrAppR(S). 636 is an example of the courts 
imposing a graver sentence because of racial motivation. Both Rankin and Irvine were 
serving police officers convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm on a taxi 
driver. 
The two police officers were amongst a group of off-duty police officers attending a 
stag night celebration. They approached a cab and asked the fare which was quoted. 
They then asked how much more it would be to take five in the cab, rather than four. 
The cab driver said it would cost more because he was not supposed to take five and 
that he would be in trouble with the police if they found him. At which point, one or 
other of the group announced that they were police officers. The cab driver then asked, 
if that was so, why were they seeking to persuade him to do something which was 
contran- to the law. 
From that an altercation developed and Irvine proceeded to subject the cab driver to 
verbal abuse, callirig him repeatedly 'A black bastard" or 'A spade bastard. 11 He also head- 
butted the cab driver twice and kicked him. 
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At that stage, one of the group of police officers tried to bring the incident to the end 
by taking the cab driver away from where he was being assaulted. Despite a IuU in the 
attack, Irvine, joined by Rankin, proceeded to follow the cab driver and renew the 
attack. They subjected him to fiirther punching and kicking. 
At trial they pleaded not guilty, but a jury found them guilty and they were sentenced to 
two years' imprisonment. They appealed against sentence. At the appeal, the Lord 
Chief justice, Lord Taylor of Gosforth, remarked that putting all the n-nitigating factors 
that one can in favour of the appellants, namely their good records and their home 
circumstances, there remained a number of aggravating factors which the learned judge 
had to take into account. 
First, cab drivers are recognised as vulnerable to attack and sentence should reflect their 
vulnerability. Secondly, "there were the unfortunate racist overtones in this case. It is pqfectly clear 
that this attack was conducted to an accoVaniment of racist remarks, and it may well have received a 
good deal of iVetusfrom that sort of motivalion. That too i's somethiq which this Court would wish 
to recqgnise in the level of sentencingg. " Thirdly, there was the renewal of the attack, and 
fourthly, a lack of contrition shown. Bearing in mind all those matters, it was held the 
judge was right to impose the sentence that he did. 
In another case, Rv Clarke [19921 13 Cr. AVV-R-(5). 640, the appellant was sitting on the 
steps of a block of flats when Mr. Patel passed h1m. The appellant butted Mr. Patel . 
the forehead for no apparent reason, called him a Taki" and punched him in the 
mouth. 
At appeal against a sentence of two years' imprisonment, Hutchinson j held: "that the 
ghtly, took the view that the seriousness of this assault was learned recorder sentenaq him plainyl and ii 
ggravated ýv the raeiahst remarks .. fmm which it might be deduced that there was a racial considerably a 
motive in what he bad done. " The Appeal judge also acknowledged that counsel for the 
appellant had realistically accepted that that certainly was an 'ý7ggravafiigfaaor and that it is 
afactor which distinguishes the casefrom a number of other authorities heofuýly' referred to in his advice 
where considerablv lower sentences were imbosed " However, sentence was reduced to twelve 
months in light of the rapid recovery of the victim, with it not beinLy the gravest of 
attacks. 
205 
Both these cases show that the Home Secretary is correct when he says that the judge 
will take into account racial motive in sentencing. Indeed, in both cases it is evident that 
the racial motive is being punished. In Rankin & Irvine, Lord Tavlor made reference to 
'That sort of motivation" s aying, 'That too is something 2phich the Court nould wish to recqgnise in 
the level of senleneiýg. " Likewise, im Clarke, Hutchinson J. 'Deduced that there Uas a racial 
motive", which was recognised as an aggravating factor in sentencing. 
However, in neither of these cases was there direct objective evidence of racial motive. 
'Ihere was certainly evidence of the use of racialist words, but the use of words itself 
mav not be conclusive as to racial motive. Indeed, the words mav be used as just 
another means with which to hurt the Victim. 
In the case of Clarke, it was clear that a racial motive was dedmced from the racialist 
remarks. But, to what standard is the deduction established? Beyond reasonable doubt? 
On the balance of probability? Or just inferred, from an absence of an alternative 
explanation from the accused? 
Likewise, in Rankin and Irvine, even if you can establish a racial motive from the words 
'Black bastard" and "Spade bastard", these words were only used by Irvine. Despite the 
fact that Rankin did not make such verbally racist comments, he was sentenced, along 
with Irvine, to the same two years imprisonment. Surely, if the racist words influenced 
the to infer a racial motive - only Irvine expressed them. 7hiS clearly suggests that 
the racist brush of Irvine may also have tarred Rankin - With Rankin being guilty because 
he took part In an attack which was itself racist. While this may seem logical in terms of 
consistency of sentencing, it must be the case that two assailants, although both working 
together in conuYntting an offence, may actually have different motives. For example, 
the motive of Irvine can be described as clearly racist due to the language he used - 
whereas the motive of Rankin could be racist (due to his participation) but perhaps of a 
lesser degree? If sentencing is to reflect motive in anv accurate sense, it should surely 
result in differing sentences where the evidence more clearly irifers a racial motive. 
There may also be other issues in establishing the possession of a racist motive while 
carrying out a violent attack. Assun-ung a defendant has a racist motive and this is 
deduced from his use of racist words, what about the issue of freedom of expression? 
This especially applies given that it may be much more difficult to determine a racial 
motive if the attacker is silent. In the USA the Supreme Court has recognised that so- 
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called 'fighting words, "are no essentialpart of an e, %posifion of ideas, and are of sucl) sfight sotial 
valme as a step to trutb that any benefit that may be deriýedfrom them is clearjl outweigbed ýy the 
soeial interest in order and morafipý. " 
It is submtted that the cases of Clarke or Rankin & Inine both fail to give a clear 
indication of what constitutes evidence of racial motivation. If anything, they suggest 
racial motive may be inferred in the absence of any -viable alternative motivation. 
The Ribbans approach. 
The case of Rv Ribbans, Du=n and Ridle does pro ide e idence of racially vi vi I 
motivated crime from the facts of the case. Ibis case involved Mr Harris (black) and 
Nfiss Woodward (white) driving into a garage, on their way home from France, to bui 
some soft drinks. The three defendants by chance were in a van behind them. When 
Nfiss Woodward went to the kiosk they started throwing some chips towards her, 
shouting abuse including remarks: 'Nigger lover, hox canyougo with a coon? 11"q's meat. 
As she returned to the car, the van drove away briefly only to stop outside the garage 
exit. The three defendants got out and ran towards the Cortina of Mr Harris and Nfiss 
Woodward, kicking at the door and punching at the passenger window. At which point, 
Mr. Harris got out of the car and said, 'What's thepmblem? " 
The answer was, "'Cause jou're black. " Ribbans challenged Mr. Hams to a fight. Mr. 
Hams was grabbed from behind and attacked. Nliss Woodward saw a shiny object, 
probably a screwdriver, pulled from the jacket of Ribbans. Duggan joined in the attack, 
with video evidence appearing to show he too pulled out a screwdriver. 
Ridley left the general attack and got into Mr Harris's Cortina. He drove it into the 
kiosk and then reversed it over the legs of Mr. Harris as he lay on the ground. 
On being taken to hospital, it was established that Mr. Hams had been stabbed and 
suffered a significant level of injuries. He had a fractured skull and probable pen-rianent 
disability to his leg. 'Mere was significant forensic evidence available and also video 
footage of the attack from the kiosk security camera. At the flat of one of the 
Chaplinskyv New Hmnpsliire (1942) 313 US 568 at 572, per Murphyj. 
Ile Time- Law Report-, 25 November 1994. 
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defendants, there were racist stickers on the wall and a metal cross and chain inscribed 
with swastikas. 
The judge, at first instance, took into account the past Violent record of all of the 
defendants and the fact that they were all on ball at the time of the attack. 'n-iey pleaded 
guilty to a charge of grievous bodily harrn and the judge imposed a five-year sentence 
for Ridley and three years for each of the others. The Attorney General appealed 
against sentence on the grounds that this was unduly lenient. " This was accepted by the 
Appeal Court, with the following words of the Lord Chief justice, Lord Taylor of 
Gosforth: 
"Ve are of the view that the sentences were in each case undujl lenient. This was notjust a 
siVIe case of causing gfievous bodily, barm with intent of the kind which so often come bffore 
the court, where there is a &ýf encounter between one offender and a vi&m. This was ajoint 
attack ýv three men on an innocent man. It was racist in motive; it was protracted, and the 
effects weregrave... 
"It cannot be too strongly eVbasised ýv this court that where there i's a radal element in an 
offence of violence, that is a grave# qgrapafiq feature. There is no specific offence of racial 
violence, altbough it has been suggested that there should be one. 
IF e take the view that it is pqfectyl properfor the court to deal with any offence of violence 
which has a proven racial element in it, in a wa y which makes clear that the as ect in ests the Pv 
offence with addedgraviýy and therefore must be regarded as an agravatiqfeature. " 
1he difficulty in analysing this case is not in determining a racist motive, since the words 
used by the defendants at the time of the attack indicate a racial motive. " Rather, it is in 
analysing the words of Lord Taylor in the Appeal Court. He accepts evidence of a racist 
motive, but then says: 'Where there is a radal element in an offence of tiolence, that is a gravqly' 
aggravatiq feature. " Clearly, he is referring to facts that help establish the offence. 
Obviously a racial element must be part of the basic offence or assault - i. e. it cannot be 
independent to the offence. But, what exactly does he consider to be a racial element? 
Is it a racial motive? Is it the fact that the victim is black, and the assailants are white? Is 
it the use of racist language, and/or racial abuse? 
pursuant to section 36 of the Criminal justice Act 1988. 
When asked by Mr. Harris "U'bat is theproblem", the defendants replied "Cxise_rurblak. " There is also no other 
explanation for the crime - no theft, no preNrious contact etc. 
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Problems in relation to the standard of proof. 
Uie case of Rv Leane): '2 provides a classic example of the difficidties that can develop. 
Leaney, had been drinking a can of lager in Brighton. It seems ffiat Mr. Ibrahim, a 
Sudanese student, had a "Collision or brusbing of shoulders") resulting in Leaney cutting his 
lip on the can. Leaney, behaved aggressively, "Sy, earing at tbree black students and abusing 
Mem. "A fight ensued down a side street and Mr. Ibrahim was fatally stabbed by 
Leaney, with a knife he had bought earlier. At the trial neither the prosecution or any 
witness described the murder as racial. 13 However, on sentencing the trial judge, judge 
Gower, told Leane-\r 
"I am safiýfied that this was a killing petpetraled becausejou took exception, asjou san, it, to 
three black men in jour path, one of wbom brwshed a ainst g jou; and I bave no doubt that 
there was an element of racialism in wbatjou did. 
I accept that jou are full of remorse for wbat jou did, but that Cannot excuse jour 
conduct,... I our conduct in this case .... considered in the ii ght ofjour past record, Contynces me 
thatyou are a continuiý g danTer to Me public, and tqy recommendation I'S thatyou be detained 
for not less Man 20jears. " 
On appeal, Anthony Hacking QC, appearing for the appellant, subrnitted that the trial 
judge was un'ustified on the merits in finding a racialist motive and was in anv event j 
unjustified in recommending such a lengthy rrunimurn period. 
In the Court of Appeal, Lord Tavior aclmowledged: 
"It I'S true that thefincas culminating in thefatal stabbin g was between white and black men 
and there were some remarks made and terms used wbicb could bape indicated a racialist 
element in the bosfiliýy, but the prosecution did not descrihe Me murder as imial at an), stage of 
the tfia4 nor does it seem Mat anp, witness did so. It was not specýficalý, put to the appellant 
in a-oss-examination by the Cmwn that tbiS was a racialist murder. Certainil there was not 
the overt and single-minded racialist motive in this case that was, for exaVle, present in the 
case of Ribbans, Qui ggan and Ridle IFe consider "Mat even ýf Mere was a rwial element in 
the case and even alloxingfor the appellant's record, a minimum sentence of 20-years was 
I. nappropfiate .. and excessive. " 
By reading Leaney in conjunction with the case of Ribbans we can establish that 
swearing at and abusing people of a different race, culminating in a violent 
attack, is not in itself sufficient to determine a racial element. It may help 
indicate a motive, but it is evidence of a specific racialist motive that is critical. 
! --neTimes, I Ith April 95 - Article by Richard Ford. Also, case report -is supplied by the Office of the Lord Chief 
, 
justice. 
" Pre-tvial publicity suggested q rqciafly motivqted attack, though the prosecution did not make such claims. 
Solicitors ncring for 1--ang (Ms. Grindlev of Gnndlev Roberts of Brighton - telephone conversation of 13th April 95) 
have suggested that HIC trial judge may have been unconsciously influciiced by this ptibhcit\. 
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The case of Leany emphaslSes the ortance of the accused an opportunity to IMP 91 
deny any racial motive. However, none of the cases lay down any standard as to which 
evidence of a racial motive shotild be proven. 
Criticism of this approach. 
The Home Affairs Committee have been critical of this type of judicial approach - 
aIg that they do not consider it right for a 'udge to impose a significantly higher r9u`n II 
sentence for a racially-motivated assault unless there is evidence of sufficient weight for 
a court to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. There is no doubt that Leang gives 
considerable weight to their argument. 
Perhaps, behind the criticism of the Home Affairs Comrnittee, there is concern for 
justice being seen to be done. It is reasonable for the judge to determine sentence on 
the basis of objective factors, like the judgement of the jury, the vulnerability of the 
victim, the element of Violence used, his past record and any rnItigating factors. " All of 
these can be ob'ectivelv assessed, both at first instance and in any appeal. However, in 
the case of motive (i. e. M the absence of the defendant providing one), it is likely to be 
detern-uned by purely subjective factors bome out of inference. 
Balanced against this argument must be the need to ensure that the courts are indeed 
punishing aggravated features, such as racial motive. This concern stems from the fact 
that a court can only punish racial motive if it is being brought to its attention. It seems 
that both the Police and the Crown Prosecution Service work to the same ACPO 
definition with regards to identifying a racial incident. " Ibis Wide and all encompassing 
approach being. 
portiq officer or investigating officer that the 'Any ineident in which it appears to the re 
coVlaint involves an element of raeial motivation or any ineident which includes an alý, gafion 
of ratial motivation made by ang person. " 
14 In a case involving an admission of guilt it is generally die case that the accused is sentenced on the basis of the 
defense presentation - that is unless there are significant difference between defence and prosecution. At which 
point a Newton Hearing will take place. 
15 In the year ending 1997-8 the police recorded 13,878 racial incidents (Source 'Stahý& on Rave and the Criminal 
jus&e ýystem'published by the Home Office December 1998). 
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1his definition has been used by the police forces of England and Wales since 1986 and 
concern has been expressed that it is too subjective. 16 Despite such criticisms, it has the 
advantage that it IS not dependent on the investigating officer for determination that the 
incident may be racial, with it taking into account he opinion of Victims etc. Another 
key feature is that it provides a form of uniformity of approach across the police and 
the CPS. Although, it seems that the police and the CPS can differ significantly on what 
falls into this ACPO definition. For example, the CPS Racial Incident Monitoring 
Scheme for the year ending 31" March 98, signifies that out of 1506 cases identified by 
the CPS and Police as involving a racial element only 37% (557) were identified by the 
Police. 'Mis means that in an alarming 63% (949 cases), the racial element was 
exclusively identified by the CpS'17 with re ional variations showing that In CPS area 1 91 
Wales, the police identified 57% of the cases - while in CPS North West, the Police 
identified racial motivation in only 15% of the cases. 
Out of the 1506 cases where defendants were charged, a total of 182 were either 
dropped or discontinued at Court. " Admissible evidence of racial motivation was 
presented to the courts in 85.25% (981 cases) of the 1151 cases which were prosecuted 
within the time span. However, the CPS also highlight that in cases in which there is no 
evidence of racial motivation, there may be brought before the court background 
information to enable it to draw an "inference" that a case is racially motivated. 
Although this is not direct evidence of racial motivation the CPS claim it will "Consist of 
faclors which it is pmper to refer to in presenting the case so the court may make ajudgement on whether 
the case might be radal# motivated and in which it would therefore be proper to iVose an increase in 
sentence. " It seems this form of evidence vanes from case to case, but an example is that 
of a defendant facing a charge of criminal damage for throwing a brick d-irough a shop 
16 Para 6 and 7 of the Home Affairs Select Committee Report on Ra., id Affmks and Harassment, published HSMO 
1994. See also 'The defmition of a raial incident'by Peter Jepson NLJ [1998] 1838. In this article, I argue that the ACP0 
definition needs to be changed so that the police look for racial hostditv rather dim racial motivation - i. e. so as to 
comply with the requirements of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The Macpherson Report (published 15', 
February 1999) recommended that a racial incident should be re-defined to be 'A racisl incident is any incident which is 
perceited to be racist by the twhm or any otherperson". This recommendation has been accepted by the Home Secretary 
who has undertaken to ensure that the new definition is universally adopted by the police, local government and 
other relevant agencies (see Stephen Lawrence Inquiry- Home Secretary's Action Plan - published by the Home 
Office, March 1999). 
17 This is alarming, given that the police and CPS are working to the same ACPO definition and working with 
essentially the same facts. It seems strange that the police files should not indicate a racial element in such a large 
number of cases. One explanation given is that the police simply fail to tick an appropriate box on a referral form? 
Whqtever the ment, or otherwise, of this explanation it is clear such differences give ammunition to the chorus, of 
claims that the police are unsyrnpatlietic to racist crime, 
IL4 Of the 182 defendants, 26 had proceedings drooped or discontinued on public interest grounds. 
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window. The shop exists in a parade of shops, but Is the only one owned by an Asian 
shopkeeper (who may have had past experience of such attacks on his property). 
The CPS point out that of out of a total of 1324 cases prosecuted during the year, some 
1102 resulted in findings of guilt, with the court signifýing an increase in sentence due to 
racial motivation in only 27% of cases. 'Ibis suggests, at best, out of a total of around 
13,000'9 police recognised racial incidents less than 2.3% have resulted in increased 
sentences for racial motivation. ' 
It is possible that the judge or magistrates may have given tougher sentences on the 
basis of the evidence of racial motivation, but declined to give an indication they have 
done so - so as to limit the chances of a successfiil appeal. It IS for such reasons, that 
the interpretation put on the CPS data should not be regarded as anythirig more than an 
indication of the problem. What the data does do, is to confirm that onlv a small 
percentage of racial incidents, reported to the police, result in crin-unals receiving an 
enhanced sentence for the racial motivation associated with the crime. 
However, it may also be the case that the courts in these 1102 cases did attempt to 
comply With the directions of Lord justice Taylor, in Ribbans, but did not consider the 
weight of evidence was sufficient to Justify an enhanced sentence in 73% of the cases. 
This approach could well be justified in light of the further comments of Lord justice 
Taylor, in Rv Leang, where the lack of an 'overt and single-minded racialist motive' (as was 
present in the case of Ribbans), led to an enhanced sentence being reduced on appeal. 
What this may signify is that the Crown Prosecution Service need to do more than 
simply bring to the attention of the court any indication(s) of a racist motive. In order 
to obtain a graver sentence, the prosecution, where appropriate, may need to make 
persuasive efforts to convince the courts that the defendant displayed an overt and 
single-minded racialist motive. 
Iýhi the year 1996-7 there were 13151 racial incidents recorded by the police. 
It is important to recognise that the interpretation put on the CPS statistics is not precise and is prone to 
difficulties in terms of accuracv of data. For example, some of the 2. Y, o of increased penalty cases may not come 
from the pool of 13151 police reported racial incidents - this being due to the CPS disagreeing with the police on 
what constitutes a racial incident in W'o of cases? 
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Legislative Change. 
Following the election of a Labour Government, in May 1997, the new Home Secretan-, 
Jack Straw MP, set the wheels in motion for the implementation of a General Election 
manifesto conarnitment to tackle racial harassment and violence. It seen-is that any 
previous reservations of the Home Office, about tackling racial motivation were swept 
aside. The new government clearly Wished to "Send a stroq messqge to sociqýy at large that 
such [raast] crime is unacceptable and that it will be dealt with Peg seriously ýy the police and the 
courts". " In this sense, the government is intent on giving a symbolic message that says 
cany crime motivated by racial hostility is unacceptable and will be dealt With harshly bi 
the courts'. 
The Govemment approach - tackling crime motivated by racial hosdW. 
The government approach to tackling crime motivated by or displaying, racial hostilltv 
can be found in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 which contains a declaratory measure 
to make it clear that a court should treat a racial element to any crime, as an aggravating 
factor in sentencingý-' - stating how this has been taken into account. Thus, in effect, 
giving statutory expression to the law as it stands following the Ribbans-ludgement. 
In many ways, the legislation is a principled acceptance of the recommendations put 
forward by the Home Affairs Select Committee in 1994 - who argued for racist crime to 
be tackled through the use of enhanced sentencing where a racial motive is proven. 
However, what is unique about the Crime and Disorder legislation, is that the 
government is seeking to tackle not just racial motive, but essentially racial hostility. In 
effect, the legislation enables the courts to consider charges for racially-aggravated 
assaults, racially-aggravated public order offences and racially-aggravated harassment. 
Further, these racial charges will be in addition to the primary offences2' - so the courts 
will first have to deterrrune if the basic offence has been proven - and then decide iC-' - 
(a) at the time of committing the offence, or imme&ately, before or after doin k-j g so, the offender 
demonstrates towards the victim of the offence bosfifiýy based on the viefim's membersbo of or 
association with a radalgrou p; 25 or 
71 'Ramil I-iolenw and Harassment -A Consultation Doc-ument'produced by the Home Office Sept 97. 
22 Section 82(2). 
23 'Mat is, the basic offences without the racial motivation or hostility. 
'4 As per s. 28 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. 
2t, Racial group is determined, as per s. 28(2), by reference to race, colour, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic 
or national origins. 
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(b) the offence is motivated (xholly or partý) ý), boslifin, tonards members of a i-acialgroup 
based on their membership of thatgroup. 
Further, it IS irrm-iaterial whether or not the offender's hostility is also based to any 
extent on the fact or presumption that any person or group of persons belong to a 
religious group. 2' Thus, it will not be possible to establish an arguably strong defence by 
clairy Ming: "I was iYot behi / hostile -I was altackni )iv, - because he is a Muslim. ,g racialy g/ 
Assurning a Jury determines guilt of a racial offence, then a much higher sentencing 
tariff level applies (see below table) than exists for d-ie basic offence itself. 
Tableshoidag sentencing changes. 
Existing Offence Maximum Penalty Max Penalty for racial equivalent. 
Common Assault 6 mths and/or level 5 fine (E5000) 2 years imp- And/or unlimited fine. 
Assault - actual bodily harm 5 years imp. 7 years imp- 
Malicious wounding 5 years imp. 7 years imp. 
s4 POA 1986 prov of molence 6 mths and/or level 5 fine (ES000) 2 years imp and/ or a fine. 
s4a POA intent harassment 6 mths, and/or level 5 fine (P-5000) 2 years imp and/ or a fine. 
s5 POA harass/alarm/distress Level 3 fine - (! E 1000) Levd 4 fine - (E2500). 
s2 Haras Act 1997-harassment 6 mths and/or leve4 5 fine (E5000) 2 years and/or level 5 fine (E500D) 
s4 Haras Act 1997-fear volence 5 years imp. 7 years imp. 
sl (1) Crim Damage Act 1971 Summary 6 mths and/or max Summary 6 mths andlor statut max fine 
fine - Indictment - 10 years imp. - Indictment 14 years imp- 
'n-iis Crime & Disorder Act 1998 is clearly intent on penalismg racist crime, with section 
82 requiring a court, in considering the seriousness of any offence (other than under 
sections 29 to 32 of the Act), to treat racial aggravation as an aggravating factor that 
increases the seriousness of the offence. Though presumably this should not apply - on 
grounds of double Jeopardy - to sections 18 to 23 of the Public Order Act 1986 which 
are offences that already deal With racial aggravation, In the form of stirring up racial 
hatred. 27 
" Section 28(3). 
'7 Which pro6des the irony that the government has sought to ensure that racial hostility displayed in relation to any 
crime can result in an enhanced sentence. 'llie only exception to this being the crime of stirring up racial hatred, 
which rernains -it a fine and/or imprisonment of up to a maxinium. of m-o ve-ars. On the 5th j anuiry 1999 the Home 
Office confinined that the government were rexieving die level of scritenctug as- ., oclated vith these 
Part III Pulabc 
Order offences so as to -ctiý, this situation. 'nie Home Office indicated that the con-unents of judge George 
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For the Crime and Disorder Act 199 to succeed, it is important that two major issues 
are fulfilled. (1) The crime needs to be correctly identified as being mifluenced by either 
racial hostility or motivation. (2) Any race charges being pursued - with the case being 
dealt with in the appropriate Court. 
The key to the first of these rests With the investigative stage of the crime. To this 
extent, the ACPO definition discussed earlier in the chapter is in need of amendment. 
It needs to be amended because the current definition seeks to find racial motivation - 
thereby failing to require a police officer to establish racial hoStilitv . 
28 However, simply 
changing the wording may not be enough, with it being self-evident that police training 
is also of great Importance. Not only should police officers benefit from training to 
help them to identify racial hostility and/or motivation, they would also benefit from 
training in relation to the form filling procedures for the labelling of crime referral 
forms to the Crown Prosecution Service. If the referral forms are clearly and accurately 
marked up displaying racial hostility and/or motive - together with any evidence to help 
substantiate - this must surely help the CPS when it comes to pursuing racial charges. 
Secondly, once those racial charges have been laid, it is obviouslv vital that the case is 
heard in the appropriate court. Given the level of sentencing, this must mean that the 
vast majority of cases will need to be heard - often by jury" - in the Crown Court. ' 
1hus, in any 'pleas for venue' it is important that the Magistrates refer the case to the 
Crown Court - even if the case is one of racial criminal damage, which does not 
normally Justifying reference to the Crown Court. " 
Bathurst Norman, expressed while sentencing Atkinson in the case concerning 'The Starmer' (see '-\Ta, -i coulard's 
lerrorised Frank 13iiino's mother' Searchlight, October 1997), that 'Parliament has fixed the ma%imum penalty for this ýýe of 
offence as tuvyex-s. It may be that Parliament should look again at the adhitks such asyou and reconsider mhether the maximum 
sentence is suYuient - because in my it is not"lass resulted in a re6ew of maximum sentenceý 
28 For a discussion on the difference between racial motivation and hostility see below in this chapter. See also The 
aefinifion ot'a racial inddent'by Peter Jepson, NLJ [1998] 1838. 
2" Not all cases that go to the Crown Court involve a jurv. For example, if the defendant pleads guilty there is no 
need for a jury, but the case may still need to be heard in the Crown Court due to the level of sentencing. 
3"Racial harassment alarm or distress' under s. 31(l)(c) of the Crime & Disorder Act 1998 can be determined in the 
Magistrates Court due to a maximum sentence of a Level 4 fine maximum of C5000. 
31 This should apply even in cases where the nunimal crimmal damage threshold of k5000 means that the case can 
be held in the Magistrates Court. '11is is because s. 82(2(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 places the Court 
under a statutoiýy duty to treit crime that displays racial motive and/or hostihty as 'aggravating' and a factor that 
increaýes the seriousness of the offence. See TackZuýg M&tant Racism'published by Peter Jepson (15 August 1998) - 
littp: /iliomszpaW. s. nationuýdeiT. net/-igpson/militxit. litin, 
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Role of the jugy. 
What is interesting about the new offences, created to tackle racial violence and hostilitv, 
is that the issue of determining racial motivation /hostilin- is, in general, being removed 
from the judge. If a defendant pleads guilty to, or is found guilty of, a racial offence the 
judge would be statutorily bound to use his discretion to impose a suitable sentence in 
keeping with the new harsher sentence pohcy. Obviously, the judge will have a large 
element of discretion, but given the obligation to penaliSe racial crime it seen-is likely that 
any sentence imposed could be expected to exceed that which is generally available for 
the basic offence. 'Mus, if a person is found guilt of a racial common assault s/he 
should be given a tougher sentence than for common assault. 
The question of whether a defendant is guilty or innocent of a racial crin-ninal offence, 
will be left to a jury to determine beyond reasonable doubt. They will need to be 
satisfied that (a) that he has the actus reus and mens rea for the basic offence. If they are 
satisfied that the defendant is guilty of the basic offence, they will need to consider (b) - 
the alternative more serious verdict that at, or around the time of the basic offence, the 
offender demonstrated racial hostility, or that the motivation for the offence was racial 
hostility. 
It follows that a consequence of this decision is that the judge will in effect be bound by 
the decision of the jury. If the jury detern-une, from the facts before the court, that 
racial motive and/or hostility was present, he will have the responsibility of passing 
sentence in accord with the decision of the jury. 
Because most cases would be determined on the facts, it seems unlikely it will be easy to 
establish grounds for appeal. " Terms, such as 'racial hostility', will be left to the jury to 
determine on the basis of a natural meaning, with ordinary everyday dictionary 
definitions applicable. 
However, such findings of guilt, on the basis of fact, does not mean the jury would 
always obtain the absolutely correct resLflt. Indeed, there are dangers that a Jun' - faced 
with a lack of objective evidence as to racial motive and hostility - may Infer gat from 
;2 'nus does not rnc-; ai that there will fewer appeals - it certainly seems likely, at least for the first few years after 
introduction, that there could be an influx of appeals from defendants who believe that the judge has used his 
discretion harshly in determining an appropriate sentence. 
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the scarcity of evidence available. As such, the directions to the jury would need to be 
carefully worded with a clear instruction from the judge that proof beyond reasonable 
doubt is necessary. Indeed, unless this is fully understood by the jury. n-niscarriages of 
justice could well become a feature of this legislation. 
Racial motivation and hosfift - an easier threshold to tuffid than Ribbans. 
It seems clear that s. 28 of the Crime and Disorder Act establishes a threshold that is 
easier for the prosecution to fulfil than existed under the terms of Ribbans. To make this 
point, I refer back to the case Rv L-eany, which was discussed earlier in this chapter and 
involved the defendant stabbing a Sudanese student after swearing at black students and 
abusing them - with a 20-year sentence being imposed for murder. At the appeal 
against sentence, Lord justice Taylor acknowledged grounds because, mter alia, 'There 
was not the overt and sin C, re , gle-minded rmialist motive 
in this ase that was, for exatVie, 
_p 
sent in the 
case of Ribbans, Dugean and RLdley. " 
Should Leang have been dealt with under the terms of the Crime and Disorder Act 
1998 it seen-is probable that the appeal against sentence would not have succeeded on 
these grounds. " This applies because s. 28 produces a threshold that is easier for the 
prosecution to fulfil than existed under the terms of Ribbans. Indeed, s. 82 statutorily 
requires the judge, even in a murder trial, to regard racial motivation and/or hostility as 
an aggravating feature in sentencing and to state in open court that the offence was so 
aggravated. Ibis applies whether the offence is motivated partly, or whol# by hostility 
towards members of a racial group based upon their membership of that group. ' Thus, 
there is no longer a need for evidence of 'overt and single-minded raciSn-i'. " 
Even if the judge is not convinced that the offence is partly motivated by racial hostility 
it seems highly likely that the facts, as produced in Leang, would result ma fmding that, 
at the time of the offence (or immediately before or after doing so), the defendant 
33 Ilere was also an iniportfuit issue that the defendant had not been cross-examined over the racist motive. This is 
of fundamental importance since it goes to the root of the principles of natural justice, Therefore it is reasonable to 
accept that the 1-2ang appeal may well have been successful on these grounds alone. 
'-' 
something Lord Taylor argued existed in Ribbans but he did not consider existed in Leane). 
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demonstrated racial hostihtv towards the victim based on the victim's membership of, 
or association with members of, a racial group. 36 
Difference between racial motivation and hostihty. 
As this also indicates, persons who may be found not to possess a racial motive, could 
be found 'Ity of demonstrating racial hostility. The case of Rv Cole (and othersý" 9w 
provides an example of the kind of threshold situation that may arise. What is also 
interesting about this case, is that it also indicates that while a person may not possess 
racial motivation, he could still be found guilty of demonstrating racial hos tdltýT. 38 
In Cole the victim (Mr Kagwi) was asked to leave a public house after it was alleged that 
he had blown down the neck of a woman. Outside the public house, later that evenln& 
the defendant Ms Cole said to her companions, 'There's that blooýv niger', ' proceeding to 
assault Mr Kagvn by throwing beer over him and smashing a glass on the side of his 
head. The victim was rendered unconscious and further blows caused him to lose the 
sight of one of his eyes. When people tried to help the victim 1\& Cole said, 'What do 
you Mink you are doing? - He's only a coon. Hare" cites this case as an example of a 
situation where there is no necessary relationship between nuking racist comments and 
having a racial motivation for the assault. Presumably his comments are based upon the 
assumption that the words used, although racially discriminatory, are not conclusive as 
to a racial motivation for the attack - with an alternative explanation being that the 
assault was due to Mr I-, '-agwl's conduct of blowing down the neck of a woman. While 
that rnay be the case so far as racial motivation is concerned, the racist words used, at 
the time of the attack, demonstrate racial hostility towards the Victim. 
lbus, if Cole had been tried under the tem-is of s-28 of the Cnme and Disorder Act, it 
seems probable that a jury might fail to establish racial motivation, " but find that racial 
31, S. 28(la) 
37 [1993] Crim LR 300. 
', ý Indeed asimple illustration of this point is that should Tom (an indigenous white man) punching Muhammad and 
say - "take that you black bastard" he would be clearly guilty of demonstrating racial hostility. This would applý 
even if the motive for the attack were not racial - but jealousy, with Muhammad being sexually friendly with Tomýs 
wife. For a more detailed --Analysis of this point see the article written by Peter Jepson The defini6gn of a rwid ineident'- 
NLJ [1998] 1838. 
N '4gislatkg -tgainst Hate - The 4gal Response to Bias Cnmes' by Ivan Hare at page 430 - Oxford journal of Legal 
Studies Vol 17 page 414.1997. Ivan Hare is a Fellow ofTrinity College, Cambridge. 
- Under s. 28(lb) of the Crime and Disorder Bill 
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hostility was evident at the time of the attack. " In these circumstances, the defendant 
would be given an enhanced sentence due to racial motivation and/or hostility - With 
there being no difference between racial motivation and hostility for the purposes of 
sentencing. It is obviously possible that in sentencing, the judge rnight wish to take into 
account the fact that the defendant had been found guilty due to the existence of an 
easier d-ireshold for racial hostility d-ian exists for motivation. However, parliament has 
specifically decided not to differentiate and a judge may have limited powers in this area 
- with any perceived policy of giving such leniency being open to challenge in the appeal 
courts. 
Problems with defining racial motivation. 
This analysis of Cole, emphasiSes that the approach to detern-nining hostility IS distinctive 
from that concerning motivation. In deterrnining hostility the legislation reqiures the 
jury to determine, from the facts within the case, guilt or innocence by applying an 
objective assessment of what happened at the time of, or immediately before or after 
comn-utting the offence. If the defendant demonstrated racial hostility - the jury should 
find him guilty. In other words they look at the nature of the attack and consider 
objective evidence like words used etc. From these objective factors, it is expected that 
the jury would infer, or determine, racial hostility. 
In comparison, a requirement under s. 28(b) for the jury to detern-une if the offence is 
motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards members of a racial group, based on 
their membership of that group, is much more difficult to establish. The only objective 
element within this, is a person being a member of a racial group'2 - the issue of 
motivation is essentially subjective (unless the defendant adrniitS a racial motive), with 
the jury in effect drawing mferences from the facts available. 
In the USA, the courts have had problems in determining racial motivation. Only three 
states, Nebraska, Utah and Wyorning, do not possess some form of bias crime law. " 
Over thirty-five states already have Hate Gime Legislation or Penalýy-Enhaneing statutes, 
where racial motive is a factor. However, this existence of anti-racist legislation has 
41 Under s. 28(l a). 
42 Under the legislation this is defined as race, colour, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or nation A origins. 
43 The miv deal vith race, gender, religion, gays and lesbians etc. See 1--gaislating a st Ha - The L,, 141 F-esponse to Ag w te 
Bias Crymes, by Ivan Hare, published in the Oxford journal of Legal Studies Vol 17 page 414.1997. 
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been more of an indication of the States' opposition to racial violence, than of a means 
of prosecuting such offenders. There have been only a handftil of successful 
prosecutions - With many failing to surmount the significant hurdle of a breach of the 
first amendment. ' Such has been the US failure of this racial motivation legislation, 
acadernics" have argued that the burden of proof needs changing - so that racial motive 
is assumed, unless the defence prove otherwise. Understandably, this presumption of a 
racial motive has been criticised as failing to fulfil due process principles, with a guiltý 
n-und being assumed. ' 
Indeed, such proposals, and arguments, have developed because of the considerable 
problen-Ls that exist With regards to the proving of racial motive beyond reasonable 
doubt. Ills stems from the fact that it is purely a mental element, with any possible 
evidence at best circumstantial. To consider this point, I will examine the US case of 
Wisconsin v NEtchell. 47 
Nfitchell had been to the cinema to see the movie Mississopi Burning, which contains 
several scenes in which white racists assault black victims. Nfitchell, a black person, on 
pPn leaving the cinema, remarked to some fellow youths: 'E)ojoufeel hyped u to mo eo some 
white people? " Seeing a white teenager nearby, he said, 'You all want to fUCk somebody mp? 
There goes a white boy; go get him. " The teenage victim was comatose for four days, 
suffering brain damage. Nlitchell was convicted of an aggravated offence carrying a two 
year sentence. However, the jury also found racial motivation in the victirrýs selection 
of the teenage target. Thus, in accord with the hate crime sentence-enhancement 
provisions, for racially motivated crime, this was increased to four years. 
On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that the hate crime statute 
contravened the first amendment, with pure thought being determined to be speech. 
Since free speech is protected, under the first amendment, it followed that so must be 
44 'Hate Crimes and the First Amendment'- Ian Loveland -Public Law [19941174. 
'! ' See generally Marc L. Fleischauer. Comment, 'Teeth for a Paper Tzg'er. A Pmposal To Add Enjbn-eabilio to Flmida's 
Hate Crimes Act, 17 Fla St. U. L. Rev 697 [19901. Also, see Note, 'Combating Racid Tl'ioleme A Lýgislafim Proposal', 101 
Han- L. Rev 1270 (1990). 
-james Morsch - We ProbIe)7. rqjMothv in Hate Crimes: The argument againstpirsymptigns of racidmofivafiýn' - 
Thejounial 
of Crýninal Law & Crýminoloff [19921 Vol. 82, page 659, 
47 485 NW. 2nd 807 (Wis 1992), cert granted, 61 U. S. L. W. 3435 (U. S. Dec 14.1992) (No 92-415). For a resume on 
this case see Malik, '[Fiswnsiýi Burnitýrg: Senlence Enhancement and the Freedom to E. %press Hafe'KCLJ 6 (1995-6) 139. 
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thought. In effect, the majonty concluded that the process of selection was not 
conduct, but that of speech. 
On reaching the United States Supreme Court, it was unanimously held that a 
defendant's motive was one such factor that could either aggravate or mitigate the 
crime. Accordingly, it was accepted that appropriately drafted hate crimes do not 
-violate the First Amendment rights of defendants - essentially because they are laws 
designed to deal with violent conduct. While this could not be stretched to encompass 
"ýibstract beliefs" the court should be able to differentiate between motive and abstract befifý. 
Mly not tackle racial discrimination and ignore motivation? 
Instead of tackling racial motive - and all the problems that ensue - the government 
could have taken a more stable, tried and tested approach. They could have simply 
introduced a two-tier level of Jury determination in relation to crin-unal offences 
involving people of different races. The first task of the Jury being to detern-une if the 
basic offence has been comn-iitted beyond reasonable doubt and, if established, for 
them then to consider if the offence would have been comrnitted 'butfor' the race or 
nationality of the victim or intended VCtiM. 48 
I will demonstrate the role and approach of the law by way of example: 
Suppose Tom finds Muhammad in bed with his wife and punches him 
saying. "Fake thatjou black bastard " 
A jury would first have to establish that an assault has occurred. That is, they would 
need to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Tom committed the actus reus of 
common assault while possessing the necessary mens rea - or intent - for the offence. 
Having established such guilt the jury could then be required to consider whether, butfor 
the race of the victim, or intended victim, the assault would not have occurred. The 
motivation for the attack can clearly be seen as stemnung from )ealousil, rather than 
being racial. However, the facts also show racial hostility was demonstrated at the time 
of the attack - so in theory a *- should find Tom guilty of the new offence of 
demonstrating racial hostility, resulting in an enhanced sentence. This outcome may be 
considered as being exceedingly harsh on Tom - since he is being treated, and penaliSed, 
4ý 'llie intended victim is useful in cases such as criminal damage, where the victim mav be the landlord whose 
property is damages, but the intended , ictim is the tenant who may be attacked because of his/her race. 
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as a racist crin-unal when the facts suggest that he was not motivated by race - but by 
jealous-v. 
Ibis result reflects the swinging pendulum problem of the government's new anti-racist 
legislation. On the one hand motivation of racial hostility can be difficLýdt to establish 
due to the opportunity of an accused to provide another explanation as to motive - 
thereby increasing the likelihood that he will be acquitted of a more serious race charge. 
While on the other hand - in the case of demonstrating racial hostility - the net is cast so 
wide that people who are not motivated by racism - but are essentially expressing a 
racist View so as to further hurt the victim - can and will be caught. 
In comparison, if the government had taken the tried and tested 'butforthe race of the 
victim approach, the 'ury would have more discretion as to the overall circumstances of 
the case. In the example of Tom saying, "Eike thatyou black bastard'; the Jury could 
recognise the racial hostility - but conclude that Tom would have punched any man he 
found in bed with his wife. As such, the jurv would be entitled to conclude that the 
assault was due to jealousy and have occurred irrespective of the race of the victim. 
Thus, on the facts, the jury could decide that Tom is not guilty of the racial element 
associated with the criminal assault. 
This 'bmtfor'proposal - which I will call the 'butfor the race of the Vidim'approach - stems 
from the method taken by the judiciary in establishing direct discrirruination in racial or 
sexual discrirrýunation cases. I'he case of James v Eastleig, _hn 
Borouý_, h Council 49 is 
applicable and involves a husband and wife, both aged 61, deciding to go for a swim in 
the baths of Eastleigh Borough Council. On entering the baths Mrs James was allowed 
in free because she had reached pension age of 60 for women, but Nfr James was 
reqwred to pay 75p admission because, although the same age as his wife, he was below 
the pension age of 65 for men. The House of Lords considered that 'butfor'the fact 
that Mr James was a man he could swim free of charge in the baths - with the authority 
applying a criteria which was gender based and therefore potentially unlawful. In this 
case, the charitable motive of the local authority was considered irrelevant to the finding 
of direct discrirrunation. Indeed, the court was not concerned with the motive, just with 
the existence of discnrrunation. 
49 p9gol IRLR 288. 
222 
Obviously, in any racial criminal case, if the defendant indicates that he acted according 
to the victim's race, colour, or nationality, it may be reasonably straightforward for the 
jury to detern-une guilt beyond reasonable doubt of a racially discriminatory offence. 
However, assuming that the defendant does not adrnit the assault was conducted 
because of the race of the -victim, it may be necessary for the jury to mfer guilt from the 
primary facts. This 'inference' approach is taken in civil law cases with Nell Lj, in KIng 
v Great Britain China, " providing the fol-lowing summary in relation to establishing 
direct discrin-unation: 
(1) It isfor the applicant who coVlains of rmial discrimination to make out his or her case. Thus 
if the applicant does notprove the case on the balance ofprvbabikýy he or she willfaiZ 
(2) It is iVorlant to bear in mind that it is unusual tofind &rect evidence of radal discrimination. 
Few eVlqyees mill be prepared to admit such &scrimination even to themselves. In some cases the 
discrimination will not be ill-intentional but merely based on an assuVfion 'he or she would not 
bavefitled in'. 
(3) The outcome of the case with therefore usually, depend on what inferences it is pmper to draw 
fmm the primag facts found ýv the TribunaZ These inferences can include, in appropriate cases, 
any inferences that it isjust and equitable to draw in accordance with s. 65(2)(b) of the 1976 Act 
from an evasive or equivocal rep# to a questionnaire. 
(4) Though there will be some cases where, for exaVle, the non-selection of the applicantfor a post 
orpromotion is clearjI not on radalgrounds, afih&ng of discrimination and afln&ýT of a dýfierence 
in race will often point to the possibiko of radal discrimination. In such circumstances the 
Tfibunal will look to the eVloyerfor an e, %planafion. ý'no eNplanation is then putforward or if 
the Tribunal considers the e4lanation to be inadequate or ansafisfactog it will be leTifimatefor the 
Tribunal to infer that the discrimination was on radaIgmunds. This is not a matter of law but, as 
Mqy Ljput it in Noone, 'almost common sense' 
(5) It is unnecessag and unhe45ful to introduce the concept of a shiftiýg evidential burden ofpmof. 
At the conclusion of all the evidence the Dibunal should makefindings as to theprimagfacts and 
draw such inferences as thgfeelproperfrom tbosefacts. Thy should then reach a conclusion on 
the balance ofprobabilifies, bearing in mind both the &fftculties wbichface aperson who cot*lains 
of unlawful &scrimination and thefact that it isfor the coVlainant to prove his or her case. " 
'Mis raises essentially two issues. One, the differing standards of proof between civil 
and crin-unal cases and, two, the relevance of the drawing of mferences in relation to 
criminal cases. 
50[19911 IRLR 513. 
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(1) Differing standards of proof between civil and criminal cases. 
51 1 Denningj, in Nfiller v Minister of Pgrisions, spoke of the degree of cogency which the 
evidence on a crin-unal charge must reach before the accused can be convicted. He said: 
'That degree is well settled It need not reach certatnO, but it mast carg a high degree of 
probabi#ýv. Proof byond reasonable doubt does not mean proof bgond a shadow of doubt. 
The lam wouldfail to protect the coxmaxýy #d admilledfanaful possibilities to dejkct the 
course ofjusfice. ýf the evidence is so strong against a man to leave on# a remote possibikp, in 
bisfavour, which can be dismissed with the sentence 'of course it is possible but not in the least 
probable'the case is proved byond reasonabk doubt, but nothing short of that will suice. " 
While referring to the degree of cogency which evidence must carry in relation to civil 
cases, Lord Denning said: 
"Fliat degree is mell settled It must cang a reasonable degree ofprobabifiýy, but not as bigl) as 
is required in a c7iminal case. Y Me evidence is such that the tribunal can say 'we Mink it 
more probable than not; the burden is efischarged, but ýQhe probabififies am equal it is not. " 
While this is accepted law, it is clear that at times the distinction has been questioned. 
For example, Lord Goddard, in Rv Hepworth and Feamle " once confessed that he 
had difficulty in understanding how there are or can be two standards. Hilberry J, in R 
v Martaý_rh and Kennedy 53 is reported to have said: 
"I personally have never seen the &fference between the onys of proof in a civil and aiminal 
case. ý'a thing is proved, it is proved, but I am not entitled to that viav. " 
Despite there being a practical distinction between civil and criminal levels of Proof, 
there exists some evidence to suggest that even within the limits of such evidential proof 
cogency there are circumstances where the courts consider that some decisions are 
more serious than others. 'n-lis can result in prosecutors having a higher hurdle to 
surmount on the more serious criminal charges or those carrying graver consequences. 
Some evidence of this can be found in the comments of Denning Lj, from the case of 
Bater v Bater: " 
It is of course true that bj our law a hiýher standard ofproof is required in aiminal cases 
than in civil cases. But this is suýiect to the quakfication that there is no absolute standard in 
either case In criminal cases the charge must be proved bgond reasonable doubt, but there 
ma y be degtres ofproof within that standard ...... So also in dvil cases the case must be proved ýy a preponderance of probabikýi, hut the ma degre re y also be , es of probabiktv within that 
standard. The dýgree depends u pon the su6iect matter A civil court, when considering a 
-'1 1194712 AJI ER 372. 
-12 [195512 QB 600. 
1,3 [1955] 39 Cr App Rep 72. 
54 [1951] P35 it p36-7. [195012 All ER 458. This passage has frequently met with judicial approval. For examples-ee 
Blyth v Blyth [1966] AC 643 at 673. 
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chaqe offraud, will naturally, requirefor itseff a higher degree ofprobabifio than that which it 
would require when asking if negligence is established. It does not adopt so high a degree as a 
criminal court, even when it is considering a charge of a criminal nature; but still it does require 
a degree ofprobabilip, whicb is commensurate with the occasion " 
What this conftismgly indicates is that, in practice, there mail be no fixed criteria in 
relation to a standard of proof in either civil or crirninal cases. Indeed, it suggests that - 
in practice - even in crin-unal cases the courts may display a degree of flexibility in 
determining guilt beyond reasonable doubt. That does not mean that the courts Will 
willingly deterrnine guilt beyond reasonable doubt when the standard has not been met, 
but rather that they may spend more time considering the issues in cases that involve 
longer prison sentences. 1hereby, the burden of proof may become more difficult to 
establish because it will be tested more fully. 
Inevitably this may mean that a jury will naturally be cautious when they determine 
issues like racial motivation - or whether 'butfor the race or nafionakýy of the victim'. or 
intended victim, the offence would not have been committed. However, this is surely 
correct given that longer prison sentences will almost inevitably follow such a finding of 
guilt. 
(2) The relevance of the drawinig of inferences in relation to criminal cases. 
As indicated, from the China Centre case, it is appropriate for the ciVil courts to draw 
inferences from the primary facts of any discrimination law case. Even in criminal cases 
it can be appropriate to draw inferences from primary facts and any failure, on behalf of 
the accused, to give a credible explanation can result in a finding of guilt. For example, 
if someone who IS charged with burglary was found in the hall of a house without 
permission, it is incumbent on him as a matter of common sense, though not as a 
matter of law, to give a satisfactory explanation of his presence, and, if that is not 
forthcoming, the jury will be justified in inferring the reqLusite guilty intent. 5-5 
It clearly follows, that in theory a jury, which has first established that a criminal offence 
has occurred, should after due consideration be able to determine whether that offence 
quire has been influenced by race. Irrespective of which approach the jury is re id to take 
(i. e. 'motivated by racial hostility, 'a demonstration of racial hostilin', or a 'but for the 
race or nationality of the victim' approach), they may need to draw inferences from the 
15 Rv Wood (1911) 7 Cr. App Rep 56. 
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primary facts within the case - but this is something that is already an accepted practice 
in crirninal cases. As such, there would appear to be no logical reason why the 'butfor 
the race of the victim' test, could not be applied in cases involving crirninal assault or 
harassment, With longer sentences being applied should this element be proven. 
It seen-is that the Home Office legislators when drawing up legislation to tackle racist 
crime, did consider this as an option. However, the "politicians"" 'in the Home Office, 
seemed to have doubts about making what amounts to crime conducted with - or 
through - racial discrimination a criminal offence. Instead, thev opted for introducing 
longer sentences for crimes that display racial hostility or are motivated by racial 
hostility. The only justification for this approach seen-is to be a political desire to avoid 
'racial discrin-unation' becoming a crin-unal offence, with the government believing that 
tackling racial hostility is preferable because 'hostilityý has a direct relationship to 
'conduct'. In other words, the government wishes to be seen as tackling racial conduct 
as opposed to racial thought. 
However, this argument, although initially attractive, is easily underrruned by the fact 
that the 'bmtfor the race of the victim'test is itself conduct-orientated, since a pre-requisite is 
a crinunal offence. 
Possibly one additional justification for the governments approach, n-night lie in the 
relative simplicity of the 'butfor the race of the victim' test, with no requirement being 
evident for determining a mens rea. It is subrnitted that this argument is again seriously 
undermined by the government's promotion of a racial hostility approach that 
concentrates on the act of demonstrating racial hostility and excludes consideration of 
any mens rea or intent. No doubt this approach can be considered as acceptable because 
the jug sbould bave determined the mens rea for the basic offence before they went on to 
detern, une whether the offence involved a racial element. This surely indicates that any 
objection to the racial discrin-unation 'butfor' test approach should not he with the 
simplicity of a test that excludes mens rea. If anything, a simple test that relates to any 
racial element associated with a crime should be welcomed, since it provides for a 
greater opportunity for consistency in the application of legal decisions. 
', Infonnation supplied by a Home Office source in -.,. A telephone conversation dated 14thjanuary 98. 
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Plea-bargainine. 
One disadvantage of the government's racial motivation/hostility approach, IS that the 
additional verdict method inevitably opens up the prospect of plea-bargaining - i. e. the 
defence seeking to plead gwltv to one offence on the understanding that the 
prosecution will not present evidence in relation to other more serious charges. This 
possibility IS enhanced by a desire on behalf of the government to reduce the expense 
of the justice system. " 
Normally any lesser charge cases, such as common assault and harassment, would be 
heard summarily in a Magistrates Court. However, given that the government proposes 
to introduce up to two-year prison sentences for the racial aspect of certain crimes, it is 
clear these cases will need to be dealt with by the Crown Court. " 
It is not just the trial by jury that would need to be referred to the Crown Court - but 
also the sentencing of defendants who plead guilty to the relevant racial offence. " Ibis 
must logically apply, since magistrates' powers are lirruted to cases where the sentence is 
one of siX months' imprisonment or less. 
At a time of financial restrictions being imposed on the judicial system, these changes 
could result in legal costs escalatingmi these ty I , pes of cases. 
For example, racial common 
assault and harassment cases could involve an appearance at the Magistrates Court, with 
subsequent referral to the Crown Court. Even if as a matter of policy all racial cases 
were to be referred to the Crown Court, the costs are greater for Crown Court hearings 
- with jury hearings lasting longer and often involving more senior counsel. Further, 
57 Officials in the Home Office have confirmed that consideration was given to including a proviso in the legislation 
that places the Crown Prosecution Service under a statutory duty to pursue racial charges where the evidence so 
justifies. This would have had the effect of ensuring that plea-bargaining is not driven bv financial matters, but this 
approqch was abandoned after the CPS gave to the Minister an assurance that they were fully committed to pursuing 
racial charges. For a discus-ion of this area 'Tackling Militant Racism' by Peter Jepson (15 August 1998) 
lin,: //borngp,, jM. s. nationni-eiW. iiet/-jgpson/mihtant. htm. See also 'Aen, Labour's attack on trial byjug' by David 
Wolchover and Andiony Heaton Armstrong NLJ [19981 1613 who argue that financial pressures have led to a 
government consultation paper - 'Deterniining mode of trial in Either-Vag cases' - on reducing the number of trials by 
jurý'. 
', 8 hi Oct 97, At -i joint meeting organised by the 'Society of Labour Lawyers' and the 'Society of Black La'ayers' 
Mike O'Brien MP - Home Office Minster - accepted that these racial crime cases will likely be heard in Crown 
Courts. He defended this decision on the basis that enhanced penalties are an important symbol that society will not 
tolerate racial Niolence. 
5'. 1 Part I of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 indicates that having heard the e6dence in a case the Magistrates may 
coirurut the case to the Crown Court if they take the view that the offence is so serious that a greater punishment 
should be inflicted than they have the power to impose. 
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while costs may escalate, it is also worth recalling that the number of convictions could 
marginally drop due to conviction rates being lower in the Crown Court (90.8%) than in 
the Magistrates Courts (98%). 60 
These figures, however, combine guilty and not guilty pleas. If we exclude those 
pleading guiltý,, it seems the conviction figures reach 75% in the Magistrates Court - 
compared to 59.9% in the Crown Court. What IS more, for reasons that are not 
apparent, a smaller percentage of convictions are found in cases involving racial 
motivation than in cases for crime in general. For example, the CPS Racial Incident 
Monitoring Scheme for 1996-7 indicates that 79.25% of cases result in a guilty finding. 
This signifies a drop in conviction rates compared to cru-ne in general. 
It follows that one logical outcome that may develop, due to the new method of 
additional verdicts, is that of plea-bargaining. Indeed, it would make both economic and 
judicial sense for a prosecutor to accept a ilty plea for say, common assault, with a 9W , 
sentence of up to siX months' imprisonment, than to risk an expensive 'lose all' racial 
common assault trial in the Crown Court (where chances of acquittal are greater). A 
Home Office research project confirmed the existence of plea-bargaining by lawyers 
with the following words: 
'The two mostfirquent reasons givenjor a change in adtvýe on pleas on the day schedWedfor 
trial were a bargain with the prosecution' and 'information about probable sentence' The 
mostfrequentforms of concession were that, in consideration of one or more pleas ofguilýi, the 
prosecution should offer no evidence, or agree to the defendant being bound over, on other 
chaqes. '()I 
Further, one of the recornmenclations of the Royal Con-=ission on Crirnlnal justice' 
would, if adopted, increase the amount of plea-bargaining by introducing the possibility 
of a 'sentence canvass' before the judge in all cases. 
Certainly the existence of plea-bargainmg has the potential of undermining the intent of 
establishing symbolic sentencing for racist crime . 
63 
It would do this because defendants, 
60 See CPS Annual Report for 1996-7. 
"'Riley& Vennard (1988) "Friable-l-'ither-ll--, ýývC-umCowtorMagi5fiatesCourf page 20, Home Office Research Study 
no 98 HMSO. To same effect see Hedderman and Moxon (1992) 'Magistrates' Court or Cro" Courts? Afoek oftryýil 
, kdsion and senAwcing, pages 22-24 - Home Office Research Study 125 HMSO. 
,, 2 Report Cm 2263 HMSO. 
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on advice from lawyers, may opt for pleading guilty to the lesser basic offence in the fiffl 
knowledge that a judge would impose the lesser penalty. Indeed, it should not be 
possible" for a judge in sentencing for a basic offence - that falls within the parameters 
of sections 29 to 32 of d-le Crime and Disorder Act 1998 65 _ to take into account 
aggravating features such as racial motive /hostility unless the defendant is charged with 
a racial offence and he is found guilty of that offence. 
The 'but for the race of the victimtest could prevent plea-bargaining problems. 
It is submitted that the 'biefor the race of the victim' approach also has the advantage of 
enabling the judiciary to prevent plea-bargaining. That is because in cases involving 
racial hostility there is an obvious recluirement for evidence to be presented. Whereas in 
any miter-racial case, considered under the 'butfor'principles, the jury have the evidence 
from the basic offence and could then simply be reqLured to determine if that offence 
would have been committed 'butfor Me race of Me victim' Accordingly, this approach 
could be applied in all cases - thereby underrnining any prospect of plea-bargaining. 
Conclusion. 
Within this chapter I have examined a number of approaches to penalismg a racial 
element associated with a crime. These can be loosely sumn-iansed as consisting of- 
(1) The traditional or Ribbans approach, with the judge treating any racial 
motive as an aggravating feature when sentencing. 
(2) The jury detern-uning a racial motive, with a longer sentence applying if 
proven. 
(3) The jury detern-iming racial hostility, vnth a longer sentence applying if 
proven. 
, -" 'I'his was recognised in the Macpherson Report, which recommended that the CPS and Counsel should ensure 
that no-pleq-bargaining should ever be allowed to exclude evidence of racial motivation. Note, however that this 
recommendation does not rule out plea-bargauung. 
64 possibly, if a judge were to be made part of the plea-bargaining process he could ensure that he used his 
discretion to impose a harsh sentence for crimes that display 3 racial element within the basic offence parameters. 
However, not only arejudges excluded from my plea-bargauung process in the UK/Britain, this seeins incompatible 
with the intent behind the Crime & Disorder Act 1998 since any racial hostility/motive will not have been 
established bNI a juiý, or a guilty pleq. 
,: Section . 29 assault 
(consisting of GBH, ABH and common assault); s. 30, criminal damage; s3l, public order 
offences; s. 32, harassment. 
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(4) The penalising of crime that occurs because of the race of the victim - this 
being established by utilising a 'butfor the race of Me idaim'approach, with a longer 
sentence applying if proven. 
In effect the government - due to concerns that option one was not working effectivelý 
- have taken a form of comprornise, by combining options 1,2 and 3. The combined 
model - found in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 - places a Court under a statuton- 
duty to treat as an aggravating feature crime that involves racial hostility, or there is 
evidence of such motivation. What is more, the legislation introduces a new concept of 
additional racial hostility offences with regards to assault and/or harassment, With 
enhanced sentencing where guilt IS proven beyond reasonable doubt. 
This new legislation appears to show tremendous potential for tack-ling militant racism, 
with the enhanced sentencing policy likely to demonstrate that racist crime is 
unacceptable and that those who commit such acts can expect to be dealt With harshly 
by the courts. 
However, this combination does present a worrying feature. Indeed, as welcome as this 
toughening up on racist crime may be, it is important to reflect that the anti-racist net 
may be cast tooVqde. Ibis applies because a demonstration of racial hostility is likely to 
catch a person who may not posses a racial motive, but - possibly instinctively - have 
used racist language to hurt their victim even further. Whatever the value of enhanced 
sentencing for those who commit racist crimes, it seems harsh to send someone to 
prison as a racist criminal, when they n-uy not have possessed a racial motive. For 
example, if we assume no racial motive exists, and D argues with V (who happens to be 
black) over support for a football team, punching and abusing him. It seems unfair that 
k g" than D could serve a much longer period in prison if he used the words "I ou blac pi 
he would if he used the words "I ýufatpig. 
Another problem, With the UK/British legislative approach, is that plea-bargammg 
seems an inevitable outcome as defendants may play the system by opting to plead 
guilty to the basic offence in the expectation that the racial hostility element will be 
dropped. 'Ibis could be overcome by the Crown Prosecution Service refusing to enter 
into plea-bargams, but this seems a little like resisting an incoming tide. To this end, it 
seen-is disappointing that the tried and tested 'butfor Me race of the ti&m approach'was not 
adopted, su-ice a court could decide this issue, in all inter-racial cases, thereby preventing 
plea-bargainmg. 
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This 'bat for' approach also has the advantage that it can be applied without the 
complexities of detern-unmg a motive. It has been tried and tested, operating with 
simplicity in direct discrimination cases. Further, it is not quite so restrictive as the racial 
hostility approach, since it enables a Jury to consider the wider circumstances of the case 
when deciding if the offence would have occurred but for the race of the victim. After 
all this is the very defimition of a racial offence - if the offence would have happened 
irrespective of the race of the victim then it cannot be a racial offence. 
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CONCLUSION 
Chapter Ei 
, ghl. 
During the period I have been researching and writing this thesis there have been 
significant changes to British laws that are capable of tackling racist crii-ne. Indeed, such 
has been the pace of change, since the General Election of 1997, it has been impossible 
to quantifý, and fully assess the value of the le islative chan . 91 ge 
Siggificant and radical reform. 
For example, the Crime & Disorder Act 1998 seerns capable of having a significant 
impact with regards to tackling militant racism. ' As I display in chapter seven, those 
committing racially aggravated offences can now expect a long prison sentence should 
d-iey be found iltv of racist crime. Indeed, the changes are not minimal but significant. 9W 
By way of illustration, a person found uilty of committirig a common assault could face 9LU , 
up to 6 months imprisonment. Bv comparison if additional racial charges are brought, 
and the court determines that at the time of comn-utting the basic offence racial hostility 
was demonstrated, then a sentence of up to two-years could be applicable for racial 
common assault. What is more, these radical changes do not apply to just common 
assault, but to a whole range of offences associated with violence. 2 Section 82 of the 
Crime &-Disorder Act 1998 reql-ures a judge in determining sentence in relation to any 
offence, to treat racial hostility - demonstrated at the time of cornmitting the basic 
offence, as an aggravating feature that increases the seriousness of the offence and 
therefore the sentence. Further, as a result of s. 82 (2)(b) of the Crime & Disorder Act 
1998, a 'udge is now under a statutory duty to state in open court that the offence was so 
aggravated. 
While the Crime & Disorder Act 1998 will inevitably make it more diffici-ilt for militant 
racists, its success is dependent upon the police identiýying a racial incident, arresting and 
charging suspects and passing appropriate racial details to the Crown Prosecution 
Service. As the case of Stephen Lawrence has shown, there does exist a lack of 
confidence in the ability of the police to identiýy racial incidents and it certainly does not 
help that they are currently working to a 1986 ACPO guideline definition of a racial 
P q1 sikmifies t inflit-nit r-icisml was defined in Cbapter One -iý 'ývmbafiyv md aggirsshv adion, ar adhi4, in sup my -a cause MAO' 
d rd p4 j oiher rwes. andpmmoles antagonism1hosl ilý toma speo ,o 
hqpter . -veli. 
A] ýo . 
be defimfion ýf a r6wial imi&nt'bý Peter Jepson NI-j [1998] 1838. 2 See C Se ee 'rý 
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incident which is inconsistent with the law as it now stands. As I argued within chapter 
seven, in order to fulfil the potential of the Crime & Disorder Act 1998., it is important 
that the police move away from this procedural requirement to look for racial motivation 
and start looking instead for racial hostility. There is a distinction between racial 
motivation and racial hostility, with the law now requiring evidence of racial hostility in 
order to determine racial aggravation. It, therefore, makes little sense for the police to be 
looking for racial motivation - especially since it is much more difficult to identify than 
3 the more objective criteria available in relation to racial hostilitý . However, the means of 
rectifying this anomaly is procedural rather than legislative, and it does seem that 
following an assessment of the findings of the Stephen Lawrence Public Inquiry the 
police will be required to make changes to the ACPO guidelines. ' 
As the Crime & Disorder Act 1998 demonstrates, almost every criminal offence can now 
result in a longer sentence where racial hostility IS associated with the basic offence. 
Despite such dramatic legal changes, there have recently been calls for yet more 
legislation to tackle racist crime. For example, in the alternative Christmas Day message 
of 1998 the Stephen Lawrence Family called for more crimes to tackle racism, in 
particular they called for a new offence of "racist murder". This plea was made, 
presumably on the basis that to murder on the grounds of racial malice should be 
considered as more serious than to murder on the grounds of malice? The justification 
for such an approach seems to be based upon that which exists for tackling racially- 
aggravated crime. It is a desire to send out a symbolic message that says: 'any aime 
motivated ýy racial hostilitv is unacceptable. " Indeed, in the words of the Home Office 
consultative docurnent, ' it is to "send a stmng message to socieýy at large that such racist c7ime is 
unacceptable and that it will be dealt with Peg senousyl ýy the po&e and the courts. " Despite such 
an argument, there is a danger that to introduce laws to establish a new offence of 'racist 
murder' could lead to a political backlash, with rnilitant racists likely to make political 
3' SeeChapter Seven and 'The defRition ofa racial imadent'by Peter Jepson - NLJ [199811838. 
4 The Home Secretary has accepted a recommendation of the Macpherson Report that the definition of a racial 
incident should be changed to 'A racist inadent is imy incident which ispen-eitxd Ag be rmist ýv h6e iiýAim or any otherp-rson " See 
'Stephen Lnvcrence Inquim Home Secretary's Action Plan', published by the Home Office March 1999. There is a 
danger that the proposed definition is too subjective and will result in many more incidents being classed as racial. 
Ilere is a danger this could undenrane confidence in die judicial process, since only q small percentage of these racial 
incidents will result in a prosecution for racial hostility. An alternative, and narrower approach, is to establish a racial 
incident which is based upon 'racial hosihty- this is more objectively determined andwould provide consistency with 
the racially aggravated offences established in the Crime & Disorder Act 1998. For a discussion on this area and isueý 
associated with a racial motive in the Stephen Lawrence case, see if-as Stephen Launme's mm-&r raiaLyl motivated'by 
Peterjepson, published hftp: //homepages. nation%videiM. net/-iýpson/motive. htm - 10june 1999. 
lWal Iiokmv and Harassment -A Consultatite Document'- produced by the Horne Office, September 1997 
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capital by arguing that this new law is evidence of a government that values a black 
person's life more than that of a white person. While in reahty this would be untrue, 
since a black person could also face prosecution for a racist murder of a white victim, it 
seems inevitable that such legislative change would be a hot political potato. Possibly, 
the strongest argument against establishing a new offence of 'racist murder' comes from 
the fact that there appears to be no logical level of sentencing that would justify such a 
change. In the case of common assault and racial common assault the deterrent 
difference in sentencing level is 6 months to 2 years. 6 Murder, alreadil carries a life 
sentence and the only practical means of increasing such a sentence would be to require a 
life sentence that expresses a specific rninimurn served. ' Ibis approach can already be 
taken under the. Crime & Disorder Act 1998, with a judge being statutorily bound to treat 
racial hostility as an aggravating feature which increases the seriousness of the basic 
offence. Accordingly a judge, in passing sentence in relation to a murder that displays 
racial hostility, already has powers to make a recommendation that determines a 
nunimum that should be served. For such minimal sentence recomi-nendations to 
become practice, a guideline or direction from the Lord Chief justice is all that is 
necessary. 
Do we need more laws to tackle racist crime? 
Ibis call for new laws to tackle racist crime clearly relates to the first questions I asked in 
this thesis - 'Do we need any more hms to tackle racist crime? ' The answer from my thesis is 
that in Britain we do not need more laws, but we would benefit from amending existing 
laws so that they can be more effective in tackling militant racism. Indeed, throughout 
this thesis I have examined a whole range of existing laws that can tackle n-nilitant racism, 
such is the diversity of these laws that they range from the Criminal Damage 1971 to 
offences under the Malicious Communications Act 1988. Despite such variety, the 
proposals in this thesis for legislative change relate almost exclusively to Part III of the 
Public Order Act 1986. For example, there are strong grounds for amending the Public 
Order Act 1998 so that person(s)' can become crin-unally liable for not just stirring up 
racial hatred, but also for stirring up racial discrin-unation. As I argued in chapter four, 
6 This was discussed in Chapter Seven. 
7 In 'Senten6iiýg & Criminaljllslie' (page 49) Andrew Ashworth advises that a judge makes -a recommendation -is to a 
.. urn life -entence served in fewer than 10'o of cases. In such cases the judge notes down the detention "necessag 
to meel the requiremenis of rehibuAý- and dete"ma ". 
The term 'persons' can be interpreted to include individuals and organisations (see Chapter Five) 
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incitement to racial discrin-imation can lay the foundations for racial hatred, thus a 
decision to tackle the stirring up of racial discrimination can be justified on the basis of 
tackling not just crime, but the causes of crime. Indeed, so long as along With these 
changes there are the necessary pre-reqLusites of Ybreat, abuse and insult'this should not be 
a controversial or problerriatic legislative reform. Certainly, such legislative change would 
be entirely consistent With the international obligations of the UK, in relation to the 
'International Convention on the Ehrnination of All Forms of Racial Discrirmination 
(CERD Convention, ' and the 'International Covenant on Civil and Political Rýights 
ýICCPR),. 9 
A number of other changes are also needed to the Public Order Act 1986. A small but 
illustrative example comes from the reforms of the Crime & Disorder Act 1998. As I 
have already shown in this chapter, Section 82(1) requires a court to treat racial 
aggravation as an aggravating factor that increases the seriousness of any offence. Ibis 
expressly applies to all forms of crin-unal offence, with the exception of that referred to 
under sections. 29 and 32 of the C&D Act 1998 and also (indirectly) sections 18-23 of 
the Public Order Act 1986. Ibis indirect reference applies because these public order 
offences are themselves racial offences and the double jeopardy principle means that it 
would be unjust for a judge to increase sentence due to racial aggravation - when race is 
already a key element of the basic offence. The Home Office has acknowledged this, 10 
and it does accept that in light of the increased tariff for racial offences there is a need to 
increase the level of sentence from the current maximum of two years imprisonment. 
One classic example of another necessary change to the Public Order Act 1986 relates to 
religious terminology that may stir up racial hatred [discrm-unation]. As I show in chapter 
four, under current public order laws a rnilitant racist can stir up racial hatred through the 
use of 'thmateniný abusive or insulting words' while avoiding prosecution because he applies 
religious tern-unology rather than racial. Indeed, although it is legally explicable, it seems 
almost nonsensical that I could produce a leaflet that said 'Attack a -Aluskmfor Chlistmas" 
and it could not amount to the offence of stirring up of racial hatred, but if I said 'Attack 
a Sikbfor Christmas "it would. Such loopholes that derive from le i lative boundaries only gis 
11 See (II. Vtcr Four. 
I I, In a telephone conversation of the 9th January 1999. 
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serve to unden-nme the value of British race law, and it is clear that change in this area is 
long overdue. " 
Tackfing racial offence. 
While these Ernited changes would certainly tidy up the law, they are not significant in the 
sense of widening the scope of laws that tackle militant racism. They would, as is the airn 
of this thesis, make it more difficult for a militant racist to carry out his activities, but 
they still make no attempt to deal with the distribution of material that may be 'ratially 
offensit, e'and stir up racial discrin-unation or hatred. 
Indeed, while I acknowledged from the outset that such 'radal# offensive' materials may 
not be directly responsible for any increase of racist crime in localities, I have accepted 
the community representative arguments that indirectly such material raises racial 
tensions which at times results in an increase in racial conflict. Accordingly, I have 
assessed a variety of racist materials that have been circulated 12 and reached the 
conclusion that a great deal of the material (that displays a person who can be identified 
as a publisher) is generally designed to avoid prosecution because it is neither Yhreatening, 
, g' 
despite the fact that an intent or likelihood exists that it would stir abusive andl or insultin , 
up racial hatred. Even changing that law, so that the stirring up of racial discriin-unation is 
an offence, would not dramatically adjust matters since the material is generally not 
clearly 'threatening, abusive or insulliq' '1hus, I came to the conclusion that, adding the 
term 'radal offence' to the pre-reql-usites would have the potential for nuking it almost 
impossible for rnilitant racists to produce nuterial that stirs up racial 
discrimination /hatred. While such a result may on face value seem desirable - since it 
would help fulfil my aim of tackling not just the crime, but the causes of racist crime - 
the problem with this approach is that it may undermine the concept of freedom of 
expression and could therefore be in danger of being found to be incompatible with the 
'Convention on Human Rights'. 
Compatibilfty with the 'Convention on Human Rights'. 
Despite this, the proposal to add the term 'radal ofence'to the pre-requiisites for a Part III 
Public Order Act 1986 prosecution is a central feature of this thesis. However, as I 
11 See discussion in Cl3ptei: Four. Also, see 'Tvkýg relikigus krminologv that stirs up rwýjl hered' by Petei Jepson, 
h Lvp 7//boinMagesm atimmi dei-,, j; V -net/ - jcpmm 1/ rtf! 
4ými. h tm 13january 1999. 
J" See Ch-Tter Three. 
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explain in chapter five, I do not lose sight of the fact that Incompatibility with the 
'Convention on Human Rights' should be avoided at all costs. This derives from both a 
desire to respect human rights and because, as per the Human RigLits Act 1998, a 
Nhnister is now statutorily bound to inform the House of Commons, in writing, if his Bill 
is incompatible with the 'Convention on Human Rights'. 1he probable consequences of 
which being, that any Bill that IS openly declared as being incompatible may still become 
law, but it can be expected to have an exceedingly troublesome passage through 
parliament. To d-us extent, I have sought to ensure that the proposals to tackle 'ra4ially 
offensive' material are reasonably compatible with the 'Convention on Human Rights', or 
at least are not Incompatible. 
The approach I have taken is to cushion the 'mcompatibiliW impact the proposals would 
have on tackling 'radally, offensive' materl 1 ising Ict 'al. I have done this by recogni i the confli 
between freedom of expression and the need to tackle 'radalyl offensive' material and 
proposing a form of legislative compromise. This consisting of 'counter-message 
legislation' which will allow publication of words that are 'ra(ialjI offensive'. so long as 
associated with the offending words is a counter-message that warns of the possible 
racial content and displays a message consistent with the government's anti-racist policy 
of saying No to Radsm' 13 Logically, any person who produces material that is 'rwialyl 
offensive', and which does not display a counter-message, could face prosecution. The idea 
being that thev would, if found guilty, be penallSed on the same basis as applies to 
material that is Mrvatening, abusive or insulting' and may stir up racial hatred 
[diSM'rnination]. 14 
Naturally, as in deten nrýmning the issue of whether material is 'threatening, abusive or insultiýT', 
there will always be a question of fact as to whether any words used can be considered to 
be 'racial# offensive' Obviously, the courts must be the final arbitrators of such issues, 
with my proposals arguing that this should be a question of a corribination of statutory 
interpretation with regards to "race" and applying a 'ordinary usage - natural meaning - 
methodology' with regards to "offence" " However, in order to help arnehorate any 
interpretative difficulties, I have indicated that there should be a bona fide defence - in 
13 Ilie exact nature of the counter-inessage in teims of its size, positioning etc has not been considered, but a simple 
clause thqt require, that a counter-message must be pronmently displayed on the face of any racially offensive material, 
or preceding any racially offensive speech imy suffice. 
14 'ýC-c Chapter Five. 
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relation to the mens rea - if any defendant could show that he sought advice from a body 
like ffie Cornryussion for Racial Equalitý- and it advised that a counter-message was not 
necessary due to the innocuous nature of the material. 
The counter-message principle can equally be applied to speech, though of course the 
factual evidence may be more problematic In relation to proof - both in terms of the 
racial offence'of the material and of the nature of any counter-message expressed. As in 
all such situations, the necessary proof recluired must be that of proof beyond reasonable 
doubt, though once that the prosecution have established a prima facie case of 'racial 
offence'- the onus will inevitably fall upon the defendant to show that a bona fide counter- 
message was displayed or given. 
While in practise these proposals can work, the big question about these counter- 
message proposals IS - Are Yhg incoVatible with the 'Convention on Human Rights? As I 
argued in chapter five, Article 10 of the Convention on Human Rights provides for 
freedom of expression, which includes not just the right of the expresser, but also of the 
receiver of the expression. It is thereby argued that the counter-message proposals 
enhance freedom of expression since they do not deny the right of the expresser to 
articulate 'rmialyl offensive'Views, while enhancing the rights of the receiver by effectively 
alerting him to the fact that the rriaterial may be 'rmially, offensive' 
The expresser may feel aggrieved that the counter-message may contradict some of his 
words, but all that it does is give an alternative view for the reader to consider. Possibly 
more importantly, the proposals give the receiver a choice. He can tell from the counter- 
message that the matenial may be 'radalyl, offensit)e', so he is able to choose whether to read, 
and risk offence, orignore the material. In effect, the counter-message acts as a forrn of 
government health wamm& without denying the freedom of expression. 
To this extent, it must be considered that the proposals are not incompatible with the 
'Convention on Human Rights'. However, ariv such doubt may be removed bv the 
decisions of the ECHR Commission who have generally declined to facilitate applicants 
who seek to utilise Article 10 to develop racist expression. Indeed, they have interpreted 
the ECHR in a way consistent with Anicle 14, so that a person can only secure his/her 
15 See Chapter 5 for consideration of this matter 
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right of freedom of expression, under the ECHI; ý if s/he displays no discrimination on 
grounds of sex, race, colour, national origin etc. Ihis Gfimmerveen appmacl)6 of the 
Commission being approved by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of 
jersild v Denmark. 17 noUgh, as I pointed out In Chapter Five, it is important to reflect 
when considering the contradiction between Article 10 and 14 (and my other Article), that 
the issue of proportionality is always a criterion that weighs in the mind of Courts of 
Human Rights. 
The two-fold advantage of the counter-message proposals 
Possibly, the counter-message proposals can be criticised for legislative form and 91 
fensive'material. However, the facts are that such material i already authority to 'racially oII is 
lawfiý under existing legislation and the changes would still outlaw existing racist material 
that is 'threatenin& abusive andlor insultiiýg' and which stirs up racial hatred. In fact, I am 
proposing no similar counter-message defence in relation to this kind of material, 
understanding that this should remain a criminal offence. Rather, the idea is to extend the 
parameters of the Publi Order Act 1986 so as to punish those who produce 'racially 
offensive'material that stirs up racial discrirnination /hatred unless they display a counter- 
message. 'Me specific advantage of the counter-message is two-fold, with a possible third 
dimension. First it is educational, In that it educates both the author and the reader that 
material which is 'racially, ofensive'Is undesirable and that society does not approve of such 
terminology. Secondly, it provides the receiver with a choice. He can read and risk being 
offended, or turn his back on material which may be inconsistent with a 'general will' of 
our civilised society - which now accepts, through the ratio of international covenants, that 
people should be treated equally irrespective of their race. 11-ie possible third dimension is 
that the very existence of the counter-message may undermine support for politically 
organised racist activity, with volunteer activists likely to be reluctant to walk the streets to 
deliver material which displays a message rejecting racism. 
A catholic priest 18 once expressed to me that, in his view, racism exists in all of us - "the kg 
Is I)Ow tl)at racism is managed" The proposals in this thesis are not, and could never be, a 
magical solution in relation to the problems of racial intolerance that exists within society. 
1( C-isenumbers 8348 and 8406/78 -see also the -section entitled'Eurýpean Convenfzýonfor the Pmtecfion of Human Rýhts'in 
C_b, TtL-r Five and the section Compafibzlýv uith the Contention on Human Rý, htf. 
17 19 ECHR 1, at page 28 -'fliejel-sild case involves die freedom of the press and media to report racist issues and will 
be discussed in more detail later in this chapter under Press Freedom' 
" Father Gerry Burke, Parish Priest of St Lawrence of Feltharn- 
239 
Indeed, the proposals simply improve the anti-raciSt laws of the Britain and therefore make 
management of rMlitant racist activity more effective. They do this, by rnal6ng it more 
difficult for rrulitant racist to stir up racial discrin-unation and or hatred. 
Equally importantly, through a form of educational process, the counter-message 
proposals aim to alert our inner consciousness into recogmsmg that we all need to manage 
any inner particular' feelings of racism that we may possess. Indeed, the proposals seek to 
help us all to recognise a 'general will' of society that says 'no to racism' 
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Bernard Manning material. Appendix reference: 1. 
Bernard Manning, addressing a Dinner organised by Greater Manchester Police 
Officers (source World in Action - 24th April 95). 
At the dinner, Manning, mocking a sole black PC sitting In the audience remarked: 
# "They actually think they're English because they're born here. That means if a 
dog's born in a stable, it's a horse. " 
# "Them Los Angeles police kicked that nigger on the floor. I thought that's not 
on... not enough police. " 
# When the police pull you up they must caution you. They say to you "You're not 
obliged to say anything, but anything you do say will be taken down and used in 
evidence. " 
Your next sentence must be, "Please don't hit me again officer. " 
But if you're a nigger, "again and again and again. " 
#A Liverpool docker went over to South Africa for a job. The boss there tells him: 
"These credentials, we couldn'tfault these. It's people like you we want over here. 
We have a lot of trouble with the blacks. " 
The docker says, "We've got afew inUverpool. " 
The boss tells him, "It's not the same we don't bother with them. 
So the docker asks, "Mat do we do then? " 
The boss says, "I'll give you a bit of a test. 771ere's a revolver, go out and shoot 
six niggers and a rabbit. " 
The docker asks, "WMt have I got to shoot the rabbitfor? 
The boss says, "You've got thejob. " 
Book Club items. Appendix reference: 2&3- 
Item (2) relates to the statement from a hooklet called Redwatch, produced. by Combat 
18. This booklet is sent, via a book club, to C 18 members and is not readily available to 
the public. 
"David Irvine, the historian, is causing quite a stir with his claims about the 
Holocaust. Our view on the Holocaust is if it didn't happen it should have; if it did 
happen its a pity they didn't kill them all. The subhuman Jew must die if our race is 
to survive",. 
ftem rom Redwatch, advertises: 01, also f 
"Zyklon-B - Over six million satisfied customers. Manufactured by Combat 
18"2. 
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W Ansch nd HantssmM - Vuhme 11 - ompm 1993-9c 
2 am Am Ie. bmftawý 
Anti-Semitic Material. Appendix reference: 8. 
Appendix Item 8 is an extract from "Another Blood Libel ... or Ritual Murder? " a 
publication for which Lady Birdwood was convicted under Part III of the Public 
Order Act 19861. 
"Bearing in mind the total Jewish domination of the pornography industry in Britain, 
could there be some connection between extreme janaticalforms of Judaism and 
paedophilia ? Study of the Jewish "catechism " the Talmus, may give us a clue". 
I we the limes, 17th Ocm*cr 1991. IA* bin*WOOd Isla Sieves a casiffitiosal 
diwlaroc *xr dis olfcocc, Tlive years later, in April 94, she was again ccnvicwd for 
offe, see un(kr *c mass, aL no msrý at Ibc age of at die was given a3 wooft suspended 
(Daily Wffror27/5/95). 
